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What procedures should officials use as a matter of justice when they apply and 
enforce the law or exercise discretion vested in them by the law?2 This is an impor-
tant question of political morality, since procedurally just treatment at the hands 
of officials is a precondition for the justifiable exercise of state power. Yet legal 
theorists and philosophers have paid surprisingly little attention to addressing 
this question. This contrasts with the extensive philosophical literature exploring 
substantive forms of justice, such as distributive justice and rectificatory justice 
(Bayles 1990, p. 1), and with the recognition of the importance of procedures in 
other areas of philosophical inquiry, such as meta-ethics and political philosophy 
(e.g. in the field of democratic theory). The philosophical neglect of procedural 
justice is all the more striking in light of the attention the concept has attracted 
in other disciplines. Social psychologists in particular have undertaken extensive 
empirical research on procedural justice in legal, policing, and organisational con-
texts. A central finding of this research is that people care as much about pro-
cedures as about outcomes, and that their understanding of procedural justice 
is shaped by relational factors, such as the attitudes expressed by authorities in 
interacting with them. The premise of this volume is that the empirical research 
into the psychology of procedural justice is significant. However, this research 
needs to be complemented by normative theorising that explains the moral sig-
nificance of procedures and makes normative sense of people’s concerns about 
relational factors.
This volume contributes to the field of applied legal philosophy by initiating 
an interdisciplinary exchange between moral philosophers, lawyers, legal theo-
rists, psychologists, and criminologists on the topic of procedural justice in legal 
contexts. In particular, given the importance of relational factors according to the 
research in social psychology, a central focus of the volume is to investigate pro-
cedural justice from the perspective of relational theories of ethics and justice, and 
to explore the implications of this perspective for the design of legal procedures.
One of the challenges posed by interdisciplinary exchange of this kind is 
that scholars from different disciplines can use the same concepts with subtly 
or sometimes substantially different meanings, leading to misunderstanding and 
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miscommunication. One of our aims in this introduction is to try to avert poten-
tial misunderstandings by explaining some differences between the way lawyers, 
legal theorists, social psychologists, and philosophers understand certain key con-
cepts. In Section 2, we provide an overview of some key concepts and relevant 
background literature on procedural justice in law, legal theory, social psychol-
ogy, and philosophy. In Section 3, we provide a brief overview of the structure of 
the volume and summarise the contents of each chapter.
0.2  Key concepts for understanding procedural justice
Procedural justice is, of course, a central legal concept (usually under the name 
of ‘procedural fairness’, ‘natural justice’ or ‘procedural due process’, depending 
on the jurisdiction).3 However, this volume is not centrally concerned with the 
law’s approach to procedural justice as a doctrinal matter (the analysis of legal 
concepts, rules, and practices). Instead, it approaches procedural justice from a 
more critical, normative perspective.
As an example of the law’s approach, consider the hearing rule, which is one 
of the two classic rules of procedural fairness recognised by the common law, 
the other being the rule against bias. The hearing rule imposes a legal obligation 
on certain decision-makers (whether in the exercise of judicial or administrative 
power) to give individuals a ‘fair opportunity’ to advance their case. Doctrinal 
treatments of the rule are concerned mainly with determining to which decisions 
and decision-makers the rule applies and analysing its content when it does apply. 
Since the rule applies in the majority of cases, the latter tends to be the ‘real and 
practical question’ (Galligan 1996, p. 358). The key consideration here is that the 
hearing rule is very generally framed, and the courts have emphasised that its con-
tent is flexible, saying that its requirements are more or less stringent, depending 
on the circumstances of the particular case. Thus, the rule has a ‘chameleon-like’ 
nature (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 612). For instance, the courts have 
held that fairness to affected persons sometimes requires a full-blown oral hearing 
with legal representation (e.g. in the circumstances of a criminal trial), but that in 
other circumstances (e.g. high-volume administrative matters, such as the refusal 
of a licence renewal), a pared-back hearing based solely on written submissions 
will suffice. From the doctrinal perspective, then, the focus is on close, particular-
ised analysis of whether a person has had an adequate opportunity to be involved 
in the decision-making process in light of all the surrounding circumstances. By 
contrast, deeper moral questions about the justifiability of the hearing rule are of 
less interest. As DJ Galligan says, ‘the courts tend not to enter into direct discus-
sion of why the hearing principle is a fundamental requirement of procedural fair-
ness’ (1996, p. 354). Instead, the reason for this is often taken to be self-evident, 
as in Justice Fortescue’s frequently quoted statement in Dr Bentley’s Case that 
‘God himself would not condemn Adam for his transgression until he had called 
him to know what he could say in his defence … Such proceeding is agreeable to 
justice’ (The King v Chancellor of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str 557, 2 Ld Raym 1334, 
8 Mod 148, 164).
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By contrast, a normative approach is in search of the most defensible theory 
of procedural justice from a philosophical point of view. Such a theory answers 
deeper moral questions about the procedures that officials should use when they 
apply the law, enforce the law, or make discretionary decisions, and it also sug-
gests ways in which procedural rules and practices should be reformed if they 
diverge from the relevant normative standards. For instance, while it is no doubt 
more ‘agreeable to justice’ to determine questions of guilt and innocence by 
allowing accused persons to defend themselves as opposed to, say, tossing a coin, 
a normative theory will ask why this is the case. Is it, for instance, because a 
hearing makes it more likely that the rules of the criminal law will be accurately 
applied? Or does a hearing also serve non-instrumental values and, if so, what 
form do they take? Consider also the problem of bias. What sort of bias is offen-
sive to procedural justice? Personal bias is obviously a breach of procedural jus-
tice, but what should we say about more insidious, systemic forms of bias in, for 
instance, bureaucracies and the police force (see Galligan 1996, pp. 438–439)? 
Why, for example, is it morally problematic if government officials treat welfare 
recipients with disrespect or operate with the assumption that they are undeserv-
ing? Or, as Natalie Stoljar asks in her contribution to this volume, why might the 
use of racial profiling by police be inherently morally problematic? A normative 
theory of procedural justice is necessary to answer these questions.
To the extent that legal theorists and philosophers have sought to develop nor-
mative theories of procedural justice, the literature is dominated by instrumental 
and dignitarian accounts. Instrumental accounts take the outcomes-oriented view 
that the only purpose of procedures is to lead to outcomes that uphold substan-
tive legal rights. Ronald Dworkin is an influential defender of the instrumentalist 
view, as is John Rawls. Dworkin believes that people who are mistakenly denied 
their legal rights suffer injustice or ‘moral harm’ (1985, p. 80) and that proce-
dural justice consists in the use of procedures that guard against this form of 
injustice. Dworkin makes clear that he believes that there is no moral harm other 
than the harm of a mistaken decision (pp. 102–103). This implies that the only 
reason to insist on a procedure such as a hearing is if it guards against legal error. 
Rawls takes a related view, saying that procedural justice in criminal trials consists 
in the use of procedures that lead to the correct result most of the time (1971, p. 
86), and that due process is ‘a process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth’ 
(1971, p. 239). Richard Posner’s economic approach to procedural justice (1973) 
is also a form of instrumentalism, although, unlike Dworkin and Rawls, Posner 
does not regard the erroneous deprivation of legal rights as a form of injustice to 
individuals. Instead, he is concerned only about the fact that legal error makes it 
more difficult to achieve the aims of the substantive law. This is a social cost, not 
a moral cost. Furthermore, since accurate procedures are expensive and therefore 
have their own social cost, Posner is willing to trade off the social benefits of accu-
racy-promoting procedures against their costs. In this volume, Emanuela Ceva, 
Denise Meyerson, and Kristen Rundle develop critiques of instrumental accounts.
By contrast with instrumentalists, dignitarians such as Antony Duff and 
Jeremy Waldron maintain that certain procedures have an inherent value that 
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is independent of any contribution they make to arriving at legally correct out-
comes. They argue that this independent ‘process value’ is the value of respect 
for dignity in the Kantian sense of rational agency. In their view, procedural 
justice requires respect for people as active subjects, not passive objects—ends, 
not means. This involves respecting them as people who can reason and explain 
themselves (Duff et al. 2007; Waldron 2011). Thus, dignitarians argue that deny-
ing defendants a hearing would fail to respect their rational agency and be unjust 
in itself, even when their guilt is certain, and an accurate verdict can be arrived at 
without their participation.
One of the aims of this volume is to present an alternative to instrumentalist 
and dignitarian accounts of procedural justice. This alternative, relational account 
is inspired by both relational theory in ethics and political philosophy and by 
relational accounts of procedural justice in social psychology and criminology. 
Relational theory is informed by feminist critique of the excessively individualistic 
and rationalistic focus of much contemporary ethics and philosophy (see, e.g., 
Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000). In contrast to dominant assumptions of atomistic 
individualism and rationalism, relational theorists maintain that ethics and politi-
cal philosophy should pay more attention to the relational dimensions of human 
agency and identity. This includes attending to the social, embodied, and emo-
tional dimensions of human agency, as well as taking seriously the ways that our 
individual identities are constituted by our interpersonal, familial, and social rela-
tionships, by our social group memberships, and by enculturation into specific 
linguistic and political communities. Relational theory also draws attention to 
the impact of unjust social hierarchies on individual agency and identity. Applied 
to the context of procedural justice, while a relational account agrees with the 
dignitarians about the importance of respect, it rejects their emphasis on rational 
agency, arguing for an expanded conception of agency as social, embodied, and 
emotional as well as rational. It also highlights the critical role of social relation-
ships in fostering respect and self-respect, and the ways in which these attitudes 
can be undermined by social injustice, oppression, and inequality.
As far as the empirical research on procedural justice undertaken by social 
psychologists is concerned, some key aspects are worth highlighting. One of the 
significant findings is that processes matter to people. In fact, the experience of 
having been treated fairly can be as important as outcome favourability (whether 
the outcome leads to personal gain) and outcome fairness (whether the outcome 
is deserved). This proposition, described as ‘counter-intuitive’ by Steven Blader 
and Tom Tyler (2003, p. 747), has been widely confirmed in a range of empirical 
studies. It is not that people are happy to lose, but they are more likely to be will-
ing to accept such a loss if they feel they were treated fairly (Tyler 2007, p. 26). 
Second, people do not typically associate procedural justice with procedures that 
maximise their chances of achieving a desired outcome. Instead, they interpret 
procedures as conveying information about their relationship with authori-
ties, and they understand procedural justice in terms of relational criteria. Four 
factors in particular are central to people’s assessments of procedural fairness: 
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respect, trustworthiness, neutrality, and voice (Tyler 2007, p. 30). Respect refers 
to people’s sense that they have been treated with respect and dignity in their 
interactions with authorities and in the context of decision-making processes. 
Trustworthiness refers to people’s assessments of whether or not authorities can 
be trusted to behave fairly towards them, both in the context of a particular 
decision-making process and in future interactions with them or members of their 
social group. Neutrality refers to people’s assessments of whether authorities are 
impartial and even-handed in their dealings with them, rather than biased against 
them for personal reasons or on the basis of group characteristics, such as gender, 
race, ethnicity, or religion. Voice refers to people’s perceptions that authorities 
have provided them with opportunities to participate in the decision-making pro-
cess and to voice their points of view. If people feel that they have been treated 
with respect by authorities, if they perceive these authorities to be trustworthy 
and neutral, and if they are given opportunities to participate in the decision-
making process, they are more likely to judge that process as fair. Conversely, 
people are likely to experience a sense of injustice if their treatment fails to satisfy 
these criteria, even if they accept that the flaws in their treatment made no mate-
rial difference to the outcome. A final key finding from the empirical studies is 
that the experience of procedurally just treatment fosters belief in the legitimacy 
of authorities and promotes law-abiding behaviour (Tyler 2009).
As to why the experience of procedural justice should have such powerful 
attitudinal and behavioural effects, the most prominent explanation is the group 
value model originally developed by Tom Tyler and Allan Lind. According 
to this model, people seek out social group connections and are highly moti-
vated to ‘understand, maintain and improve the social bonds that exist within 
groups’. Further, ‘people are concerned about their status in groups because 
high status within a valued group validates their own self-identity’ (Tyler & Lind 
1992, p. 141). Procedures come into this picture via the fact that people inter-
pret satisfactory treatment at the hands of group authorities as a sign that they 
have value and status within their group. The experience of fair treatment there-
fore validates their self-identity and promotes a sense of self-worth or self-respect 
(Tyler & Lind 1992, pp. 139–141; Tyler & Blader 2000, pp. 90–92, 171, 185–
187). In short, it is identity processes that drive our interest in procedures and 
explain why procedural justice fosters belief in the legitimacy of authorities and 
promotes law-abiding behaviour (Murphy 2017, p. 48). Several chapters in this 
volume elaborate on these various aspects of the empirical research and further 
them in the specific contexts of policing (Kristina Murphy), jury reforms and trial 
innovations (Jane Goodman-Delahunty, David Tait, and Natalie Martschuk), 
and prisons (Julie Barkworth).
This set of claims is central to what social psychologists refer to as a ‘relational’ 
model of procedural justice. Relational models are often contrasted with both 
social exchange and distributive models. Social exchange theories posit self-inter-
est as people’s primary motivation for engaging in social interactions and social 
relationships, and hence claim that people assess the value of social relationships 
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in terms of the costs and benefits to themselves of those relationships. Applied 
to the context of procedural justice, social exchange theories hold that people 
assess decisions and procedures according to the personal outcome favourability 
or otherwise of those decisions, and the personal transactions costs or benefits 
of the procedures (Tyler & Lind 1992, pp. 119–121). In contrast, group value 
theory, which underpins relational models of procedural justice, emphasises the 
importance of social group membership for individual identity and its role in psy-
chological motivation. In common with relational models, distributive models of 
procedural justice claim that people assess authorities and procedures in terms of 
fairness, rather than self-interest. However, distributive models claim that people 
assess fairness in terms of outcome distribution, for example, how the outcome 
they receive compares to the outcome others receive, or whether the outcome 
falls short of their expectations (Tyler & Lind 1992, pp. 121–122). Relational 
models, by contrast, as discussed above, hold that judgements about fairness are 
linked to procedures even more than outcomes. In their contribution to this vol-
ume, Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe suggest that this contrast may have 
been overstated by relational models, and propose a procedural justice framework 
that incorporates both procedural and distributive notions of fairness.
The social psychology literature is expressly descriptive, rather than norma-
tive in the philosophical sense. It offers a descriptive and explanatory account of 
people’s beliefs and attitudes, not an account of the moral value of procedures, 
such as the instrumental, dignitarian, and relational accounts proposed by phi-
losophers, as discussed above. Kjell Törnblom, for instance, contrasts a social 
psychological approach to justice, which involves the scientific investigation of 
people’s perceptions of justice, with philosophers’ normative arguments about 
which political or economic system is most just (1992, pp. 177, 190). In the con-
text of discussing legitimacy, Tom Tyler likewise explains that a social scientific 
perspective on legitimacy uses psychological methods of data collection to inves-
tigate the factors that cause people to feel under a sense of obligation to obey the 
law, while a normative or philosophical perspective asks whether people ought to 
defer to legal authorities and obey the law. Tyler explains that he takes the social 
scientific perspective on legitimacy and is not concerned with normative or philo-
sophical issues (2003, p. 285; 2006, pp. 286–287). Social psychologists there-
fore understand legitimacy in a descriptive or sociological sense; namely, that an 
institution or authority is legitimate if those who are subject to it perceive it as 
legitimate, or as having the moral right to exercise authority. Philosophers, by 
contrast, understand legitimacy as a normative concept. An institution or author-
ity is normatively legitimate if in fact it does have the moral right to exercise 
authority over those it governs and is therefore entitled to their allegiance (see, 
e.g., Levitov 2016 for a helpful discussion of this distinction). In their contribu-
tion to this volume, Noam Gur and Jonathan Jackson explain how legitimacy in 
the descriptive sense is measured, and how the felt duty to obey the law interacts 
with the belief that specific laws are morally justifiable, in this way strengthening 
people’s motive to obey the law. In her chapter, Catriona Mackenzie addresses 
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the question of whether the four elements of procedural justice identified in the 
empirical literature might satisfy the criteria for both descriptive and normative 
legitimacy.
However, although the social psychology literature is not normative in the 
philosophical sense, social psychologists do use the term ‘normative’. They also 
use the term ‘instrumental’, although again not in the way in which philosophers 
use it, viz. to describe a particular normative approach to the value of procedures. 
Instead, social psychologists use ‘normative’ and ‘instrumental’ as opposites. As 
Bottoms and Tankebe explain in their chapter in this volume, social scientists use 
‘normative’ and ‘instrumental’ to distinguish between different kinds of motiva-
tions for law-abiding behaviour. People may obey the law in order to avoid pun-
ishment (an ‘instrumental’ explanation based on self-interest), or they may obey 
the law because they believe that legal authorities are legitimate and entitled to be 
obeyed (a ‘normative’ explanation). Murphy’s chapter in this volume elaborates 
on this distinction between instrumental and normative explanations of compli-
ance. The distinctive feature of this use of the word ‘normative’ is that it is used 
merely to report on, not endorse, people’s normative judgements. It is therefore 
consistent with the social scientists’ descriptive methodology.
Murphy makes a further distinction between instrumental and normative justi-
fications for treating people in ways that satisfy the four procedural justice desid-
erata of respect, neutrality, trustworthiness, and voice. Many social scientists see 
procedural justice as a strategy for engineering legal compliance. Their approach 
is informed by findings which show (i) that people who believe that authorities 
have a right to be obeyed are more likely to comply with the law than people 
who are motivated by self-interest, and (ii) that the experience of procedural 
justice is a powerful factor in activating the normative judgement that author-
ities have such a right. This is known as the ‘procedural justice effect’ (Tyler 
1987, p. 333). Combining these findings, social scientists argue that the cheapest 
and most effective way to secure obedience to the law is for officials to exercise 
power in a way that satisfies people’s procedural expectations. For instance, Riël 
Vermunt and Kjell Törnblom explain that psychologists apply ‘social psychologi-
cal knowledge … about justice processes … for the purpose of reducing conflict’ 
(2007, p. 10). Tyler and Yuen Huo describe this justification for procedural jus-
tice as ‘psychological jurisprudence’, saying that it ‘provides a distinctly empiri-
cal, rather than normative perspective on the problems presented by the law’ 
(2002, p. 209). It can also be described as an ‘instrumental’ justification, because 
procedural justice is viewed as a technique or tool for encouraging law-abiding 
behaviour. By contrast, normative justifications for procedural justice of the kind 
discussed above would see procedural justice as a moral requirement whether or 
not it promotes compliance.
It is also important to be aware of both commonalities and differences in the 
way social psychologists and political philosophers use the term ‘relational’. In 
common is the idea that human beings are fundamentally social creatures and 
that people’s identities and sense of self, including attitudes of self-respect and 
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self-worth, are bound up with their interpersonal relationships. As mentioned 
previously, social psychologists in the field of procedural justice elaborate this idea 
in terms of group value theory. According to this theory, people are motivated 
to bond with their group because positive messages about their status within the 
group support their sense of self-worth and validate their self-identity. For this 
reason, people are very attentive to cues and messages that convey information 
about their social group status. Group value theory is thus a descriptive hypoth-
esis about what motivates human social behaviour.
While relational theory in ethics and political philosophy is also premised on 
the view that humans are fundamentally social creatures, as discussed above, it is 
underpinned by both normative and methodological concerns. The normative 
focus of relational theory is the critique of various forms of social oppression, 
inequality, and injustice and their effects on the lives of individual members of 
minority social groups. Connected with this normative concern, relational theory 
rejects the methodological individualism that characterises much philosophical 
theorising. The term ‘methodological individualism’ refers to a set of theoreti-
cal assumptions about social groups and the relationship between individuals 
and the groups to which they belong. In particular, methodological individu-
alism eschews explanations of social phenomena and individual behaviour that 
make reference to social groups and the structural constraints imposed by group 
membership on individual action, choice and behaviour (Cudd 2006, p. 46). By 
contrast, relational theories argue that a focus on social groups and the social 
dynamics of power is critical for understanding how the actions, choices, and 
behaviour of individual members of minority social groups are constrained and 
shaped by oppression and inequality.
The differences between the sense in which social psychologists and philoso-
phers use the term ‘relational’ are therefore twofold. The project of relational 
theory in social psychology is descriptive and explanatory: it aims to describe 
and analyse the psychological effects of interpersonal relationships and social 
group dynamics on individuals’ identities. The project of relational theory in 
ethics and political philosophy is normative analysis: it aims to provide a norma-
tive critique of social oppression and inequality and their impact on individuals’ 
lives. This difference in aim explains a further respect in which the social psy-
chology and philosophical literatures differ in the context of theorising about 
procedural justice. Empirical research in social psychology has identified the 
importance of the four relational factors of respect, neutrality, trustworthiness, 
and voice for people’s perceptions of procedural justice and seeks to provide 
a descriptive explanation and analysis, in terms of group value theory, of why 
these four factors matter to people. Taking this empirical research as its starting 
point, philosophers influenced by relational theory in ethics and political phi-
losophy seek to explain the normative significance of these four factors. Thus, 
the chapters in this volume by Ceva, Mackenzie, Stoljar, and Sorial seek to show 
why the relational factors identified in the empirical literature are normatively 
significant.
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The relational account of procedural justice that emerges from this volume 
has implications for the design of legal procedures. Tyler identifies one of the 
core aims of the legal system as being that people’s disputes are managed ‘in 
ways that lead them to accept and be willing to abide by the decisions made by 
the courts’ (Tyler 2007, p. 26). In this way, procedurally just legal processes can 
foster faith in legal institutions and willingness to comply with the decisions made 
by such institutions. A key factor in bringing this about is the existence of partici-
patory processes that are appropriate to the issue under consideration. A number 
of contributions to this volume (see Sorial and Therese MacDermott in particular) 
examine the form in which legal procedures should be structured so that individu-
als have the sense that they were afforded a genuine opportunity to tell their story, 
that an unbiased decision-maker took the time to consider their point of view, and 
that the decision-maker tried to act fairly towards all parties. MacDermott also 
identifies the need for mechanisms to be built into dispute resolution frameworks 
to provide individuals with appropriate support and adequate explanations to 
enable them to take part fully in legal decision-making processes affecting them.
Like many institutions of government, legal authorities are continually under 
pressure to provide their services in ways that are timely and cost-efficient. As 
a former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia observed, ‘[t]here is a 
tendency in some quarters to regard procedural fairness as a species of ethics 
ornamentation, a moral luxury which is a drag on efficient decision-making’ 
(French 2010, p. 2). However, contributions to this volume emphasise that the 
participation that is at the core of procedural justice is what confers legitimacy on 
decision-making processes and fosters compliance with the law. Hence, although 
resource constraints make it impossible to provide perfect procedures, participa-
tion is a fundamental requirement that cannot simply be balanced away in the 
service of timeliness and efficiency. There is also a tendency to minimise the need 
for extensive procedures when claims are of low monetary value. This type of 
approach fails to acknowledge the crucial relational dynamics that need to be 
addressed in resolving any dispute, irrespective of the monetary amount at stake.
In addition, there are certain situations, such as the exercise of policy-based 
administrative discretion or racial profiling in policing, where the legal rules of 
procedural fairness may not be regarded as applicable. However, the chapters by 
Rundle and Stoljar in this volume show that a relational perspective can explain 
why it is not simply the legal form in which power is exercised that dictates 
whether procedural justice considerations should apply. The same can be said of 
forms of alternative dispute resolution that seek to resolve disputes through less 
formal means than are available to parties when an adjudicative process such as a 
hearing or trial is conducted.4
This brief analysis of key concepts in procedural justice research highlights 
why procedural justice matters and why an interdisciplinary approach to the topic 
is necessary and timely. In the following section, we provide an overview of the 
contributions made by the chapters in this volume to advancing this interdiscipli-
nary research agenda.
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0.3  Chapter overview
Part I, ‘Procedural justice in policing, courts, and prisons: empirical reviews’, 
explores psychological perspectives on procedural justice, using a range of empiri-
cal studies in the contexts of policing, juries and courtrooms, and correctional 
facilities.
In Chapter 1, Kristina Murphy provides a comprehensive survey of the 
Australian procedural justice policing scholarship. She explores ways of meas-
uring procedural justice, explains why police should be concerned with it, and 
outlines the challenges involved in undertaking empirical work of this nature. 
Murphy’s chapter explains that procedurally just treatment in a policing context 
matters primarily because it promotes perceptions of legitimacy and fosters the 
belief that police and laws ought to be obeyed. Murphy is particularly inter-
ested in what motivates people to volunteer information and engage in other 
citizen-initiated contact with police, and the implications of this for police rela-
tions with vulnerable population groups and marginalised communities. Murphy 
argues that procedurally just treatment by police can create positive messages for 
communities who are uncertain about the treatment they might receive from 
the police and about their acceptance in society. This can in turn contribute to 
initiatives that rely on harnessing the support of communities in voluntarily coop-
erating with the police, for instance, by reporting terror threats. In terms of chal-
lenges, Murphy mentions the cost of quality sampling and measurement issues, 
as well as the difficulty of embedding procedural justice in policing practices and 
the risk that such an approach may be seen as soft on crime. She concludes with 
some reflections on the future direction of procedural justice policing, including 
its importance for police interactions with vulnerable groups, such as those who 
experience domestic violence.
In Chapter 2, Jane Goodman-Delahunty, David Tait, and Natalie Martschuk 
examine jury reform efforts based on the four key principles of procedural justice 
(respect, trustworthiness, voice, and neutrality). They also discuss ways of show-
ing respect to the accused that can have an indirect effect on juries. First, the 
authors examine ways in which the physical environment of the courtroom and 
the jury room can be designed to reduce juror discomfort (respectful treatment) 
and enhance jury neutrality. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that the 
accused should not be isolated in a dock, since confinement within an enclosed 
space may encourage the jury to believe the accused is dangerous. Second, the 
authors discuss a range of matters relevant to trust in the jury, such as the exclu-
sion of probative evidence from trials. They point out that from a procedural 
justice perspective the exclusion of evidence conveys a lack of trust in the jury, 
and they refer to empirical studies suggesting that jurors exposed to evidence 
of the kind that is traditionally excluded do not engage in prejudicial reason-
ing. By contrast, the innovative introduction of ‘question trails’ to guide jury 
deliberations reflects trust in the capacities of jurors. Third, the authors discuss 
studies that show that many jurors ignore judicial directions that forbid internet 
research. These findings have led to innovations that allow jurors to participate 
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more actively in trials, such as allowing juries to take notes and to submit ques-
tions to witnesses and the court. These interventions speak primarily to the pro-
cedural justice interest in voice. Finally, the authors address issues of legitimacy. 
They discuss empirical research that shows that most jurors express a high degree 
of confidence in the criminal justice process and that legal professionals strongly 
support juries as an institution.
In Chapter 3, Julie Barkworth examines how procedural justice might be uti-
lised in interactions between prisoners and staff. She focuses on two issues that are 
critical to the prison environment—prisoner well-being and compliance-related 
behaviour. Barkworth makes reference to a broad range of empirical studies that 
illustrate the links between perceived fairness of staff behaviour and improved 
prisoner perceptions of staff legitimacy as well as the willingness of prisoners to 
comply with prison rules. In terms of challenges, Barkworth refers to discrepan-
cies that can arise when empirical studies use varied measurement approaches to 
assessing both procedural justice and legitimacy. She also points to the limitations 
of cross-sectional research designs that only provide a snapshot of interactions 
with prison authorities at a particular point in time, and do not separate the 
influence of procedural justice from the influence of social and cultural factors 
such as poverty, family, isolation, and other forms of social dysfunction. As for 
future research, Barkworth identifies the need to expand the scope of research 
beyond high-security male prisons to include female prisoners, prisoners held 
in other correctional environments such as low-risk facilities, and prisoners sub-
jected to periods of incarceration of varying lengths. She also highlights the lack 
of research regarding how prison staff perceive procedural justice and its value in 
the correctional context.
The chapters in Part II, ‘Procedural justice and legitimacy: empirical and nor-
mative perspectives’, discuss empirical and theoretical approaches to legitimacy 
and participation.
Chapter 4, by Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe, seeks to explicate the 
relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy, and to show why both 
concepts should be understood as social/relational and contextual. The start-
ing point for Bottoms and Tankebe’s analysis of legitimacy is the claim (derived 
from Bernard Williams) that power is legitimate to the extent that power-holders 
honour citizens’ ‘basic legitimation expectations’. They suggest that one way of 
understanding Tyler’s analysis of the connection between procedural justice and 
legitimacy is that the four procedural justice factors could be understood as basic 
legitimation expectations. However, while agreeing that procedural justice is 
important for legitimacy, Bottoms and Tankebe argue that there is both empiri-
cal and conceptual support for their view (elaborated in Bottoms & Tankebe 
2012, 2017) that citizens assess the legitimacy of criminal justice authorities with 
reference to three additional basic legitimation expectations. These are lawful-
ness (that authorities exercise power and act within the boundaries of the law); 
distributive justice (that justice outcomes are fairly distributed among different 
social groups); and effectiveness (that criminal justice agencies are effective in the 
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performance of their duties). Notably, they claim that the importance of these 
factors can vary in different social and situational contexts, and therefore that no 
single factor best promotes legitimacy in every context. Bottoms and Tankebe’s 
second main concern is to draw attention to the influence of social/relational and 
contextual variables on judgements of legitimacy. In support of this claim, they 
cite a number of studies showing that judgements of legitimacy vary depend-
ing on a range of such variables, including people’s core normative and political 
values, and social and cultural backgrounds. They also discuss the evidence that 
experiences of social exclusion, marginalisation, or powerlessness, for example, 
on the grounds of race, social class, or gender, significantly influence judge-
ments of legitimacy and can result in pervasive cynicism about legal authorities. 
Additionally, they suggest that citizens’ prior interactions with authorities, the 
stakes involved in a specific interaction, and whether the interaction was initiated 
by the citizen or by the police (e.g. in random stop and frisk activities), all have 
an impact on judgements of legitimacy. Bottoms and Tankebe conclude that 
procedural justice research should attend more closely to the complex contextual 
variability of judgements of legitimacy.
In Chapter 5, Noam Gur and Jonathan Jackson analyse interactions between 
procedure and content from both empirical and normative perspectives. They 
discuss empirical survey data about people’s attitudes to law, explaining that two 
factors are important predictors of legal compliance. The first is people’s belief 
that they have a content-independent moral duty to obey the law (which is an ele-
ment of descriptive or perceived legitimacy and itself strongly predicted by public 
perceptions of procedural justice in the operation of police and courts). The sec-
ond factor is people’s moral assessment of the content of specific laws (sometimes 
called their ‘personal morality’). Furthermore, Gur and Jackson claim that these 
two factors interact, in the sense that a felt content-independent duty to obey the 
law does not merely add to the motivational force of the belief that specific laws 
are morally justifiable but strengthens it, and vice versa. In short, perceptions of 
fair treatment at the hands of the police and courts promote legitimacy and influ-
ence law-abiding behaviour, but this influence is greater when people approve of 
the moral content of legal requirements. So far as Gur and Jackson’s parallel nor-
mative argument is concerned, they adopt Fuller’s ‘procedural’ conception of the 
rule of law, according to which the rule of law depends on certain formal features 
of law, such as its generality, clarity, and prospectivity, as well as on congruence 
between the enacted rules and their application. An on-going debate concerns 
whether observance of Fuller’s principles has intrinsic moral value regardless of 
the content of the law, or whether his principles merely supply a ‘recipe’ for law-
makers, whether good or bad, to achieve their aims efficiently. Gur and Jackson 
argue that neither position is correct. They defend a ‘hybrid’ position involv-
ing both content and procedure, according to which Fuller’s principles have an 
expressive moral quality, but the extent to which their expressive effect material-
ises is sensitive to the moral quality of the law’s content. Thus, they conclude that 
the expressive value of rule-of-law adherence will be enhanced when the content 
of the law is morally defensible.
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In Chapter 6, Sarah Sorial draws on procedural theories of law and democracy 
in developing a normative account of the relevance of participation for legitimacy 
and compliance with the law. Building on the notion of ‘legitimacy as dialogue’ 
(Bottoms & Tankebe 2012), she recasts the relationship between the citizen and 
the state as dialogical and relational in nature. Sorial argues that participatory pro-
cedures give citizens an opportunity to engage in law-making processes that make 
them parties to the legal norms binding them, thereby conferring legitimacy and 
bringing about compliance with the law. Her account focuses on the unique 
features of legitimacy in democratic societies and the kinds of opportunities they 
offer for participation in elections, law-making, and a variety of decision-making 
processes ranging from criminal trials to commissions of inquiry. In the context 
of being heard in one’s own defence in a criminal trial, Sorial identifies some 
core features of a participatory procedure that confer legitimacy. These include 
hearing from the person whose interests are at stake, giving their arguments due 
consideration in arriving at a decision, and supporting decisions with good rea-
sons that all participants can accept. In addition, she argues that dialogical aspects 
of the trial process that involve public scrutiny and deliberation contribute to the 
recognition of courts as just institutions whose decisions should be respected. 
These aspects include the justificatory nature of reason-giving, the fact that court 
proceedings are open to the public, and the potential involvement of citizens as 
jurors.
The chapters in Part III, ‘The concept of procedural justice: philosophical per-
spectives’ discuss a range of philosophical approaches to procedural justice from 
a normative perspective. In Chapter 7, Denise Meyerson explores the concept of 
procedural justice in the adjudicative context, asking what procedures officials 
should use when they apply legal rules. Is it an entirely instrumental matter, 
dependent solely on the capacity of procedures to lead to accurate legal results, 
or can procedures also be just for intrinsic reasons? Meyerson argues against two 
versions of instrumentalism—economic theories, which see procedural justice as 
a matter of balancing the value of accuracy-promoting procedures against their 
monetary costs in an effort to maximise wealth, and outcome-based theories, 
which hold that individuals are entitled as a matter of fairness to procedures that 
are suited to enforce their legal rights. She argues that economic theories fail to 
take our legal rights seriously. Meyerson divides outcome-based theories into 
theories that maintain that procedural justice consists in the use of procedures 
that are guaranteed to produce correct results (e.g. Galligan) and theories that 
are satisfied with something less (e.g. Rawls and Dworkin). Although Galligan 
takes our legal rights with utmost seriousness, Meyerson argues that this comes 
at a price: since procedural perfection is unachievable in the real world, Galligan’s 
understanding of procedural justice is utopian. Dworkin and Rawls avoid this 
problem by conceding that just procedures are not capable of perfectly protect-
ing our legal rights. Dworkin regards procedures as unjust only when the risk 
of error is distributed unfairly, and Rawls regards them as unjust only when the 
risk of error is too high. Although Meyerson thinks that Dworkin and Rawls are 
right to concede that procedural justice should not be identified with procedural 
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perfection, she argues that this concession undermines their commitment to 
instrumentalism. If real-world procedures are capable of enforcing our legal 
rights only imperfectly, why, asks Meyerson, should we accept that this anaemic 
form of procedural protection exhausts what individuals are entitled to as a mat-
ter of fairness? She concludes that it is more plausible to infer that procedures 
must matter intrinsically as well as instrumentally.
Chapter 8, by Emanuela Ceva, aims to explain the normative value of the 
principle of due process in criminal trials. She considers three possible explana-
tions of the normative value of this principle. The first, instrumental, explanation 
focuses on the epistemic value of due process. According to this explanation, due 
process is valuable to the extent that it plays a crucial epistemic role in enabling 
the relevant facts to be revealed. Insofar as they facilitate the revelation of the 
truth, criminal proceedings are just. Ceva argues that this instrumental explana-
tion locates the normative value of due process in a value that is extrinsic to the 
process itself, namely in the truth of the facts that the process aims to reveal. The 
second explanation holds that due process derives its value from its expressive role 
in publicly acknowledging the normative status of the participants. Just as the 
value of democratic processes of decision-making lies in their public expression 
and recognition of the status of citizens as equal political agents, so too legal pro-
ceedings informed by the principle of due process express important institutional 
messages of respect for participants. As the empirical literature on procedural jus-
tice shows, these messages play a critical role in supporting participants’ sense of 
self-respect. While acknowledging that both the epistemic and expressive expla-
nations highlight important normative dimensions of due process, Ceva argues 
that neither explanation can explain its inherent value. Her alternative explana-
tion, which she refers to as ‘interactive justice’, locates this value in the structural 
properties or ‘constitutive rules’ of the process. These establish what people who 
participate in the process can claim against and owe to each other. Drawing on 
dignitarian views, she argues that the constitutive rules of due process confer a 
special dignitary status on participants, the status of right holders and claim mak-
ers. Thus, due process as an instantiation of procedural justice does not simply 
express, but rather bestows, normative status on participants.
In Chapter 9, Catriona Mackenzie discusses different justifications for why offi-
cials should embed procedural justice in their interactions with citizens. Empirical 
approaches typically focus on the claim that procedural justice is more effective 
than other methods of law enforcement, such as deterrence-based strategies that 
rely on coercion or reward mechanisms. However, Mackenzie argues that this 
instrumental explanation needs to be supplemented by a normative argument, 
explaining why social institutions and their representatives are morally obliged to 
treat citizens in a procedurally just manner. Mackenzie draws on recent work in 
political philosophy on relational equality to develop this argument. Relational 
egalitarians argue that justice is not just a matter of distributive fairness; it is also 
fundamentally about social equality. One of the central concerns of relational 
egalitarian theory is to explain the normative obligations of state institutions with 
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respect to citizens subject to their power. These include ensuring that processes 
and authorities express respect for the moral and social equality of all persons and 
that the exercise of power by authorities is regarded as legitimate. Mechanisms 
must also be in place for enabling persons subject to power to hold institutions 
and authorities publicly accountable and to voice their concerns and interests. 
Mackenzie argues that these claims dovetail with and give normative substance 
to the concerns about social standing and fair treatment in the empirical research 
on procedural justice. Relational egalitarian theory also provides normative sup-
port for citizens’ expectations that they should be treated fairly and with respect. 
Relational egalitarian theory has much in common with Ceva’s interactive the-
ory of procedural justice. However, while sympathetic to Ceva’s central claims, 
Mackenzie suggests that Ceva’s theory is more dignitarian than relational, insofar 
as it emphasises rational agency as the basis of obligations of respect. To explain 
the difference between these approaches, Mackenzie draws on feminist analysis of 
the relational and emotional dimensions of respect and self-respect. She suggests 
that this analysis resonates with group value theory, and provides a complemen-
tary explanation of why people are so sensitive to the messages about their status 
conveyed by group processes and by how they are treated by persons in positions 
of authority. It also underscores the normative connections between social equal-
ity and self-respect. In conclusion, Mackenzie suggests that if her argument is 
persuasive it shows why institutions that satisfy citizens’ expectations for fair and 
respectful treatment will count not only as descriptively but also as normatively 
legitimate.
Part IV, ‘Implications and applications: legal institutions and the exercise of 
legal authority’, explores the implications and relevance of a relational approach 
to procedural justice for particular legal contexts.
Chapter 10, by Natalie Stoljar, considers whether the use of racial profiling 
in policing contexts constitutes morally unjust discrimination. Drawing on the 
empirical literature on procedural justice, her first aim is to critically appraise con-
sequentialist arguments in favour of racial profiling. Stoljar argues that since racial 
profiling is perceived by targeted groups as unfairly singling them out it under-
mines legitimacy and erodes compliance. This calls into question consequentialist 
arguments to the effect that racial profiling can sometimes be justified on the basis 
of the alleged social benefit of increased security. She also rejects the consequen-
tialist claim that the benefits of profiling outweigh its costs, allegedly because in 
a racist society profiling adds only minimally to the harm already suffered by tar-
geted groups. This claim, she argues, misunderstands both the extent and type of 
harm suffered by targeted groups, especially the magnitude of the process-related 
harms brought about by profiling. These harms are highlighted in the empirical 
literature, which seems to provide support for consequentialist arguments against 
profiling. Stoljar’s second aim is to develop a new, non-consequentialist objection 
to racial profiling. Some philosophers have argued that because racial profiling is 
based on non-spurious statistical correlations between racialised groups and crimi-
nality, the practice of profiling is not intrinsically disrespectful to those groups. 
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Stoljar challenges this argument, drawing on recent philosophical work on striking 
property generics. These ‘pick out essentialised kinds and attribute a disposition 
to have the negative property (i.e. criminality, being a terrorist) to the nature of 
each member of the kind’ (p. 226). This implicit positing of an untrue associa-
tion between certain social groups and negative properties is inconsistent with 
respect, because it makes a moral mistake about the personhood of each profiled 
person (as well as about members of the whole group). Thus, profiling violates 
the state’s obligation to treat citizens with equal respect and constitutes morally 
unjust discrimination. In conclusion, Stoljar proposes that the feeling by members 
of targeted groups that the criminal justice system is unfair and disrespectful is jus-
tified, because ‘profiling actually does constitute disrespectful treatment’ (p. 228).
In Chapter 11, Kristen Rundle shifts the focus of attention to procedural fair-
ness in discretionary contexts. As she points out, the demands of procedural fair-
ness in circumstances of administrative discretion have not attracted the same 
attention as procedural fairness in the rule-based, adjudicative context. The key 
difference is that in the adjudicative context, the relationship between officials 
and legal subjects is framed by pre-existing rules to which both officials and sub-
jects are subordinate. By contrast, in the discretionary context, officials are free 
to make a choice between possible courses of action. This raises the question 
of whether officials have any procedural obligations in such circumstances. This 
question is even more acute when an official is required to act in the public inter-
est when deciding how an individual should be treated (for instance, in deciding 
whether to release a prisoner on parole). Rundle argues that procedural fairness 
is, in fact, of great importance even when there is a policy element to the exercise 
of discretion. In her view, this form of decision-making encourages an extreme 
turn towards the repository of power and away from the individual’s perspective. 
The value of procedural fairness, for Rundle, is that it supplies a ‘relational correc-
tion’ to this ‘stark asymmetry’ by obliging the official to engage with the agency 
of the person subject to the discretion. Since Rundle also defends a conception 
of the rule of law influenced by Lon Fuller, in terms of which the rule of law 
depends on the quality of governing relationships between those who exercise 
power and those subject to it, she draws the conclusion that procedural fairness 
makes it possible for discretionary power to be exercised in a way that meets the 
demands of the rule of law. For Rundle, then, procedural fairness in the adminis-
trative context has a wider significance that goes beyond the interests of individu-
als in fair treatment, important though these interests are.
The final chapter, by Therese MacDermott, examines the nature of proce-
dures adopted by Australian tribunals in dealing predominantly with civil matters. 
Tribunals are generally regarded as operating as a forum for affordable justice 
and are vested with considerable procedural flexibility, where the ‘just, quick 
and cheap resolution’ of the issues in dispute is often part of a tribunal’s statu-
tory mandate. The idea that these three competing factors should be balanced is 
regularly adopted in the decision-making of tribunals and in the judgements of 
appellant courts called upon to evaluate the procedural practices of other legal 
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institutions. MacDermott considers whether a balancing approach meets the 
requirements of justice. She argues instead for an approach, informed by rela-
tional theory, based on the importance of participation. In her view, affording 
the opportunity for participation takes substantial priority over factors of cost or 
efficiency. MacDermott also examines whether a just resolution can be achieved 
in a forum that encourages self-representation if tribunals do not adequately fulfil 
their obligations to help parties understand the procedures in which they are 
involved.
Notes
1 The editors’ research for this volume was funded by the Australian Government 
through the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Project funding scheme 
(DP1701009600: ‘A Relational Theory of Procedural Justice’).
2 This volume is concerned only with questions of procedural justice arising out 
of relationships between citizens and the state and we use the term ‘officials’ to 
refer to individuals on whom the state has conferred official authority. We also 
categorise all such individuals as ‘officials’. The volume’s primary focus is on the 
procedural obligations of judges, tribunal members, administrative officials, and 
police and correctional authorities.
3 Most contributors to this volume refer to ‘procedural justice’. However, some 
authors refer to ‘procedural fairness’ or use these terms interchangeably.
4 MacDermott and Meyerson (2018) have argued elsewhere that there are sound 
normative reasons for taking people’s relational concerns into account in the 
alternative dispute resolution context.
References
Bayles, MD 1990, Procedural justice: allocating to individuals, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Dordrecht.
Blader, SL & Tyler, TR 2003, ‘A four-component model of procedural justice: 
defining the meaning of a “fair” process’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 747–758.
Bottoms, AE & Tankebe, J 2012, ‘Beyond procedural justice: a dialogic approach to 
legitimacy in criminal justice’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 102, 
no. 1, pp. 119–170.
Bottoms, AE & Tankebe, J 2017, ‘Police legitimacy and the authority of the state’, in 
A du Bois-Pedain, M Ulväng, & P Asp (eds), Criminal law and the authority of the 
state, Hart Publishing, Oxford.
Cudd, A 2006. Analyzing oppression, Oxford University Press, New York.
Duff, A, Farmer, L, Marshall, S, & Tadros, V 2007, The trial on trial, vol. 3, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford/Portland, OR.
Dworkin, R 1985, ‘Principle, policy, procedure’, in A matter of principle, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
French, R 2010, ‘Procedural fairness—indispensable to justice?’ Sir Anthony Mason 
Lecture, University of Melbourne Law School, available at https ://ww w.hco urt.
g ov.au /asse ts/pu blica tions /spee ches/ curre nt-ju stice s/fre nchcj /fren chcj0 7oct1 
0.pdf 
18 Denise Meyerson et al. 
Galligan, DJ 1996, Due process and fair procedures: a study of administrative procedures, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Levitov, A 2016, ‘Normative legitimacy and the state’, retrieved from Oxford 
Handbooks Online, DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.013.131, online 
publication date October 2016.
MacDermott, T & Meyerson, D 2018, ‘Australian tribunals and alternative dispute 
resolution: a procedural justice perspective’, Civil Justice Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 
4, pp. 443–462.
Mackenzie, C & Stoljar, N (eds) 2000, Relational autonomy: feminist perspectives on 
autonomy, agency and the social self, Oxford University Press, New York.
Murphy, K 2017, ‘Procedural justice and its role in promoting voluntary compliance’, 
in P Drahos (ed.), Regulatory theory: foundations and applications, ANU Press, 
Canberra, ACT.
Posner, RA 1973, ‘An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial 
administration’, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 399–458.
Rawls, J 1971, A theory of justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Törnblom, K 1992, ‘The social psychology of distributive justice’, in KR Scherer (ed.), 
Justice: interdisciplinary perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tyler, TR 1987, ‘Conditions leading to value-expressive effects in judgments 
of procedural justice: a test of four models’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 333–344.
Tyler, TR 2003, ‘Procedural justice, legitimacy and the effective rule of law’, Crime 
and Justice, vol. 30, pp. 283–357.
Tyler, TR 2006, Why people obey the law, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Tyler, TR 2007, ‘Procedural justice and the courts’, Court Review: The Journal of the 
American Judges Association, vol. 44, no. 1/2, pp. 26–31.
Tyler, TR 2009, ‘Legitimacy and criminal justice: the benefits of self-regulation’, Ohio 
State Journal of Criminal Law, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 307–359.
Tyler, TR & Blader SL, 2000, Cooperation in groups: procedural justice, social identity, 
and cooperative behaviour, Psychology Press, New York.
Tyler, TR & Lind, EA 1992, ‘A relational model of authority in groups’, Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 25, pp. 115–191.
Tyler, TR & Huo, YJ 2002, Trust in the law: encouraging public cooperation with the 
police and courts, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
Vermunt, R & Törnblom, K 2007, ‘Distributive and procedural justice’, in K 
Törnblom and R Vermunt (eds), Distributive and procedural justice: research and 
social applications, Ashgate, Aldershot.
Waldron, J 2011, ‘The rule of law and the importance of procedure’, in JE Fleming 
(ed.), Getting to the rule of law, New York University Press, New York/London.
Part I
Procedural justice in 





In 2014, US President Barack Obama established a Presidential Task Force on 
21st Century Policing. This was borne out of concern over the mounting tensions 
between America’s police and racial minority communities. Numerous police 
shootings of unarmed black men pointed to a widespread cultural problem of 
racism in American police agencies. The violent Black Lives Matter Protests that 
occurred in the US in 2020 reveal this problem has still not been resolved. The 
President’s Task Force released its final report in 2015 (President’s Task Force 
2015). The report cited research—including Australian research—espousing 
the virtues of procedural justice policing. Procedural justice policing is a style of 
policing that emphasises the fair and respectful treatment of citizens. The report 
cited evidence linking police use of procedural justice to citizens’ enhanced trust 
and confidence in the police. At the same time, the report also recognised the 
normative importance of procedural justice for policing, highlighting that ‘trust 
between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essen-
tial in a democracy’ (p. 1). Thus, the Task Force recommended that procedural 
justice should be a guiding principle on which quality policing should be based.
In Australia, a long history of strained relationships between police and minor-
ity communities also exists. Chan (1997, pp. 108–115) explored police–minority 
relations in NSW in the mid-1990s and noted—as in the US—that the cul-
ture of the NSW Police Service supported widespread racism toward minority 
communities. Australian police agencies have since made a concerted effort to 
recognise the value of procedural justice for improving police–community rela-
tions. The Queensland Police Service (2017) specifies, as a key research priority, 
the strengthening of its relationship with the community and highlights pro-
cedural justice as important for achieving this goal. However, as evidenced by 
the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests that occurred in Australia issues regarding 
police racism still remain in Australia.
Since the release of the President’s Task Force report in 2015, the empirical 
study of procedural justice in policing has proliferated exponentially. Scholars 
have sought to measure public perceptions of the police, with the aim of ascer-
taining the value of procedural justice for improving citizen experiences with 
The empirical study of procedural 
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police (e.g. Nix et al. 2015). Some scholars have also focused on whether police 
officers can be trained to support and be procedurally just in interactions with the 
public (e.g. Skogan, van Craen & Hennessy 2015), and others have sought to 
understand the situational contexts under which procedural justice policing mat-
ters most to citizens (e.g. Wolfe et al. 2016).
Prior to this new wave of empirical research, a large number of procedural 
justice policing studies had already emerged from Australia, including studies 
with minority communities. This chapter presents an overview of the procedural 
justice policing scholarship that has been undertaken in Australia both before 
and after the Presidential Task Force released its final report. Drawing on these 
Australian studies, the chapter will discuss how procedural justice has typically 
been measured in Australian research and why the police should be concerned 
with procedural justice. The chapter then highlights key empirical findings from 
Australian research. Overall, findings show that procedural justice is important 
to Australians and can strengthen positive relations between the police and the 
public. Finally, the challenges associated with undertaking empirical research of 
this nature will be discussed before some reflections are made about the future 
direction of procedural justice policing research. Before doing this, the following 
sections provide an overview of what procedural justice is and why procedural 
justice has gained prominence in policing research.
1.2  What is procedural justice policing?
Procedural justice in policing refers to the quality of the interpersonal treatment 
people receive from police and the fairness of the procedures police use to make 
decisions (see Tyler 1990, p. 7). Tyler (1990, p. 7) noted that four key elements 
are required for a police–citizen interaction to be considered as procedurally just. 
These four elements are: trustworthiness; respectful treatment; neutrality; and 
voice. A police officer who displays sincerity in being helpful, honest and open, 
and who acts consistently and in the best interests of citizens is an officer who 
will be viewed as trustworthy. Respectful treatment refers to police behaviour that 
displays respect for people’s rights and exemplifies dignified and polite treatment. 
People are particularly sensitive to signs that they are being treated respectfully 
by police, and they respond very negatively to signs of rude behaviour. In fact, 
rude behaviour from police typically attracts the largest number of citizen com-
plaints in Australia each year (Porter & Prenzler 2017, p. 874). Police convey 
neutrality when they treat all individuals and groups in the community equally, 
and refrain from acting on biases or pre-existing views about people when making 
decisions. The over- or under-policing of certain communities can be perceived 
as police not providing neutral treatment across society (Tyler & Wakslak 2004, 
p. 254). Finally, voice refers to the ability of citizens to have a say in a situation 
that involves them. Having the opportunity to air a concern or explain one’s 
side of the story to a police officer before a decision is made, and being genu-
inely listened to, are indicators of procedural justice. Being consulted in police 
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decision-making processes also constitutes an important element of voice. For 
example, research on Muslim communities shows that the provision of voice is 
an extremely important feature of Muslims’ interactions with police in counter-
terrorism. A major criticism that Muslims have of police engagement efforts is 
that police do little in the way of consulting Muslims or involving Muslims in 
genuine discussions about how radicalisation in the Muslim community should 
be dealt with (Cherney & Murphy 2016, p. 491).
1.2.1  Deterrence versus procedural justice?
Policing is grounded on a deterrence-based model of crime control, where the 
focus is on detecting and apprehending lawbreakers (Mazerolle et al. 2014, 
p. 57). A deterrence-based model of policing assumes that people are rational 
actors who will be deterred from disobeying police or breaking the law because 
the consequences of being non-compliant will be detrimental to their welfare. 
In other words, people weigh up the costs and benefits of obeying police or the 
law. If the perceived costs of non-compliance outweigh the perceived benefits, 
then compliance will be the rational choice. A deterrence-based model assumes 
that police can best promote law-abiding behaviour through displaying power, 
effective enforcement and creating severe sanctions for non-compliance (Nagin 
2013, pp. 205–206).
The problem with a deterrence-based policing approach, however, is it cannot 
explain why people still comply with police and the law when there is little chance 
of being detected breaking the law or when sanctions for non-compliance are 
minimal (Murphy, Bradford & Jackson 2015, p. 103). It also cannot explain why 
contact with the criminal justice system can increase re-offending. Anwar and 
Loughran (2011, p. 673), for example, noted that persistent offenders respond 
differently to deterrence. They showed that serious offenders reported being 
less concerned with sanction risk when compared to less persistent offenders. 
Deterrence perspectives are particularly problematic when explaining discretion-
ary forms of law-related behaviour. Discretionary law-related behaviours include 
contacting police to report a crime or victimisation, or assisting police in crime 
prevention activities. Discretionary law-related behaviours are essential to the 
effective operation of the criminal justice system. Without such forms of behav-
iour, crimes would not be identified, witnesses would not come forward to pro-
vide evidence, and police would be unable to work with communities to promote 
and maintain order. Deciding not to engage in these behaviours will not—in 
most cases—result in a sanction. Yet most people engage willingly in these types 
of discretionary behaviour. At the same time, research with marginalised groups 
(e.g. crime victims, racial/ethnic minorities, those living in high crime neigh-
bourhoods) finds these groups often avoid contact with police even in times of 
need (e.g. Murphy & Barkworth 2014, p. 178). Using the threat of punishment 
with individuals who do not engage in discretionary activities is likely to exacer-
bate disengagement.
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Procedural justice scholars have therefore responded to the limitations of 
deterrence-based policing by arguing that most people cooperate and com-
ply with legal authorities and laws because they believe it is right to do so, not 
because they fear the consequences of doing otherwise. For discretionary forms 
of law-abiding behaviour, procedural justice scholars suggest that concerns about 
fair treatment and respect are likely to be particularly salient in motivating peo-
ple’s decisions to engage with police.
According to the procedural justice perspective, law-related behaviour is driven 
by normative and relational concerns, not instrumental concerns. Here, people 
cooperate and comply because they believe in the legitimacy of police and believe 
police and laws are entitled to be obeyed. In other words, the procedural justice 
perspective is underpinned by the normative assumption that authorities who 
treat people fairly have earned their rightful position to govern others, are enti-
tled to be regarded as legitimate and have the right to request law-abiding behav-
iour from citizens (e.g. Hinds & Murphy 2007, p. 27). Studies demonstrate that 
an authority’s legitimacy can be damaged when an authority behaves badly. An 
authority that abuses its power or treats its citizens poorly will be distrusted by 
the community, resulting in an unwillingness of citizens to volunteer informa-
tion, or to cooperate or comply with the authority and its laws (e.g. Murphy, 
Mazerolle & Bennett 2014, p. 408).
1.3  Why should procedural justice be of concern to police?
There are three main reasons why police should be concerned with procedural 
justice. The first reason is based on an instrumental argument. Mazerolle et al. 
(2014, p. 3–5) argue that authorities that govern with procedural justice will be 
better able to foster compliance and discretionary cooperation from citizens and 
will have to rely less heavily on deterrence. It has also been suggested that proce-
durally just dialogue is a more low-cost and time-efficient strategy for obtaining 
compliance when compared to deterrence (Drahos & Krygier 2017, p. 5). Put 
simply, procedural justice can be cheaper and more effective than deterrence. An 
instrumental argument has appeal for police agencies because they are increas-
ingly being tasked to do more with less.
The second reason why police should be concerned with procedural justice is 
based on a normative argument. ‘A widely shared normative expectation about 
the appropriate use of legal power is that justice officials should act in accordance 
with the principles of fair treatment and impartial decision-making’ (Trinkner, 
Jackson & Tyler 2018, p. 281). Police have a moral obligation to exercise their 
authority in a procedurally fair way, irrespective of any instrumental benefit such 
an approach may have in facilitating their role in maintaining cooperation and 
compliance. In other words, procedural justice should be viewed as a common 
good in itself. While authorities can view procedural justice as an instrumental 
tool to gain cooperation or compliance from citizens, citizens have clear expecta-
tions of how police should behave in interactions with the community. As noted 
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earlier, citizens confer legitimacy upon an authority if authorities act in ways that 
adhere to the values and expectations of the community. Procedurally just treat-
ment helps to engender the sense among citizens that police are legitimate and 
entitled to be obeyed. Hence, authorities should commit to being procedurally 
just because it is expected of them and because it is the right thing to do.
The third reason why procedural justice should be of concern to police is 
based on a relational argument. This relational argument is most pertinent to the 
theme of this book. The relational perspective suggests that procedural justice 
is important because it strengthens the social bonds and relationships between 
authorities and those they govern. Exercising authority in a procedurally just 
way communicates status and value to those on the receiving end of the actions 
of authorities. Braithwaite (2017, p. 33) suggests that all forms of regulation 
pose a threat to people’s freedom. As such, how authorities wield their power 
can have negative or positive consequences for social relations. Procedural jus-
tice is thought to strengthen relationships because it communicates information 
about citizens’ value and standing within society (Tyler & Blader 2000, p. 15). 
People place importance on procedurally just treatment because it communicates 
important information about the quality of the relationship between police and 
citizens. Procedural features like trustworthiness, neutrality, respectful treatment 
and voice convey important symbolic information about identity, belonging and 
position in society (Bradford, Murphy & Jackson 2014, p. 528). The experience 
of procedural justice thus promotes connection to the authority and the group it 
represents. People in turn feel more obligated to support and cooperate with the 
authorities of the groups to which they belong (Bradford, Murphy, & Jackson 
2014, p. 528). While procedural justice is related to positive social identities and 
inclusion, unjust treatment from authorities can have negative consequences for 
identity formation (Tyler & Blader 2000, p. 15). Those who feel they have been 
treated in a procedurally unjust way by authorities will view such treatment as 
reflective of their worth and status in the eyes of that authority. As important 
representatives of the state, the treatment that police convey toward an individual 
can also signal how society in general views them. Procedurally unjust treatment 
signals social exclusion. Social exclusion in turn can result in disengagement from 
society and its social institutions.
Empirical research also highlights the importance of emotion for understand-
ing why procedural justice matters to people. Felt injustice and unfair treatment 
at the hands of authorities can trigger strong emotional responses in people, most 
notably anger. In fact, the discrete emotions of happiness, joy, anger, frustra-
tion, guilt, and anxiety have all been linked to perceptions of procedural justice 
and injustice (for a review see Barkworth & Murphy 2015). This suggests that 
experiencing procedural injustice from police can damage people’s relationship 
with police due to the negative emotions it can elicit. Hence, procedural justice 
is important from a relational point of view because it can improve relationships 
between police and the public and can reduce the hostility individuals direct 
toward police.
26 Kristina Murphy 
1.4  How is procedural justice policing typically measured 
in empirical research?
Having established what procedural justice policing is and why police should 
care about procedural justice, this section presents an overview of how Australian 
scholars have typically measured procedural justice policing in their research. The 
vast majority of published procedural justice studies have made use of quantita-
tive-based survey methodology. This is the case for both Australian research and 
research conducted elsewhere. Hence, this section focuses specifically on how 
procedural justice has been measured in survey-based research.
It should be highlighted that the measurement of procedural justice in empiri-
cal studies has proven to be a source of much debate and criticism. A number 
of academics have argued that procedural justice research inconsistently opera-
tionalises key constructs and has done little to evaluate the construct validity of 
existing measures (e.g. Gau 2011, p. 489; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz 2007, p. 
1006).2 These authors note that measures of procedural justice have often dif-
fered substantially between studies. Concern has also been raised about whether 
measured variables actually reflect their stated concept. Rightly so, these critics 
argue that when measures are inconsistent between studies, or do not measure 
what is intended, this can lead to misleading, inaccurate, and conflicting conclu-
sions across different studies. Fortunately, these criticisms can be overcome by 
utilising similar measures across different studies and by performing statistical 
techniques on survey data to assess whether different concepts in a study are sta-
tistically reliable and have construct validity.
Importantly, almost all of the procedural justice studies undertaken and pub-
lished by key Australian scholars Kristina Murphy, Adrian Cherney, Elise Sargeant, 
Lorraine Mazerolle, Emma Antrobus, Sarah Bennett and Natasha Madon have 
avoided these measurement issues. These scholars typically use similar and stand-
ardised measures of procedural justice across their studies. These scholars also 
use factor analytic statistical techniques to ensure that their procedural justice 
measures are reliable, have construct validity, and are conceptually distinct from 
other measures incorporated in the study (i.e. the procedural justice measure is 
conceptually distinct from measures of police legitimacy, trust in police, satisfac-
tion with police, willingness to cooperate with police, etc.).
Table 1.1 presents the commonly used survey items that have been used to 
measure procedural justice in surveys conducted in Australia. These items were 
originally adapted from Tyler’s (1990) seminal work in the US, and have been 
refined and improved over time for use in Australia. These procedural justice 
measures include a 5-point Likert scale response format, where survey partici-
pants indicate their agreement or disagreement to several statements (e.g. ‘Police 
treat people with dignity and respect’: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = nei-
ther disagree nor agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). These statements assess 
citizens’ perceptions of police use of procedural justice, either in general terms 
or in response to a specific encounter with a police officer. Thus, they are sub-
jective assessments rather than objective assessments of the treatment received 
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Table 1.1  Survey Items Used to Measure Perceptions of Procedural Justice Policing 
in Australia
General Procedural Justice Measures Encounter Specific Procedural Justice 
Measures
Based on your experiences or perceptions 
indicate whether you agree or disagree with 
the following statements:
 • Police try to be fair when making 
decisions (T)
 • Police treat people fairly (T)
 • Police treat people with dignity and 
respect (R)
 • Police are always polite when dealing with 
people (R)
 • Police listen to people before making 
decisions (V)
 • Police make decisions based upon facts, 
not their personal biases or opinions (N)
 • Police respect people’s rights when 
decisions are made (R)
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89
OR
When dealing with people in your community
 • Police give people a chance to express their 
views before making decisions (V)
 • Police make their decisions based upon 
facts, not their personal opinions (N)
 • Police apply the law consistently to 
everyone, regardless of who they are (N)
 • Police consider people’s views when 
deciding what to do (V)
 • Police take account of the needs and 
concerns of the people they deal with (V)
 • Police respect people’s rights (R)
 • Police treat people with dignity and 
respect (R)
 • Police treat people fairly (T)
 • Police try to be fair when making 
decisions (T)
 • Police are polite when dealing with 
people (R)
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95
Thinking about your most recent 
encounter with police, do you think:
 • The police officer treated me with 
dignity and respect (R)
 • The police officer was polite when 
dealing with me (R)
 • The police officer was fair (T)
 • The police officer gave me the 
opportunity to express my views (V)
 • The police officer listened to me (V)
 • The police officer made decisions 
based upon facts, not their personal 
biases or opinions (N)
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88
T = trustworthiness; R = respectful treatment; N = neutrality; V = voice
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from police. Best practice measures of procedural justice typically include several 
questions canvassing the four elements of procedural justice (i.e. trustworthiness, 
respectful treatment, neutrality, voice) which are combined to create an overall 
procedural justice scale. To test the construct validity of a scale and its reliabil-
ity, measures are tested via factor analysis and a Cronbach alpha calculation.3 
Cronbach alpha scores between 0.8 and 1.0 indicate an internally reliable scale.
1.5  Procedural justice policing research in Australia: 
findings and highlights
The previous section discussed how procedural justice is typically measured in 
Australian surveys. The findings from Australian procedural justice policing stud-
ies are presented in this section. At the time of writing this chapter, 48 Australian 
studies had been published in journals or book chapters.4 The 48 studies are 
organised as follows: (a) procedural justice studies with general population sam-
ples (including the early published Australian studies); (b) studies undertaken 
with vulnerable communities (i.e. youth, crime victims, ethnic/racial minorities); 
(c) counter-terrorism policing studies; (d) neighbourhood-level studies; and (e) 
applied policing studies. The Appendix to this chapter provides a full list of the 
authors responsible for these five groups of studies.
1.5.1  Studies undertaken with general population samples
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Tom Tyler and his colleagues empirically 
tested the importance of procedural justice policing to American citizens’ evalu-
ations of police. That survey research revealed that Americans’ procedural justice 
perceptions were strongly and positively associated with their perceptions of the 
legitimacy of police, their satisfaction with police, their willingness to cooperate 
with police, and their willingness to comply with laws. It was also found that pro-
cedural justice, not instrumental factors (i.e. personal outcomes; perceived ability 
of police to detect and prevent crime), dominated Americans’ concerns when 
predicting these outcomes (e.g. Tyler 1990, p. 102; Sunshine & Tyler 2003, 
pp. 525–528). Such findings were viewed as important because they highlighted 
the fact that police could directly influence public sentiment and behaviour 
through the way they treated people.
In the mid-2000s, Hinds and Murphy (2007, p. 31) pointed out that the 
generalisability of the US-based research was unknown. Due to the dearth of 
procedural justice policing studies outside the US, it was unclear whether the 
findings linking procedural justice to citizens’ enhanced perceptions of police 
legitimacy, satisfaction with police, and willingness to cooperate with police and 
comply with laws could be replicated in jurisdictions outside the US. The aim of 
the early Australian procedural justice policing work, therefore, was to test for the 
first time the applicability and generalisability of the procedural justice framework 
in a non-US context.
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Six of the early Australian studies were published between 2007 and 2009 by 
Kristina Murphy and/or Lyn Hinds. Each of these six studies utilised survey 
data collected from adult citizens from the general population. Three of the six 
papers simply sought to replicate key findings from the US, investigating spe-
cifically whether citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice were positively asso-
ciated with: (a) perceptions of police legitimacy (Hinds & Murphy, 2007), (b) 
satisfaction with police (Hinds 2009a; Hinds & Murphy 2007), and c) willing-
ness to cooperate with police (Murphy, Hinds, & Fleming 2008). The studies 
also examined whether procedural justice concerns, not police effectiveness con-
cerns, dominated citizens’ evaluations of police. The other three papers (Murphy 
2009a, 2009b; Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis 2009) examined the contextual effects 
of procedural justice, investigating specifically whether procedural justice effects 
could vary across groups or situations. Overall, the six early studies confirmed 
the salience and generalisability of the American procedural justice literature to 
Australian policing. In each study, procedural justice policing perceptions were 
positively associated with legitimacy, satisfaction, or self-reported cooperation/
compliance levels.
Three notable findings were obtained from the early Australian research. 
First, Hinds and Murphy (2007, p. 36) revealed that relative to Americans, 
Australians placed more weight on instrumental concerns when evaluating the 
police. Specifically, while procedural justice still mattered more to Australians, 
respondents also focused strongly on whether police were effective. Second, 
these effects varied across policing context (e.g. Murphy 2009a, p. 172). Murphy 
(2009a) found that Australians focused most on procedural justice concerns and 
less on police effectiveness concerns when they were involved in police-initiated 
contacts. In contrast, when involved in citizen-initiated contacts with police, 
Australians focused most on police effectiveness and less on procedural justice 
concerns. Third, the Murphy (2009b) and Murphy et al. (2009) studies revealed 
that psychological factors could moderate the effect of procedural justice on citi-
zens’ evaluations of police. For example, Murphy (2009b, p. 18) found that 
peoples’ propensity to act emotionally to events influenced their receptiveness to 
procedural justice; specifically, procedural justice resulted in lower defiance levels 
toward police for those Australians who were low in emotionality. For those who 
were high in emotionality, procedural justice had little effect in reducing defiance.
‘Most procedural justice scholars assume that procedural justice effects are 
always positive or “invariant” across people, groups and contexts’ (Murphy 
2017a, p. 430). Certainly, much of the empirical procedural justice policing 
research has revealed that procedural justice matters equally to people from dif-
ferent demographic groups (e.g. Wolfe et al. 2016, p. 253). The Australian find-
ings cited above reveal, however, that procedural justice effects can vary.
There are several explanations for why differences have been observed in 
Australia but not in the US research. Two are offered here. The US research exam-
ined differences in procedural justice effects between demographic groups. Those 
studies did not consider the potential influence of individual-level psychological 
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factors and how these can shape people’s receptiveness to procedural justice. In 
the justice literature, it has been proposed that justice is a subjective-affective 
construct (van den Bos, 2003, p. 483). This suggests that justice perceptions 
result from how people feel emotionally after experiencing justice or injustice. 
It follows that individual differences in a person’s personality or predispositions 
should influence how they respond to procedural justice and injustice. Indeed, 
the Murphy (2009b, p. 18) study cited above confirmed that emotional disposi-
tion did influence how Australians reacted to procedural justice.
It also makes sense from a psychological point of view that people will focus 
more on procedural justice in police-initiated contacts, while concerns about 
the effectiveness of police should dominate in citizen-initiated contacts. Police-
initiated contacts tend not to be entered into voluntarily. Hence, they can be 
perceived by individuals in a suspicious or adversarial way. The more adversarial 
nature of police-initiated encounters can evoke unpleasant emotions and uncer-
tainty regarding how the event will unfold. To reduce feelings of uncertainty, 
people tend to focus on relational aspects of encounters with authorities. In 
other words, they place greater emphasis on signs they are being treated justly 
by authorities. When people contact police for assistance, in contrast, the hope is 
that police will take action that results in a positive outcome for the individual. 
The emphasis here is likely to be on whether police are effective in dealing with 
the citizen’s concerns. While procedural justice is also appreciated in this context, 
the primary concern will be with the officer dealing with the issue at hand.
Following the publication of the six early Australian studies, five additional 
papers using general population samples were published. These five studies sought 
to further understand when and why procedural justice mattered to Australian 
citizens. Four of the five studies focused on the relational properties of proce-
dural justice and its ability to enhance identity and reduce negative emotions 
and defiance. Bradford, Murphy, and Jackson (2014, p. 538) revealed that pro-
cedural justice enhanced Australians’ identity as law-abiding citizens, with those 
who identified more strongly as law-abiding perceiving police as more legitimate 
and entitled to be obeyed. Barkworth and Murphy (2015, p. 268) confirmed 
that procedural justice could reduce negative affect, and Murphy (2016, p. 101) 
showed that procedural justice could reduce defiance toward police. Using longi-
tudinal survey data, Sargeant, Murphy, and Madon (2017, p. 131) also demon-
strated that if citizens held defiant attitudes toward police when entering into an 
interaction this had an impact on their perceptions of procedural justice and, in 
turn, their satisfaction with the encounter (p. 132).
1.5.2  Studies undertaken with vulnerable communities
The second group of procedural justice studies in Australia focused on the impor-
tance of procedural justice to vulnerable population groups. This work built upon 
the early Australian studies presented in the previous section and aimed to better 
understand the different contexts under which procedural justice policing was 
effective or ineffective.
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Of the 15 studies published in this group, four focused on youth (Hinds 2007; 
Hinds 2009b; Murphy 2015; Bates, Allen & Watson 2016), four focused on 
crime victims (Elliott, Thomas & Ogloff 2011, 2012; Murphy & Barkworth 
2014; Barkworth & Murphy 2016), one focused on the LGBTI community 
(Miles-Johnson 2013), and six focused on ethnic/racial minority communities (see 
Appendix for a full list of these authors). Almost all of these studies confirmed that 
procedural justice policing was positively associated with citizens’ trust in police, 
their perceptions of the police as legitimate, their satisfaction with the police, or 
their willingness to voluntarily cooperate with the police. However, one study 
revealed that procedural justice policing had a negative effect on ethnic minorities’ 
cooperation with police (Murphy & Cherney 2011, p. 248). Sargeant, Murphy, 
and Cherney’s (2014, p. 513) study also revealed that procedural justice had little 
impact in building Vietnamese immigrants’ trust in police, but it mattered a great 
deal for Indian immigrants and non-minority respondents. For Vietnamese immi-
grants, concerns regarding police effectiveness dominated their trust in police.
In other studies, Murphy and Barkworth (2014, pp. 193–194) also revealed 
that procedural justice had a stronger positive effect for certain types of crime 
victim (i.e. domestic violence, burglary, vandalism victims), while for other types 
of crime victim (i.e. motor theft victims) the perceived effectiveness of police 
mattered more when deciding to report future victimisation. Murphy (2015, p. 
53) also revealed that young people placed more importance on procedural jus-
tice than adults, and Madon, Murphy, and Sargeant (2017, p. 624) found that 
procedural justice mattered most to disengaged individuals when evaluating the 
legitimacy of the police. Finally, Murphy (2013, p. 193) revealed that ethnic 
minorities who identified more strongly with their ethnic identity placed more 
importance on procedural justice when deciding to trust the police. Together, 
these studies challenge the view that all population groups respond equally to 
procedural justice; that is, that procedural justice effects are invariant across dif-
ferent demographic groups.
Each of the studies cited above provided explanations for the differing effects 
of procedural justice across groups. While there is no space in this chapter to 
go through all the explanations, two noteworthy suggestions are offered. For 
the studies involving ethnic minority and immigrant groups, the finding that 
procedural justice mattered little to some groups can be explained by examining 
the historical and cultural legacies of some minority groups. For some migrant 
groups, immigration to Australia was driven by a need to flee war or commu-
nist regimes (e.g. Vietnamese immigrants). Given their experiences of war and 
oppression, immigrants from these types of countries may place more attention 
on the ability of police in their host country to keep them safe; whether they are 
treated respectfully or not is of less concern. Procedural justice studies conducted 
in African contexts show similar findings. Tankebe (2009, p. 1265) showed that 
people in Ghana placed little importance on procedural justice when judging 
the legitimacy of police, instead focusing on whether the police were effective. 
Tankebe argued that police effectiveness becomes particularly important to peo-
ple when personal security is of concern.
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When explaining why some groups may be more positively affected by pro-
cedural justice than others, we can draw from prior research in non-policing 
domains. Prior research suggests that when people feel more uncertain about 
how authorities might view or treat them, procedural justice concerns become 
particularly salient (Van den Bos 2003, p. 483). This again points to the impor-
tant relational aspects of procedural justice. Procedural justice can act as an uncer-
tainty reducer (DeCremer, Brebels & Sedikides, 2008, p. 1524), allaying people’s 
anxiety about how authorities view them. This is because procedural justice can 
promote relationships between those in authority and those they govern. Prior 
psychological research on prejudice also reveals that minority group members 
who identify strongly with their own minority group are more sensitive to signs 
of discrimination and bias (Operario & Fiske 2001, p. 550). Identifying strongly 
with a minority group heightens expectations of unfair treatment and injustice. 
It might be the case that youth, those who see their ethnicity as more central to 
their identity, those who feel more disengaged, and domestic violence victims, 
may feel particularly anxious and uncertain about how police might view them; 
and this explains why they responded more positively to procedural justice in the 
Australian studies.
1.5.3  Counter-terrorism policing studies
Emerging from the Australian procedural justice work on ethnic minority com-
munities was the next wave of Australian research, examining procedural justice 
concerns in the counter-terrorism policing context. While terrorism can be perpe-
trated by any group or individual, the focus of the Australian studies centred on 
Muslim communities. Research abroad had revealed that police struggle to engage 
Muslim communities in counter-terrorism due to Muslims reporting suspicion 
and resentment of counter-terrorism policing and laws, and due to Muslims feel-
ing stigmatised by the association of Islam with terrorism (Innes 2006, p. 237).
In a series of seven studies, Adrian Cherney and Kristina Murphy, and others 
(Cherney & Murphy 2013, 2017; Madon, Murphy & Cherney 2017; Murphy & 
Cherney 2017; Murphy, Madon & Cherney 2017, 2020; Murphy, Cherney & 
Teston 2019), found that procedural justice policing was extremely important 
to Muslims living in Australia. Using survey data collected from 800 Muslims 
living in Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne, Cherney and Murphy (2017) con-
firmed that many Muslims did feel stigmatised by Australia’s policing response 
to Islamist-inspired terrorism (p. 1026). They also revealed that when counter-
terrorism police were perceived to be adhering to procedural justice principles, 
Muslims trusted the police more and were more willing to report terror threats 
to them (p. 1031). In one recent study, Murphy, Madon, and Cherney (2020, 
p. 370) revealed that procedural justice was particularly important for promoting 
a willingness to report terror threats to police for those Muslims who felt most 
stigmatised. These findings again highlight the relational aspects of procedural 
justice. DeCremer and Sedikides (2005, p. 157) showed that when people hold 
greater doubts about their inclusiveness in a group they will be more sensitive 
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to signs of procedural justice and injustice. Those who feel more stigmatised 
by others are likely to hold greater doubts about their acceptance in society. 
Through their interactions with the police, Muslims can construe their perceived 
worth and standing within the broader community by how the police treat them; 
as procedural justice conveys to highly stigmatised individuals that police value 
them and value their input in the fight against terrorism. Overall, these studies 
revealed that even in the challenging domain of counter-terrorism policing—
where Muslims feel highly stigmatised, and police are often viewed with high 
levels of suspicion and scepticism by Muslims—procedural justice can promote 
closer relationships and mutual trust.
1.5.4  Neighbourhood-level studies
In the fourth group of studies, Sargeant, Mazerolle, and Wickes (2016), Sargeant 
and Kochel (2018), and Antrobus et al. (2015) considered community-level 
factors for understanding how police are perceived in Australia. A long history 
of US-based research demonstrates that ‘place’ matters when explaining peo-
ple’s views of police (e.g. Reisig & Parks 2000, p. 607; Weitzer 1999, p. 841). 
Unlike in the US, the Australian studies revealed that attitudes toward police and 
their perceived use of procedural justice varied little between neighbourhoods 
(although Sargeant and Kochel (2018, p. 832) did reveal that neighbourhood 
characteristics and procedural justice perceptions both explained the variation in 
Australians’ willingness to cooperate with police). Two explanations are offered 
for why neighbourhood factors may matter less in Australia. First, policing in 
Australia operates in a very centralised manner at a state and territory level. Thus, 
each state and territory police agency has a single policing function. By contrast, 
policing is much more fragmented in the US. There are over 14,000 policing 
agencies across three levels of government (county, state, and federal) (FBI 2004), 
with agencies at each level being responsible for a different function. Australia’s 
centralised policing model means less potential for interagency rivalry and greater 
intrastate consistency in policing roles, legal responsibilities, service delivery, and 
performance criteria. Second, violent crime rates across suburbs in Australia tend 
to be significantly lower than in the US and vary less between suburbs. In the US, 
many neighbourhoods are also characterised by enduring levels of violent crime. 
Police in these high crime American neighbourhoods often adopt a very different 
approach to those in low crime neighbourhoods; they typically rely more heav-
ily on the use of force, and they place a strong emphasis on deterrence (Weitzer 
1999, p. 822). Unsurprisingly, community attitudes toward police therefore vary 
greatly in the US between high and low crime neighbourhoods.
1.5.5  Applied policing studies
The final collection of studies from Australia canvass collaborative work under-
taken between academics and police agencies, most notably the Queensland 
Police Service. Murphy (2017b, p. 54) recently noted ‘a burgeoning area of study 
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in the procedural justice field has involved researchers working closely with regu-
lators to evaluate procedural justice effects in applied settings’. The Australian 
studies: (a) assessed how police officers perceived the efficacy of procedural jus-
tice, (b) tested whether police could be trained to be more procedurally just in 
encounters with the public, and (c) used randomised controlled trials to evaluate 
the effects of procedural justice policing in the field. Randomised controlled trials 
can overcome some of the limitations of survey research by clarifying the causal 
relationships between predictor variables (e.g. procedural justice) and outcome 
variables (e.g. trust in police). Twelve Australian studies have been published in 
this area to date (see Appendix for the full list of studies).
In general, the studies revealed that training police officers to be more procedur-
ally just in encounters with the public (i.e. training them how to be more respectful, 
to allow citizens a voice, to be neutral in encounters, and to express trustworthy 
motives) had a positive effect on how the public perceived their interactions with 
police. Specifically, the studies revealed that providing training to police about the 
importance of procedural justice did enhance citizens’ trust in police (Murphy, 
Mazerolle, & Bennett, 2014, p. 405); perceptions that police were legitimate (e.g. 
Sargeant et al. 2016, p. 797); satisfaction with a police encounter (e.g., Mazerolle 
et al. 2012, pp. 358–359); and willingness to cooperate with police (e.g. Murphy 
et al. 2014, pp. 417–418). Importantly, the studies also revealed that training 
police in procedural justice made police more aware of their own behaviour (e.g. 
Bates et al. 2015, p. 442) and influenced their attitudes regarding the efficacy of 
procedural justice (e.g. Bond, Murphy & Porter 2015, p. 229).
1.6  Reflections on the challenges of doing empirically 
based procedural justice research and directions for 
future research
This final section provides a brief discussion of the challenges associated with 
doing empirically based procedural justice research. Following this will be some 
reflections on where empirical research on procedural justice policing might be 
headed in the future.
There are several challenges associated with doing empirical procedural justice 
research. The first challenge relates to the cost of quality sampling. Applied survey 
research can be very expensive and can be prohibitive to many researchers. If 
one’s aim is to extrapolate findings to the wider population and to inform actual 
police practice, it is important to ensure that the target sample being studied 
is as representative as possible of the population from which it is drawn, and 
that sufficient numbers have been sampled to provide reliable results. Otherwise 
the validity of one’s findings and conclusions can be challenged. Recruiting a 
large representative sample can be particularly challenging when surveying small 
hard-to-reach minority communities or where language or cultural barriers exist. 
To access such groups, researchers typically require the services of a reputable 
third party survey provider that specialises in recruiting culturally and linguisti-
cally diverse population groups. These research companies have the resources to 
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employ and train non-English speakers to recruit and interview participants, but 
they come with a significant economic outlay to the researcher, which can be 
prohibitive for many researchers.
The second challenge relates to measurement. As already noted, many studies 
in the procedural justice field have been criticised for failing to pay attention to 
measurement issues. The conclusions drawn from studies can be questioned if 
measured constructs have not been rigorously created or validated. While the vast 
majority of Australian studies cited in this chapter did pay attention to measure-
ment issues, some did not. Often scholars who indirectly study procedural justice 
make use of available survey datasets that were not originally designed to measure 
procedural justice or its associated constructs. This practice must be avoided as 
unreliable measures can produce results that conflict with prior research.
Third, embedding procedural justice into actual police work is not without its 
challenges. Organisational factors operating within police agencies (e.g. lack of 
resources, or a culture that opposes the use of procedural justice) can inhibit 
the reliable uptake of strategies that draw on a procedural justice-based polic-
ing model. External factors pertaining to the public and political demands on 
police can also undermine innovation in policing. When police are placed under 
increasing pressure to achieve value for money in service delivery, anything that 
adds to the time they spend on their duties (i.e. procedural justice initiatives such 
as taking time to build trust, allowing citizens a voice, etc.) may be set aside as 
it distracts them from detecting and apprehending criminals. Media and political 
discourse surrounding crime control and the need to ‘get tough’ on crime, and 
the dominance of the deterrence-based model of policing, are likely to be other 
significant barriers to the uptake of procedural justice policing. Procedural jus-
tice may be perceived as the ‘soft on crime’ approach despite research revealing 
that it benefits police in both a relational and instrumental sense. As Mazerolle 
et al. (2014, p. 70) argue, changing police culture to adopt procedural justice 
into service delivery ‘requires organizational support, training, and willingness 
on the part of police’ to adopt and test procedural justice in different operational 
settings. As the Black Lives Matter Movement also highlights, police need to 
pay due attention to procedural justice if they wish to improve relations with 
Australia’s ethnic and racial minority communities.
The procedural justice research described in this chapter has made important 
contributions to policing in Australia. Sarre (2016, pp. 7–8) notes it as one of 
the top ten ‘big bangs’ that have made a difference to Australian policing in the 
past three decades. With this in mind, it is worth mentioning some future direc-
tions that research on procedural justice policing might take. First, procedural 
justice is particularly important for vulnerable groups. Domestic violence victims, 
for example, place a great deal of importance on procedural justice when decid-
ing whether to report future victimisations to police. There is still more to learn 
about how and when procedural justice policing can improve the quality of life 
and justice needs of victims of violent crime. Likewise, ethnic/racial minorities 
respond very well to police adhering to procedural justice. There is still more to 
learn about how, when and why minority groups respond to procedural justice. 
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Second, there are still unanswered questions regarding whether procedural jus-
tice actually changes people’s compliance behaviour. The vast majority of pro-
cedural justice studies rely on survey methods. The associations made between 
self-reported views and behaviour in these studies obscure the causal relationships 
between variables. It is unclear, for example, whether procedural justice results in 
greater compliance with the law or whether those who are more compliant rate 
police as more procedurally just. Therefore, demonstrating that there is a measur-
able impact of procedural justice on actual legal compliance behaviour is a matter 
for further study. Third, scholars have begun to focus attention on police and how 
they think about procedural justice and its effectiveness, their willingness to use it 
in the field, and the barriers to its implementation. More of this type of research is 
warranted as changing police officers’ attitudes to procedural justice can influence 
how police provide their service to the community. Finally, police increasingly 
rely on the use of technology to do their work. It is unclear, for example, what 
impact the rollout of body-worn video cameras has on street-level policing and 
frontline police–citizen interactions. Examining the impact of the use of technol-
ogy in policing on public perceptions of procedural justice is an area ripe for study.
1.7  Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter has provided a summary of the significant body of 
procedural justice policing research undertaken in Australia. The chapter has dis-
cussed how procedural justice has been defined and operationalised in Australian 
research and how the empirical study of procedural justice reveals that procedural 
justice policing can have a number of positive instrumental, normative, and rela-
tional benefits for police and the public. While this research has not been without 
its limitations and challenges, it appears on balance that procedural justice polic-
ing offers police agencies the opportunity to improve their relationship with the 
public. The groundswell of interest in procedural justice policing research is yet 
to wane, and so this chapter concluded with some reflections on possible future 
directions for the field. Police have the power to change their relationship with 
the public. Adhering to procedural justice principles enables police to move from 
a relationship based on deterrence and coercion, to one based on reassuring the 
public that they are there to serve their communities.
Appendix
The appendix presents a list of the 48 published Australian procedural justice 
policing studies canvassed in this chapter. 
Studies with general population samples
Hinds & Murphy (2007)
Murphy, Hinds & Fleming (2008)
Hinds (2009a)
Murphy (2009a)
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Murphy (2009b)
Murphy, Tyler & Curtis (2009)
Bradford, Murphy & Jackson (2014)
Barkworth & Murphy (2015)
Murphy, Sargeant & Cherney (2015)
Murphy (2016)
Sargeant, Murphy & Madon (2017)
Counter-terrorism policing studies
Cherney & Murphy (2013)
Cherney & Murphy (2017)
Madon, Murphy & Cherney (2017)
Murphy, Madon & Cherney (2017)
Murphy & Cherney (2017)
Murphy, Madon & Cherney (2018)




Murphy & Cherney (2011)
Elliott, Thomas & Ogloff (2011)
Elliott, Thomas & Ogloff (2012)
Murphy & Cherney (2012)
Miles-Johnson (2013)
Murphy (2013)
Murphy & Barkworth (2014)
Sargeant, Murphy & Cherney (2014)
Murphy (2015) 
Bates, Allen & Watson (2016)
Barkworth & Murphy (2016)
Murphy & Cherney (2017)
Madon, Murphy & Sargeant (2017)
Neighborhood-level studies
Antrobus, Bradford, Murphy & Sargeant (2015)
Sargeant, Mazerolle & Wickes (2016)
Sargeant & Kochel (2018)
Applied policing studies
Mazerolle, Bennett, Antrobus & Eggins (2012)
Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett & Tyler (2013)
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Murphy, Mazerolle & Bennett (2014)
Bond, Murphy & Porter (2015)
Bates, Antrobus, Bennett & Martin (2015)
Fildes, Murphy & Porter (2016)
Sargeant, Antrobus, Murphy, Bennett & Mazerolle (2016)
Antrobus & Pilloto (2016)
Murphy (2017a)
Bennett, Newman & Sydes (2017)
Murphy & Mazerolle (2018)
Antrobus, Thompson & Ariel (2019)
Notes
1 I acknowledge the funding support of the Australian Research Council (Grant 
Number FT180100139).
2 Construct validity refers to the degree to which something measures what it 
claims, or purports, to be measuring.
3 Cronbach’s alpha is a statistical calculation performed on survey data and is a 
measure of internal consistency; that is, it measures how closely related a set of 
items are as a group. It is considered to be a measure of scale reliability.
4 Additional papers have been written in Australia but they were discussion pieces, 
relied on qualitative interview data, were contained in conference proceedings, 
or examined the relevance of procedural justice in non-policing contexts. Hence, 
they are not reviewed in this chapter.
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2.1  Introduction
Challenges faced by juries in performing their duties are well documented. These 
include the unfamiliarity and gravity of the assignment, the absence of guidance 
on key tasks, inadequate remuneration, working with strangers, and grappling 
with highly technical legalese (Goodman-Delahunty et al. 2008; Peter-Hagene, 
Salerno & Phalen 2019). Criticisms of jury competence are perennial, and rely on 
dominant narratives, many of which have been exposed as myths (Bornstein & 
Greene 2017). Unsurprisingly, avoidance of jury duty is a common response to 
a jury summons (Sams, Neal & Brodsky 2013, p. 4). Jury reforms in this context 
are constant, and not necessarily evidence-based.
Most jury reform efforts centre on judicial directions, and are often ad hoc 
(Clough et al. 2019, p. 1). This focus derives from an outmoded model of jury 
information processing—a judicial myth that juries understand and adhere to 
every direction from the court, so all that has to be done is modify the directions 
to accomplish new judicial objectives. As more judges come to accept that juries 
struggle to understand and apply legal jury instructions, reliance on linguistic 
simplification to remedy the communication problem is diminishing. For exam-
ple, during his tenure as Chair of the NSW Law Reform Commission, Justice 
Wood led initiatives to increase the participation of citizens on juries and sup-
ported a range of interventions to improve communications between courts and 
juries (Goodman-Delahunty 2015, p. 58). Contemporary reforms incorporate 
a paradigm shift that respectfully acknowledges jurors’ active engagement as 
fact-finders:
It is true that, in modern times, it is seen as important that the jury be 
accorded respect, and not treated as passive recipients or mere observers of 
the trial process.
(Tootle v R (2017) 94 NSWLR 430 [59] (Simpson JA))
This chapter examines research on jury reforms and trial innovations related to 
procedural fairness to juries and to the accused.
Procedural fairness and 
jury satisfaction
An analysis of relational dimensions
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Procedural fairness and jury satisfac-
tion
2.1.1  Procedural fairness in jury trials
A leading social psychological theory applied in the justice sector draws on the 
Group Value Relational Model (Tyler 1989) to support policies and practices 
that focus on interpersonal relational values. Procedural Justice Theory contends 
that the behaviour of an authority figure is evaluated in terms of what it com-
municates regarding the social relationship between the individual citizen and 
the authority. Thus, the manner in which disputes are handled has an important 
influence upon people’s evaluations of their experiences in court and of the crimi-
nal justice process. Some research has explored ways in which procedural justice 
can be incorporated into courts. Notably, these findings
do not apply only to litigants or other members of the public who come to 
court (the ‘clients’ of the court system). They also apply to the people who 
work within the court system … and the same principles that can be used to 
design efforts to deal with the public also apply to efforts to design effective 
approaches to dealing with the people working within the criminal justice 
system.
(Tyler 2008, p. 29)
Another important factor is the perceived legitimacy of the laws and confidence 
in the justice system—a factor that seems to be directly associated with perceived 
procedural justice (Murphy 2018; Murphy, Tyler & Curtis 2009).
The four key principles or tenets of procedural justice are respect, trustworthi-
ness, neutrality, and voice (Tyler 1989, 2008). We consider these four concepts in 
turn, both their direct effects on juries, and to a lesser extent, to the accused with 
an indirect effect on juries.
In its original formulation, respectful treatment refers to the treatment of citi-
zens with professionalism and dignity. Respect could refer to the consideration the 
judge shows the jury: acknowledging their contribution, providing clear instruc-
tions, giving the jury comfort breaks, and giving them opportunities to ask ques-
tions when appropriate. Additionally, respect could refer to democratic practice in 
the jury room: civil discourse, taking turns to speak, and attempting to incorporate 
diverse perspectives into a common view. In this chapter, we focus on the respect 
shown to the accused by the way they are accommodated in court and the conse-
quential effects on juries. A more general issue this raises is the way the design of 
court facilities incorporates principles affording dignity to different participants.
Trustworthiness refers to the public perception of courts’ openness, sincerity, 
and motivation to serve the best interests of the jury and community. The notion 
of trustworthiness could draw attention to the integrity and credibility of judges 
in the eyes of jurors, but could also refer to how the public think about the jury 
system itself and particular verdicts.
Neutrality is the perceived absence of biased treatment. In one sense juries 
should be neutral. Clearly, jurors should not pre-judge a matter and should come 
46 Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al. 
with an open mind to the case—unlike early English juries where prior knowl-
edge of the matter was precisely what was required. Jurors are expected, however, 
to bring common sense. Further, as members of a diverse community, jurors 
come with a range of expectations, preconceptions, and biases. Potentially this is 
an advantage, in that the jury deliberation can provide an opportunity for jurors 
to challenge each other and bring their different experiences of life to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and the accused to decide how much of their evidence 
to accept. However, this may sometimes be wishful thinking. Jurors may share 
stereotyped views about members of minority or disadvantaged populations; they 
may (often unconsciously) apply assumptions about how a mother should react 
to the loss of a child, how people of a particular ethnic group treat women, or 
how priests can be expected to behave with children.
Voice refers to citizens’ sense of being heard and having their input valued 
(Goodman-Delahunty 2010, pp. 404–405). As such, voice is the one aspect of 
procedural justice that seems least relevant to the role of the jury. For the most 
part, jurors silently and passively observe the criminal trial (Dann & Hans 2004, 
p. 12). They do not disagree openly with the judge, talk to the witnesses in the 
corridor, talk to fellow jurors as they listen to the evidence, or ‘friend’ the pros-
ecutor or the defence lawyer on Facebook. Indeed, jurors who do any of these 
things could find themselves in trouble. When they sit on a jury trial, the normal 
forms of voice that jurors use in their everyday lives are closed to them. Yet voice 
is fundamental to jury deliberation, and to the oral process that is a public trial. 
What witnesses say on the stand constitutes the raw material for the jury to con-
sider and evaluate in order to make their findings of fact. In doing so, the jury 
finally gets their chance to use their voice, as they review, assess, deliberate, and 
try to reach consensus. Yet it is a constrained voice. Common law juries almost 
never give reasons for their decision. Voice for the accused in a jury trial also takes 
an unusual form, namely the right to remain silent, a right that many counsels 
advise their clients to exercise. For the jury this may mean that they do not hear 
‘both’ sides of a case; they hear mostly the prosecution evidence and have to 
decide if it reaches the standard prescribed by the court.
The four elements identified in the procedural justice literature shine light on 
some aspects of jury trials. We distinguish respectful treatment of jurors and the per-
ceived legitimacy of jury trials in general from fairness to the accused. We deal with 
each of these in turn as we review contemporary jury interventions in the following 
sections. Chief among these are innovations to enhance the physical environment 
and quality of technology in courtrooms (Section 2.2); to entrust juries with evidence 
presumed to be prejudicial and supplement jury directions with fact-based ques-
tion trails (Section 2.3); and to increase jury participation in the trial (Section 2.4). 
Finally, we discuss legitimacy of the jury and confidence in the jury system.
2.2  Procedural justice through the physical environment
An extensive body of research examines how juries make decisions. By contrast, 
relatively little research explores how jurors are influenced by elements of their 
environment, such as the design of the courtroom or jury room, the placement of 
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the accused, or the technology used in court. Attention to these aspects of the jury 
experience centres on two procedural justice tenets, namely, respect and neutrality.
Several studies have documented the physical discomfort that many jurors 
experience in poorly designed, physically inadequate jury boxes, and cramped 
deliberation rooms with no spaces to relax or unwind (Goodman-Delahunty 
et al. 2008, p. 108). Australian and New Zealand judges reported that the poor 
courtroom acoustics made communication difficult (Clough et al. 2019, p. 54). 
In one Sydney courtroom, a large pillar blocks visual contact between witnesses 
and jurors, so the jury has to view the witness on a video screen. While some 
of the research uses experimental methods, it is more difficult to access realistic 
courtroom environments than psychology laboratories more commonly used to 
explore other jury-related issues.
2.2.1  Jurors: respectful jury facilities
The courtroom
The courtroom has not always been a safe and comfortable place for jurors. 
English courtrooms were typically cold, draughty, and, at least until the nine-
teenth century, rife with infectious diseases. Court officials and architects came to 
believe that a well-designed courtroom was essential to evoke the right emotional 
responses in jurors, a principle expressed in the nineteenth-century re-design of 
the Palais de Justice in Paris:
In a nondescript courtroom, cold and mean, the architecture cannot help 
the juror to comprehend the gravity of his role, the weight of the terrible 
responsibility that he assumes. In a room in which the forms, proportions 
and decorations are out of the ordinary, able to astonish and surprise, his 
emotions are different, he feels that he has been removed from his milieu to 
an exceptional, abnormal situation.
(Narjoux cited in Taylor 1993, p. 101)
The ideal courtroom was therefore conceptualised as one that took jurors out of 
their everyday lives to assume the ‘terrible responsibility’ of their office. As for 
forms, proportions and decorations being ‘out of the ordinary’, school children 
perform worse when visual stimulation in the environment is high, so jurors may 
be similarly distracted by overly ornate courtrooms (Barrett et al. 2015, p. 129).
Designing respectful jury spaces in the modern courtroom, more prosaically, 
focuses on providing comfortable spaces that allow jurors to concentrate on 
their task (Ingham & Spencer 1977) describe similar aspects in medical waiting 
rooms). As the design standards for the Western Australian justice system specify:
Jurors should be extended the comfort and courtesies appropriate to people 
who must concentrate and remain alert for what can in some cases be for 
extended periods of time.
(Government of Western Australia 2017, p. 68)
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Other design features of the courtroom may reflect the level of respect with which 
the justice system treats the jury, and may potentially affect jurors’ ability to lis-
ten attentively to the evidence and contribute to a more relaxed, or conversely 
stressed, jury. While there are few studies that document how more respectful 
spaces improve jury performance—specifically how listening more attentively is 
likely to render a more accurate verdict—we can draw tentative conclusions from 
research carried out with other groups in other workplaces. For example, in other 
workplaces, good lighting, thermal comfort, and an absence of noise has been 
found to contribute to increased comfort and less tired workers (Vischer 2007). 
We also know that students are more likely to keep ‘on task’ when they have 
full-spectrum lighting (Pulay 2015, p. 74). Attention to lighting may likewise be 
important for jurors’ comfort and ability to attend to the trial. Another study has 
demonstrated that perceived privacy increases satisfaction with the work environ-
ment (Ruijter 2006, p. 7). For jurors, an innovation to address privacy could 
include modesty panels in front of the first row of jury seats.
The jury room
Special areas for juries to deliberate were not necessary for Greek or Roman 
juries, who voted immediately after hearing the evidence. Nor were they always 
available for English juries until the eighteenth century—jurors usually huddled 
together to reach their decision without retiring. But juries did not deliberate 
for long. Juries in seventeenth-century England typically heard between 12 and 
20 cases in a day (Phillips & Thomas 1986, p. 207). If they could not agree, it 
was standard practice until 1870 to lock them up overnight ‘without meat, drink, 
fire and tobacco’ (Phillips & Thomas 1986, p. 210).
With longer trials and more evidence to sort through, jury rooms began to 
become more comfortable, and juror treatment more respectful. Jury facilities 
built since the 1990s in three Australian states were rated by jurors more favour-
ably than those in older courthouses. Satisfaction with the comfort of the jury 
room ranged from a high of 73% for the 5-year-old Victorian County Court in 
Melbourne to a low of 26% for the Downing Centre in Sydney, converted from a 
department store in 1985 (Goodman-Delahunty et al. 2008, p. 138). Features of 
jury rooms with considerable variation between older and newer courts included 
direct access to outdoor space (garden or balcony) and natural ventilation (access 
and quality) (Goodman-Delahunty et al. 2008, pp. 119–121). Architectural 
enhancements such as these have a measurable impact on juror satisfaction, and 
convey greater respect shown to jurors by the justice system.
The design of furniture in the jury room may impact the ability of individual 
jurors to have their say—to voice—during deliberation. The position of jurors at 
a rectangular jury table influences power dynamics and interactions among jurors, 
with the person seated at the head of the table most likely to be voted foreper-
son, and people seated at right angles more likely to interact with each other 
than with those either across the table or alongside (Sommer 1959, p. 401). 
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A round or square table might produce more equal interactions (Sommer 1961, 
p. 108). To address some of these concerns, a report to the Western Australian 
Law Reform Commission recommended replacing rectangular with round tables 
for jury deliberation (Kennedy & Tait 1999, p. 1050). Size constraints in many 
jury rooms made this impractical, so new jury rooms tend to provide an oval 
table for jury use. Whether this type of deliberation space gives more voice to less 
confident jurors or produces mutual respect is largely unknown.
2.2.2  The accused: neutral spaces in the courtroom for the accused
How the accused is accommodated in the courtroom can influence jury percep-
tions of the accused, and consequently the fairness of the trial process and out-
come. This issue has generated much judicial and academic commentary and a 
small number of experimental studies. Key questions are i) how the accused can 
be granted a voice in the trial proceedings (generally described as instructing 
counsel), and (ii) whether the placement of the accused in the courtroom conveys 
respect for their human dignity, and is perceived as neutral rather than prejudi-
cial. The jury is, in a sense, the critical test for each of these.
Nineteenth-century juries tended to see the accused in a designated area vari-
ously known as a box, a dock, or bench (Anklagebank or banc des accusés). In 
European courts, the accused spoke and was questioned from this position; in 
common law countries, the accused moved to a witness stand. The use of a dock 
was challenged in a 1914 Pennsylvania case on the grounds that placement of 
the accused in a dock undermined his right to consult his lawyer (Commonwealth 
v Boyd, 246 Pa 529, 535 (1914)) and thereby his right to voice. Any form of 
visible constraint was ruled unacceptable in 1970 by the US Supreme Court in 
Illinois v Allen (397 US 337, 344 (1970)) for undermining the right to dignity. 
Meanwhile, in 2005 the US Supreme Court held that any mark of restraint, 
including a dock, undermined the presumption of innocence and could create 
prejudice in the minds of jurors (Deck v Missouri, 554 US 622, IIIA (2005)). 
Similar shifts away from the use of an enclosed area for the accused occurred in 
Germany, Ireland, and Scandinavian countries, while Australia, the UK, and most 
of Central and Eastern Europe moved towards greater use of security docks of 
some sort (Tait 2011, p. 468, 478–479). But what evidence is there that isolating 
the accused in this way may compromise jury neutrality and jeopardise the fair-
ness of the trial for the accused?
Generally, we associate people with the environment in which they appear—the 
ecological contamination hypothesis (Werthman & Piliavin 1967, p. 56), or the 
‘room with a cue’ (Gosling et al. 2002, p. 387). Thus, confining accused persons 
within the courtroom may signal to the jury that they are dangerous. One field 
experimental study, using a terrorism scenario and mock jurors in a high-secu-
rity counter-terrorism courtroom, revealed that the accused was about 1.8 times 
more likely to be convicted (and to appear ‘dangerous’) if he was seated in a dock, 
compared to being seated beside his lawyer at the bar table (Rossner et al. 2017). 
The dock provided a ‘box with a cue’ for the jury telling them that the accused 
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was guilty. A subsequent mock jury study, using a dog-fighting scenario and a 
low-security courtroom, replicated this finding (Tait et al. 2017). If the accused 
person was seated in a dock in the courtroom, he was 1.7 times more likely to be 
convicted for that matter than when sitting alongside his lawyer in court, or in a 
remote location. These studies support the US Supreme Court’s assertion that 
any form of visible constraint of the accused can be prejudicial.
Fairness for the accused may also potentially be threatened by another aspect 
of court design—the relative position of the two parties. A fundamental principle 
of an adversarial contest, such as a trial, is equality of arms. This includes whether 
either party is given a physical position in court that affords them a symbolic 
advantage. In older French courts, the Avocat général, the prosecutor, typically 
sits on a throne, in a red gown fringed with ermine, and, when standing, is the 
tallest person in the room. By contrast, the defence lawyer is located in the well 
of the court, usually dressed in black. The cue provided to the jury by this place-
ment could be that the voice of the prosecutor counts more than the voice of the 
defence lawyer. Largely for this reason, newer French courts tend to place the 
two parties at the same level. Differences in common law courts are more subtle, 
but the lawyer whose table is closest to the jury might have an advantage by virtue 
of proximity.
2.3  Procedural justice through the management of 
evidence and jury directions
A series of innovations in jury trials centres on the trustworthiness of juries and 
their neutrality. These include procedural features such as management of the 
evidence to which juries are exposed, to avoid bias, and greater attention to the 
capacities and welfare of juries, reflected in jury instructions on the law, and the 
availability of counselling services for jurors.
2.3.1  Exclusion of prejudicial information
To ensure the right of the accused to a fair trial, a number of jury procedures have 
been implemented to avoid the risk of verdicts based on unfair prejudice. This 
includes the exclusion from a trial of relevant probative evidence. This is more 
critical in jury systems that follow the English model, with lay jurors deliberating 
on their own. In most mixed-panel jury systems where jurors and judges deliberate 
together, wider tolerance is given to evidence admitted during the trial, including 
evidence about prior convictions of the accused. Exclusion of such information 
may, however, demonstrate a lack of trust in the jury. In some cases, evidence that 
is withheld from the jury is available to the trial judge in a judge-alone trial, and 
the extent to which this evidence may be unfairly prejudicial is not empirically 
validated. For example, judges would typically not allow jurors to see beheading 
videos that the prosecution argues are relevant to a case, although the judge may 
view them themselves in a judge-only trial (Goodman-Delahunty 2017).
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Studies of real jurors in Australia and New Zealand indicate that jurors often 
believe that they do not get all the relevant evidence they need to arrive at a 
fair and impartial decision (Horan 2012; Young, Cameron & Tinsley 1999), 
particularly in word-against-word cases. Juries are often frustrated by what they 
perceive as gaps in the trial evidence, and by the application of evidentiary rules 
that preclude courts and lawyers from placing all salient probative facts before 
them. For instance, evidence from multiple complainants about their experiences 
with the same defendant is often excluded to ensure that juries do not engage in 
impermissible reasoning that is unfairly prejudicial to the accused. This issue was 
investigated in a realistic live controlled jury simulation study using examples of 
institutional child sexual abuse by a repeat offender. Mock jurors attended either 
(a) a standard trial including one complainant; (b) a trial in which additional 
evidence about grooming behaviour and four uncharged acts of sexual abuse 
against the same complainant were provided; or (c) a trial in which additional 
evidence about four uncharged acts by the accused against two additional victims 
was presented (Goodman-Delahunty & Martschuk 2020). The major finding 
was that juries exposed to evidence of additional sexual misconduct by the same 
perpetrator (tendency evidence) did not engage in unfairly prejudicial reasoning. 
Jury observations and content analyses of deliberations showed that exposure 
to evidence of prior offending by the accused did not cause juries to lower the 
standard of proof or render verdicts that were emotionally driven, illogical, based 
on accumulation of evidence, or confusion of charged and uncharged acts.
From a procedural justice standpoint, the admission of probative background 
evidence conveys trust in the jury and respect for their conscientiousness in avoid-
ing bias. Withholding this information not only frustrates juries, but conveys dis-
respect by insinuating their verdicts are untrustworthy, prone to bias and unfair 
prejudice. Among the actions that jurors may engage in when they perceive gaps 
in the relevant information needed to reach a fair decision is to resort to social 
media to conduct extra-curial research, e.g. internet searches, to which we now 
turn.
2.3.2  Jury directions prohibiting internet research
Typically, juries receive judicial directions that forbid internet research accom-
panied by information about the consequential criminal penalties. For example, 
section 68C of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) prohibits a juror from seeking informa-
tion about the accused or any matters relevant to the trial, and punishes viola-
tions with a sentence of up to two years in prison. Academics, legal practitioners, 
and judges (Sweeney 2011) have acknowledged that the traditional paradigm of 
judicial instructions with a threat of sanctions is premised on passive pre-internet 
jurors, but does not work reliably with contemporary active, information-seeking, 
internet-aware jurors.
Internationally, since access to this technology became widespread, the number 
of ‘Google mistrials’ burgeoned. In one Florida drug trial, 9 out of 12 jurors admit-
ted conducting internet research on the case (Blackman & Brickman 2011, p. 2). 
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In high profile trials and in trials where information about the trial is posted on 
the internet, more jurors are prone to violate the judicial direction (Hannaford-
Agor, Rottman & Waters 2012, p. 3).
Research with US juries serving on 35 trials revealed that most jurors wanted 
to use the internet to conduct research to assist them in their jury duties 
because they were accustomed to using social media in this way on a daily basis 
(Hannaford-Agor, Rottman & Waters 2012, p. 6). Approximately one-third 
of jurors misunderstand the scope of the judicial admonition regarding social 
media (Hannaford-Agor, Rottman & Waters 2012, p. 6). This was often because 
‘Googling’ was not regarded as an activity comprising ‘research’, but was per-
ceived as something more informal, and an exercise of juror engagement or 
voice. Other jurors believed that using the internet to obtain general information 
was not prohibited because they understood the prohibited conduct to apply to 
searches for specific information pertaining to the parties and the particular case 
(Hannaford-Agor, Rottman & Waters 2012, p. 6). For instance, many jurors did 
not recognise that use of the internet to check definitions of terms that were not 
explained by witnesses or legal counsel constitutes proscribed ‘research’ because 
they regard this as non-prejudicial, neutral extrinsic information, necessary to 
perform their duties.
Researchers have attributed juror non-compliance with judicial directions to 
several factors. Some emphasise that the judicial direction is counter-intuitive to 
contemporary jurors, who are accustomed to reliance on the internet (Waters & 
Hannaford-Agor 2014, pp. 2735, 2737). Contemporary jurors rely extensively 
on the internet to inform their decision-making in other aspects of their lives, 
such as health care, finances, and education. From the individual juror’s perspec-
tive, such research aims to produce a more trustworthy, well-informed verdict. 
From the point of view of public confidence in justice, however, it suggests that 
the integrity of the jury process and the authority of judges could be diminished.
An Australian field study explored what motivated jurors to engage in internet 
and other independent investigations. A total of 78 New South Wales jurors who 
served on criminal trials in the period 2005–2006 and 2011 were interviewed. 
Results disclosed that it is the conscientious jurors who feel most compelled 
to conduct independent research to reach a fairer and well-informed decision 
(Hunter 2013, p. 37). A major case-related factor explaining jurors’ compulsion 
to conduct research is incomplete or insufficient evidence. Jurors knowingly defy 
judicial directions to refrain from independent research because they perceive a 
higher duty to return a more robust and trustworthy verdict, and are more prone 
to do so when the evidence presented at trial seems incomplete (Horan 2012, 
pp. 166–167).
Courts responding to jury use of the internet should respect the need by 
jurors, especially conscientious jurors, for more information. Allowing juries to 
submit questions to the court or to witnesses is an innovation proposed to reduce 
independent juror investigations and internet use (Hoffmeister 2015, p. 994). 
This innovation (discussed below) increases jury participation in trials, reflects 
respect for and trust in juries, and increases their voice.
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2.3.3  Aiding jury decision-making with questions
After decades of research confirming that juries often struggle to understand and 
apply legal directions provided at the conclusion of a trial (Peter-Hagene, Salerno 
& Phalen 2019, p. 353), a number of jurisdictions have experimented with an 
innovation that removes this burden from jurors and focuses on their fact-find-
ing abilities. By embedding the law and relevant facts in a series of questions 
that are posed to juries, called a ‘question trail’ (Spivak, Ogloff & Clough 2019, 
p. 443), the need to provide juries with lengthy instructions on legal definitions 
and principles is obviated. Among logistic advantages of this approach are that it 
could shorten deliberation times, thereby reducing demands on court space and 
resources. However, the primary objective is to encourage the jury to handle the 
evidence in a systematic way that will allow them to reach a fair decision. In other 
words, juries are trusted to understand what the evidence is and how it is relevant 
to the choice they have to make.
Nowadays, more judges are adopting fact-based directions (Clough et al. 2019, 
p. 50). For example, this approach is routine in New Zealand courts. Evidence 
about the benefits of this approach comes from a realistic trial simulation with 
403 mock jurors who deliberated to a verdict using standard judicial directions 
or standard directions accompanied by a question trail (Goodman-Delahunty, 
Cossins & Martschuk 2016, pp. 222–230). Results showed that question trail use 
increased the efficiency of jury decision-making and reduced deliberation time. 
Jurors who used the question trail reported significantly less cognitive effort to 
reach a unanimous verdict than those who did not. Content analyses of jury 
deliberations revealed that mock jurors given a question trail spent more time on 
discussion of the charges, judicial principles, and instructions than jurors given 
traditional jury directions.
Similarly, mock jurors reported expending less cognitive effort to evaluate the 
defence case when assisted by the question trail. Such effects are either logisti-
cal (less time taken), or provide psychological benefits for the jurors themselves 
(reduced cognitive load). Whether the decisions made are fairer to the accused 
is yet to be established. It is possible, for example, in matters where the jury may 
be considering nullification, where they consider the prosecution is over-zealous 
or the law is unjust, that a question trail may act as a constraint on their voice.
2.3.4  Juror counselling
Increasingly, courts acknowledge that jury participation may come with a cost, 
as the experience of jury service can cause some jurors significant stress and anxi-
ety. This is due to a number of factors, including unfamiliarity with the task, the 
burden of isolation and secrecy, uncertainty, financial insecurity, the explicit or 
traumatic nature of the evidence (Goodman-Delahunty 2017, p. 91), conflicts 
with other jurors, and the gravity of consequences of a life-altering verdict.
The dominant jurisprudential concern has been the extent of discomfort while 
evidence is displayed, rather than the impact on a juror’s subsequent wellbeing 
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and decision-making, or the types of procedural measures to ensure psychological 
support for jurors, so that juror stress can be avoided or minimised. Surprisingly, a 
survey of judges in Australia and New Zealand revealed that not all courts inform 
jurors of the availability of juror counselling services, and that some judges were 
unaware of available services within their own courts (Clough et al. 2019, p. 55).
Favourable cues to the trustworthiness of authorities come from indications 
that their intentions are benevolent, caring, and sincere in trying to do what is 
best for the people with whom they are dealing (Murphy 2018). Contemporary 
courts are showing more genuine concern for the welfare of jurors, in line with 
the procedural tenet of trust. They are educating judges and juries to better rec-
ognise symptoms of psychological distress, informing them of available counsel-
ling services, and providing trial debriefing after a case closes to assist jurors in 
dealing with the aftermath of jury service (Report of the Standing Committee 
on Justice and Human Rights 2018, pp. 19–24). Arguably, these measures also 
reflect a more respectful treatment of juries and increase their satisfaction with 
jury duty (Miller & Bornstein 2013, pp. 252, 254, 256).
2.4  Procedural justice through increased jury participation
Enabling jurors to participate more actively in a trial increases the procedural jus-
tice tenet of voice. Examples of trial procedures that expanded jurors’ voice are 
notetaking and allowing jurors to submit questions to witnesses.
2.4.1  Taking notes
The role of juries as observant bystanders during a trial is largely passive. 
Nevertheless, there are some small shifts to increase jury participation during 
the trial. Allowing, or more strongly encouraging, jurors to take notes is one 
practice that has been adopted in many jurisdictions. This assists jurors to keep 
track of the evidence, particularly over a long trial, rather than relying on the 
necessarily selective summing up of counsel to remind them of the main lines of 
argument and points of evidence. In some older courtrooms on a hot afternoon, 
any manual activity, including notetaking, may help jurors to remain alert and 
awake. Notetaking can assist jurors to ask questions of witnesses. However, the 
main benefit of juror notetaking is the expectation that it will assist in delibera-
tion. When jurors take notes, this makes it more likely that important evidence 
is discussed around the jury table. In addition, faulty memories of some jurors 
are corrected by reference to contemporaneous notes taken by others. Given that 
one of the claimed advantages of the jury system is the way the selection process 
may result in jurors with rather different backgrounds and views being able to 
challenge each other’s prejudices, it is expected that they will similarly be able to 
correct and challenge each other’s notes.
That at least is the theory. In practice, any improvement in the collective mem-
ory resulting from juror notetaking is ‘modest’ (Dann & Hans 2004, p. 14), 
although jurors tend to believe the practice improves their recall and judges are 
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strongly in favour of it. However, there are no reported downsides to the prac-
tice, such as lengthening the deliberation process or giving more weight in the 
jury room to the views of those who chose to take notes. Jurors who took notes 
were likely to recall more legally relevant facts (Hope, Eales & Mirashi 2014, p. 
325). Whether case outcomes are impacted by notetaking is unclear. In a recent 
study using a criminal vignette, whether mock jurors took notes made no differ-
ence to verdict, verdict certainty or verdict satisfaction (Thorley, Baxter & Lorek 
2016, p. 567). Perhaps civil verdicts may be more susceptible to the influence of 
notetaking. Mock jurors who took notes distinguished between the legal situa-
tions of plaintiffs better than those who did not (Foster, Horowitz & Bourgeois 
1994, p. 576). In another study, damage awards from mock juries who did not 
take notes were higher than those from their counterparts who did (Horowitz & 
Bordens 2002, pp. 383–384).
There are several forms in which notes may be taken. Jurors are likely to take 
more complete notes if they are given organisational cues in the form of a struc-
tured notebook with headings than if they write their notes freestyle (Thorley, 
Baxter & Lorek 2016, p. 568). When jurors structured their own notebooks 
in a systematic way, they had better recall than jurors who were less organised 
(Rosenhan, Eisner & Robinson 1994, pp. 58–59). On the other hand, better 
notes do not necessarily translate into the ability to retrieve information subse-
quently (Thorley, Baxter & Lorek 2016, p. 569). Retrieval of information may 
improve with the use of tablets rather than paper to take notes. With an evidence 
book on tablets, some jurisdictions allow jurors to add their own notes in digital 
form, avoiding the need for two different technologies. This has two important 
consequences, both of which have yet to be studied in detail. The first is that the 
notes may tag or highlight the evidence, providing not so much a summary as 
an interpretation or cue. Second, having an evidence book in digital form allows 
the original evidence to form the basis of jury deliberation, with the annotations 
providing speedy access to the relevant place in the evidence book. Juries tend to 
find information more quickly on iPads than paper evidence books (McDonald 
et al. 2015), and with the additional cues provided by annotations, this process 
may be hastened still further.
There are some questions about the efficacy of these studies. For example, 
the effectiveness of notetaking may be greater in real trials than those reported 
for mock juries. Most mock jury studies are necessarily limited in time, with the 
length of performance typically about 30 minutes, compared to the typical trial 
which would run for anywhere from three days to six months. It is easier to recall 
something that one saw 15 minutes ago than six months ago. Further, mock 
trial scenarios tend to be ordered and parsimonious, whereas real trials are often 
confusing and repetitive. With many short mock trials, the failure to obtain sig-
nificant improvements in memory simply reflects the fact that most participants 
are already near the top of the range.
In terms of the four elements of procedural justice outlined above, notetaking 
is relevant to all. It facilitates a voice for jurors, making the opportunity to ask 
questions of witnesses less stressful (compared to relying solely on memory), as 
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well as allowing less confident jurors a prop to use in deliberation. In a mixed jury 
system, having notes might balance the scales a little, giving lay jurors some written 
material to access during deliberation to counter the advantage given professional 
jurors who have read the written dossier. The very act of writing notes empowers 
the jurors to select the evidence they consider relevant and provide their own inter-
pretation of what they hear rather than relying on the unmediated statements of 
counsel (or the judge). The opportunity to take notes is a small mark of the respect 
accorded to the jury by the court; it assumes the members of the jury are not just 
competent in oral communication, but literate in written communication as well. 
Jury neutrality may be enhanced if notetaking reduces errors or omissions when 
recalling the evidence in deliberations. However, while taking notes necessarily 
involves the selection of what is most relevant, jurors are more likely to write down 
what they hear as they hear it, allowing them to cross-check what others say later. 
In the jury room this prompted memory aid may contribute to greater weight 
being given to the evidence adduced in court, at the expense of retrospective 
hunches, prejudicial comments, or other statements that could violate neutrality.
2.4.2  Asking questions
Traditionally, courts dealt with questions from juries that arose in the course of 
their post-trial deliberations, often simply by advising the jury to reread the jury 
directions. Starting in the late 1990s, courts experimented by allowing jurors to 
submit questions during the trial at the conclusion of a witness examination, after 
the counsel’s presentation of the evidence (Heuer & Penrod 1994; Mott 2003). 
Among the noted benefits were that jurors were better informed, thus less prone 
to bias. An analysis of the frequency and type of questions asked by jurors in 
North American trials revealed that the mean number per trial was 16 questions, 
although juries posed twice as many questions in criminal than civil trials. The 
researcher observed that the questions were intended to enhance the jury role as 
neutral fact-finder (Mott 2003, p. 119), in line with the procedural justice tenet of 
neutrality. This innovation was also rated as more respectful of jurors, by regarding 
them as ‘intelligent and contributing members of the justice system’ (Mott 2003, 
p. 1120). Jurors’ questions fell into three major categories, seeking clarification 
of (a) legal standards; (b) the parties’ or witnesses’ motives; and (c) evidence. A 
smaller proportion of questions were about legal procedures or the meaning of 
legal directions. Conversely, if jurors are discouraged from asking questions they 
may perceive themselves as bystanders and more passive participants in jury trials, 
which may increase their dissatisfaction with the justice process (Horan 2012).
2.5  The legitimacy of the jury
Perceived procedural justice shapes satisfaction with the justice process (Murphy 
2018), because it increases the perceived legitimacy of the laws. The perceived 
legitimacy of the jury is reflected in confidence in the jury system by the public, 
jurors, and legal practitioners.
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2.5.1  Confidence of jurors in justice
One claimed benefit of the jury system, or more particularly participating in the 
system as a juror, is that it will increase citizen confidence in the justice process. 
Jurors will, it is claimed, see for themselves how the system works, and develop 
an enhanced respect for the rule of law. This increased awareness would not relate 
to one trial or one judge, but to the system as a whole. Perceived legitimacy of 
the justice process could translate into greater support for judges and courts, and 
less criticism of the system as a whole when citizens disagree with the outcome 
of one trial.
Overall, Australian jurors have a moderate degree of confidence in the criminal 
justice process, as shown in a large-scale study of Australian jury-eligible citi-
zens (Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins & Martschuk 2016) using the Pretrial Juror 
Attitude Questionnaire (Lecci & Myers 2008). Compared to jurors in the United 
Kingdom (Furnham & Alison 1994) or the United States (Chapdelaine & Griffin 
1997), Australians held more pro-prosecution attitudes (Goodman-Delahunty, 
Martschuk & Cheung 2020). This is a measure of the trustworthiness of one 
element of the criminal justice process, but given the items used to measure it, is 
likely to diminish another key feature of the justice system—the presumption of 
innocence.
At the same time, jurors’ exposure to and contact with the court may influence 
their confidence in the criminal justice process (Diamond 1993). Despite initial 
reluctance to serve on juries, at the completion of their service, most jurors express 
a high degree of satisfaction (Cutler & Hughes 2001; Matthews, Hancock & 
Briggs 2004). For instance, a survey of empanelled and non-empanelled jurors in 
three different states in Australia showed that more extensive participation in the 
court process (non-empanelled jurors versus empanelled jurors discharged before 
deliberation versus empanelled jurors who deliberated to a verdict) was associated 
with significantly higher satisfaction with their jury experience and increased con-
fidence in the criminal justice process (O’Brien et al. 2008). These findings were 
replicated in an experimental simulation with jury-eligible participants, showing 
consensus that deliberation assisted them in reaching a verdict and increased their 
confidence in the verdict (Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins & Martschuk 2016, 
pp. 236–237). One possible reason is that individual jurors in a diverse group 
may have relevant knowledge and experience to assist others with complex evi-
dence or difficult legal constructs, leading to overall better performance of the 
group (Horan 2012). In addition, participation in deliberation, actively giving 
jurors from diverse backgrounds a voice in the justice process, increases citizens’ 
commitment to the jury system and the legitimacy of the criminal justice process 
(Cornwell & Hans 2011; Hans, Gastil & Feller 2014).
2.5.2  Confidence of legal professionals in the jury system
A procedural justice analysis of juries cannot look simply at how juries them-
selves feel or respond. In terms of neutrality and trust, it also matters how juries 
are perceived by the public. Research on confidence in juries within the criminal 
58 Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al. 
justice process has shown that legal professionals who work most closely with 
juries have higher confidence in their abilities than those who do not. Justice 
Wood, who served as Chief Judge at Common Law in New South Wales, 
Australia, for eight years, remarked on how this experience, during which he 
was deeply engaged with juries in the most serious criminal cases, left him with 
strong confidence in the jury system as opposed to judge-alone trials (Goodman-
Delahunty 2015, p. 58). For these reasons, he opposed the weakening of or 
abolition of juries.
We investigated the extent to which legal professionals (prosecutors, crimi-
nal defence lawyers, judges, and jury administrators) endorsed jury trials using 
a sample of key stakeholders in the criminal justice system in three Australian 
states (Goodman-Delahunty et al. 2008). These legal professionals expressed sig-
nificantly greater confidence in juries (84%) than judges (73%). All were asked 
whether they personally would choose a jury or a judge-alone trial, first, if they 
were the victim of a crime, and second if they were the accused. Results revealed 
a preference for trial by jury in both roles, but stronger if the participant were 
the accused. This degree of support for juries as an institution indicates that legal 
professionals see juries as legitimate. Since they are the group that works in close 
contact with juries, this provides some assurance that the jury is likely to survive, 
at least in common law countries.
2.6  Conclusion
This review has examined different aspects of procedural fairness in jury trials, 
using the four-fold-category developed by Tyler. Increased respect for jurors 
themselves has taken the form of better accommodation. Jury neutrality has been 
enhanced by the placement of the accused in court. Trust in the jury has been 
augmented by reforms more sensitive to the capacity and conscientiousness of 
juries as fact-finders, such as doctrines on the exclusion of prejudicial material, 
the management of internet research by jurors, uses of question trails to guide 
jury deliberations, and counselling services for distressed jurors. Greater voice for 
juries is demonstrated by increased opportunities for trial participation, such as 
the chance to take notes and ask questions. On the other hand, some changes 
have compromised jury neutrality. In countries such as the UK, Australia, and 
France, caging the accused in court runs the risk of prejudicing the jury against 
the accused.
Overall, this review suggests that enhanced relational contact between courts 
and juries yields increases in jurors’ positive civic attitudes, willingness to serve, 
as well as satisfaction with the justice process. Increases in jury participation have 
enhanced the legitimacy of the criminal justice process. The support of legal pro-
fessionals for the jury shows confidence in the jury system. The findings sup-
port the view that improved relational engagement in the criminal justice system 
through managerial practices and innovations that apply procedural justice tenets 
is critical to the effectiveness, legitimacy, and retention of the petit jury.
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3.1  Introduction
Prison provides an environment that exposes people to a range of physical and 
psychological conflicts, and prison staff are faced with managing these conflicts. 
Prisoners, particularly those who do not feel equipped to defend themselves, are 
likely to experience fear and anxiety as a result of increasing frustrations in an envi-
ronment that is often overcrowded and where boredom is at a peak (Molleman & 
Van Ginneken 2015; Sykes 1958; Toch 1997). Gresham Sykes’ (1958) pioneer-
ing research on prison social life identified certain ‘pains’ experienced by prisoners 
that were considered acceptable and unavoidable consequences of imprisonment. 
The pains or deprivations identified by Sykes included the losses of liberty, het-
erosexual relationships, goods and services, autonomy, and security. In more 
recent times, with the introduction of visitation programmes, incentives and 
earned privileges schemes, and single-cell accommodation,1 some of the tradi-
tional pains of imprisonment have been reduced, but they remain present. With a 
changing prison environment also comes new pains. For example, Crewe (2011a) 
identified pains of uncertainty and indeterminacy, psychological assessment and 
self-government. Liebling, Arnold, and Straub (2011) identified pains relating to 
trust, fear, safety, re-making identity (for survival in prison and then for public 
acceptance upon release), humanity, relationships and fairness, power and secu-
rity, hope, meaning making progress, and getting out of prison.
The primary goals of prison staff are to maintain a safe and secure prison 
environment, provide prisoners with ‘care with humanity’, provide opportunities 
for prisoners to address their offending behaviour, and to assist with the day-to-
day operations of the prison (Liebling, Price, & Bottoms 1999, p. 37). Staff are 
therefore able to help mitigate some of the pains of imprisonment previously 
identified through the way they perform their duties. However, meeting these 
goals within such a complex organisation and with prisoners who may have seri-
ous behavioural or psychological problems requires staff to be equipped with 
a range of skills and approaches for achieving successful outcomes. Procedural 
justice has recently been proposed as a method by which prison staff can meet 
these goals in their interactions with prisoners. Research undertaken in a range of 
regulatory contexts (e.g. taxation, policing, courts) has linked procedural justice 
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with citizens’ enhanced emotional well-being, quality of life, the degree to which 
they perceive authorities as legitimate, and their willingness to cooperate with 
authorities and comply with the rules and laws enforced by those authorities (e.g. 
Barkworth & Murphy 2015, 2016; Jackson et al. 2012; Murphy & Tyler 2008; 
Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler & Huo 2002). However, only a limited number 
of studies have examined the relationship between procedural justice (or related 
concepts), prisoners’ well-being, and compliance behaviour (e.g. Barkworth 
2018; Beijersbergen et al. 2014, 2015, 2016; Brunton-Smith & McCarthy 2016; 
Jenness & Calavita 2018; Reisig & Mesko 2009; Weinrath 2016). Considering 
the potential negative consequences the prison environment can have on prison-
ers, and the importance of staff–prisoner relationships for ameliorating the situa-
tion, finding ways to enhance these relationships is increasingly at the forefront of 
penology research. Research in the corrections context allows for a unique look 
at the importance of procedural justice, given that prisoners and prison staff inter-
act on a daily basis, as opposed to the sporadic nature of interactions between 
authorities and citizens in non-correctional contexts.
This chapter provides an overview of the implications of procedural justice for 
prisoners’ well-being and compliance-related behaviour. Section 3.2 presents an 
overview of the two key issues prisoners and prison staff are often faced with daily: 
prisoner well-being, which is often affected due to the nature of the prison envi-
ronment, and prisoner compliance behaviour (including how staff may go about 
enforcing compliance). Section 3.3 provides an overview of Tyler’s (1990) model 
of procedural justice, with consideration given as to how procedural justice might 
be utilised in interactions between prisoners and prison staff. Section 4 then intro-
duces the empirical research conducted to date that examines the link between 
procedural justice, prisoners’ well-being, and reduced psychological distress 
(see Section 3.4.1), between procedural justice and perceived legitimacy, coop-
eration, and compliance (see Section 3.4.2) and additional studies examining 
procedural justice in the context of prisoner grievance processes and in relation 
to interactions with offender supervisors (see Section 3.4.3). Section 3.5 high-
lights limitations of the research conducted to date and provides suggestions for 
future research directions before presenting conclusions in Section 3.6. Overall, 
the research demonstrates positive outcomes for prisoners and prison authorities 
when prison staff behave in a procedurally just manner.
3.2  Two key issues in the prison environment: prisoner 
well-being and compliance
Prisoners must undergo significant adjustments when entering prison in order to 
adapt to and cope with prison life. A significant body of research has shown that 
prisoners are at increased risk of experiencing depression, anxiety, and stress when 
compared to the general population (e.g. Gullone, Jones, & Cummins 2000; 
Schneider et al. 2011). These risks can be attributed to their experiences of the 
quality of prison life as a result of reduced activity, support, feelings of safety, and 
visits from family and friends (Toch 1997; Wooldredge 1999).
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As a result of heightened levels of anxiety, fear, and depression, prisoners 
are also more likely to experience suicide ideation, with suicide rates among 
this population higher than in the general population (Fazel, Grann, Kling, & 
Hawton 2011, p. 193). How staff interact with and respond to prisoners may 
subsequently influence the way prisoners react. Staff–prisoner relationships are 
arguably at ‘the heart of prison work’ (Liebling & Price 2001, p. 75). Therefore, 
staff can ultimately act as a protective factor against prisoner distress and sui-
cidal ideation (Daniel 2006). The respect, fairness, and humanity shown in posi-
tive staff–prisoner relationships have been linked with lower levels of stress and 
improved quality of life and prisoner well-being (Liebling 2011; Liebling, assisted 
by Arnold 20042; Molleman & Van Ginneken 2015; Slotboom, Kruttshnitt, 
Bijleveld, & Menting 2011).
In addition to acting as a protective factor, what staff do and the way in which 
they do it can have important implications for the type of order they establish 
and the chances of successfully implementing the right type of order (Sparks, 
Bottoms, & Hay 1996). Order within prisons is clearly important for maintaining 
a safe and secure environment for both prisoners and staff. Prison staff are greatly 
outnumbered by prisoners in any correctional facility, indicating that prisoners 
could overpower staff if they chose to do so (Cressey 1961). As a result, prison 
provides an environment where force is more likely to be used to enforce rules 
and regain control. However, the use of excessive force may lead to detrimen-
tal psychological consequences for prisoners, or result in increased acts of rule-
breaking, resistance, and retribution, particularly by those who already do not 
view the regime as legitimate (Jackson, Tyler, Bradford, Taylor, & Shiner 2010, 
p. 5). Jackson et al. (2010, p. 5) therefore suggest that it may be even more 
important in the prison environment than elsewhere to find alternatives to the 
use of coercive power and excessive force, particularly for encouraging voluntary 
cooperation with staff and willing compliance with prison rules. Given that pro-
cedural justice has produced a number of positive outcomes regarding well-being 
and compliance when examined in a range of regulatory contexts (as outlined in 
Section 3.1), scholars have more recently begun to consider the potential benefits 
of procedural justice in the context of prison staff interactions with prisoners.
3.3  What is procedural justice and what might 
it look like in prison?
Procedural justice is commonly understood as the perceived fairness of the treat-
ment received and the perceived fairness of procedures used during a decision-
making process (Blader & Tyler 2003, p. 748). Early procedural justice scholars 
(e.g. Thibaut & Walker 1975) examined third-party disputes and argued that 
people placed greater importance on receiving a favourable outcome and what 
they needed to do to achieve that outcome than on the treatment they received; 
that is, they were motivated by instrumental concerns. According to Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) procedural justice is important to people because it allows them to 
take control of the decision-making process and therefore have influence over the 
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outcome of this process. Tyler (1990), however, argues that people are more con-
cerned with how they feel they are being treated rather than with outcomes; that 
is, they are motivated by relational concerns. Tyler argues that procedural justice 
matters because it communicates to people that they are valued and respected 
by those in authority, and subsequently their self-worth is strengthened. Tyler’s 
model of procedural justice incorporates four key elements of respect, neutrality, 
voice and trustworthiness.
Respectful treatment involves treating people with respect, dignity, and polite-
ness (Tyler & Lind 1992, p. 141). Pilling (1992, p. 6) has suggested that within 
a prison environment respectful treatment might be demonstrated by staff refer-
ring to prisoners by their preferred name, addressing them in a courteous man-
ner, and asking them to do something rather than ordering them to do so.3 In 
contrast, disrespectful treatment might involve referring to prisoners by numbers, 
not acknowledging them as they pass by, or not making an effort to get to know 
them as individuals.
Neutrality refers to making decisions using a consistent set of rules and proce-
dures, rather than basing decisions on personal opinions or prejudices (Tyler & 
Fagan 2008, p. 239). Tyler (2010, p. 130) argues that there are ample oppor-
tunities within a prison environment for decisions to be made based on personal 
prejudice given the nature of those being governed; however, he also acknowl-
edges this is an environment with specifically defined rules upon which authori-
ties can base and explain their decisions. In general, neutrality within the prison 
environment is important for the consistent and fair application of rules to all 
prisoners, and for clearly justifying and explaining exceptions to those rules when 
discretion is utilised.
Voice allows individuals an opportunity to explain their side of the story before 
a decision is made (Tyler 2010, pp. 129–130). For prisoners, this means being 
given an opportunity to state their case when a conflict has arisen and having 
an opportunity to participate in both formal and informal processes that allow 
prisoners to contribute to decisions made about their time spent in incarceration 
(Tyler 2010, p. 129). Crewe (2011a, p. 514) highlights the fact that prisoners 
are often frustrated at not being given an opportunity to contribute to decisions 
about categorisation or release, and this can subsequently result in them feeling 
they are not being treated with the respect due to them as a person.
Finally, trustworthiness refers to an authority communicating to the indi-
viduals they govern that they are acting in their best interests and that they are 
open and honest in their interactions (Tyler 2007, p. 31). When people perceive 
authority as trustworthy, they are more willing to conform to the group norms 
that authority represents (Boeckmann & Tyler 2002, p. 2071). Prison staff may 
be able to display trustworthiness by expressing a genuine interest in prisoners’ 
well-being, recognising signs of potential psychological struggles, and checking 
in with them to see how they are doing. Liebling and Price (2001) noted that 
prison staff are often hesitant to completely trust prisoners and struggle with the 
conflict of demonstrating care while maintaining security and order; however, 
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when staff can maintain a balance between these roles, they are more likely to 
maintain positive and trustworthy relationships with prisoners.
Liebling and Arnold (2004) spent considerable time in prisons to identify 
what makes some prisons better than others at providing a safe and secure envi-
ronment, focusing on what works best rather than what does not work. They 
suggested that prison quality had not been previously satisfactorily defined in offi-
cial measures of the prison, arguing that an important aspect of prison quality is 
the concept of moral performance and that ‘prisons should perform well because 
it is important to treat human beings well’ (p. 473). Liebling and Arnold’s study 
of ‘what matters’ in prison identified that the moral performance of a prison 
refers to ‘those aspects of a prisoner’s mainly interpersonal and material treatment 
that render a term of imprisonment more or less dehumanising and/or painful’ 
(p. 473). What mattered to prisoners were positive staff–prisoner relationships. 
This includes staff who treated prisoners with respect, humanity, and fairness, 
and staff who improved safety and order within the prison. Therefore, when 
prison staff engage in procedurally just practices, such as treating prisoners with 
respect and dignity, being consistent in how decisions are made, giving prisoners 
a chance to state their case, and demonstrating concern and understanding, they 
are more likely to be seen as fair in their interactions with prisoners (Tyler 2010).
3.4  Empirical research on prisoner perceptions of 
procedural justice
Examining the concept of procedural fairness in corrections has emerged out of 
two bodies of research: the first from penology scholars (e.g. Liebling & Arnold 
2004; Sparks et al. 1996) and the second from procedural justice scholars (e.g. 
Barkworth 2018; Reisig & Mesko 2009). Each body of research considers related 
concepts around fairness and respect while employing varying measures of each. 
The research from penology scholars has largely focused on Liebling and Arnold’s 
(2004) study of prison quality and the importance of staff–prisoner relationships 
for building a healthy and well-functioning prison. As mentioned above, many 
of the concepts that arose out of Liebling and Arnold’s study align with Tyler’s 
(1990) model of procedural justice (e.g. respect, fairness, humanity). Tyler’s 
model of procedural justice has been widely employed across many regulatory 
contexts, but there is only a small collection of recent studies that have specifically 
examined its importance in the corrections context. Each of the studies arising 
from these two bodies of research will be considered in the following sections.
3.4.1  Well-being and psychological distress
Liebling and Arnold’s (2004) study of prison quality did not specifically examine 
procedural justice; however, it did identify a range of elements commonly con-
sidered part of procedural justice. Their study utilised an Appreciative Inquiry 
approach to determine ‘what matters’ to both prisoners and prison staff across 
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five prisons in England and Wales. The findings of this approach were then used 
to develop a quality of life survey that was administered to 512 prisoners and 
121 prison staff. The authors found that prisoners’ perceptions of the quality of 
prison life were based on whether they viewed relationships with prison staff as 
positive. Prisoners who perceived staff were treating them with respect, humanity, 
and fairness, and who considered staff–prisoner relationships to be balanced, were 
also likely to indicate they had trust in prison staff and felt they were trusted by 
staff. This trust was the result of prisoner experiences with staff who were honest, 
responsible, and confident. Their study highlighted that positive staff–prisoner 
relationships were related to prisoner views of fairness and humanity, which in 
turn were related to enhanced prisoner well-being. A later study by Liebling 
(2011) found that diminutions in perceived respect, fairness, and humanity in 
staff–prisoner interactions were subsequently associated with heightened levels of 
stress related to prisoner suicide rates.
Similarly, Slotboom et al. (2011) administered a survey to 251 female Dutch 
prisoners to examine links between staff treatment and prisoners’ psychologi-
cal distress. Prisoners who felt they were treated disrespectfully reported more 
depressive symptoms, irritability, post-traumatic stress disorders, and thoughts 
of self-harm. These studies indicate the importance of the procedural justice ele-
ment of respectful treatment for reducing prisoners’ psychological distress.
Researchers from the Netherlands carried out a longitudinal study from 
2010 to 2011, which sought to examine the importance of procedural justice 
for prisoner well-being (Beijersbergen et al. 2014). A self-report survey was 
administered to a total of 824 prisoners who had been in pre-trial detention 
for three weeks. The survey was then administered again after three months. 
Elements of procedural justice as measured by Liebling and Arnold (2004) were 
used by Beijersbergen et al. (2014). They included fairness, respect, humanity, 
and relationships with prison staff (similar sub-scales were also used by Mol & 
Henneken-Hordijk 2008).4 Prisoner mental health was assessed with a psycho-
metric assessment. Prisoners who reported positive perceptions of procedural jus-
tice after three weeks in custody also reported fewer mental health problems three 
months later (Beijersbergen et al. 2014). While both Liebling and Arnold (2004) 
and Beijersbergen et al. (2014) referred to Tyler’s (1990) model of procedural 
justice in their respective studies, neither indicated the measures were specifically 
derived from Tyler’s work.
Barkworth (2018) was the first to specifically apply Tyler’s four-factor model 
of procedural justice in a study considering prisoners’ well-being and psycho-
logical distress. Procedural justice was therefore measured as respect, trustworthi-
ness, neutrality, and voice. Well-being was measured according to Liebling and 
Arnold’s (2004) measure of well-being, which tapped into whether prisoners 
considered their experience of prison as painful or feeling like a punishment. 
Finally, psychological distress was measured using the Kessler-10 (k10) assess-
ment tool. It assessed prisoners’ self-reported depressive and anxiety symptoms. 
Key findings from Barkworth’s study revealed that perceived procedural justice 
 Procedural justice in corrections 69
was positively related to higher levels of prisoner well-being and lower levels of 
psychological distress.
3.4.2  Legitimacy, cooperation and compliance
Several early prison studies also examined the relationship between procedural 
justice perceptions and legitimacy judgements, cooperation, and compliance. 
Across these studies, legitimacy tended to be measured in a variety of ways that 
assessed prisoners’ feelings of obligation to obey prison staff, their trust in prison 
staff, and whether their morals and values aligned with prison staff. When staff, 
who act as representatives of the institution, are perceived as legitimate, so too 
is the prison regime or the institution itself (e.g. Brunton-Smith & McCarthy 
2016, p. 9; Sparks & Bottoms 1995). Sparks et al. (1996, p. 307) consider an 
authority’s use of fair procedures as a ‘representation dimension’ of encounters 
and treatment and suggest that prisoners will comply with rules if they a) believe 
it is right and proper that a prison has rules and laws and b) that the prison offic-
ers enforcing those rules are fair in their means of exercising power and there-
fore can command authority. Hence, prisoners who perceive prison staff and the 
prison regime to be legitimate also believe the prison should have rules, and those 
rules should be followed.
Early studies considered the link between fair treatment and legitimacy 
and between fair treatment, legitimacy, and compliance. For example, Ahmad 
(1996, cited in Liebling & Arnold 2004) used structured interview data from 
230 prisoners in the UK to examine the fairness of prison life. Prisoners indicated 
that interpersonal aspects of fairness, such as being treated with respect by staff, 
and being treated with understanding, concern, and equality, were most impor-
tant to prisoners. Ahmad also found that prisoner perceptions of staff fairness 
were also related to regime fairness, which can be linked to views of legitimacy. 
Butler and Maruna (2009) further found that prisoners were more likely to feel 
victimised by an authority and were less likely to take responsibility for their 
actions when they felt treated with disrespect.
Perhaps most notable is the work of Sparks et al. (1996), who conducted 
extensive fieldwork in two maximum-security prisons in the UK (Long Lartin and 
Albany). Over six weeks, Sparks and colleagues observed daily routines, engaged 
in informal discussions with prisoners and staff, and conducted interviews with 
83 prisoners and 66 staff. Official data regarding prisoner population character-
istics and recorded incidents was also utilised. Long Lartin was viewed as a more 
relaxed prison with less reported staff–prisoner conflict, and was therefore seen 
as the more legitimate of the two prisons examined. The relaxed environment 
of Long Lartin was generally attributed to steps taken to improve the loss of 
autonomy (e.g. prisoners allowed to wear their own clothes rather than a uni-
form) and loss of liberty (e.g. more freedom to move around corridors at certain 
times). Prisoners indicated that good staff were those who helped them, did not 
promise something they could not deliver, had a sense of humour, and were 
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not antagonistic. It was found that prisoners had particularly positive perceptions 
of staff who treated them with respect and decency. In general, the day-to-day 
actions of prison staff partially influenced the perceived fairness of those staff, 
with prisoners who viewed staff as fair also indicating they were more willing to 
comply with officer directives and prison rules. However, Long Lartin staff were 
seen to take a more flexible rather than consistent approach to order and control, 
which was a source of anxiety for some prisoners as they were uncertain as to how 
far they could go or what was expected of them. In the end, though, prisoners saw 
this as a ‘mutually acceptable compromise’ (p. 173). Based on key findings from 
their study, Sparks et al. highlighted the importance of legitimacy for encourag-
ing compliance, and supported Woolf’s (1991) argument that legitimacy can be 
achieved through prison staff behaving in a procedurally just manner.
In Slovenia, Hacin and Meško (2018) used qualitative interview data from 
193 male and female prisoners to examine perceptions of fairness and staff legiti-
macy (e.g. prisoners’ feelings of obligation to follow the rules and instructions 
imposed by prison staff and prisoners’ acceptance of decisions made by prison 
staff even if they disagreed). They also studied differences between instrumental 
motives (e.g. avoiding punishment/receiving rewards) and normative motives 
(e.g. attitudes based on values and beliefs) for compliance. In general, prison-
ers felt prison staff were professional and treated them with respect but still felt 
obliged to obey staff and comply with rules even if they did not like how they 
were treated. Hacin and Meško argued:
Instrumental compliance is considered as the first step toward establishing 
legitimacy in a prison environment. It is unreasonable to expect that pris-
oners, who are defined by their fundamental conflict with the state, would 
internalise the norms of prison workers, whom they consider the direct rep-
resentatives of the criminal justice system, immediately upon their arrival to 
prison.
(p. 15)
They further claimed ‘[t]he transition from prisoners’ instrumental compliance 
to normative compliance is possible when relations between prison staff and pris-
oners are based on respect, legality, and fairness’ (p. 16). This study provides 
further support for staff using procedural justice practices to encourage normative 
compliance, but indicates that additional research into understanding the various 
reasons why prisoners comply with prison rules should be conducted.
A range of studies considering prisoners’ perceptions of the legitimacy of 
prison staff and compliance behaviour has also been developed out of Liebling 
and Arnold’s (2004) prison quality work (e.g. Beijersbergen et al. 2015, 2016; 
Brunton-Smith & McCarthy 2016). Liebling and Arnold, specifically found that 
perceived fairness of staff, prison rules, and decision-making influenced percep-
tions of order and control in prison, highlighting that staff–prisoner relation-
ships and the idea of procedural justice are important for regulating the prison 
environment.
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As part of the Prison Project carried out in the Netherlands from 2010–2011, 
Beijersbergen et al. (2015, 2016) examined the link between procedural jus-
tice and prisoners’ anger and misconduct (Study 1), and between procedural 
justice and prisoners’ perceptions of legitimacy and likelihood of re-conviction 
(Study 2). Here, Beijersbergen et al.’s measure of procedural justice was cre-
ated from four sub-scales relating to fairness, respect, humanity, and relationships 
with officers. In the first study, prisoner misconduct was measured using both 
self-report compliance data and official prison disciplinary reports (Beijersbergen 
et al. 2015). The results showed that prisoners who felt fairly treated three weeks 
into their time in detention were less likely to engage in misconduct three months 
later. The authors also confirmed that if prisoners received disciplinary action 
during the first three weeks of detention this had no impact on whether prison-
ers felt fairly treated by staff three months later. The study further showed that 
anger mediated the relationship between perceived procedural justice and sub-
sequent misconduct; that is, those who felt unfairly treated by prison staff early 
in their detention were more likely to report feeling angry three months later 
and were therefore more likely to engage in misconduct. In the second study, 
Beijersbergen et al. (2016) utilised both survey and re-conviction data from 
1,241 prisoners to examine the relationship between perceptions of procedural 
justice during their time in detention, the perceived legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system, and post-release offending behaviour. The study highlighted a 
significant link between positive perceptions of procedural justice and a reduced 
likelihood of re-conviction 18 months after release. Prisoners’ perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system were not found to mediate this relation-
ship. Overall, the findings from the Prison Project demonstrated that procedural 
justice (as per Liebling and Arnold’s (2004) conceptualisation) is important for 
prisoners’ behavioural outcomes, including misconduct within prison and likeli-
hood of post-release offending.
Another study utilising Liebling and Arnold’s (2004) measures was conducted 
by Brunton-Smith and McCarthy (2016) in England and Wales. Their study con-
sidered the role of both prison-level and individual-level characteristics to deter-
mine prisoners’ perceptions of staff legitimacy. The legitimacy measure was taken 
at the individual level using data from the Surveying Prisoner Crime Reduction 
(SPCR) project, which included 3,000 prisoners sentenced to between one 
month and four years from 2005 to 2006 in England and Wales. Prisoners were 
surveyed within the first two to five weeks of entering prison and again within 
four weeks prior to release. The legitimacy measure covered prisoner percep-
tions of staff–prisoner relationships, trust (in staff and by staff), perceptions of fair 
treatment and support from staff, and perceptions of staff honesty and integrity. 
The procedural justice measure utilised data from the 2005 to 2009 round of the 
‘Measuring the Quality of Prison Life’ (MQPL) survey (see Liebling, Hulley & 
Crewe 2012 for further details of MQPL). An overall summary measure of proce-
dural justice for each prison was utilised, which captured the fairness of the prison 
(e.g. consistent treatment from staff) and whether procedures were in place for 
prisoners to express their views during decision-making processes. The study did 
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not measure individual prisoners’ perceptions of procedural justice, but instead 
merged the individual-level measure of legitimacy and prison-level measure of 
procedural justice into one dataset. Brunton-Smith and McCarthy utilised multi-
level modelling to demonstrate that when a prison was viewed as procedurally 
just, prisoners’ perceptions of staff legitimacy were higher. In other words, those 
residing in prisons where the systems in place to respond to problems were seen 
to be clearer and fairer were more likely to perceive the prison as more legitimate 
(as per their views of staff legitimacy).
It should be noted here that the procedural justice and legitimacy measures 
used by Brunton-Smith and McCarthy are not typical of those used in similar 
research. For example, the legitimacy measure covered aspects around fair treat-
ment, staff–prisoner relationships, humanity, and support that are often incorpo-
rated in measures of procedural justice; on the other hand, the procedural justice 
measure placed greater emphasis on procedures and privileges that are not often 
examined as part of common procedural justice measures. Interpreting the find-
ings of this study should therefore be done with these variations in mind.
The studies discussed thus far demonstrated the importance of the perceived 
fairness of staff and prisons for improving prisoner perceptions of staff legitimacy 
and their willingness to comply with the prisons’ rules. While these studies often 
refer to procedural justice in regard to measuring respect, fairness, and relation-
ships; only a few recent studies have specifically incorporated Tyler’s (1990) four-
factor model of procedural justice. For example, Weinrath (2016) conducted 
in-depth interviews with 38 prisoners and 24 correctional staff in four Western 
Canadian prisons to examine perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy 
within staff–prisoner relationships. Weinrath found that when prisoners viewed 
staff behaviour as being consistent with the principles of procedural justice, they 
were more likely to perceive those staff as legitimate. In particular, prisoners felt 
that being treated with respect was the most important element of procedural jus-
tice. Weinrath’s study identified the importance of procedural justice for improv-
ing staff–prisoner relationships and the perceived legitimacy of staff.
One of the first empirical studies to examine the relationship between pris-
oner perceptions of procedural justice, the perceived legitimacy of prison staff, 
and prisoner misconduct was conducted by Reisig and Mesko (2009) in a high-
security Slovenian prison. They utilised self-report survey data collected in struc-
tured face-to-face interviews and official records from the six months following 
the interviews to capture both self-report and official measures of misconduct. 
Legitimacy was measured as a prisoner’s sense of obligation to obey staff, and 
procedural justice incorporated the four key elements of respect, neutrality, voice, 
and trustworthiness. The results demonstrated that when prisoners viewed staff 
as more procedurally just, they were less likely to later engage in behavioural 
misconduct (the finding was supported with both self-report and official data). 
Interestingly, no relationship was found between perceptions of procedural jus-
tice and perceived legitimacy, or between legitimacy and prisoner misconduct. 
The findings from Reisig and Mesko’s study suggest it is the perceived fairness of 
treatment that matters most for encouraging prisoner compliance.
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A recent study in Australia has also sought to empirically examine the effect of 
prisoner perceptions of procedural justice on the perceived legitimacy of staff (i.e. 
obligation to obey staff and accept staff decisions), on prisoners’ cooperation, 
and on compliance behaviour (Barkworth 2018). Procedural justice captured 
Tyler’s (1990) four key elements of respect, neutrality, voice, and trustworthi-
ness. Legitimacy was measured as prisoners’ sense of obligation to obey prison 
staff. Cooperation referred to prisoners’ willingness to provide information to 
staff about the goings-on in prison. Compliance captured prisoners’ willingness 
to follow the prison rules (self-report) and the number of breaches they had 
received (official data). It was found that prisoners who perceived staff as being 
procedurally just were more likely to also perceive them as legitimate and were 
more willing to cooperate with staff and comply with prison rules (supported 
with both self-report and official data).
Barkworth and Murphy (2019) further examined whether perceptions of pro-
cedural justice relate to prisoners’ social distancing from staff and their subse-
quent compliance behaviour. Here, social distancing was operationalised using 
Braithwaite’s (2003) motivational posturing styles that include commitment, 
capitulation, resistance, disengagement, and game-playing. The findings showed 
that prisoners who viewed staff as more procedurally just were more likely to 
subscribe to deferent postures of commitment and capitulation, and less likely 
to subscribe to defiant postures of resistance, disengagement, and game-playing. 
It was also found that those with deferent postures were more willing to comply 
with prison rules than those with defiant postures. These studies further support 
the positive implications for prisoners’ behaviour through prison staff employing 
procedural justice practices.
The procedural justice perspective highlights the importance of normative 
compliance. Normative compliance occurs when people consider that rules and 
laws align with their own personal values, and when the authorities who enforce 
those rules and laws are seen as just and moral (Tyler 2007, p. 161). A particularly 
important factor for encouraging normative compliance is the perceived legiti-
macy of the authority charged with enforcing the rules and laws to be followed 
(Liebling & Arnold 2004; Sparks et al. 1996; Tyler 1990). An authority is seen 
as legitimate when it is perceived as being entitled to make decisions and when 
people feel obligated to follow those decisions (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler 
1997). Legitimacy is considered most important for encouraging both coop-
eration and compliance behaviour because it is ‘ethically more desirable, more 
cost-effective, and ultimately more durable than systems maintained “down the 
barrel of a gun”’ (Jackson et al. 2010, p. 4). Sparks et al. (1996, p. 307) refer 
to the ‘representational dimension’ of people’s encounters with criminal justice 
agencies: prisoners will comply partly because they believe a prison should have 
rules and laws, and partly because the staff enforcing those rules and laws are fair 
in how they exercise power and can therefore command authority.
Ultimately, procedural justice is important for building legitimacy and 
encouraging subsequent cooperation and compliance behaviour. Tyler (2003, 
p. 306) argues that when people view authorities as exercising power through 
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fair procedures, they are more likely to adopt the social values those authorities 
represent, which subsequently helps create and maintain a self-regulating and 
law-abiding society. Tyler and Blader (2003, p. 353) further argue that these 
social values represent what people feel they should do, and therefore ‘reflect 
feelings of responsibility and obligation to follow group rules and the orders of 
group leaders’.
One of the key theoretical explanations for why procedural justice has a posi-
tive association with cooperation and compliance behaviour is Tyler and Blader’s 
(2003) Group Engagement Model. The model is based on relational concerns 
and suggests that people’s identification, or sense of belongingness, with a group 
is shaped through procedural justice. In this sense, people value being treated 
with respect and fairness and being given a voice as it communicates to them 
that they are valued and respected members of a group. Tyler and Blader (2003, 
p. 353) argue that ‘Groups help to define who people are and help them to evalu-
ate their status’. Hence, people feel good about themselves through associations 
with groups they perceive as having high status (Tyler & Blader 2003). What 
should be considered in this context is whether prisoners attribute high status to 
prison staff and whether they are more likely to identify with prison staff rather 
than other prisoners. This is where using procedural justice practices may be par-
ticularly important; that is, prisoners may be more likely to perceive staff as having 
high status and may be more likely to identify with those staff when they perceive 
them to be procedurally just.
3.4.3  Additional procedural justice studies
Although not specifically examining prisoners’ psychological and behavioural 
outcomes, it is important to mention additional research on procedural justice 
in the corrections context. For example, Jenness and Calavita (2018) compared 
prisoners’ satisfaction with the process (procedural justice) and outcome (sub-
stantive justice) of grievances filed, for example, around staff misconduct, con-
testing a serious disciplinary violation or complaint about prison classification. 
Here, it was found that the outcome received was more important for prisoners’ 
satisfaction than how the process was handled; that is, even those who consid-
ered the grievance to be adequately managed were unlikely to be satisfied with 
an unfavourable outcome. This particular finding opposes what is often found in 
the policing literature, that people can accept an unfavourable outcome if they 
believe that outcome has been arrived at through fair treatment and procedures 
(e.g. Tyler & Huo 2002; Barkworth & Murphy 2015). The authors did offer sev-
eral explanations for their findings, including that prison is a high stakes environ-
ment and when the stakes are high it is more likely that perceptions of procedure 
and outcome will be combined (Heinz 1985 cited in Jenness & Calavita 2018, 
p. 48). However, the findings do suggest that prisoners tend to place greater 
importance on instrumental concerns when an outcome has a direct impact on 
them. The conflicting findings from this study, compared to what is often found 
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in the policing context, suggests that additional research into understanding 
prison grievance processes could be done.
Much of the research to date has focused on prisoner perceptions of inter-
actions with correctional officers. However, a recent study by Bickers, Crewe, 
and Mitchell (2019) examined prisoner perceptions of procedural justice during 
interactions with offender supervisors (i.e. those responsible for risk assessments). 
It highlighted that staff involved in risk assessment were seen as unqualified to 
make such decisions and therefore lacked legitimacy (Crewe 2009, 2011b). 
Bickers et al. found that prisoner perceptions of procedural justice were low with 
regard to staff involved in risk assessment, which had negative impacts on devel-
oping positive relationships. Bickers et al. (2019, p. 17) argued that when staff 
prioritise actuarial risk assessments over developing quality relationships a range 
of negative outcomes is likely, including disengaging from offender supervisors, 
withholding information, and bypassing formal management systems. They sug-
gested that all staff working with prisoners should have a clear understanding of 
the key elements of procedural justice.
3.5  Limitations of the current research 
and future directions
This chapter has reviewed the research conducted to date on prisoner perceptions 
of procedural justice and subsequent psychological and behavioural outcomes. 
The research discussed in this chapter is not, however, without limitations. For 
example, there are variations in how procedural justice and legitimacy have been 
measured across different studies. On the one hand, several studies have utilised 
measures based on Liebling and Arnold’s (2004) work on prison quality, incor-
porating elements of respect, fairness, humanity, and staff–prisoner relationships 
(e.g. Beijersbergen et al. 2014, 2015, 2016; Brunton-Smith & McCarthy 2016). 
Others more specifically considered Tyler’s (1990) model of procedural justice, 
examining the key elements of respect, trustworthiness, neutrality, and voice 
(e.g. Barkworth 2018; Reisig & Mesko 2009; Weinrath 2016). Some measured 
legitimacy as felt obligation to obey prison staff (e.g. Barkworth 2018; Hacin & 
Meško 2018; Reisig & Mesko 2009), while others incorporated trust, fair treat-
ment from staff, and perceptions of staff honesty and integrity in their measure 
of legitimacy (e.g. Brunton-Smith & McCarthy 2016). Such differences in how 
both procedural justice and legitimacy have been measured means caution should 
be observed when considering the variations in findings across studies.
Most of the research has also only been conducted in high-security male pris-
ons (e.g. Barkworth 2018; Beijersbergen et al. 2014, 2015, 2016; Liebling & 
Arnold 2004; Reisig & Mesko 2009; Sparks et al. 1996), and has largely been lim-
ited by the use of cross-sectional research designs, which only provide a snapshot 
of what is happening at one point in time. Cross-sectional research designs do not 
consider whether it is procedural justice that influences outcome variables (such as 
well-being, psychological distress, legitimacy, or cooperation and compliance) or 
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whether prisoners have pre-existing mental health conditions, attitudes, or behav-
ioural tendencies that influence their perceptions of procedural justice. Nagin and 
Telep (2017, p. 7) argue that perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy are 
likely the result of a lifetime of influences based on culture, community, and fam-
ily, rather than just one or more interactions with an authority. They further argue 
that it would be particularly difficult in disadvantaged communities to separate 
the influence of procedural justice on legitimacy and compliance from influences 
such as extreme poverty, racial isolation, and various forms of social dysfunction. 
Nagin and Telep (2017, p. 12) therefore argue that alternate common causes and 
reverse causality may be responsible for the links found between perceptions of 
procedural justice, perceived legitimacy, and compliance. In other words, those 
who are compliant to begin with are more likely to view an authority as procedur-
ally just and legitimate, which then influences subsequent compliance behaviour. 
Beijersbergen et al. (2015) did, however, conduct a cross-lagged analysis and 
found that positive perceptions of procedural justice measured within three weeks 
of entering prison were related to fewer instances of misconduct three months 
later, although misconduct during the first three weeks of incarceration was not 
related to perceptions of procedural justice three months later. This study provides 
the first evidence from a corrections context that procedural justice influences 
compliance, but compliance does not influence perceptions of procedural jus-
tice. Longitudinal research designs are needed in order to determine any changes 
in prisoners’ perceptions, conditions, attitudes, and behaviour that occur over 
time. Beijersbergen et al.’s (2014, 2015, 2016) Prison Project is the only longi-
tudinal study to examine perceptions of procedural justice on prisoners’ mental 
health, misconduct behaviour, and likelihood of re-conviction after release. Their 
research, however, is limited by the fact that it only examined prisoners who had 
spent a maximum of three months in pre-trial detention, and therefore did not 
further consider the impacts that long-term incarceration may have on individuals.
Future research should further examine Tyler’s (1990) model of procedural 
justice, as well as address methodological issues, including: the use of longitudi-
nal designs; controlling for cultural, community and familial differences, and pre-
vious experiences with authorities; and evaluating an experimental manipulation 
of procedural justice. Future research should also consider perceptions of proce-
dural justice from female prisoners, prisoners who have spent varying lengths of 
time in prison, those from medium, low, and work camp facilities, and those who 
have varying histories with engagement with criminal justice authorities. Finally, 
very little research has considered prison staff perspectives on procedural justice 
in corrections. Only a couple of studies have turned their attention to exam-
ining how prison staff perceive procedural justice and their willingness to use 
it (e.g. Lambert, Hogan, & Barton-Bellessa 2011; Meško, Hacin, Tankebe, & 
Fields 2017; Trammell et al. 2018). Additional research is needed to understand 
whether staff see value in using such practices; what barriers they may face in 
implementing procedural justice practices; and the potential risks they may asso-
ciate with the use of such practices (e.g. whether it may make staff vulnerable to 
forming inappropriate relationships with prisoners). Given that prison staff are 
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responsible for creating and maintaining positive relationships with prisoners that 
can enhance prisoner well-being and assist with keeping order, it is important to 
understand the role of procedural justice from their perspective.
3.6  Conclusion
Prison staff play an important role in creating a safe, secure, and well-functioning 
prison through improving prisoner psychological well-being and maintaining 
prison order. It is therefore vital for staff to find ways to ensure positive outcomes 
for prisoners, with procedural justice identified as a key way to achieve such a 
goal. This is important because the way in which staff treat prisoners can most 
easily be changed and implemented. The research reviewed in this chapter has 
shown that procedural justice can have positive outcomes for both prisoners and 
prisons. For example, procedural justice was related to enhanced prisoner well-
being and reduced psychological distress. In addition, perceptions of procedural 
justice were related to the perceived legitimacy of prisons and prison staff, as well 
as an increased willingness to voluntarily cooperate with staff and comply with 
prison rules. While the research examining procedural justice in the corrections 
context has produced some promising findings, there is evidently much more 
research that can be undertaken in this area.
Notes
1 While single-cell accommodation has been introduced, over-crowding is still a 
consistent issue in prisons.
2 It should be noted that the correct referencing of this source is Liebling, assisted 
by Arnold 2004, as noted here; however, for ease of reading, this source will be 
cited as Liebling and Arnold 2004 from this point on.
3 It should be noted that prisons are hierarchical institutions and by their very 
nature may require staff to enforce prison rules through a range of methods 
including ordering prisoners to comply and using force when they do not comply. 
The suggestion to ask a prisoner to do something rather than ordering them to 
do so should be a first-step approach when circumstances do not require anything 
more authoritative or forceful (e.g. prisoner is going about their day-to-day activi-
ties and not causing any problems).
4 The study by Mol and Henneken-Hordijk (2008) has not been discussed as it was 
only published in Dutch.
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Part II
Procedural justice and 
legitimacy




Most people can remember occasions when they have been treated unfairly by an 
authority figure—for example, a teacher, a boss, a police officer, an airport offi-
cial, or a referee in a sports game. Perhaps that person refused to listen to what 
we were trying to explain to them; or perhaps they seemed to have already made 
up their mind without considering all the facts; or perhaps they made belittling 
personal remarks about us, or made an unkind joke at our expense. We might also 
remember occasions when the reverse has happened, and an authority figure has 
treated us very courteously and with a concern for our well-being, or has gone 
out of her way to master all the facts and carefully explain her decision.
In the world of academia, these matters are described as ‘procedural justice’ 
(or injustice), and there is now a large and rather technical literature on this topic. 
It is therefore worth reminding ourselves that this literature concerns an everyday 
phenomenon, of which we all have experience. That being the case, procedural 
justice (or injustice) is delivered in a wide variety of social contexts. It has to be 
said, however, that the empirical research literature on procedural justice (here-
after, ‘PJ’) has not always taken adequate account of the social contexts of the 
encounters that it seeks to study. We are therefore pleased to have been asked 
to contribute to a volume that, among other things, is seeking to redress this 
imbalance.
Within criminology, a further feature of the academic literature on PJ is that 
much of it is closely linked to analyses of the legitimacy of criminal justice author-
ities. Thus, it is very commonly claimed that when such authorities act with pro-
cedural justice, this enhances their legitimacy in the eyes of those they are dealing 
with; and it is sometimes claimed that PJ is the most important factor promoting 
such legitimacy.
Against this background, the analysis in this chapter will be developed in two 
main sections and a conclusion. In Section 4.2, we discuss PJ within the context 
of its relation to the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions and personnel. In 
so doing, we pay particular attention to the meaning of ‘PJ’ and of ‘legitimacy’, 
and we argue that understanding of both concepts is enhanced by seeing them 
through the lens of a theory of ‘basic legitimation expectations’. That theory 
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also suggests that factors other than PJ might contribute to the legitimacy of 
criminal justice authorities. In Section 4.3, we emphasise the social embedded-
ness of procedural justice and legitimacy. This leads us to consider how a citizen’s 
social background, and his or her prior experiences with legal authorities, might 
shape understandings of, and reactions to, a current encounter with an author-
ity figure; how the particular situational context of the current encounter might 
also be important; and why a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘right’ relation-
ships between citizens and legal authorities is relevant in the study of PJ. In the 
conclusion, we argue that the contextual variability demonstrated in Section 4.3 
suggests that PJ scholarship should in future pay greater attention to the social 
circumstances in which PJ is delivered, and therefore also to qualitative research 
methods.
Throughout, we will in particular consider PJ and legitimacy in the context 
of policing because that has been the principal focus of the empirical research 
literature. However, where appropriate we also introduce evidence from other 
criminal justice contexts, especially prisons.
4.2  Procedural justice and legitimacy
It is central to our argument that both procedural justice and legitimacy are, in 
a double sense, normative concepts. Within the framework of social and legal 
philosophy, they are normative in the sense that they offer reasons why legal 
authorities should behave in certain ways. Within the framework of descriptive 
social science (which, for the most part, aims to be morally neutral in its study of 
social processes), they also provide normative as opposed to instrumental expla-
nations of human behaviour.1
In thus emphasising the doubly normative character of PJ and legitimacy, 
we are influenced by the analyses of the legal philosopher Neil MacCormick 
(2007), who pointed out that, descriptively speaking, human beings are ines-
capably ‘norm-users, whose interactions with each other depend on mutually 
recognizable patterns that can be articulated in terms of right versus wrong con-
duct, or of what one ought to do in a certain setting’ (p. 20). Building on his 
understanding of the indispensability of norms to everyday life, MacCormick 
further claimed that the central characteristic of a modern legal system is that 
it is a form of ‘institutional normative order’—that is, it comprises a complex 
set of social institutions that, among other things, embody and proclaim stand-
ards of ‘right versus wrong conduct, or of what one ought to do in a certain 
setting’ (p. 11).
4.2.1  Conceptual issues
If law is institutional normative order, it follows that any attempt to understand 
people’s orientations to legal authorities must include some consideration of the 
normative status of those authorities (Beetham 1991/2013).
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This thought immediately introduces the concept of legitimacy. Legitimate 
power has been well described, within the framework of social science, as power 
that is ‘acknowledged as rightful by relevant agents, who include power-holders 
and their staff, those subject to the power and third parties whose support or 
recognition may help confirm it’ (Beetham 2013, p. 19, emphasis in original).2 
Among these ‘relevant agents’, those subject to the power are perhaps of special 
significance because of their potential vulnerability. This point has been illumi-
nated in a posthumously published essay by the philosopher Bernard Williams. 
Williams (2005) argues that the ‘first political question’ in any society is always 
the ‘securing of order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of co-oper-
ation’, because without a solution to this question people cannot satisfactorily 
pursue everyday routine activities such as economic production, trade, child care, 
and education (p. 3). However, as Geoffrey Hawthorn (2005, p. xii) pointed out 
in his introduction to Williams’ essays, if a ruler with no moral scruples has access 
to effective state power, then ‘putting a stop to disorder is not difficult’; but in 
those circumstances a solution to the ‘first question’ might well generate a further 
problem—that of living under despotism. This is why, in Williams’ analysis, it is 
always reasonable for those subject to state power to ‘ask what the nature of the 
state’s protection and its price are to be and why, and they will want a reasonable 
reply’ (Hawthorn 2005, p. xii). Raising such questions is described by Williams as 
making ‘Basic Legitimation Demands’, or BLDs. These so-called ‘demands’ indi-
cate the kind of conditions that citizens consider will allow them to acknowledge 
state power as ‘rightful’. Given this, we think they are perhaps better described 
as ‘expectations’ rather than ‘demands’ (or BLEs rather than BLDs)—that is, 
they indicate the expectations that the citizens of a given state have of rightful 
power-holders. Williams argues that the difference between legitimate and ille-
gitimate power lies in the ability of power-holders to honour citizens’ BLEs, to a 
reasonable extent, in particular state contexts.3 Crucially, he also claims that what 
people consider a satisfactory ‘legitimation story’ (i.e. an account that satisfies 
their BLEs) is historically variable. This implies that we can only hypothesise, 
rather than determine a priori, what the structure of legitimacy might look like 
in any given society; and such structures will probably vary both historically and 
geographically (for example, they will likely be different in a medieval theocracy 
and a modern liberal democracy).
How does PJ fit into this kind of analysis? It is now standard for scholars inter-
ested in PJ to describe it as referring to four aspects of the exercise of authority. A 
useful summary of this framework has recently been provided by Tom Tyler and 
Tracey Meares (2019):
First, people want a voice. The public wants [authorities] to allow people 
to express their views or tell their side of the story before determining poli-
cies or making decisions. Second, people care about neutrality. People want 
[authorities] to act in a transparent and impartial manner by making deci-
sions based upon facts, not prejudices. Neutrality is also related to whether 
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[authorities] explain what their policies are, and how they are being applied. 
Third, people want interpersonal respect. This includes respect for people’s 
rights as citizens and for their dignity as people … Fourth, people care about 
trustworthy motives. It is important to people to feel that [authorities] are 
motivated to do what is good for the people in their community.4
(p. 74, emphasis added)
In light of Bernard Williams’ analysis, it is interesting to note that this account 
is couched in terms of what people ‘want’ or ‘care about’ in their dealings with 
legal authorities. Given this, it seems reasonable to argue that Tom Tyler, the 
leading academic proponent of PJ in relation to criminal justice, is here in effect 
claiming that the four identified aspects of PJ constitute (at least in liberal democ-
racies such as the United States) four aspects of a basic legitimation expectation 
that authorities will act with procedural justice. If that is correct, it is potentially 
an important conceptual linkage of PJ theory to legitimacy theory. However, it 
leaves open the question of whether citizens might also have Basic Legitimation 
Expectations concerning other matters, which might also need to be satisfied 
before the authority is regarded as fully legitimate.
Tom Tyler’s work has primarily focused on empirical analyses. Ever since his 
seminal book, Why People Obey the Law (Tyler 1990/2006), he has argued for a 
sequence of empirical links between PJ and legal compliance, approximately as fol-
lows: the procedurally just treatment of citizens by criminal justice (CJ) agents will 
lead citizens to form positive perceptions of PJ by CJ agents; this in turn will mean that 
citizens are more likely to recognise CJ agents as legitimate authorities; and, finally, 
this recognition of legitimacy will lead citizens to an enhanced compliance with law.5
A key explanatory question arising from this proposed sequence is: why are citi-
zens who form positive perceptions of PJ by CJ agents more likely to regard those 
authorities as legitimate? The principal explanation that has been put forward in 
the PJ literature is the so-called ‘group value model’, originally developed by 
Lind and Tyler (1988), which postulates that human beings are social creatures 
who derive part of their understanding of themselves from how they are valued 
(or otherwise) by other members of the social groups to which they belong—
from families to the state.6 Tyler (1990/2006) applied this theory to procedural 
justice in legal contexts in the following way:
When people approach authorities, their social standing and feelings of secu-
rity within the group are on the line. They may have an experience that reaf-
firms their belief that they are valued, protected members of society … they 
may also have an experience that makes them feel less valued and protected 
than they would like to believe … Dealing with authorities clearly raises 
issues far beyond those connected with the issue to be decided … When the 
police harass members of minority groups, the poor or the young, they are 
communicating to those groups that they have marginal social status. 
(pp. 175–176) 
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In our view, this is a compelling normative explanation as to why the exercise 
of procedural justice by legal authorities is likely to contribute to attributions of 
legitimacy.7 As will shortly be seen, however, we believe that other factors also 
often contribute to these attributions.
4.2.2  Assessing procedural justice
A technical question of some importance concerns how researchers can best 
measure the concept of procedural justice. In some criminal justice contexts, such 
as courts, PJ can in principle be observed directly, because courts are open to the 
public. But the bulk of PJ research has focused on the police, and here matters are 
more complicated, because many interactions between police and citizens have 
few if any witnesses. Most empirical research on PJ in policing contexts has there-
fore measured PJ by survey questions to people who have had some contact with 
the police. In such surveys, respondents are asked about (among other things) 
their overall satisfaction with the encounter, whether the police officer allowed 
the citizen to have a voice, whether the officer was polite and treated the citizen 
with respect, and so on. This might be described as a measure of ‘subjective PJ’ 
or ‘perceived PJ’.
Recently, several researchers have published studies that attempt to get closer 
to what actually happens when police meet citizens (see, for example, Jonathan-
Zamir et al. 2015; McCluskey et al. 2019; Nawaz & Tankebe 2018). The most 
interesting, and the most challenging, of these studies is by Worden and McLean 
(2017) in Schenectady, New York. These authors studied 411 police–citizen 
encounters where, uniquely, data about the same encounter were available both 
from the citizen’s recollections in a standard survey and from independent cod-
ing of a video recording of the incident. As expected, these two data sources 
were positively correlated; but, much more surprisingly, the correlation was only 
‘weak to moderate’ (p. 134), so that observed ‘procedural justice and injustice 
together explained no more than 12 per cent of the variations in citizens’ subjec-
tive experience’ of PJ (p. 179). We should not jump to too many conclusions 
from a single study, but methodologically speaking this result does suggest that 
scholars should be cautious, at present, before they too readily assume that what 
might be described as ‘subjective PJ’ is identical to ‘independently observed PJ’.
But suppose it turns out, after a number of further research studies, that these 
two concepts are consistently shown to be only weakly connected? Here, it is 
important to recall that Tyler’s (1990/2006) hypothesised causal sequence is 
that ‘observed PJ’ leads to ‘perceived PJ’ leads to ‘citizens’ attributions of legiti-
macy’ (see previous discussion). That being so, a result of the kind described 
would have no impact on the bulk of research findings about the relationship 
between PJ and legitimacy (other than to substitute ‘perceived PJ’ for ‘PJ’), 
because the hypothesis has always been that perceived PJ leads to attributions of legiti-
macy. What such a result would do, however, is to open up a fresh strand of 
empirical research into why citizens’ recollections of PJ are sometimes different 
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from what actually happened; in other words, it would raise important questions 
about how police behaviour is socially perceived by citizens. We will return to this 
issue in Section 4.3.1 below.
4.2.3  The Bottoms-Tankebe approach to criminal justice legitimacy
In previous publications on legitimacy and criminal justice, we have advanced a 
number of propositions, two of which are of relevance in the current context. 
First, in a 2012 paper, we argued that ‘legitimacy needs to be perceived as always 
dialogic and relational in character’ (emphasis added). We elaborated the point 
as follows:
those in power (or seeking power) in a given context make a claim to be the 
legitimate ruler(s); then members of the audience8 respond to this claim; the 
power-holder might adjust the nature of the claim in light of the audience’s 
response; and this process repeats itself … [I]t is more like a perpetual discus-
sion, in which the content of power-holders’ later claims will be affected by 
the nature of the audience response. 
(Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012, p. 129)
At the time that we wrote that paper, we were not aware of Bernard Williams’ 
conceptualisation of the ‘basic legitimation demand’, but it is clear that seeing 
legitimation as a continuing dialogue is highly congruent with the ‘BLD/BLE’ 
approach.9
A second main claim in our previous work has been that, at least in democratic 
societies, it is possible to identify four Basic Legitimation Expectations that seem 
likely to contribute to the structure of legitimacy of criminal justice agencies. 
This claim has an empirical element, because each of these four BLEs has been 
shown empirically to contribute to perceptions of legitimacy in some situations. 
However, we also argue that these empirical findings are coherently related to 
the definition of legitimacy as power that is ‘acknowledged as rightful’ (Beetham 
2013, p. 19). This is because each of the four matters can be seen as being appro-
priately raised as BLEs when citizens ask criminal justice authorities ‘what the 
nature of the state’s protection and its price are to be, and why’ (Hawthorn 2005, 
p. xii).
One of these four suggested BLEs is procedural justice; the others are the law-
fulness, distributive justice, and effectiveness of the relevant authorities (Bottoms 
& Tankebe 2017; Tankebe 2013). Lawfulness concerns authorities’ adherence to 
the rule of law; more specifically, to an expectation that they will exercise only 
those powers that are explicitly provided in law, and that they will act within the 
relevant legal boundaries. Distributive justice concerns the perceived fairness of 
criminal justice agencies in allocating resources and making key decisions (police 
stops, sentencing, parole, etc.) with regard to relevant social groupings. These 
groupings include race, gender, social class, political affiliation, and offence type. 
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Distributive justice therefore ‘raises questions regarding the evenness with which 
law enforcement and sanction is applied—whether justice outcomes are distributed 
fairly’ (Peffley & Hurwitz 2010, p. 71, emphasis in original). Finally, effective-
ness is concerned with public expectations that criminal justice agencies should 
be reasonably effective in performing the tasks that they have been assigned. 
Effectiveness might be called into question if, for example, the police seem una-
ble to address public safety satisfactorily in a particular area, or if a parole board 
regularly releases people who then commit serious offences.
In the research literature, the most contentious of these four matters as con-
tributors to attributions of legitimacy have been distributive justice and effective-
ness,10 and the debates around this matter have been partly empirical and partly 
conceptual.
The empirical debate has focused on the question ‘which factor(s) is/are most 
important in generating legitimacy’? Some PJ scholars have claimed that pro-
cedural justice is always or almost always the most important, but this claim is 
becoming increasingly hard to sustain. For example, as regards effectiveness, there 
are now a number of studies, especially from African countries where the state 
is often weak, suggesting that (congruently with Williams’ ‘first political ques-
tion’) effectiveness in providing basic social order, rather than procedural justice, 
is the primary concern for citizens seeking legitimate governance (Tankebe 2009; 
Bradford et al. 2014; Akinlabi 2018). Similarly, as later sections of this chapter 
will show, there is now clear evidence that in some circumstances distributive jus-
tice or injustice is a more powerful explanation of the observed social phenomena 
than is procedural justice or injustice. Our own reading of the evidence is that 
there is no one factor that best promotes legitimacy in every context; instead, the 
importance of factors can and does vary in different social contexts.
The second debatable issue is conceptual. It arises from the fact that effective-
ness and distributive justice both contain an outcome-oriented dimension, which 
some scholars have seen as making them necessarily instrumental in focus, and 
therefore distinct from the normative concept of legitimacy (see, for example, 
Sunshine & Tyler 2003, p. 514). In our view, however, such a position is con-
ceptually problematic. Certainly, distributive justice and effectiveness include 
a concern with outcomes, but that does not make them simply instrumental. 
For social behaviour to be instrumental, it needs to be arrived at by consider-
ing the future consequences of the behaviour—usually the anticipated future ben-
efits or costs (financial or otherwise). Attributions of legitimacy, however, are 
not forward-looking: they are judgements about the current normative status of 
power-holders (Beetham 1991/2013); hence, they describe a positive or nega-
tive assessment by citizens of a power-holder’s current moral right to exercise 
power (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012; Coicaud 2002). Using that criterion, a police 
service that seems either ineffective, or biased against a particular ethnic group, 
might reasonably be considered by some citizens to have lost the moral right to 
exercise power.11 For example, the main concern of the Black Lives Matter move-
ment in the United States has not been the fairness of the processes leading to 
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police decisions to shoot African Americans, nor even the legality of police vio-
lence. Rather, what drives this movement is a deep concern and resentment about 
the unfairness of the very disproportionate representation of African Americans as 
victims in fatal police–civilian encounters. Thus, their ethical stance is not based 
on an instrumental (cost-benefit) calculation of future outcomes; rather, it is 
rooted in a deep moral concern about the apparent disregard by many police 
services of the statement in the 1776 American Declaration of Independence 
that ‘all [human beings] are created equal … with certain unalienable rights … 
[including those of] life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. Black people in the 
US are continuing to express a ‘basic legitimation expectation’ that their police 
services should honour this principle; that police often seem not to be doing so 
(distributive unfairness) is therefore very much a matter of normative, not instru-
mental, concern.
In order to avoid misunderstanding about our proposed fourfold legitimacy 
structure, some clarificatory comments about it might be helpful. In a recent 
paper on legitimacy in policing, we described the structure in this way:
Legitimacy dialogues are always contingent on specific features of the time 
and place in which they occur … and this means that the specifics of legiti-
mation and legitimacy can be very variable. We have however suggested the 
enduring importance of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness 
and lawfulness as guides to the delivery of legitimate policing … [F]irm evi-
dence can be cited that a failure to deliver on any one of these four matters 
has on some occasions led to a legitimacy deficit for a public police service. 
(Bottoms & Tankebe 2017, p. 88)
Two points about this statement are worth emphasising. First, the approach taken 
is empirical, so no claim is made that these four matters will always contribute 
to citizens’ perceptions of criminal justice legitimacy in every cultural context (in 
some situations, they may not12). Nor is it claimed that no other factors will ever 
contribute to criminal justice legitimacy (very likely, in some situations they will, 
especially as more research is conducted in non-Western contexts). The claim is 
simply that each of these matters has been shown empirically to contribute to 
the formation of citizens’ views about criminal justice legitimacy; hence those 
interested in building improved legitimacy should always consider the potential 
relevance of each of these matters in their particular situation. Second, the struc-
ture does not assume that all of its proposed contributors carry equal weight. On 
the contrary, depending on the social context, one or more of them might be of 
greater or lesser importance.
Finally, we should note that a recent empirical study in the United States pro-
vides some encouraging support for our fourfold model. Kearns et al. (2019), 
having noted that the academic literature contains varied theoretical approaches 
to the understanding of legitimacy, decided to survey the general population on 
this question. They therefore asked 1,900 US residents the open-ended question: 
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‘When thinking about the police, what does “legitimacy” mean to you?’ Answers 
were mostly short (mean = 6.2 words), but the researchers were able to code the 
responses into seven distinct categories, which varied very little across different 
ethnic groups.13 Overall, the most frequently mentioned category was ‘follows 
the law’ (mentioned by 37% of respondents); the other categories were ‘hon-
esty’ (19%), ‘fairness’ (11%), ‘right to govern’ (11%), ‘effective’ (9%), ‘moral/do 
right’ (9%), and ‘protection’ (5%). As the authors note, these categories explicitly 
include each of the four dimensions in the Bottoms-Tankebe model [‘follows 
the law’; ‘fairness’ (procedural and distributive)14; and ‘effective’], although the 
proportion of respondents choosing some of these dimensions was small. As we 
interpret them, the categories also include one item (‘right to govern’) that is very 
close to academic definitions of legitimacy; two items (‘honesty’ and ‘moral/do 
right’) that could be subsumed under the heading of procedural justice; and one 
item (‘protection’) that could be subsumed under effectiveness. Since the research 
question was open-ended, with no prompting, the results of this study offer sup-
port for the view that each element of our proposed fourfold structure is regarded 
as a basic legitimation expectation by at least a proportion of ordinary citizens.
4.2.4  Comment
This initial section has focused on trying to understand the concepts of procedural 
justice and legitimacy more fully, and to show how they might be related. But 
in doing so, we have also, directly or by implication, raised a number of matters 
that require us to understand these concepts as necessarily social and relational in 
character. Indeed, the concept of legitimacy itself makes no sense except against 
the background facts that, first, human beings always live in groups; and second 
that for these groups to function adequately, some people have to be given the 
power to make certain decisions on behalf of the group, in order to promote the 
safety and well-being of its members.15 In turn, this leads those without power 
to express some ‘basic legitimation expectations’ to the power-holders, in order 
to try to ensure that the character of the power being exercised does not become 
unjust, or otherwise inappropriate. If power-holders do start to behave in ways 
that citizens consider to be unjust, people will not feel that they are being treated 
with proper dignity as members of the group or society. All this being the case, 
both PJ and legitimacy are deeply social as well as normative concepts. It is there-
fore now necessary to explore in more detail some of their social features.
4.3  Social and situational contexts
Employing a terminology used in economic sociology, it is possible to categorise 
two broad approaches to social-scientific research: formalist and substantivist. A 
formalist approach to social action isolates individuals from their socio-historical 
contexts and attempts to analyse their actions in an atomised fashion. Granovetter 
(1985, p. 490) identifies three characteristics of the formalist position: the 
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transactors are previously unacquainted; they are unlikely to transact again, and 
information about the activities of either is unlikely to reach others with whom 
they might transact in the future. A substantivist approach, on the other hand, 
emphasises the embeddedness of social actions within specific socio-historical 
settings and within ‘concrete, ongoing systems of social relations’ (Granovetter 
1985, p. 487).
No procedural justice research has all the characteristics of the formalist posi-
tion. Nevertheless, because much of the PJ literature is survey-based, some of it 
does have a tendency to treat interactions between legal authorities and civilians 
as ‘spot’ encounters, atomised and without history, and lacking much considera-
tion of broader social contexts and the current situational framework. From our 
dialogic perspective of legitimacy, this is a mistake: as we have argued above, 
legitimacy dialogues are always contingent on specific features of the place and 
time in which they occur. A substantivist view is therefore consistent with the 
insights from political science that there are always social forces and processes that 
shape the nature and outcomes of legitimacy dialogues (see Dunn 2013). Those 
forces and processes might, of course, operate at macro-, meso- or micro-social 
levels. However, given the focus of this volume on procedural justice, it is appro-
priate in this chapter to consider especially what happens when there are actual 
encounters (or a deliberate avoidance of encounters) between authority figures 
and citizens. Accordingly, our focus here is on micro- and meso-social issues.16
Our substantivist discussion will work with the useful distinction drawn by 
Worden and McLean (2017, Figure 6, p. 83) between the influence of ‘citi-
zens’ backgrounds’ and the influence of the current ‘situational context’ in which 
legitimacy-relevant encounters occur.
4.3.1  Citizens’ backgrounds, procedural justice and legitimacy
We begin by exploring the possible relevance of citizens’ normative beliefs. In 
Why People Obey the Law, Tyler (1990/2006) identified two different types 
of internalised obligation to obey authorities. These are legitimacy, and what 
he called ‘personal morality’, which was described as differing from legitimacy 
because it is ‘not a feeling of obligation to an external … authority’, but instead 
‘an internalized obligation to follow one’s personal sense of what is morally right 
or wrong’ (pp. 25–26). Despite this conceptual distinction, however, Tyler noted 
that in some circumstances these two kinds of obligation might be empirically 
linked, because an individual’s personal morality (e.g. his or her political beliefs) 
‘may or may not’ lead him or her to ascribe legitimacy to the authorities in a given 
situation (p. 26). Much of the literature has paid only limited attention to pos-
sible links of this kind, but recently this topic has been more actively considered.
An important analysis in this vein was conducted by Mehozay and Factor 
(2017), using data from over 52,000 respondents to the European Social Survey 
(which covers 27 countries). The authors hypothesised that beliefs about the 
legitimacy of the police derive, to a significant extent, from what they term ‘core 
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normative values (i.e. notions of the good and virtuous life) that stem from 
deeply embedded cultural orientations through which individuals operate in 
and interpret the world’ (p. 154). Four such categories of ‘deep values’ were 
identified, and described as liberal; republican–communitarian; ethno-national 
and religious-traditional. The analysis of survey responses showed that percep-
tions of the legitimacy of police were positive for individuals holding liberal or 
republican–communitarian worldviews, but they were negative for those hold-
ing ethno-national normative values.17 The authors also conducted an analysis 
in which respondents’ views were aggregated on a national basis, which showed 
some important differences by country, both in dominant normative values and 
in assessments of police legitimacy. The results of the study are described as pro-
viding preliminary support for the authors’ main hypothesis. Importantly, how-
ever, it is argued that if the theory underpinning that hypothesis receives fuller 
substantiation, this will show that ‘even optimal [police] procedural conduct or 
efficiency may not affect the attitudes of some populations’ (p. 172). At a theo-
retical level, the authors also argue that the ‘core normative values’ that they 
describe ‘are so embedded and internalized that they become a sort of habit’, 
which, they suggest, might explain why they have received little attention in the 
criminological literature, because habit is a compliance mechanism that ‘seems to 
be much ignored by [most] criminologists’ (p. 171).18 Not dissimilar results have 
emerged from a French survey by Roché and Roux (2017), which explored how a 
general population sample judged ‘police unfairness’. In a multivariate analysis, it 
was found that ‘political attitudes and values emerged as the strongest predictors’ 
(p. 524). More specifically, police were considered to be fairer by those holding 
right-wing political views, punitive attitudes, ‘legalistic’ values, and an intolerance 
towards crime.
However, the Roché-Roux study also raises a different issue about the possible 
influence of social background on judgements of legitimacy. A special subsample 
was drawn from those living in the large Seine-St. Denis area on the outskirts of 
Paris, which has a very high level of social deprivation, and a high proportion of 
ethnic minority and immigrant residents. Respondents from this area returned 
the lowest ratings on police fairness. But this result raises the fresh question: is 
the perceived police unfairness attributable to the cultural norms prevailing in this 
type of area, or to police behaviour in the area? Probably the answer is ‘both’, 
because in the survey both ‘high police-initiated contact’ and living in St. Denis 
were significantly associated with perceived police unfairness when other vari-
ables were controlled for. Similar findings emerged in a survey by Wesley Skogan 
(2006) in Chicago, where the dependent variable was confidence in the police; in 
this study, negative experiences with the police were statistically associated with 
lack of confidence, but so were ‘neighbourhood dissatisfaction’ and perceived 
problems in the area (drugs, social disorder). Most recently, after a complex and 
fascinating analysis of ethnicity and legitimacy in European Social Survey data, 
Bradford et al. (2018, pp. 69–70) report that while ‘the experience of police 
activity seems to shape legitimacy in important ways’, so too do ‘economic, 
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social and political marginalization’, which in policy terms, they suggest, means 
that governments should consider not only improvements to policing, but also 
‘broader political responses to social exclusion’.
The analyses reported above clearly demonstrate that when citizens meet 
police officers, they do not do so with blank minds (and neither, of course, do the 
police come to such meetings in that fashion). The ‘personal morality’ which citi-
zens bring to the meeting may be shaped, among other things, by their political 
or religious values; by their social status; by the culture and concerns of the area 
where they live; or by their previous experiences with the police. Given this, the 
question arises: do any of these background matters actually affect how citizens 
react in a specific encounter with police? The research evidence on this matter is 
still limited, but the answer to the question is clearly ‘yes’, as two studies—in dif-
ferent ways—help to illuminate.
The first of these studies provided evidence of a clear ethnic difference in citi-
zens’ reactions, based on their prior experiences with the police. Charles Epp and 
colleagues (2014) carried out research into police vehicle stops in the US, distin-
guishing between ‘traffic-safety stops’ and so-called ‘investigative stops’, in which 
officers target people whom they suspect of lawbreaking. The authors claim that, 
while officers shared with most ordinary citizens a bias against African Americans, 
this bias was not generally visible; however, it was apparent ‘in the process of 
making investigatory stops’ (p. 53). So, for example, a white woman living in a 
‘nice neighbourhood’ is quoted as saying that she has been ‘pulled over’ much 
less often than her black neighbour and friend—‘she’s pulled over down at the 
corner more, and just asked “Do you live around here?”’ (p. 122). By law, offic-
ers need a probable cause to order a stop, but the authors report that ‘a minimal 
justification for the stop’ is frequently voiced in African Americans’ accounts of 
investigatory stops (p. 119). All this has significant consequences:
Most white drivers’ narratives are of typical traffic-safety stops. White drivers 
never express a fear of the officer demanding to search the vehicle or make an 
arrest … [By contrast] African American drivers … focus on whether the stop 
was really about traffic enforcement or something else. Deana … reported 
being ‘scared’ after being stopped twice within a few minutes ‘for no reason, 
just to see where I was going’, even though the officers were ‘nice’ and gave 
her no tickets … Elizabeth … characterized a stop as ‘racial abuse’ because 
the officers seemed less interested in the violation that they used to justify 
the stop—a late turn on a yellow light—than in checking her out and peering 
closely into her car. 
(pp. 124–125)
The authors further report that it is common for African American drivers to 
express ‘indignation’ at the behaviour of ‘polite but intrusively inquisitive offic-
ers’ (p. 125), but that no such reaction was found among white drivers. Naturally, 
these matters are widely discussed among African Americans; and their ‘shared 
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knowledge of investigatory stops leads them to look carefully for signs that [their 
next] stop is an investigatory stop’ (p. 120). Thus, there are very different imme-
diate reactions when people are stopped. Epp et al. (2014) report that evaluations 
by whites are ‘framed within the range of typical possibilities in the “normal” 
traffic-safety stop: ticket versus warning’; by contrast, African Americans’ evalua-
tions ‘are framed within a much wider range of possibilities: speeding stop versus 
intrusive investigation’ (p. 126). It is also worth emphasising that, in this study, 
the indignation of African Americans subjected to investigatory stops was not 
mitigated by the politeness of officers; it was simply not the case that, as a former 
Chicago police chief once claimed, ‘it’s not what you do, it’s how you do it’ 
(Thacher 2019, p. 98). Procedural justice (including politeness) certainly mat-
ters, but so does non-discriminatory police practice (distributive justice).19
The second study was led by the late Peter (‘Tank’) Waddington, whose 
research team showed four video clips of real-life encounters between police 
and citizens (taken from BBC documentary programmes) to 34 focus groups 
in England. These groups were of varied age, ethnicity, and social status; for 
example, they included groups of Muslim women, mid-career professionals, and 
young offenders on probation. An early publication from the study describes in 
detail group members’ reactions to just one of the video clips, which focused on 
a traffic stop by motorway police of a suspected car thief, and the aftermath of 
the stop as it became clear that the incident was more complex than the offic-
ers originally thought. The main conclusion was that the behaviour of the two 
police officers in this incident was often (although not invariably) assessed very 
differently by different people.20 What the authors described as ‘issues of fairness 
and respect’ surfaced repeatedly in the group discussions, but on many occa-
sions different participants ‘drew attention to the same occurrences within the 
video clip to justify entirely contradictory evaluations’ (Waddington et al. 2015, 
p. 212). Further analysis showed that these divergent opinions ‘could not readily 
be explained either by differences in the age, gender, ethnicity, or class composi-
tion of groups, or the purpose for which the group existed’ (p. 221). The main 
reason for this perhaps surprising finding was that respondents
relied on their wider cognitive resources not only to interpret what they saw 
on screen, but also to infer what could not be seen and imagine past occur-
rences, current possibilities and future potentialities far removed from what 
they witnessed. 
(p. 232, emphasis added)
This is valuable evidence that as citizens meet criminal justice authorities, they 
interpret the developing incident not only in terms of what is actually observed, 
but also in terms of inferences that—based on their background—they might 
draw about what they have seen. An example from a different videoed incident, 
reported in a later publication, is instructive in this regard. There was a gen-
eral consensus that a police officer showed considerable patience when taking a 
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statement from an elderly man who had just been robbed. However, during this 
process the officer looked at his wristwatch. In one group, this was interpreted 
by one observer as discourteous (‘he was trying to rush it along’), but another 
thought the officer was fulfilling an administrative requirement to record the time 
on the statement (Waddington et al. 2017, p. 52).
There is much complexity here; and very possibly the issues identified by 
Waddington and colleagues might be related to Worden and McLean’s (2017) 
findings of only a weak to moderate relationship between independently observed 
PJ and subjective PJ (see previous discussion). This is clearly an issue requiring 
further research.
4.3.2  Situational contexts, procedural justice, and legitimacy
We will explore the issue of situational contexts by considering the varying ways 
in which citizens meet police officers; the relationship between outcomes and 
judgements of PJ; and whether, in certain situations, people depart from the 
behaviour that might be expected in light of their ‘deeply embedded core norma-
tive values’ (Mehozay & Factor 2017).
In the now extensive literature on assessments of PJ and legitimacy in policing 
encounters, it is frequently reported that contacts initiated by citizens themselves 
(often described as ‘calls for service’) are more positively evaluated than are police-
initiated contacts. Some useful detail is available from the Schenectady study by 
Worden and McLean (2017, Table 5, p. 138), where—it will be recalled—the 
available data included both ‘observed’ and ‘subjective’ measures of PJ for the 
same incidents. The authors conducted a series of regression analyses in which 
‘subjective procedural justice’ was the dependent variable. In an early model, 
both observed procedural justice and observed procedural injustice were associ-
ated (in the expected directions) with subjective PJ, but so were encounters based 
on calls for service (positive) and arrests (negative) (Model II). Further analyses 
showed, first, that non-consensual stops and searches, either on the street or in a 
vehicle, were more negatively associated with PJ even than arrests21 (Models III 
and IV); and second that if the citizen had resisted the police during the encoun-
ter, he or she was particularly unlikely to perceive the encounter as procedurally 
just (Model V). In the final model (Model V), when all variables were included, 
observed procedural injustice still generated negative subjective perceptions of PJ, 
but observed procedural justice was no longer significant. The general picture that 
emerges from this survey is that citizens’ perceptions of PJ seem to be inversely 
correlated with the police’s use of coercive authority. This conclusion is sup-
ported by evidence from Waddington and colleagues’ (2017) video clip analysis, 
which found that ‘physical grappling with suspects’ was ‘not regarded with equa-
nimity’ by most members of the focus groups, especially when it involved more 
than one officer (p. 126). Since even the best police forces must, in order to do 
their job properly, sometimes use a degree of coercive authority (especially when 
dealing with citizen resistance, or with serious crimes ), these findings inevitably 
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raise some policy dilemmas for police services: the uncomfortable truth seems to 
be that it is difficult to deliver optimal PJ when carrying out certain police tasks.22 
However, it is important to note that by no means all police-initiated contact with 
citizens is coercive, and indeed community-oriented policing (COP) strategies 
explicitly set out to promote a different kind of proactive contact. A recent ran-
domised field experiment yielded encouraging results as regards this type of con-
tact; it was found that positive, non-enforcement COP visits by police to citizens’ 
homes substantially improved public attitudes to the police, including legitimacy 
and willingness to cooperate, and these results were not limited to individuals 
with prior positive attitudes to the police (Peyton at al. 2019). Overall, therefore, 
the evidence suggests that the context of the police–citizen contact is an issue of 
some significance for subjective judgements of PJ and legitimacy.
Just as important as the above issues is the less well-explored situational issue 
of underenforcement; that is, situations where there is a lack of effective polic-
ing, although a credible ‘basic legitimation expectation’ for citizen protection 
is clearly present. A tragic example of this type of situation was described in an 
independent report into widespread child sexual abuse in the English town of 
Rotherham. The summary of the report makes clear the ‘appalling nature of the 
abuse that [some] child victims suffered’, which included ‘being raped by multi-
ple perpetrators [and] trafficked to other towns and cities’. The police, the inquiry 
concluded, ‘gave no priority to [child sexual abuse], regarding many child victims 
with contempt’. Over a period of four years, three reports were made available 
to the police and the local government authority, and collectively these reports 
‘could not have been clearer in their description of the situation’. Unfortunately, 
however, the first report was ‘effectively suppressed … [while] the other two 
reports … were ignored and no action was taken’ (Jay 2014, p. 1). The victim-
ised children and their families clearly considered that the police response lacked 
legitimacy. However, in making this judgement they were primarily concerned 
with the police’s lack of effectiveness, and an apparent discrimination against this 
form of victimisation, rather than with a lack of procedural justice, although this 
was also present.
In the Rotherham example, those disadvantaged by underenforcement were 
socially powerless and vulnerable people. Alexandra Natapoff (2006) has argued 
that this structural characteristic is a recurring feature of underenforcement, 
which is
often linked with official discrimination … legal failure, and the undemo-
cratic treatment of the poor ... Conceived of as a form of public policy, 
underenforcement is a crucial distribution mechanism whereby the social 
good of lawfulness can be withheld. 
(p. 1717)
The same author also notes that underenforcement can be observed not only 
(as in Rotherham) in weak state responses to victimisation, but also in weak 
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responses to lawbreaking. This can take the familiar form of not pursuing cases 
against powerful people or corporations, but it can also occur when the law-
breakers are not powerful, but the offences they have committed have victimised 
vulnerable citizens.23
We turn now to a second aspect of social situations relevant to procedural 
justice and legitimacy, namely the relationship between process and outcome. 
Tyler and Meares (2019) have claimed that a ‘central conclusion’ of the research 
literature is that,
when people deal with authorities, their evaluations of the perceived fairness 
of the procedures through which authority is exercised influence legitimacy 
more strongly than does the perceived outcome of the encounter. 
(p. 83) 
In our most recent joint paper, we endorsed this claim to the extent of saying 
that ‘a powerful conclusion from the existing research is that … citizens often 
prioritise procedural fairness’ over perceived outcome favourability or fairness 
(Bottoms & Tankebe 2017, p. 75, emphasis added). We also fully accept the 
encouraging evidence that fair procedures can act as a significant ‘cushion of 
support against the potentially damaging effects of unfavorable outcomes’ (Tyler 
1990/2006, p. 101). Nevertheless, and of relevance to the present discussion 
of situational differences, research has also shown that, in some circumstances, 
outcomes can matter rather more than the statement by Tyler and Meares would 
suggest; and three different issues are of relevance here.
First, do people actually know the outcomes delivered in other, similar, situ-
ations? For example, survey respondents who report having been the subject of 
a traffic stop might not know the outcomes for other stopped drivers—in which 
case, a claim of distributive unfairness of the outcome is hardly possible. By con-
trast, it has been shown that in long-term prisons—where news travels fast and 
the outcomes of most incidents are widely known—comparative outcome fairness 
is widely debated, and is of great importance (Sparks et al. 1996, pp. 303–311; 
discussed by Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, p. 123). Second, some studies suggest 
that outcomes matter more to people’s assessments of fairness when the stakes 
are high. For example, Jacobson et al. (2015) studied proceedings at an English 
Crown Court dealing with serious offences, where for defendants the poten-
tial consequences were usually much more serious than those at stake in most 
survey-based legitimacy research. The authors found that defendants were indeed 
interested in the fairness of procedures, but ‘in the stark setting of the court-
room, the outcome of a case [conviction or acquittal; severity of sentence] … is 
a crucial determinant of … perceptions of legitimacy’ (p. 166, emphasis added). 
Third, experience has confirmed Tyler’s (1990/2006, p. 107) early speculation 
that ‘if a “fair” procedure continually delivers unfavorable outcomes, its fairness 
may ultimately come under scrutiny’. Exactly such a situation has been reported 
by Jenness and Calavita (2018) in a study of grievance procedures in California 
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prisons, where ‘prison officials … uniformly lauded the [grievance] system as fair 
to prisoners’ (p. 46) but where over 95% of prisoners’ grievances were denied 
(p. 45), creating considerable cynicism. From both their quantitative and quali-
tative analyses, the authors concluded that ‘procedural justice does matter to … 
prisoners’; however,
The prisoners in our study were above all concerned with how their griev-
ance turned out—specifically, whether they were able to extract remedies 
from this institution that otherwise is responsible for so much daily depri-
vation. So dominant is this substantive dimension to their satisfaction that 
procedural dimensions are largely subordinate to it … [In addition], the 
important relationship between outcome and satisfaction is further magni-
fied when the stakes associated with the grievance are the highest. 
(pp. 66–67).
None of the studies discussed in the previous paragraph argues that procedural 
justice was of no relevance in the situations that were researched. However, they 
all caution against assuming that procedural justice will always be more important 
than outcome favourability or perceived outcome fairness. Taken together they 
seem to have identified one situation where procedural justice will be dominant 
(citizens have little knowledge of outcomes other than their own) and two situa-
tions where perceptions of outcome might well be more important (high stakes; 
routine delivery of unfavourable outcomes). Empirical studies on this topic are 
still limited in quantity, but it ought to be possible for researchers to develop a 
fuller understanding of how procedures and outcomes seem to vary in their sig-
nificance to citizens in different sets of social circumstances.
Section 4.3.1, above, focused among other things on citizens’ ‘deeply embed-
ded core normative values’; by contrast, this section has considered the specifics 
of social situations. Clearly, any full ‘substantivist’ study of PJ and legitimacy will 
need to take account of both matters, and to assess how they might be inter-
related. To close this section, we therefore draw attention to one recent study 
that carefully addresses this interaction.
Monica Bell (2016) became interested in the concept of ‘legal cynicism’, 
defined as a strong distrust of and cynicism about all legal authorities, especially 
the police; this worldview incorporates a moral rule that ‘you don’t snitch to the 
police’. She noted the extensive evidence that legal cynicism is pervasive among 
residents of poor, black neighbourhoods in the US; but she was also struck by 
some less frequently cited data, which show that residents of such areas have, 
even when one controls for crime rates, a higher rate of calls to police than residents 
of white, middle-class areas. To explore this apparent paradox, Bell conducted 
50 lengthy qualitative interviews with poor African American mothers living in 
Washington, DC. She found plenty of evidence of legal cynicism in her sample, 
yet two-thirds of her respondents said that they had called the police at least 
once (p. 325). Why? Broadly, there were two main kinds of reason. One was 
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what Bell calls ‘officer exceptionalism’; that is, some women were willing to trust 
certain individual officers whom they had come to know personally, while still 
not placing any ‘legitimacy or trust in the broader system’ of policing (p. 329). 
Second, there were various circumstances in which the mothers might turn to 
the police because police seemed likely to offer better solutions than anyone else 
in specific situations.24 For example, one woman, while saying that she agreed 
with the ‘street code’ against calling the police, also reported that she had several 
times called police to help friends facing domestic violence, and to help control 
her teenage children (pp. 332–333). This example illustrates a further finding 
of Bell’s study, namely that calls to the police were usually made about issues 
within or physically near to the women’s homes, or those of their families or close 
friends, in an effort to regain or retain control of situations that were literally close 
to home. For more distant issues, such as drug trafficking and violent crime in 
the streets, the community norm against snitching held powerful sway, and the 
police were not called. Subtle findings such as these are important in remind-
ing us of the value of qualitative as well as quantitative research methods; many 
surveys would simply record Bell’s respondents as having negative perceptions of 
the police.
Monica Bell’s research was not longitudinal, so she necessarily could not 
address the important question of how ‘deeply embedded core normative values’ 
might change in response to particular encounters or incidents. That is a further 
topic that requires research, although for some valuable ‘informed speculation’ 
on this issue, see Waddington et al. (2017, pp. 164–165).
4.3.3  Moral contexts: ‘good’ versus ‘right’ relationships
In an important paper on prisons, Alison Liebling (2011) differentiates between 
two kinds of relationships between prison officers and prisoners, described as 
‘good’ and ‘right’ relationships. When talking about a particular prison, observ-
ers frequently ask whether that institution has good staff–prisoner relationships, 
but Liebling insists that this is not, ultimately, the correct question. She points 
out that having ‘good’ relations simply means that people are getting on with 
each other; however, a relationship between an officer and a prisoner may be 
‘good’ but not ‘right’. This can happen if, for example, the officer is turning 
a blind eye to the undercover importation of drugs into the prison, and/or if 
he or she is afraid to assert authority over some powerful prisoners. The prob-
lem is, essentially, that such relationships are ‘too close or too informal, lacking 
boundaries and professional distance’ (Liebling 2011, p. 491).25 By contrast, 
‘right’ relationships are professional and ethical: the officer maintains humane-
ness, approachability, politeness, and so on, but is always aware of his or her pro-
fessional obligations, including the need both to enforce and to abide by relevant 
laws and regulations.
It is important to note a theoretical point arising from this distinction. 
Following Hinsch (2010), many social scientists now distinguish between 
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‘empirical legitimacy’ and ‘normative legitimacy’. The ‘good’ versus ‘right’ dis-
tinction suggests that, as we have previously argued (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, 
pp. 156–158; Bottoms & Tankebe 2017, pp. 48–51), while a predominantly 
empirical approach to the study of legitimacy is the appropriate starting point for 
social-scientific researchers, an exclusively empirical account is ultimately inad-
equate. However, rather than enter into this theoretical territory here, we will 
illustrate its implications from a recent empirical study.
Tankebe et al. (2019) conducted research with samples of drivers of com-
mercial vehicles in two cities in Ghana. One of their regression analyses focused 
on self-reported traffic violations as the dependent variable. An initial analysis 
found that the variable ‘personal experiences of police corruption’ was associated 
with more traffic violations, but ‘police fairness’ (a standard set of PJ questions) 
was not significant. Further analyses explored possible interaction effects between 
‘personal experiences of police corruption’ and ‘police fairness’, to determine 
whether the effects of the latter depended on the former. The results were signifi-
cant, if disturbing. They suggested that the influence of police fairness on traffic 
violations depended on the moral context: where there was greater experience of 
corruption, ‘police fairness’ (better PJ) was associated with more, not fewer traffic 
violations.26 The research data did not allow further exploration of this fascinating 
finding, but—as the authors suggest—it is possible that underlying the data are 
‘good’ rather than ‘right’ relationships: that is, the officers might have been will-
ing to ‘listen to what drivers have to say, explain decisions, show care for drivers’ 
well-being, and avoid discriminatory stops of drivers, yet choose not to enforce 
the law on account of extra-legal considerations’ (p. 11). Overall, therefore, the 
results of this study suggest that different moral contexts can generate different 
behavioural reactions to procedural justice; and in policy terms, we might wish 
to modify our advocacy of PJ by insisting that some (corrupt) versions of PJ are 
not to be encouraged.
4.3.4  Comment
In this section, we have traversed a great deal of ground rather quickly, but 
it is clear from the discussion that social and situational contexts can very 
significantly influence perceptions of PJ and legitimacy. Among the relevant 
issues in this respect are: citizens’ deeply held political and moral views; 
neighbourhood norms; experiences of systematic distributive injustice; the 
nature of the current encounter with legal authorities (e.g. for police, calls 
for service versus arrests and searches); citizens drawing inferences about 
authorities’ actions beyond what is actually observed; whether an encounter 
involves high stakes; experiences of underenforcement; setting aside one’s 
normal perception of authorities in particular situations; and the distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘right’ relationships. Many of these topics have yet to be 
explored in depth by scholars, so there remains a significant and challenging 
agenda for research.
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4.4  Concluding discussion
The importance of procedural justice for criminological analysis was first pro-
posed by social psychologists. Social psychologists are, of course, concerned with 
social issues, but within that framework they focus especially on questions of 
individual psychology.
We are sociologists, not social psychologists, and in our first joint paper on 
legitimacy in criminology (which we titled ‘Beyond Procedural Justice’), we sum-
marised our position as one of ‘going beyond—but emphatically not jettisoning—
the procedural justice framework’ (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, p. 169). This stance 
has been interpreted by some as a rejection of procedural justice as a contributor 
to legitimacy, but this is incorrect. By ‘going beyond’ we meant simply that in our 
view other matters, of a more sociological character, had to be considered in order 
to explain empirical legitimacy adequately; but when we said we were ‘not jettison-
ing’ PJ, we meant just that. Accordingly, in our 2017 paper, we wrote that ‘there 
is no doubt about its [PJ’s] empirical importance in relation to police legitimacy’ 
(Bottoms & Tankebe 2017, p. 75). We remain of the same view today.
In that 2017 paper, we drew for the first time on Bernard Williams’ conceptu-
alisation of legitimacy. Within Williams’ theoretical framework, we have no doubt 
that the exercise of procedural justice by state criminal justice agents is a ‘basic 
legitimation expectation’ (BLE) that citizens will justifiably express, bearing in 
mind the evidence that PJ touches crucially on citizens’ ‘social standing’ and 
their ‘feelings of security’ within society (Tyler 1990/2006, p. 175). However, 
it is also pertinent to ask whether PJ will be the only such legitimation expecta-
tion that citizens will express to the state and its agents. Our answer is that it will 
not, and that some other matters (including distributive justice, lawfulness, and 
effectiveness) will also often constitute reasonable BLEs.
Even if that is so, however, perhaps these other matters will, empirically speak-
ing, be regarded by citizens as much less important legitimation expectations than 
procedural justice? This seems to be the claim made by Tyler and Meares (2019) 
when they wrote in a recent paper that ‘research points to evaluations of the jus-
tice or injustice of the procedures through which the police exercise their author-
ity (i.e. procedural justice) as the key antecedents of legitimacy’ (p. 71, emphasis 
added). However, if these authors are making such a claim, we would have to say 
that, in some circumstances, it is empirically doubtful, as various examples discussed 
in this chapter have shown (see for example Epp et al. 2014; Jay 2014; Tankebe 
et al. 2019). In our judgement, the available empirical evidence does not support 
the view that any one factor is in all circumstances the key basic legitimation expec-
tation that citizens have of criminal justice systems. Instead, the evidence suggests 
that in different social contexts different legitimation expectations can be the most 
important. Accordingly, although in some social circumstances the exercise of PJ 
might be no more than ‘palliative’ (see note 19 below), in other circumstances it 
could be of vital importance. For example, if in a given social area there is a prob-
lem of heightened crime and insecurity, improved police effectiveness might be 
the main route to better legitimacy; but once that problem is resolved, issues of 
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procedural justice—such as the respectful treatment of suspects and victims, and 
greater transparency in decisions—might well replace effectiveness as the most 
important factor within the structure of legitimacy.27 This contextual variability 
means, in our view, that PJ scholarship should in future pay greater attention to 
the social and situational circumstances in which PJ is delivered;28 and, as our dis-
cussion in Section 4.3 of this chapter has hopefully demonstrated, understanding 
these circumstances fully will be a complex undertaking. Meeting this research 
agenda will accordingly require the development of a stronger qualitative research 
literature than currently exists (Tankebe 2014, p. 254), to set alongside the survey 
work that has so far been dominant in this field of scholarship.
Notes
1 It is important to distinguish these two meanings of the word ‘normative’ 
because—as described for example by Meyerson and Mackenzie (2018)—it is 
possible to formulate instrumental theories of PJ (such as utilitarianism) that are 
normative in the first but not the second sense. By contrast, social scientists study-
ing PJ usually say that their work is descriptive and explanatory, and therefore 
not concerned with ‘normative ethics’ in the first sense. However, within this 
descriptive/explanatory framework, they draw a distinction between normative 
and instrumental explanations of human behaviour. Tom Tyler (1990/2006, 
p. 3) succinctly described this distinction as a contrast between ‘the influence of 
what people regard as just and moral’ [normative] and the influence of ‘what is in 
[people’s] self-interest’ [instrumental].
2 Arising from this definition, we should note an important distinction between 
‘legitimacy’ and what has been called ‘dull compulsion’ or ‘fatalism’. Fatalism 
exists where there is a marked power imbalance between power-holders and 
their subjects, and people obey simply because they fatalistically accept that the 
structures of power, wealth and/or status are inexorably stacked against them 
(Lockwood 1992, p. 43). This is very different from an uncoerced acknowledg-
ment that power is held rightfully.
3 There can however be a problem with this ‘realist’ theoretical approach where the 
content of a citizen-approved BLE is regarded as morally wrong by the governing 
authority. For a full discussion of this issue see Bottoms and Tankebe (2017).
4 This quotation is taken from a paper on PJ in the specific context of policing. In 
four places (indicated by square brackets) we have substituted ‘authorities’ for the 
original of ‘the police’.
5 There has been some lively recent controversy concerning whether the causal 
links in this proposed sequence have been adequately demonstrated empirically 
(see Nagin & Telep 2017; Tyler 2017). This debate is, however, of limited impor-
tance for the purposes of this chapter, because the issue of compliance with law 
(the final stage in the projected sequence, and the one of particular interest to 
critics) is outside the scope of our discussion.
6 The insights of the Group Value Model (GVM) were subsequently developed in 
the ‘Group Engagement Model’ (Tyler & Blader 2003). This added to the GVM 
an explanation for why PJ shapes co-operation in groups and societies (p. 352) – a 
topic that (see note 5 above) is not our focus in this chapter.
7 In a previous paper (Bottoms & Tankebe 2017, p. 76) we have also tentatively 
suggested that there may be conceptual links between the group value model of 
PJ and Axel Honneth’s philosophical work on the recognition of individuals (see 
Honneth 1995; Zurn 2015).
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8 Although the reference here is to a single ‘audience’, elsewhere in the same paper 
we make clear that there can be several different audiences for a claim to legitimate 
authority. For example, when introducing a new operational policy, the Director of 
Prisons for a given state will certainly have to consider how prisoners will evaluate 
the justice of the policy; but she will also need to take into account the views of her 
political masters, and those of the prison staff who will have to implement the policy.
9 Note also that the nature of legitimacy dialogues can change significantly over 
time. For example, in 2019 Hong Kong experienced a series of conflicts on the 
streets between protestors and authorities, extending over several weeks. Initially, 
the demonstrators focused on grievances concerning an extradition law, but later 
their complaints became more general. Police behaviour was not at first a cause 
of complaint by protestors, but it later became so as they claimed that police had 
behaved inappropriately when dealing with some of their demonstrations.
10 See, however, the recent critique of PJ by David Thacher (2019), a central claim 
of which is that ‘procedural justice leaves out lawfulness’ (p. 99).
11 See also the comments by David Beetham (1991/2013, p. 137) in the context of 
the legitimacy of state government more generally: ‘the performance of govern-
ment makes a significant difference to, and forms a necessary component of, its 
legitimacy…After all, how can the enormous powers of the state be at all justified, 
or people obliged to obey it, unless it fulfil requirements necessary to the society 
and their own well being, and that it fulfil them effectively?’
12 An example is the situation in County Donegal, Republic of Ireland, described 
by Conway (2014) and summarised in Bottoms and Tankebe (2017, p. 86). 
Documented findings of serious police lawlessness and corruption had little effect 
on public confidence in the police in that county, for reasons connected with 
wider features of Irish history and politics.
13 The study included three ethnic groups of roughly equal size: blacks, Hispanics 
and whites. The only statistically significant differences between groups were 
that, as compared with black respondents, Hispanics were more likely to mention 
‘honesty’ and less likely to mention ‘fairness’.
14 To create the categories used in the research, the research team deliberately hired 
a research assistant who was not familiar with the academic literatures on legiti-
macy and trust. From the responses, this assistant created the category ‘fairness’, 
which included both procedural and distributive fairness.
15 On the first point, see Dunbar (2014) on the importance of group living within 
the complex story of human evolution. On the second point, see the classic analy-
sis by the legal theorist Karl Llewellyn (1940) of the need for all social groups 
to develop ways of handling certain ‘law-jobs’, if the group is to function well. 
Among these law-jobs is ‘The Say’, which covers questions of who is given author-
ity to make different kinds of decisions within the group.
16 On the theoretical importance of macro-social issues wihin democratic legitimacy 
dialogues, see Loader and Sparks (2013). For a vivid example of the relevance 
of such issues within a high-profile debate about the legitimacy of various prac-
tices in the Illinois prison system in the 1960s, see Jacobs (1977), summarised in 
Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, pp. 167–168).
17 The ‘religious-traditional’ factor was not related to legitimacy, possibly because 
many of the relevant questionnaire items ‘measure religious practice instead of 
directly measuring religious-traditional core normative values’ (p. 171). The 
results for the ethno-national factor bear some similarity to Tyler’s (2000) find-
ings that, within the U.S., citizens who identify more strongly with a particular 
ethnic group (rather than with American society as a whole) are less influenced by 
considerations of procedural justice and more influenced by whether policies are 
favourable to their ethnic group. This is because ‘they identify more strongly with 
subgroups than with society, and/or view the authorities as representatives of a 
group to which they do not belong’ (p. 983).
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18 As an exception to this generalisation, the authors cite the work of Anthony 
Bottoms on compliance; see now Bottoms (2019). See also Sato (2018, pp. 108, 
121) on habit as a possible mechanism for co-operation with the police in Japan.
19 This point was recognised by Tom Tyler in a back-cover endorsement of the study 
by Epp and colleagues on police stops. Tyler wrote that ‘polite and respectful 
police demeanor, while to some extent palliative, cannot assuage the damaging 
effects of the widespread and systematic use of this policing technique on the 
minority community’
20 An important exception to the dissensus was a ‘remarkable agreement’ that at the 
time of the stop on the motorway, the first officer to approach the stopped vehicle 
should have politely asked the driver to alight from the car. Instead, he reached 
into the car and began tussling with the driver, saying ‘Get out before I drag you 
out’ (Waddington et al. 2017, pp. 98–99). Note that here the focus groups are 
strongly endorsing a PJ approach.
21 By contrast, in citizen-initiated contacts, a rapid police response time was posi-
tively associated with subjective procedural justice (Model IV).
22 Waddington et al. (2017, p. 126) found that, in assessing police use of non-lethal 
force, members of the public in their focus groups ‘relied, as the law does, on 
whether [it] is “reasonable”’. However, there was often marked dissensus as to 
whether the force used in a particular incident was in fact reasonable.
23 A well-known example of this is the case of Stephen Lawrence, a young black 
man who was murdered in the streets of south London in 1993. A commission 
of inquiry eventually concluded that the police’s failure to take the case seri-
ously had been occasioned by what the commission called ‘institutional racism’ 
defined as ‘the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin … 
[exemplified by] unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stere-
otyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people’ (Macpherson Inquiry 1999, 
para. 6.34).
24 In more detail, Bell distinguished cases where (i) women thought that police 
would be the most effective agency to handle a particular problem (‘domain spec-
ificity’); or (ii) they foresaw some beneficial outcome in a given situation (‘thera-
peutic consequences’); or (iii) they turned to the police in a quest for protection 
or to secure leverage with other power-holders (‘institutional navigation’).
25 There are, of course, parallels to this within policing: see for example Muir’s 
discussion of officers who adopt a ‘reciprocator’ role, aiming for a reputation as a 
‘Joe Good Guy’ and with a tendency to ‘bestow upon the citizen the reciprocal of 
[their] authority, [their] leniency, the power not to hurt’ in exchange for personal 
profit (Muir 1977, p. 293).
26 Interestingly, the results were the same when the authors substituted ‘vicarious 
experiences of police corruption’ for ‘personal experiences of police corruption’
27 See, for example, Chen (1997) who argues that legitimacy crises sometimes arise 
for authoritarian governments even when they are effective in producing eco-
nomic prosperity. The reason is the emergence of new demands—such as pressure 
for voice and participation in governance—to which such governments might be 
ill-prepared to respond.
28 For a congruent message, see Roché and Oberwittler (2018).
References
Akinlabi, OM 2018, ‘Why do Nigerians cooperate with the police?: legitimacy, 
procedural justice and other contextual factors in Nigeria’, in D Oberwittler & S 
Roché (eds.), Police-citizen relations across the world: comparing sources and contexts 
of trust and legitimacy, Routledge, London.
108 Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe 
Beetham, D 1991/2013, The legitimation of power, first edition 1991 Macmillan, 
London; second edition with new introduction and new Part III 2013, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Beetham, D 2013, ‘Revisiting legitimacy, twenty years on’, in J Tankebe & A Liebling 
(eds.), Legitimacy and criminal justice: an international exploration, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Bell, MC 2016, ‘Situational trust: how disadvantaged mothers reconceive legal 
cynicism’, Law & Society Review, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 314–47.
Bottoms, AE 2019, ‘Understanding compliance with laws and regulations: a 
mechanism-based approach’, in M. Krambia-Kapardis (ed.) Financial compliance: 
issues, concerns and future directions, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Bottoms, AE & Tankebe, J 2012, ‘Beyond procedural justice: a dialogic approach to 
legitimacy in criminal justice’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 102, 
no. 1, pp. 119–70.
Bottoms, AE & Tankebe, J 2017, ‘Police legitimacy and the authority of the state’, in 
A du Bois-Pedain, M Ulväng & P Asp (eds.), Criminal law and the authority of the 
state, Hart Publishing, Oxford.
Bradford, B, Huq, A, Jackson, J & Roberts, B 2014, ‘What price fairness when 
security is at stake?: police legitimacy in South Africa’, Regulation & Governance, 
vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 246–68.
Bradford, B, Jackson J & Hough M 2018, ‘Ethnicity, group position and police 
legitimacy: early findings from the European social survey’, in D Oberwittler & 
S Roché (eds.), Police-citizen relations across the world: comparing sources and 
contexts of trust and legitimacy, Routledge, London
Chen, F 1997, ‘The dilemma of eudaemonic legitimacy in post-Mao China’, Polity, 
vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 421–39.
Coicaud, JM 2002, Legitimacy and politics: a contribution to the study of political right 
and political responsibility, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Conway, V 2014, Policing twentieth century Ireland: a history of An Garda Siochana, 
Routledge, London.
Dunbar, R 2014, Human evolution, Penguin, London.
Dunn, J 2013, ‘Legitimacy and democracy in the world today’, in J Tankebe & A 
Liebling (eds.), Legitimacy and criminal justice: an international exploration, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Epp, CR, Maynard-Moody, S & Haider-Markel, D 2014, Pulled over: how police stops 
define race and citizenship, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Granovetter, M 1985, ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 481–510.
Hawthorn, G 2005, ‘Introduction’, in B Williams, In the beginning was the deed: 
realism and moralism in political argument, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Hinsch, W 2010, ‘Justice, legitimacy, and constitutional rights’, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 39–54.
Honneth, A 1995, The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts, 
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Jacobs, JB 1977, Stateville: the penitentiary in mass society. Chicago University Press, 
Chicago.
Jacobson, J, Hunter, G & Kirby, A 2015, Inside Crown Court: personal experiences 
and questions of legitimacy, Policy Press, Bristol.
 PJ, legitimacy, and social contexts 109
Jay, A 2014, Independent inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. Available 
at https ://ww w.rot herha m.gov .uk/d ownlo ads/f ile/2 79/in depen dent- inqui 
ry-in to-ch ild-s exual -expl oitat ion-i n-rot herha m [Accessed December 2019]
Jenness, V & Calavita, K 2018, ‘“It depends on the outcome”: prisoners, grievances, 
and perceptions of justice’, Law & Society Review, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 41–72.
Jonathan-Zamir, T, Mastrofski, SD & Moyal, S 2015, ‘Measuring procedural justice 
in police–citizen encounters’, Justice Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 845–71.
Kearns, EM, Ashooh, E & Lowrey-Kinberg, B 2019, ‘Racial differences in 
conceptualizing legitimacy and trust in police’, American Journal of Criminal 
Justice, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 190–214.
Liebling, A 2011, ‘Distinctions and distinctiveness in the work of prison officers: 
legitimacy and authority revisited’, European Journal of Criminology, vol. 8, no. 
6, pp. 484–99.
Lind, EA & Tyler, TR 1988, The social psychology of procedural justice, Plenum Press, 
New York.
Llewellyn, KN 1940, ‘The normative, the legal, and the law-jobs: the problem of 
juristic method’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 49, no. 8, pp. 1355–1400.
Loader, I & Sparks, R 2013, ‘Unfinished business: legitimacy, crime control and 
democratic politics’, in J Tankebe & A Liebling (eds.), Legitimacy and criminal 
justice: an international exploration, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lockwood, D 1992, Solidarity and schism: the problem of disorder in Durkheim and 
Marxist sociology, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
MacCormick, N 2007, Institutions of law, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Macpherson Inquiry, 1999, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: report of an inquiry by Sir 
William Macpherson of Cluny, Cm 4262, The Stationery Office, London.
McCluskey, JD, Uchida, CD, Solomon, SE, Wooditch, A, Connor, C & Revier, L 
2019, ‘Assessing the effects of body‐worn cameras on procedural justice in the Los 
Angeles Police Department’, Criminology, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 208–236.
Mehozay, Y & Factor, R 2017, ‘Deeply embedded core normative values and 
legitimacy of law enforcement authorities’, Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 151–180.
Meyerson, D & Mackenzie, C 2018, ‘Procedural justice and the law’, Philosophy 
Compass vol. 13, no. 12, pp. 1–11.
Muir, WK 1977, Police: streetcorner politicians, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Nagin, D & Telep, C 2017, ‘Procedural justice and legal compliance’, Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science, vol. 13, pp. 5–28.
Natapoff, A 2006, ‘Underenforcement’, Fordham Law Review, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 
1715–76.
Nawaz, A & Tankebe, J 2018, ‘Tracking procedural justice in stop and search 
encounters: coding evidence from body-worn video cameras’, Cambridge Journal 
of Evidence-Based Policing, vol. 2, pp. 139–163.
Peffley, M & Hurwitz, J 2010, Justice in America: the separate realities of blacks and 
whites, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Peyton, K, Sierra-Arévalo, M & Rand, DG 2019, ‘A field experiment on community 
policing and police legitimacy’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
vol. 116, no. 40, pp. 19894–19898.
Roché, S & Oberwittler, D 2018, ‘Towards a broader view of police–citizen relations: 
how societal cleavages and political contexts shape trust and distrust, legitimacy and 
110 Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe 
illegitimacy’, in D Oberwittler & S Roché (eds.), Police-citizen relations across the 
world: comparing sources and contexts of trust and legitimacy, Routledge, London.
Roché, S & Roux, G 2017, ‘The “silver bullet” to good policing—a mirage: an 
analysis of the effects of political ideology and ethnic identity on procedural 
justice’, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 
vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 514–28.
Sato, M 2018, ‘Police legitimacy and public cooperation: is Japan an outlier in the 
procedural justice model?’, in D Oberwittler & S Roché (eds.), Police-citizen 
relations across the world: comparing sources and contexts of trust and legitimacy, 
Routledge, London.
Skogan, WG 2006, ‘Asymmetry in the impact of encounters with police’, Policing & 
Society, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 99–126.
Sparks, R, Bottoms, A & Hay, W 1996, Prisons and the problem of order, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford.
Sunshine, J & Tyler, TR 2003, ‘The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping 
public support for policing’, Law & Society Review, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 513–48.
Tankebe, J 2009, ‘Public cooperation with the police in Ghana: does procedural 
fairness matter?’, Criminology, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 1265–1293.
Tankebe, J 2013, ‘Viewing things differently: the dimensions of public perceptions of 
police legitimacy’, Criminology, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 103–135.
Tankebe, J 2014, ‘Police legitimacy’, in MD Reisig & R Kane (eds.), Oxford handbook 
of policing, Oxford University Press, New York.
Tankebe, J, Boakye, KE & Amagnya, MA 2019, ‘Traffic violations and cooperative 
intentions among drivers: the role of corruption and fairness’, Policing and Society. 
doi:10.1080/10439463.2019.1636795
Thacher, D 2019, ‘The limits of procedural justice’, in D Weisburd & A Braga (eds.), 
Police innovation: contrasting perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tyler, TR 1990/2006, Why people obey the law, first edition 1990 Yale University 
Press, New Haven; second edition 2006 (with afterword) Princeton University 
Press, Princeton.
Tyler, TR 2000, ‘Multiculturalism and the willingness of citizens to defer to law and 
to legal authorities’, Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 983–1019.
Tyler, TR 2017, ‘Procedural justice and policing: a rush to judgment?’, Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 29–53.
Tyler, TR & Blader SL 2003, ‘The Group Engagement Model: procedural justice, 
social identity and co-operative behavior’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 349–361.
Tyler, TR & Meares TL 2019, ‘Procedural justice in policing’, in D Weisburd & 
A Braga (eds.), Police innovation: contrasting perspectives, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
Waddington, PAJ, Williams, K, Wright, M & Newburn, T 2015, ‘Dissension in 
public evaluations of the police’, Policing and Society, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 212–235.
Waddington, PAJ, Williams, K, Wright, M & Newburn, T 2017, How people judge 
policing, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Williams, B 2005, In the beginning was the deed: realism and moralism in political 
argument, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Worden, RE & McLean, SJ 2017, Mirage of police reform: procedural justice and police 
legitimacy. University of California Press, Oakland.
Zurn, C 2015, Axel Honneth, Polity Press, Cambridge.
5
5.1  Introduction1
Analytical jurisprudence tends to operate with clean and sharp conceptual distinc-
tions: content-dependence versus content-independence, substance versus form, 
legitimate versus illegitimate (merely de facto) authority, and so on. This impulse 
for sharp delineation has important benefits, such as the promotion of precision 
and clarity, but it also has at least one, less fortunate, side effect: it can, and some-
times does, blind one to certain nuances and complexities of the studied human 
phenomenon that do not readily fall on one side of the dividing line between 
alternative conceptual categories.
The empirical input of the social sciences can help the philosopher avoid, or 
correct for, such oversights. The point made here is not merely that an empirical 
perspective can serve to remind the philosopher that psychological realities—such 
as the realities of our attitudes, motivations, and deliberation vis-à-vis the law—
are not nearly as ‘tidy’ as the conceptual systems prevailing in analytical juris-
prudence. Our point goes further: empirical findings can draw the philosopher’s 
attention to what are, even from the perspective of his or her own discipline, 
interesting interrelations between the sharply delineated conceptual categories 
predominating in his or her field of inquiry. It is in this way that empirical inquiry 
informs philosophical analysis in the present chapter.2
Before outlining our argument, an additional comment is worth making 
regarding the link between empirical and philosophical inquiries. Empirical 
research can inform a philosophical discussion in various ways, some of which are 
straightforward (e.g. the verification of factual assumptions, such as assumptions 
about the human condition or about what people are like, which form part of 
a chain of moral reasoning),3 whereas others are more contested or might even 
be accused of making an unwarranted leap from descriptive arguments to evalu-
ative conclusions. But one should take care not to invoke the latter accusation 
too readily; it would often be unjustified, since theorists working at the interface 
between empirical and philosophical inquiries normally do not suggest ‘that we 
read morality directly off survey results’ (to use the words of Alfano, Loeb, & 
Plakias 2018, Section 5.2, in a rejoinder to a similar objection). Rather, work 
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done in this vein normally draws on empirical resources in more subtle and quali-
fied ways.
At any rate, our own way of proceeding here is not susceptible to the above 
charge, because we do not treat empirical findings as the proof of a morally 
evaluative conclusion, but rather as a source of information that, by highlight-
ing certain features of the attitudinal landscape, which may (but need not) have 
moral-philosophical parallels, draws the philosopher’s attention to certain moral 
possibilities—possibilities that, in turn, ought to be borne out independently by 
recourse to morally evaluative arguments. To employ once more the words of 
Alfano, Loeb, & Plakias (2018, Section 5.2), ‘[i]magination needs material to 
work with’. And, insofar as the material, or some aspect of it, is not readily visible 
from the philosopher’s armchair, it is hard to see why he or she should resist the aid 
of empirical research, so long as it is used in the qualified manner just described.
A brief overview of our arguments is in order before plunging into substan-
tive discussion. We begin, in Section 5.2, with an empirical discussion focused 
on survey data from the US about law-related attitudes and predictors of legal 
compliance. The survey, and the completion of this study, preceded the recent 
anti-police brutality widespread protests sparked by the killing of George Floyd, 
a development with likely reverberations in terms of public perceptions of police. 
But our empirical observations, and the principled inferences drawn from them, 
can be extrapolated to—and, indeed, can be utilised for analysing—these current 
changes in the landscape of police legitimacy. Consistent with a series of previ-
ous studies, we observe that a fair amount of variation in people’s ascriptions of 
legitimacy to the legal system is explained by perceptions of procedural justice 
in, and lawfulness of, the operation of police and court officials. In addition, we 
identify two factors as significant predictors of legal compliance (as inferred from 
self-report): (i) people’s belief that they have a (content-independent, moral) 
duty to obey the law (one index of legitimacy, as defined here); and (ii) people’s 
moral assessments of the content of specific legal requirements (which is often 
labelled in the literature as ‘personal morality’, but which we prefer referring to 
as ‘perceived moral content of laws’). Crucially for present purposes, we observe 
an interactive relationship between these two factors: higher levels of perceived 
moral content of laws make the felt duty to obey a better predictor of compliance 
than it otherwise is, and, similarly, perceived moral content of laws is a better 
predictor of compliance when the felt duty to obey is relatively strong.
Thus, at the empirical level we find that (perceived) procedural justice in, and 
lawfulness of, police and courts’ actions operates as a legitimating factor and 
predicts compliance; however, the extent to which it predicts compliance is sensi-
tive, at least partly, to people’s substantive assessments of the law’s content. This 
empirical picture prompts us, in Section 5.3, to ask the following question, with 
a particular focus on the moral significance of the rule of law: Might something 
like the above interactive modality hold good in a parallel, philosophical context, 
in the sense that procedure–content interaction is not only a feature of people’s 
attitudes towards the law, but also a feature of the moral significance of the rule 
of law?
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We propose an affirmative answer, locating the value of the rule of law in 
a hybrid procedural-substantive source. We advance this claim as an alterna-
tive to two rival positions in the jurisprudential discourse: the first (‘the proce-
dural morality view’, as we refer to it) claims that Lon Fuller’s eight precepts 
of legality embody moral qualities not contingent on the law’s content; while 
the second (‘the instrumental view’, as we call it) claims that Fuller’s precepts 
are merely principles for the efficient execution of the law’s substantive goals 
(whether morally good or bad), and thus have no independent moral value. In 
contrast, on the view we propound here, Fuller’s principles possess (inter alia) 
an expressive moral quality, but their expressive effect does not materialise in 
isolation from other, contextual factors—and, in particular, the extent to which 
it materialises is partly sensitive to the moral quality of the law’s content. 
It is worth clarifying that we do not present our philosophical and empirical 
claims as counterparts of one another. Indeed, apart from their distinct charac-
ters qua empirical and philosophical claims, there are certain other differences 
of focus between them (alongside certain parallels)—for example, the notion of 
‘procedure’ is used by each of them with a different emphasis, with one tending 
to focus on legal process while the other tending to focus on legal form. But 
such differences do not pose an obstacle for our line of analysis, since we never 
suggest that our philosophical claim derives, or can be deduced, from the empiri-
cal claim. Instead, as was noted above, we merely regard our empirical find-
ings as a source of information or inspiration that leads us to examine a certain 
philosophical possibility; and we merely point out what we view as an interesting 
parallel (rather than sameness or equivalence) between our observations in these 
two contexts.
Having provided a preliminary sketch of our arguments, we now turn to the 
empirical part of this chapter.
5.2  An empirical perspective on law-related attitudes: 
legitimation, legitimacy, and legal compliance
We begin this section with a brief overview of our two empirical research ques-
tions: (1) What legitimates the police and the law generally? (2) Which norma-
tive factors predict compliance with the law? Further to this, we comment more 
specifically on the two corresponding parts of our analysis, and we then detail our 
method, measures, and results.
5.2.1  Brief overview
Our focus here is on people’s ascriptions of legitimacy to the legal system 
(labelled here ‘legitimacy’). We follow an approach in the social sciences that 
measures legitimacy by reference to two connected judgements (Jackson et al. 
2012, 2013; Bradford et al. 2014a, 2014c; Hamm et al. 2017; Huq et al. 2017; 
Gerber & Jackson 2017; Bradford & Jackson 2018; Gerber et al. 2018; for a 
review of the international literature, see Jackson 2018). The first is the perceived 
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normative appropriateness of a legal institution: the institution gains legitimacy 
from a belief that it wields its power in normatively appropriate ways (for dis-
cussion of the appropriateness part of the legitimacy construct, see Jackson & 
Gau 2015; Jackson & Bradford 2019). Normative appropriateness is gauged 
through survey items referring to the extent of alignment between the institu-
tion’s general operation and people’s sense of right and wrong, such as ‘Your 
own feelings about what is right and wrong usually agree with the laws that 
are enforced by the police and the courts’ (we subsume such items under the 
heading ‘normative alignment’).4 Positive answers to such questions suggest 
that the institution is perceived as having a valid claim to exercise power. The 
second index of legitimacy refers more directly to the perceived authority to gov-
ern (which we assume flows from perceived normative appropriateness), and is 
commonly measured by asking people questions such as whether they are under 
a duty to obey the requirements of legal institutions, whether they should obey 
the law even if they disagree with its content, and so on (for discussion of the 
obligation-to-obey part of the legitimacy construct, see Bottoms & Tankebe 
2012; Tyler & Jackson 2013; Trinkner 2019; Pósch et al. 2020). As Tyler and 
Trinkner (2018, p. 3) state:
Perceptions of legitimacy … lead individuals to feel that it is their obliga-
tion to obey rules irrespective of their content. Hence people authorize legal 
authorities to decide what is correct and then people feel an obligation to 
adhere to the law.5
Drawing on data from a nationally representative US-based survey, we examine 
the extent to which legal legitimacy is predicted by people’s perceptions of how 
police and court officials behave.6 We consider public perceptions of proce-
dural justice (e.g. impartial and accountable decision-making and the quality of 
interpersonal treatment in dealings with citizens) and lawfulness. We examine 
the extent to which these perceived attributes explain variation in police legiti-
macy and, more generally, legal legitimacy (Figure 5.1). Positive associations 
are taken to mean that procedural justice and lawfulness are two ways in which 
the police and other legal institutions legitimate themselves in the eyes of the 
public.
We also assess the predictors of legal compliance (Figure 5.1). In this regard, 
of particular interest to us is the extent to which the following two factors interact 
to explain variation in people’s compliance with the law: (i) people’s belief that 
they have a (content-independent) duty to obey the law (the second index of 
legal legitimacy); and (ii) people’s moral assessments of the content of specific 
legal requirements. Testing an interactive relationship between these two fac-
tors, we assess whether a felt content-independent duty to obey the law has what 
might be termed an ‘amplifier effect’ on the motivational force of the content-
dependent belief that specific laws are morally justifiable, and vice versa. In assess-
ing the above two predictors, we adjust for other factors, such as the perceived 
risk of sanction and expected social disapproval.
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5.2.2  Legitimation: examining the sources of police 
and legal legitimacy
Our analysis builds on Trinkner et al.’s (2018) analysis of the same dataset,7 
which found that police legitimacy was positively predicted by a formative con-
struct based on people’s beliefs about officers’ actions in terms of interpersonal 
treatment (e.g. do officers treat citizens with dignity and respect?), decision-
making (e.g. do officers make unbiased decisions?), and what they call ‘bounded 
authority’ (i.e. whether officers respect the limits of their rightful authority). In 
Trinkner et al.’s analysis, perceptions of appropriate police behaviour predicted 
police legitimacy, and police legitimacy predicted legal legitimacy more generally. 
They concluded from this that the police are tangible representations of the law 
and that interactions with the police provide information not only about police 
authority, but also about the law and government more generally (Meares 2009; 
Tyler & Jackson 2014). On this account, the law’s legitimacy is not a given 
power; rather, it is shaped partly through day-to-day encounters with its agents 
that serve an educative function in that they facilitate the internalisation of values 
from which the law gains its legitimacy (Justice & Meares 2014; Trinkner & 
Tyler 2016).
We expand this line of research to include people’s perceptions not only of 
police behaviour but also of how court officials operate, and, as mentioned, 






















Figure 5.1  Overview of the theoretical model.
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qualities as well as lawfulness. Thus, research participants were asked questions 
such as whether they thought that police and court officials generally make fair 
and impartial decisions, give people a chance to tell their side of the story, treat 
people with dignity and respect, make decisions based on the law, and do not 
arrest people or put them in jail for no reason. We test whether people who 
believe that officials act in such ways also tend to feel normatively aligned with 
the police and the law generally and feel a content-independent duty to obey the 
police and the law generally.
5.2.3  A mutually amplifying interaction between content-dependent 
and content-independent factors?
One method of empirically isolating the law-abiding—and content-independ-
ent—motivational force of legal legitimacy involves measuring offending behav-
iour, estimating its predictors, and focusing on the partial association between 
offending behaviour and the perceived-authority-to-govern index of legal legiti-
macy. The statistical modelling used for this purpose controls for the perceived 
(content-based) moral significance of the acts, the fear of sanction, and the 
appropriateness index of legal legitimacy. We follow this method here. We build 
specifically on Trinkner et al.’s (2018) study, which found that duty to obey 
the law was a significant negative predictor of offending behaviour (e.g. buying 
goods that might be stolen, shoplifting, and littering illegally), adjusting for nor-
mative alignment with the law, the perceived risk of sanction, and the perceived 
moral significance of the rule’s content.8 Adjusting for normative alignment with 
the law in their statistical modelling allowed Trinkner et al. to have greater con-
fidence that the isolated partial association between duty to obey (or, what we 
referred to as the perceived-authority-to-govern index of legal legitimacy) and 
legal compliance represents a content-independent motivation to comply.
Now, let us say that:
A is the normative motivation to act/not act in a particular illegal way,
B is the moral quality one attaches to the particular act (i.e. perceived moral 
content),
C is the moral quality one attaches (generically) to abiding by/breaking the law,
B' is the amount of motivational force generated by B alone, and
C' is the amount of motivational force generated by C alone.
Trinkner et al. (2018) found an additive relationship of A = B' + C'. Thus, for 
example, the overall normative motivation not to steal (A) equals the sum of 
the motivational force generated by the (content-dependent) perceived moral 
wrongness of stealing (B') and the motivational force generated by the (content-
independent) felt duty to obey the law (C').
Building on Trinkner et al.’s (2018) analysis of their US dataset, we test a novel 
hypothesis that (content-independent) felt duty to obey the law and perceived 
moral content of specific laws are not merely additive predictors of compliance, 
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but are also interactive predictors of compliance, in the sense that they strengthen 
each other’s link to compliance. Put in the abbreviated form used above, the 
hypothesis is that B and C amplify each other’s effect on A. That is, B enhances 
the motivational force of C, and C enhances the motivational force of B. For sim-
plified illustration, if we assign the following numerical values, B' = 3 and C' = 3, 
A would be greater than 6.
5.2.4  Method
Sample
A total of 2,561 respondents were initially drawn from KnowledgePanel, a 
nationally representative online panel operated by GfK (for more details see 
Tyler & Jackson 2014; Tyler et al. 2015; Tyler & Sevier 2013). The study was 
described to each individual, an offer of compensation extended, and a reminder 
email was sent to all people on the list who had not responded after three days. 
A total of 1,603 individuals completed the survey, representing a response rate of 
62.5%. The survey, which was in English or Spanish, was fielded in August and 
September of 2012.
Measures
Because we mostly follow Trinkner et al.’s (2018) approach to conceptualisation 
and measurement, we direct the reader to that paper for details, while noting 
below certain differences in the current analysis. Most of the attitudinal measures 
used a five-point response scale, with higher scores indicating a more positive 
response to the measured construct.
i) Offending behaviour: 
To assess offending behaviour, respondents were asked how often they had 
engaged in four different illegal behaviours in the previous five years. The vast 
majority of respondents reported engaging in no illegal behaviour. We should 
acknowledge that there is a clear potential for bias with self-report data. Having 
said that, some comparisons between self-report and other methods have indi-
cated that self-report provides a viable way of establishing frequency of offending 
action (Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis 1981; Thornberry & Krohn 2000). The four 
measures of offending behaviour were:
 • ‘How often in the last five years have you made an exaggerated or false insur-
ance claim?’
 • ‘How often in the last five years have you bought something you think might 
be stolen?’
 • ‘How often in the last five years have you illegally disposed of rubbish or 
litter?’
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 • ‘How often in the last five years have you taken something from a store 
without paying for it?’
The response categories were ‘never’ (0), ‘once’ (1), ‘twice’ (2), ‘3–4 times’ (3), 
and ‘5 times or more’ (4). We took a total count for each research participant. A 
total of 1,265 (82.0%) had a score of 0, 136 (8.8%) had a score of 1, 48 (3.1%) 
had a score of 2, 25 (1.6%) had a score of 3, and 37 (2.4%) had a score of 4, with 
a skewed tail due to one person with a score of 16.
ii) Perceived moral content of laws (aka ‘personal morality’):
To measure people’s perceptions of the moral quality of each illegal act, we used 
the following items:
 • ‘How wrong is it to make an exaggerated or false insurance claim?’
 • ‘How wrong is it to buy something you think might be stolen?’
 • ‘How wrong is it to illegally dispose of rubbish or litter?’
 • ‘How wrong is it to take something from a store without paying for it?’.
The response categories were ‘not wrong at all’ (1), ‘only a little wrong’ (2), 
‘wrong’ (3), and ‘seriously wrong’ (4). We created an index by counting up each 
research participant’s scores. Because of severe skewness of the graph in the range 
of scores between 6 and 9, and the small number of people in that range, we 
combined scores from 6 to 9 and created an index from 0 to 6.
iii) Duty to obey the law:
Responses to the following statements were used to assess the extent to which 
people consider themselves to be under a duty to obey the law:
 • ‘People should do what the law says’.
 • ‘All laws should be strictly obeyed’.9
 • ‘A person who disobeys laws is a danger to others in the community’.10
iv) Normative alignment with the law:
Normative alignment with the law was measured using the following indicators:
 • ‘Your own feelings about what is right and wrong usually agree with the laws 
that are enforced by the police and the courts’.
 • ‘The laws in your community are consistent with your own intuitions about 
what is right and just’.
 • ‘The laws of our criminal justice system are generally consistent with the 
views of the people in our community about what is right and wrong’.
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v) Police and courts procedural justice:
Following Trinkner et al. (2018), perceived procedural justice in the operation 
of the police and courts was measured here through, on the one hand, questions 
focused on the quality of interpersonal treatment, and, on the other hand, ques-
tions focused on the fairness of decision-making. The indicators used regarding 
police interpersonal treatment were:
 • ‘How often do the police treat people with dignity and respect?’
 • ‘How often do the police try to do what is best for the people they are deal-
ing with?’
Similar survey items were used, mutatis mutandis, regarding the interpersonal 
treatment exhibited by courts (cf. Tyler & Sevier 2013).
The measures of police fair decision-making were:
 • ‘How often do the police make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they 
deal with?’
 • ‘How often do the police give people a chance to tell their side of the story 
before they decide what to do?’
 • ‘How often do the police make decisions based upon the law and not their 
personal opinions or biases?’
 • ‘How often do the police explain their decisions and actions in ways that 
people can understand?’
Similar survey items were used, mutatis mutandis, regarding courts’ fair 
decision-making.
 vi) Lawfulness in the operation of police and courts (‘police lawfulness’ and 
‘court lawfulness’):
The measures of perceived lawfulness in police behaviour were:
 • ‘When the police deal with people they almost always behave according to 
the law’.
 • ‘The police often arrest people for no good reason’ [reverse coded].
The measures of perceived lawfulness in the operation of courts were:
 • ‘When judges make decisions they almost always behave according to the 
law’.
 • ‘How often do courts in your community put people in jail for no good 
reason?’ [reverse coded].
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5.2.5  Results
Relationships among the primary variables of interest are presented in Figure 5.2.11 
The model should be read as a series of regression paths, representing associa-
tions and partial associations between constructs. For example, on the left-hand 
side there are pathways from four constructs (police lawfulness, police procedural 
justice, court procedural justice, and court lawfulness) to normative alignment 
with the police. Here, normative alignment with the police is the response vari-
able (the ‘thing being explained’) and police lawfulness, police procedural justice, 
court procedural justice, and court lawfulness are the four potential explanations. 
As noted below, police lawfulness and police procedural justice emerge as the 
























































Figure 5.2  A model of procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal legitimacy, and 
legal compliance, with the interaction between felt duty to obey the law 
and perceived moral content. Structural equation modelling, predicting, 
inter alia, a count of offending behaviour (inferred from self-report) using 
negative binomial regression. Standardised coefficients (STDYX) are given 
for all but the fitted negative binomial regression part of the analysis (those 
are unstandardised coefficients). Note: pairs of variables without directed 
arrows were allowed to correlate. For instance: r = .13*** normative 
alignment with the law and duty to obey the law; r = .29*** normative 
alignment with the police and duty to obey the police; r = .32*** perceived 
moral content and duty to obey the law; and r = .08* perceived moral 
content and normative alignment with the law.
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with the police, namely they are the strongest predictors of this response variable. 
Another thing to note when surveying Figure 5.2 is that standardised coefficients 
are given for all but the predictors of offending behaviour (unstandardised coeffi-
cients are given for offending behaviour because it is a count variable, and a nega-
tive binominal regression model is fitted as appropriate to the type of distribution 
under consideration). So, for instance, the .49 partial regression coefficient for 
police lawfulness predicting normative alignment with the police should be read 
as ‘a one standard deviation unit increase in police lawfulness is associated with 
an increase in the expected level of normative alignment with the police of .49 
standard deviation units’.
Starting with police legitimacy: just under two-thirds (64.5%) of the variance 
in normative alignment with the police is explained, with police lawfulness being 
the strongest predictor (B = .49, p < .001) and police procedural justice being 
the second strongest predictor (B = .28, p < .001). When US citizens positively 
perceive police behaviour as involving lawful action, fair interpersonal interac-
tions with citizens, and fair decision-making, they are more likely to ascribe legiti-
macy to the institution that officers embody. Additionally, just under one-quarter 
(24.8%) of the variance of duty to obey the police is explained, with police proce-
dural justice being the strongest predictor (B = .22, p < .001) and police lawful-
ness being the second strongest predictor (B = .21, p < .001).
As regards legal legitimacy, normative alignment with the law (47.8% of 
explained variance) was predicted by normative alignment with the police (B = 
.41, p < .001), perceived court procedural justice (B = .14, p < .001), and per-
ceived court lawfulness (B = .14, p < .001). Thus, the more US citizens believed 
that police officers generally act in normatively appropriate ways, the more likely 
they were to think that the law generally is normatively appropriate. Equally, the 
more US citizens believed that court officials act in procedurally just and lawful 
ways, the more likely they were to think that the law is normatively appropriate. 
Of the variance in felt duty to obey the law, 21.1% was explained. The main pre-
dictor was police lawfulness (B = .24, p < .001), although both aspects of police 
legitimacy were significant factors (normative alignment, B = .11, p < .05; duty 
to obey, B = .07, p < .01).
Offending behaviour was negatively associated with the interaction between 
the perceived moral content of laws and the felt duty to obey the law. The par-
tial regression coefficient for the main effect of perceived moral content was b = 
–.28, p < .001, and the partial regression coefficient for the main effect of felt 
duty to obey the law was b = –.03, p > .05. Importantly, the partial regression 
coefficient for the interaction term between these two factors was b = –16, p < 
.05. The parameter estimates indicate that the stronger the felt duty to obey, the 
stronger the negative statistical association between perceived moral content and 
compliance with the law. Interactions are symmetrical, so the higher the scores of 
perceived moral content, the stronger the negative statistical association between 
the felt duty to obey and compliance with the law.
The range of the perceived moral content index was from 0 to 6. The range of the 
duty to obey the law was placed (using principal components analysis) on an index 
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from –3.6 to 1.6, although hardly anybody had a score below –2. Figure 5.3 pro-
vides fitted counts along the Y-axis and clustered bar charts for scores of perceived 
moral content of 0, 2, 4, and 6. The five bars in each set represent scores of –2sd, 
–1sd, mean (0), +1sd, and +2sd on the duty to obey index. Note that when the 
perceived moral content is 0, there is little difference in the expected counts across 
the different levels of duty to obey the law. As the perceived moral content increases 
from 0 to 2, 2 to 4, and 4 to 6, the negative association between duty to obey and 
offending behaviour becomes stronger. For instance, if perceived moral content is 
fixed at the top of the score range (6): when duty to obey is –2sd, the expected count 
is just above 1.2; when duty to obey is –1sd, the expected count is around 0.5; when 
duty to obey is mean (0), the expected count is just below 0.2; and so on.
5.2.6  Empirical conclusions
Before turning to the philosophical part of this chapter, it is worth summing up 
our main empirical findings. First, our analysis supports the idea that police legiti-
macy and, more generally, legal legitimacy are to a significant degree grounded in 
public perceptions of procedural justice and lawfulness in the operation of police 
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Figure 5.3  Visualising the interactive statistical effects of duty to obey the law and 
perceived moral content on offending behaviour.
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that the arrow of causality goes in the other direction (cf. Nagin & Telep 2017; 
Jackson & Pósch 2019), Trinkner et al. (2019) found in an experimental study 
that prior perceptions of police legitimacy did not predict judgements of per-
ceived procedural justice.
Second, in prior work (e.g. Tyler 2006a; Jackson et al. 2012; Bradford et al. 
2014b; Trinkner et al. 2018) the perceived moral content of laws was typically 
found to be the strongest predictor of compliance, while legitimacy was generally 
also found to be a significant (albeit less strong) positive predictor of compliance, 
adjusting for perceived moral content. That work has found additive effects of 
perceived moral content and legitimacy on legal compliance. In comparison, we 
found a positive statistical interaction between content-dependent values (per-
ceived moral content of laws) and content-independent duty to obey, which 
means that content-dependent values attached to the required act strengthen 
(rather than merely add to) the motivational force that a general content-inde-
pendent duty to obey the law has on people’s behaviour (and vice versa). Taking 
again the example of stealing, people’s content-dependent belief that stealing is 
wrong may form part of their motivation to refrain from stealing, but it may also 
amplify (rather than just add to) another part of their motivation not to steal, 
namely that which is generated by their sense that it is wrong to break the law.
5.3  A philosophical perspective: procedure–content 
interaction in the value of the rule of law
In this section, we identify a certain philosophical parallel to the above-observed 
interactive modality between content and procedure, with a particular focus on 
the value of the rule of law. Before propounding our ideas, some comments are 
required on the conception of the rule of law adopted here, its relation to the 
themes discussed in Section 5.2 above, and the principal controversy surrounding 
the rule of law’s moral significance.
What conception of the rule of law are we assuming for purposes of this analy-
sis? In particular, are we assuming a formal (or procedural) conception of the rule 
of law, such as Fuller’s (1969) and Raz’s (2009, pp. 210–218),12 according to 
which rule-of-law requirements pertain only to formal or procedural features of 
law (e.g. generality, clarity, and prospectivity of legal norms, a hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal, or the like)? Or are we assuming a conception 
such as Bingham’s (2010, p. 67)13 and Dworkin’s (1985, pp. 11–12),14 which 
includes also a substantive component in the rule of law, requiring that the con-
tent of legal norms conforms to certain standards or values (fundamental human 
rights, social justice, or the like)?
The conception assumed by our analysis is the formal (or procedural) concep-
tion of the rule of law. We adopt such a conception for the following reasons. 
First, we find merit in some of the objections voiced in the literature against 
the inclusion of substantive elements in the rule of law—for example, the con-
cern that so doing would render the notion’s meaning too open to controver-
sies between differing ideological and political persuasions, thereby eroding the 
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notion’s distinctive and useful function in theoretical and practical discourse (see 
expressions of a similar concern in Raz 2009, p. 211; Waldron 2016, Section 5.3). 
Second, a framework of analysis that lumps form and substance together in one 
conceptual category, in the way substantive conceptions of the rule of law do, is 
not likely to best facilitate our primary purpose here, which is to draw attention 
to a certain relation between form and substance; such a framework of analysis 
might, even if inadvertently, obscure the distinction between form and substance, 
and, hence, it might also make it difficult to gain a precise view of their interrela-
tions. Thus, proceeding on a formal conception of the rule of law is likely to be 
more auspicious for our theoretical purpose. Third, past jurisprudential debate on 
the moral status of the rule of law, as shaped by dominant contributors such as 
Lon Fuller (1969), HLA Hart (1965), Nigel Simmonds (2007, 2010), Matthew 
Kramer (1999, pp. 37–77, 2004), and Kristen Rundle (2012, 2014), among oth-
ers, has tended to revolve around a formal conception of the rule of law,15 and, by 
way of engaging with past discourse, it would be sensible for us to do the same.
As for the relation between this conception of the rule of law and the themes 
discussed in Section 5.2 above, it should be noted that there is an overlap 
between the two, but also that the overlap is merely partial. A clear example of 
the overlap comes into view when one notes the resemblance between, on the 
one hand, what Fuller called congruence between officials’ actions and declared 
rules (his eighth principle of legality) and, on the other hand, survey items such 
as: ‘How often do the police make decisions based upon the law and not their 
personal opinions or biases?’; ‘When the police deal with people they almost 
always behave according to the law’; and ‘[Do courts] put people in jail for no 
good reason?’. However, what limits the extent of the overlap and renders it no 
more than partial is, mainly, the fact that the conception of rule of law assumed 
here tends to focus on legal form (as defined by Fuller’s eight principles of legal-
ity), whereas the notions of ‘procedural justice’ featuring in Section 5.2 tend to 
focus on legal process.16 But, as was indicated earlier, we do not think that such 
differences undermine our overall line of analysis. This is so not only because the 
area of overlap noted above is important, albeit limited, but also (and, in fact, pri-
marily) because we do not claim that our philosophical conclusions strictly follow 
from our empirical conclusions, or that the former are counterparts of the latter. 
Instead, once more, we merely point out a certain parallel between our obser-
vations in these two contexts—that is, a parallel in the modality of interaction 
between content and procedure/form. This modest claim does not depend for 
its viability on there being an especially high level of similarity, let alone identity, 
between the respective contexts of our empirical and philosophical observations.
Reverting to the rule of law, the central contested question among jurispru-
dential writers in this area can be couched as follows: Do rule-of-law precepts—
for example, generality, clarity, publicity, and prospectivity of legal norms, and 
congruence between the norms as announced and their actual administration—
embody or serve any moral value (or, moral virtue, moral ideal, or the like)?17 
The literature on this question contains a diverse range of approaches, but for 
 Procedure–content interaction  125
present purposes it will be useful to consider two principal positions that have 
dominated the debate.
5.3.1  Two conflicting positions on the moral status of the rule of law
According to the first position, the rule-of-law principles embody a moral virtue 
not contingent on the law’s content. The second position is an antithesis that 
views the rule-of-law precepts merely as principles for the efficient execution of 
the law’s substantive goals (whether morally good or bad), principles that hold 
no independent moral value.
The first view is most notably associated with Lon Fuller (1969). To begin 
with, Fuller approaches his inquiry about law through what can be character-
ised as a ‘purposive’ framework of analysis. On this approach, law can be best 
understood by reflection on its purpose, and, in particular, on the ways it can 
fail to achieve its purpose and the conditions it must meet in order to achieve it. 
Famously highlighted by his imaginary tale of the monarch Rex are eight types 
of failure to craft law in a form fit for its purpose (pp. 33–38). From these eight 
failures, he derives his eight requirements of legal form: generality; promulga-
tion; non-retroactivity; clarity; non-contradiction; not requiring the impossible; 
constancy through time; and congruence between official action and declared 
rules. High level of compliance with these eight precepts represents a form of 
excellence in legal craftsmanship (pp. 41–42),18 whereas, at the lower end of this 
scale of attainment, these precepts manifest themselves as constitutive elements 
of law, for a total failure to comply with any one of them results in something 
that is not a legal system properly so called (p. 39). Most crucially for our pur-
pose, Fuller maintains that these eight formal requirements embody and promote 
certain moral values. They represent, in his signature terminology, ‘the inner’ or 
‘the internal’ morality of law—‘inner’ or ‘internal’ because they are integral to the 
nature of law. This formal or procedural moral aspect is distinguished by Fuller 
from what he calls ‘the external morality’ of law (pp. 47 and 96), namely substan-
tive standards of moral behaviour that the law may (or may not) adopt into the 
content of its rules of conduct. And, in a similar vein, he sometimes describes his 
eight formal requirements as a ‘procedural version of natural law’ (pp. 96–97). 
Drawing on this terminology, we will refer to Fuller’s approach as ‘the procedural 
morality view’.
Now, exactly what moral values does Fuller associate with the eight rule-of-
law principles? We can conveniently divide his comments on this into those about 
direct and those about indirect relations to value. To start with direct relations, he 
notes, for example, that the last of the eight precepts (i.e. congruence) represents 
an aspect of reciprocity in the relation between government and citizens regard-
ing the observance of rules, whereby government can be taken to say to the citi-
zen something like: These are the rules we expect you to follow, and if you follow 
them you have our assurance that we will not sanction you (p. 40). This aspect of 
reciprocity ties in with a notion of fairness: a government that would sanction a 
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citizen without there being any breach of rules on his or her part would be treating 
that citizen unfairly. In another key remark, Fuller links the eight requirements to 
respect for human agency and dignity. He notes that ‘the view of man implicit 
in’ these eight requirements is that of ‘a responsible agent capable of understand-
ing and following rules, and answerable for his defaults’ (p. 162), and that every 
departure from these requirements ‘is an affront to man’s dignity as a responsible 
agent’ (p. 162). As mentioned above, Fuller draws attention to some further, 
indirect moral significance of his eight requirements. He notes, for example, that 
acting by known rules is a precondition for any meaningful appraisal of the justice 
of the law, both by the public (because minimum consistency, promulgation, clar-
ity, etc., expose actions to public scrutiny (p. 158)) and by the lawmaker herself 
(because people tend to be more answerable to their own conscience when they 
have to articulate what they are doing (p. 159)). Thus, in Fuller’s view, although 
the eight requirements are about procedure rather than content, they create con-
ditions conducive to the moral quality of the law’s content.
The second, contrasting stance is most prominently reflected in the views of 
HLA Hart (1965) and Joseph Raz (2009).19 Hart accuses Fuller of conflating two 
different notions: morality and purposive activity (Hart 1965, pp. 1285–1286). 
Fuller’s eight requirements of legal form, claims Hart, are principles for the effi-
cient execution of a purposive activity—and a purposive activity can be morally 
good or morally bad, depending on the specific purpose pursued. Hart’s illustra-
tive example is the activity of poisoning—a purposive activity, whose purpose is 
to kill another being (p. 1286). Poisoning, Hart points out, also has ‘internal’ 
or ‘inner’ principles: for example, ‘Avoid using poisons which cause the victim 
to vomit’ or ‘Avoid using poisons if their shape, color, or size is likely to attract 
notice and alert the intended victim’ (p. 1286). But we would not, of course, call 
these principles of the poisoner’s art ‘the morality of poisoning’. And this point, 
Hart maintains, extends to the context of law: since, for him, law can be a vehicle 
for either morally worthy or morally depraved ends, we should avoid the slip from 
talking about its inner principles of operation as a purposive practice to talking 
about its inner morality.
Raz also put forward a number of notable objections to the idea that the rule 
of law embodies a moral quality. One of his objections builds on, and partly ech-
oes, Hart’s argument described in the previous paragraph. Conformity with rule-
of-law principles (e.g. promulgation, clarity, prospectivity, and consistency), Raz 
points out, is essential to law’s ability to guide conduct. It has, in other words, an 
instrumental significance, in that it enables the law to effectively achieve the direct 
goals it adopts (Raz 2009, pp. 225–226; hence, we will refer to this approach 
as ‘the instrumental view’). But, like many other instruments, it can be utilised 
for good or ill purposes—namely, the substantive purposes that law is able to 
secure by effectively guiding conduct can be either morally good or morally bad 
(depending on the content of the law in question). That is why, according to 
Raz, the rule of law should not be conceived of as a moral virtue, though it is, in 
his view, a virtue of law. This last distinction—and, more generally, the notion 
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that we can speak of some property as virtuous, but not as morally virtuous—
seems to comprise Raz’s primary supplement to the initial argument of Hart. Raz 
fleshes out this distinction through a non-legal example: the property of sharp-
ness as it relates to knives. Sharpness is part of what makes a knife effective, but 
the knife can be used for either morally good purposes (say, to prepare food for 
a person in need) or for morally ill purposes (say, to murder a person). So, sharp-
ness is not a moral virtue, but we can nonetheless say that a sharp knife is a good 
knife—which is to say that sharpness is a good-making characteristic of knives. It 
is a virtue of knives, but not a moral virtue. And, according to Raz, something 
analogous holds in our context: namely, the rule of law is to law what the sharp-
ness is to a knife—which is to say that the rule of law is a virtue of law, but not a 
moral virtue (Raz 2009, p. 226). We should add that, in light of a recent revision 
by Raz of his view on the rule of law (Raz 2019), we are unsure as to whether he 
still maintains the above objection; but, since our purpose is not exegetical, this 
doubt is immaterial to our argument.
5.3.2  Critical assessment and an alternative proposal: 
the hybrid view
We will comment on the two foregoing positions and put forward our own 
approach. The instrumental view, as explained above, declines to attach moral 
value to the procedure embodied in the rule of law; the rule of law can at most 
serve morally valuable substantive goals reflected in the content of certain laws 
(insofar as this is the case). This, we will argue, is an erroneous position. The 
procedural morality view, on the other hand, ascribes to rule-of-law procedures 
moral value, which it views as entirely independent of the content of law. This, 
too, is erroneous in our view, as will be explained below. How can both these 
positions be mistaken at once? And if they are, what is the correct position? There 
is, we suggest, a middle path between these two positions, which better captures 
the moral significance of the rule of law. This middle path emerges into view with 
the following, twofold recognition: a given procedural feature of law can have a 
genuine moral-value-endowing quality (i.e. a genuine capacity to contribute, in 
itself, to the moral value of law); and yet, at the same time, the materialisation of 
that moral value—namely, the degree to which, or even whether at all, it materi-
alises—may be partly sensitive to the law’s content and substantive ends.
The twofold recognition just stated (which will assume a more concrete form 
below) reflects a type of hybridity between procedural and substantive moral 
qualities—hence, we term our proposed view ‘the hybrid view’. The possibility 
of a hybrid modality involving content and procedure initially surfaced (if in a 
somewhat different form) in the course of our empirical analysis in Section 5.2. It 
was observed there that, empirically speaking, each of the following factors makes 
a significant contribution to compliance: (i) content-specific assessments of indi-
vidual laws, and (ii) ascriptions of legitimacy to the legal system, which are them-
selves predicted significantly by perceived procedural justice and lawfulness. But 
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the analysis also revealed an interactive, and synergetic, dynamic between these 
two factors, one aspect of this interaction being that higher levels of content-
specific moral approval make legitimacy—and, by implication, make perceived 
procedural justice and lawfulness—a better predictor of compliance than it oth-
erwise is.20 When it comes to people’s attitudes towards the law, then, procedural 
qualities perceived in the application of law operate as a legitimating factor and 
have a genuine influence on people’s actions, but the extent of their influence is 
sensitive, at least partly, to people’s substantive assessments of the law’s content. 
This empirical picture prompts us to ask: Could it be the case that this (or some 
comparable) type of content-procedure hybridity not only is a feature of people’s 
common attitudes towards law, but also characterises the actual moral signifi-
cance of some attributes of law? We consider this possibility here with a focus on 
rule-of-law attributes. So the question can be couched as follows: Is there a philo-
sophical explanation whereby the moral significance of the rule of law is shown to 
consist, wholly or partly, in content-procedure hybridity? We believe there is such 
an explanation, and will outline it in the following paragraphs.
The explanation starts with the moral value (or, at any rate, potentiality for 
moral value) attributable to procedural (or formal) rule-of-law features. In this 
regard, we believe that, whatever might be said of its deficiencies, Fuller’s view 
contains some true insights. Thus, for example, it seems cogent to say that adher-
ence to the rule of law contributes to the moral quality of the relation between 
government and citizens by securing a type of reciprocity between them with 
regard to the observance of rules.21 And there seems to be sound (if insufficiently 
qualified) intuitive sense to the claim that rule-of-law observance expresses—at 
least at a certain procedural level—respect for human dignity, and that it implic-
itly envisions the subject as a responsible agent in terms of her engagement with 
rules and ability to plan her actions in response to them.22 So, too, we find a good 
deal to agree with in subsequent elaborations or restatements of Fuller’s posi-
tion by some of his proponents, such as Simmonds’ arguments about the rule of 
law’s contribution to liberty (in the specific sense of independence of the will of 
another; Simmonds 2007, pp. 99–103)23 and Rundle’s elucidation of the relation 
between legal form and human agency (Rundle 2012, pp. 8–11, 97–101).24 It is, 
perhaps, easy to lose sight of the kernel of truth in these positions when dealing 
with the topic with purely theoretical tools at a relative distance from its practical 
settings. But even a brief consideration of the practical experience of those at the 
receiving end of violations of the rule of law should elicit appreciation of the good 
sense contained in the foregoing views. Consider, for example, the position of a 
participant in a legally permissible demonstration who is nonetheless detained by 
the police and held in custody without having violated any previously declared 
rule (some ‘reason’ is invoked—say, that he engaged in ‘disorderly behaviour’—
but it is not traceable to any rule). Or, take the case of a shopkeeper who is 
ordered by the authorities to close her business on account of a failure to comply 
with regulations that were worded in a language too ambiguous to understand 
what they actually require. Would these individuals not be correct in thinking 
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that the conditions enabling their agency have been prejudiced, and that their 
liberty (in the sense mentioned above) has been compromised? And, as far as 
expressive value is concerned, would individuals subjected to such treatment not 
be right to consider it an expression of disrespect for their agency and autonomy, 
and to feel an affront to their dignity? An affirmative answer to these questions 
seems to hold a compelling level of intuitive appeal.
So, why not view the value of the rule of law as dependent purely on proce-
dural (or formal) attributes? What sort of content-procedure interaction do we 
recognise that leads us, instead, to adopt a hybrid understanding of that value? 
One principal type of content-procedure interaction revolves around the expres-
sive significance of the rule of law. While adherence to rule-of-law standards is 
capable and apt to bear the expressive significance highlighted in the previous 
paragraph, its expressive effect partly depends for its materialisation (or, at least, 
its full materialisation) on contextual factors; and, as part of this, the degree to 
which it materialises is sensitive to the moral quality of the law’s content.25 This 
claim rests on a recognition that is hardly unique to the specific context of the 
rule of law. What we observe here, in other words, is a particular case of the 
general way in which actions derive their expressive significance: they acquire 
their expressive significance partly by virtue of their own attributes, and from 
social conventions about their meaning, but their meaning and the message they 
convey are also sensitive to contextual factors (contextual factors which include, 
inter alia, other actions originating from the same source). We say more on this 
in the following section.
5.3.3  Expressive value, contextual factors, and the rule of law
To substantiate the above claim, some general comments on the expressive 
force of actions are required. To start with, it is a conspicuous fact and a salient 
feature of everyday life that many of our actions, including non-verbal actions, 
carry expressive significance—that is, they convey meanings (Sunstein 1996, pp. 
2021–2022).26 Moreover, it seems difficult to adequately capture the richness of 
our normative and moral lives without accepting that the expressive meaning of 
an action, in at least some instances, morally matters, and (on the flipside) that 
whether the action is morally desirable, right, virtuous, or not, may depend (at 
least in part) on its expressive meaning (in this vein, see, e.g., Pildes & Anderson 
1990; Nozick 1993, pp. 28–32; Anderson & Pildes 2000; Khaitan 2012, p. 4). It 
falls outside the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive account of the 
expressive significance of actions. We will thus largely operate within the frame-
work of existing theories and mostly confine our explanatory comments to what 
is directly material to our claim.
One distinction worth noting at this point is between actions whose entire 
point is expressive (e.g. gestures such as salutation, tipping one’s hat, bow-
ing, shaking someone’s hand, or kissing the picture of a loved one) and actions 
that have other, non-expressive purposes (consisting, e.g., in their physical or 
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economic effect) but which also carry expressive meanings (e.g. physically assault-
ing another with the aim of causing them bodily harm normally also expresses 
disrespect for their dignity).27 In the interest of clarity, it seems warranted to 
reserve the label ‘expressive action’ for the former type, and to use a somewhat 
more inclusive language (e.g. ‘expressively significant action’) when referring to 
the latter type or to both types. Now, typically, where actions hold expressive 
moral significance, what those actions manifest is an attitude—for example, an 
attitude towards some person or persons, be it contempt, care, compassion, for-
giveness, courtesy, or some other kind. But this is not to say that expressive 
meaning is reducible simply to the actor’s (or indeed to any other person’s) sub-
jective state of mind (Anderson & Pildes 2000, pp. 1512–1513, 1574). To give 
one example, an action can be offensive even when the actor is oblivious to its 
offensive meaning or positively believes that it conveys some other inoffensive 
meaning (p. 1524). Although the actor’s subjective state of mind is morally rel-
evant, regard must be had to other factors, whether for pragmatic or substantive 
reasons. Determinations of expressive meaning, as emphasised by several writers, 
are exercises of interpretation or construction that are at least partly guided or 
constrained by objective standards (Anderson & Pildes 2000, pp. 1512, 1525; 
Khaitan 2012, pp. 9, 11–13). In some instances, such determinations will involve 
a relatively high measure of changeability according to local conventions and 
cultural codes—by way of example, subtly acting as if you have not noticed an 
acquaintance in the street in order not to be held up in a conversation might be 
socially acceptable in some cultures, but might come across as aloof and unsocia-
ble in other cultures.28 In other instances, however, it may be warranted for the 
attribution of expressive meaning to transcend, or break away from, specific social 
convention in response to less (or non-) contingent considerations. To borrow an 
example from Anderson and Pildes (2000), even when it was socially acceptable 
for ‘men in business settings to routinely compliment their female colleagues and 
subordinates on the way they looked’, there was nonetheless something insult-
ing in that behaviour, in that it ‘amounted to treating women as if they were not 
serious workers, but merely sexual or aesthetic adornments in a business scene’ 
(pp. 1524–1525).
Especially pertinent to our argument is the following point. As is normally the 
case with exercises of interpretation, the attribution of expressive meaning to an 
action is sensitive to the context, and the context may include, inter alia, other 
actions originating from the same source. Context-sensitivity is a familiar and 
widely accepted feature of interpretation, certainly when it comes to the inter-
pretation of verbal utterances, and there is no reason, it seems to us, to make an 
exception in this regard for the interpretation of non-verbal actions.29 Moreover, 
as a concomitant to the preceding point, contextual factors may bear on the attri-
bution of moral significance to both verbal utterances and non-verbal expressive 
actions. Suppose, for example, a speaker (Jessica) begins a statement with the 
words ‘With all due respect to X …’, but the rest of the statement is, in content 
and/or style, disrespectful to X. Should this not reflect on the expressive meaning 
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and significance we are ready to assign Jessica’s words ‘With all due respect’, per-
haps inclining us to construe them as words of irony rather than an actual expres-
sion of respect? And should we not say something similar when the case involves, 
instead of an utterance, an expressive gesture—as, for example, when James 
shakes hands with George or smiles at him, but all the other actions he performs 
before and after that gesture are invariably unfriendly to George? It seems highly 
cogent to think that the full view of James’ behaviour towards George detracts 
from, or undermines, the expressive significance his gesture could otherwise have, 
or even imbues it with the negative quality of a formal device used to disguise an 
improper attitude. Or, further consider Mark’s actions of holding the door open 
for his companion or placing a hand on the companion’s shoulder during their 
conversation. Are his actions courteous and friendly, or are they patronising? 
The answer may be sensitive, inter alia, to whether the general context of their 
relationship involves actions of domination and superiority, or instead respect 
between equals. Further examples in this vein, involving expressive or expressively 
significant actions, can be constructed.30
Actions by a legal authority, which are the type of action of interest here, are 
no exception to the above point: the expressive significance of such actions, or 
of any given aspect thereof (e.g. their procedure or substance), is also sensitive 
to context. As Hellman puts it in an article discussing the expressive meaning of 
government actions through the prism of the Equal Protection Clause, ‘under-
standing their meaning [is] an inherently contextual task’ (Hellman 2000, p. 
29). And the context, it should be stressed, may include not only its (non-legal) 
factual backdrop, but also related actions of the same institution or related aspects 
of its operation. Consider, first, an example illustrating the context-sensitivity of 
expressive meaning within the law. In the case of County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
492 US 573, 601 (1989), the US Supreme Court considered whether two dis-
plays of religious symbols on public property in Pittsburgh amounted to endorse-
ments of religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause.31 Justice Blackmun for the court made the following remark on how the 
test should be applied:
the government’s use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the 
effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the government’s use 
of religious symbolism depends upon its context. 
(p. 597) 
Applying this test, Blackmun ruled that in one of the displays, which set a 
Hanukkah menorah next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, the set-
tings neutralised any message of endorsement of Judaism that might otherwise 
be conveyed by a menorah, whereas in the second display, where a crèche was 
displayed alone, the crèche retained its religious meaning.
Contextual factors do not cease to be relevant when the law’s expressive 
significance is analysed from a moral standpoint. Thus, when we consider the 
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expressive moral significance of the law’s procedural or formal mode of operation, 
the relevant context may encompass, inter alia, the law’s substance or content. 
Suppose, for example, that your legal system limits its impositions on you to 
the confines of previously declared rules—a procedural mode of operation that 
can normally be regarded as an expression of respect for your dignity—but the 
content of its rules expresses the opposite attitude, disrespect for your dignity, in 
that it oppresses you or wrongly discriminates against you.32 The content of its 
rules, on our approach, detracts from the message of respect its procedures could 
otherwise convey—it takes away from its credibility as an expression of a genuine 
attitude of respect. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suspect that a government 
of this sort conforms to the rule of law not out of respect for its citizens, but in 
order to mask its iniquitous agenda with a mantle of legitimacy, and in this way 
to lower people’s moral guard and avoid civil resistance—a strategy involving a 
form of manipulation that actually signifies an attitude of disrespect for citizens’ 
autonomy, agency, and dignity. And, in a similar vein, such content-procedure 
hybridity can manifest itself in positive terms too: namely, when the rule of law 
is adhered to in a context where government also shows respect for citizens by 
adopting morally appropriate substantive policies into its laws, the expressive 
value of rule-of-law adherence, and the relational quality attached to it, are likely 
to materialise and flourish to their fullest potential.
To forestall possible misunderstanding, note that the hybridity we identify 
here concerns the value of the rule of law (and the conditions for the materi-
alisation of that value), not the question of what the rule of law is (i.e. which 
requirements it includes). The latter question was commented on at the outset 
of Section 5.3, where we adopted for the purpose of this analysis a formal or 
procedural conception of the rule of law; our proposal does not depart from this 
presupposed conception.
Finally, how do we perceive the relationship between our argument and rela-
tional theory of procedural justice? As we see it, our argument dovetails well with 
relational theory of procedural justice, even if it is not strictly dependent on it or 
exclusively bound up with it. A few words of explanation are required. Relational 
theory of procedural justice (in its normative variety propounded by Meyerson & 
Mackenzie 2018) locates the value of procedural justice in ‘the message of social 
inclusion and equality sent by satisfactory interpersonal interactions with authori-
ties’ (p. 7), and its positive contribution to individuals’ sense of self-respect and 
self-worth. The evaluative frame of reference used by this approach is focused nei-
ther on the community per se nor on a socially atomistic notion of the individual, 
but rather on the individual as a social creature whose identity ‘is constituted 
through interpersonal relationships and in the context of the broader social and 
political environments’ in which he or she lives (p. 6).
Now, by way of relating this outlook to our own argument, two aspects of 
their compatibility should be highlighted. First, like our own argument, the 
relational conception of procedural justice contains reference to, and (at least 
implicit) recognition of, the expressive significance of actions. Thus, for instance, 
the relational conception of procedural justice adverts to the ‘message of social 
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inclusion and equality sent by satisfactory interpersonal interactions with authori-
ties’, noting that satisfactory treatment by group authorities ‘symbolically com-
municates the information that we possess value or status in the eyes of our 
community’ (p. 7, emphases added). Such expressive attributes possibly suggest 
that the relational conception of procedural justice should even be subsumed as a 
specific variety of expressive theories of value. Second, a relational outlook seems 
particularly auspicious for our argument, or at any rate to one crucial element of 
our line of reasoning—namely, our emphasis on context-sensitivity in the attribu-
tion of expressive significance to actions. This is so for the following reason. The 
very idea of a social or interpersonal relationship implies an enduring connection 
and association between the relevant parties that extends beyond a mere one-off 
interaction, and it is plausible that this sort of relational backdrop would also 
reflect on the expressive significance attached to actions done in a relationship. 
Thus, especially in the context of a relationship—be it a relationship of friends, 
spouses, employer–employee, or government–citizen—it seems appropriate to 
attach expressive significance to various actions not by seeing them in complete 
isolation from one another, but by taking a more holistic view of the relationship 
and of certain other actions performed in it. This notion is highly consonant with 
our claim that the expressive significance of legal procedure or form is sensitive to 
its context, and to the law’s content as part of that context. To couch an example 
borrowing the terminology of relational theory, ‘the message of social inclusion 
and equality’ sent by adherence to due procedures will be, ceteris paribus, con-
siderably attenuated (if not completely obliterated) where the associated laws 
have, say, racially segregating or gender discriminatory content, rather than just 
and equitable content. In sum, then, although our line of reasoning has not been 
developed in terms confined to relational theory, a relational outlook, we believe, 
strikes a particularly harmonious tone with our argument.
5.4  Conclusion
This collaborative work initially put forward a number of empirical claims regard-
ing law-related attitudes and predictors of compliance, which, in turn, inspired 
a fresh engagement with the legal-philosophical question of the moral status of 
the rule of law.
Our empirical observations were summarised at the end of Section 5.2. At 
this point, it suffices to reiterate one key empirical finding regarding the interac-
tive effect between procedural attributes and lawfulness on the one hand and 
moral content on the other. While we observed that procedural justice and law-
fulness perceived in police and courts’ operation predict people’s compliance 
(as inferred from self-report), we also found that the strength of their predictive 
quality is sensitive to people’s substantive assessments of the law’s content. In 
particular, higher levels of moral approval of a given rule’s content render the 
(more generic) ascription of legal legitimacy—and, by implication, render per-
ceived procedural justice and lawfulness—a better predictor of compliance than 
it otherwise is.
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In Section 5.3, we put forward a jurisprudential argument with a certain paral-
lel to the above interactive phenomenon. The specific context of this argument 
was the debate over the moral value of Fuller’s rule-of-law precepts. Fuller’s pro-
cedural (or formal) precepts, we recognised, have a genuine capacity to carry 
expressive moral value, but we argued that the realisation of their expressive 
potential involves (and depends upon) a type of hybridity of procedure (or form) 
and content. In other words, the expressive effect of these procedural (or formal) 
requirements does not materialise in isolation from other, contextual factors; and, 
in particular, the extent to which it materialises is partly sensitive to the moral 
quality of the law’s content. This, we suggested, is a specific case of the general 
way in which actions derive their expressive significance: they acquire their expres-
sive significance partly by virtue of their own attributes, and from social conven-
tions about their meaning, but their meaning and conveyed message are also 
sensitive to contextual factors (including other actions originating from the same 
source). Thus, if certain aspects of government’s operation are such that they 
normally express respect for your dignity (e.g. limiting its impositions on you to a 
set of previously declared rules), but other related aspects of its operation are such 
that they clearly express the opposite attitude, namely disrespect for your dignity 
(e.g. subjecting you to rules whose content oppresses you or wrongly discrimi-
nates against you), then the latter contaminate the message of the former, detract 
from it, or take away from their credibility as expressions of a genuine attitude of 
respect. And the same idea has a positive facet: when the rule of law is adhered 
to in a context where government also shows respect for citizens by adopting 
morally appropriate substantive policies into its laws, the expressive value of rule-
of-law adherence is then likely to materialise and flourish to its fullest potential.
Notes
1 We are grateful to the editors for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
We also thank Charis Kleio Bagioki and Zinat Jimada for their diligent work as 
research assistants in connection with this chapter.
2 That jurisprudence can benefit from—or, even, that it is essential for it to draw 
on—social scientific empirical inquiry is a notion endorsed by a sizable number of 
theorists (in various distinct versions not necessarily fully identical to our own). 
See, for example, Roger Cotterrell (2018, Chapter 4); Nicola Lacey (2010); 
Brian Leiter (2007, 2009); Brian Tamanaha (2000, esp. p. 288); William Twining 
(2009); Kevin Walton (2015). Regarding Leiter’s position, see also the discussion 
in Dickson (2011).
3 As can be seen, e.g., in Gur (2018, pp. 110–131, 181–192).
4 Wording the measures of perceived normative appropriateness in a general way 
(as done, e.g., in the above cited survey item) avoids the imposition of specific 
criteria, thus leaving which specific criteria people use for judging appropriateness 
an open empirical question (Tyler & Fagan 2008; European Social Survey 2011; 
Jackson et al. 2013; Tyler & Jackson 2014). We follow the same approach here.
5 See Trinkner (2019) for discussion of whether Tyler (2006a, 2006b) specifies 
duty to obey as downstream to legitimacy or a constituent of legitimacy.
6 For discussion of the distinction between possible sources of legitimacy and 
constituent components of legitimacy, see Huq et al. (2017); Jackson (2018); 
Jackson & Bradford (2019); Trinkner (2019).
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7 With some limited modifications, namely a few survey items from their dataset 
that are not used, or that are used differently, in our analysis.
8 See also evidence on tax compliance from Murphy et al.’s (2016) Australian-
based study.
9 In theory, a negative response to this item might be compatible with a belief 
in an overridable (or ‘prima facie’) duty to obey the law. But we still consider 
that respondents’ choice on a five-point scale are, by and large, indicative of the 
strength of their felt duty to obey (an assumption reinforced by the fact that we 
found the above three items to be strongly correlated); and, at any rate, positive 
responses to this item indicate a felt duty to obey.
10 It is worth noting that this item is framed generically (referring to ‘laws’, not, 
e.g., to ‘some’ or ‘certain’ laws) and unconditionally (‘is’, not, e.g., ‘can be’ or 
‘can be, depending on which law …’), which means it is indicative of a duty not 
contingent on the content of any specific given rule. This is also reinforced by the 
fact that we found the above three items to be strongly correlated.
11 Like Trinkner et al. (2018) we use MPlus to fit a path analysis model (using full 
information maximum likelihood to deal with missing values). We also treat the 
constructs as formative, in the sense that the measures constitute the construct. 
Components scores from principal components analysis for the separate indices 
(with the exception of police lawfulness and court lawfulness, since they had 
only two indicators each) were saved using Stata and imported to MPlus.
12 A less univocal example in this regard is Dicey’s (1885) notion of the rule of law: 
his notion seems largely procedural, though certain aspects thereof are interpret-
able as substantive. See relevant analysis in Craig (1997, pp. 470–474).
13 Other notable former judges who endorsed this conception include Aharon Barak 
(Barak 2006, p. 55) and Arthur Chaskalson (quoted in Agrast, Botero & Ponce 
2011, p. 9).
14 Cf. Allan (1993, ch. 2, 2001, esp. chs. 2–3). See also the discussion in Craig 
(1997, pp. 477–479, 481–483).
15 Indeed, a substantive conception might be thought to obviate the question of 
whether the rule of law embodies or serves any moral value.
16 There are conceptions of the rule of law (e.g. Raz 2009, pp. 214–218; Waldron 
2008, pp. 6–9) that include both formal Fullerian attributes and process-related 
attributes. While there are good reasons to view such conceptions as more com-
plete than Fuller’s, as said above contemporary debate over the moral significance 
of the rule of law has frequently centered on Fuller’s legality precepts, and, in the 
limited context of the present discussion, our focus will be similar.
17 This question, it is worth noting, closely bears on the debate over the so-called 
separability thesis (i.e. over whether there is a necessary conceptual connection 
between law and morality, and, if so, what it is); and it also bears on issues such as 
law’s capacity to morally bind and to give reasons for action. Regarding the sepa-
rability thesis, see: Gardner (2012, pp. 27, 48, 193–194, 221–237); Simmonds 
(2007, pp. 70–73, 2010, pp. 281–283); Green (2008).
18 Though Fuller also explains that prefect realisation of all of these eight principles is 
‘not actually a useful target for guiding the impulse toward legality’ (Fuller 1969, 
pp. 41–46).
19 A similar stance is notably adopted and defended by Matthew Kramer (e.g. 
Kramer 2004). Also note that, while our reading of Hart and Raz is consistent 
with the standard interpretation of their position, other interpretations have been 
put forward. Cf., for example, the interpretation offered by Mark Bennett (2011).
20 An interaction in the opposite direction was also observed: namely, content-spe-
cific moral approval is a stronger predictor when legal legitimacy is higher.
21 A claim endorsed by Finnis too (2011, p. 274). See also Murphy’s (2005) advo-
cacy of this claim.
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22 See also, in this vein, Waldron (2008, esp. pp. 27–28).
23 To wit, Simmonds (2007, p. 101) explains that he refers to ‘liberty’ not in the sense 
of how wide one’s range of optional actions is, for he acknowledges that rules may 
restrict that range. Instead, he means ‘liberty’ in the sense that the limits of that 
range of actions are, at any given point in time, independent of the present will of 
another person. The rule of law prohibits the ruler from exercising force outside 
the scope of rules laid down in advance; thus, what we are allowed or not allowed 
to do at any given point in time is determined by those rules, and not by the present 
will, or whim, of the rulers. In this connection, see also Hayek (1943, Chapter VI).
24 See also Gur’s (2014) discussion of the above work and Rundle’s reply (2014, 
pp. 139–142, 144–147). On effective agency in Fuller’s work, see also Winston 
(1994).
25 In a valuable article on the rule of law, Coleen Murphy briefly makes at one point 
a statement that can be understood as consistent with our hybrid view (Murphy 
2005, p. 252).
26 Or, as Taylor (1979) puts it, they manifest something in an embodiment.
27 Cf. Wittgenstein’s (1993) distinction between instrumental or effective action on 
the one hand and ritualistic or expressive action on the other.
28 For another example to a similar effect, see Sunstein (1996, p. 2022). See also 
related point in Taylor (1979, pp. 79–80).
29 Indeed, it is arguable that the role of context in the interpretation of non-verbal 
expression is often greater than it is with regard to verbal expression, because 
non-verbal means of expression are often more ambiguous than verbal ones.
30 In some instances, contextual factors that bear on the expressive significance of 
an action can be cited either separately from the action or as part of the action, 
depending on which action description is adopted. Consider, for example, 
Martin’s act of supplying food for the sustenance of a certain group of people. 
Does the action express care and compassion, and, if so, to what extent? This may 
depend on further factors, such as whether that group consists of destitute home-
less people whom Martin came upon or is, in fact, a group of hostages held by 
Martin. But such factors can plausibly be included in the action description itself 
(e.g. ‘Martin supplies food for the sustenance of destitute homeless people whom 
he came upon/hostages held by him’). However, our point in the accompany-
ing body-text paragraph is a general one that holds irrespective of this type of 
example, not least because (expressively relevant) contextual factors cannot always 
be incorporated in what is a reasonably intuitive (as opposed to, e.g., an oddly 
contrived or strained) description of an action. Moreover, the essential point of 
our position on the expressive value of the rule of law—i.e. how that value is 
sensitive to both the form and the content of the law—could be defended even 
if formal and content-related features of the operation of legal authority were to 
be brought together under one action description. For a general discussion of 
action individuation, see, e.g., Anscombe (1957, §§ 6, 23–26); Davidson (1971); 
Goldman (1971); Thomson (1971); Gallagher (2020, ch. 1).
31 See relevant discussion in Hellman (2000, esp. pp. 25–26); Anderson & Pildes 
(2000, pp. 1545–1551).
32 For some relevant examples in the context of law’s expressive function, see van 
der Burg (2001, Section IV).
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6.1  Introduction
The relevance of certain forms of participation for legitimacy is well documented 
in the extensive social sciences literature.1 This empirical research demonstrates 
the importance of having a ‘voice’ in legal proceedings, or an opportunity to 
present one’s case, and the importance of being treated with respect by legal 
officials. This research adds substantive weight to the theoretical arguments that 
procedural justice is intrinsically valuable because of the way it respects individual 
dignity and autonomy,2 and increases people’s willingness to comply and cooper-
ate with authorities (Meyerson 2015a, p. 26; 2015b, p. 76).
In this chapter, I draw on procedural theories of law and democracy3 to 
develop a normative account of why participation matters for legitimacy and 
compliance with the law. I suggest that this normative account can help explain 
the issues of authority and compliance in ways that are sensitive to the nature 
of law in democracies, and with laypersons’ intuitions about why participation 
matters.4 In particular, I demonstrate the ways in which the relationship between 
the citizen and the state is more complex and less linear than it is characterised 
and described in some of the psychological literature. In this respect, this chapter 
builds on the ‘relational’ aspect of legitimacy identified by Meyerson (2015a, 
2015b), and on the idea of ‘legitimacy as dialogue’ developed by Bottoms and 
Tankebe (2012, p. 159).
In Section 6.2, I give an account of the empirical evidence, which is con-
cerned with people’s perceptions of legitimacy. I suggest that these descriptive 
claims about why people accept the authority of law and comply with it represent 
the relationship between the citizen and the state as a ‘top down’ relationship, 
rather than a complex dialogical and relational one. In Section 6.3 I give an 
account of procedural theories of legitimation, to demonstrate two things: first, 
the ways in which participation shifts the locus of authority and law-making from 
the state to the citizenry. Second, the ways in which this shift from government 
to citizens enables us to give a different account of legitimacy: namely, that peo-
ple should accept the authority of law issuing and law applying institutions and 
should comply with legal norms if these procedural processes are in place. I refer 
again to some of the empirical evidence to substantiate this claim, and to suggest 
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a different theoretical model for interpreting this evidence.5 In Section 6.4, I use 
this theoretical model to explain the relationship between procedural fairness 
and legitimacy in the context of the criminal trial, focusing on the opportunity 
to be heard in one’s own defence. Finally, I discuss some policy implications and 
respond to potential objections in Section 6.5.
6.2  Participation and legitimacy: the empirical evidence
In his ground-breaking book, Why People Obey the Law, Tom Tyler distinguishes 
between instrumental and normative reasons for obedience to law (Tyler 1990, 
p. 3). He further breaks down normative reasons into two categories: personal 
morality (consisting of people’s beliefs about how they should act) and legitimacy 
(referring to people’s perceptions as to whether law enforcement officials rightly 
have authority over them, i.e. descriptive legitimacy). In a series of surveys ask-
ing people questions about their recent contacts with the police or the courts, 
their reactions to those contacts, and their subsequent behaviour, Tyler con-
cludes that people comply with the law when they perceive that legal authorities 
are legitimate and that their actions are generally fair (Tyler 1990, p. 6). These 
findings lead Tyler to prioritise normative compliance over instrumental compli-
ance, and within normative compliance, to prioritise legitimacy. Interestingly, it 
was the perceived procedural fairness of law enforcement authorities, rather than 
the perceived fairness of the outcome, that was most significant for subsequent 
compliance.
There has been a significant amount of further research, which confirms 
these initial findings. Legal institutions and authorities are deemed legitimate 
when people have trust and confidence that legal authorities are honest (Tyler & 
Jackson 2014, p. 78). This causes people to ‘authorise’ the legal authority to 
dictate appropriate behaviour because they trust and have confidence that legal 
authorities are honest and act in ways that have citizens’ best interests at heart 
(Tyler & Jackson 2013, pp. 87–88; 2014, p. 78). The connection between legiti-
macy and compliance with the law is based on the theoretical consideration that 
people are able to transcend their short-term self-interest, including getting the 
outcome they want, to take actions that are consistent with their conceptions of 
what is right and appropriate (Tyler & Jackson 2014, p. 81).
Procedural justice emerges as the key criterion for conferring legitimacy and 
securing compliance in the descriptive sense. It refers to whether people perceive 
that authoritative officials—police and court officers—use their power in fair, just, 
and neutral ways. In these descriptive accounts, procedural justice is understood 
in four main ways. First, people want an opportunity to explain their situation or 
tell their side of the story in a conflict (Jackson & Tyler 2014, p. 81). Second, 
people value neutrality, which means they expect that the decisions that are made 
are based on consistently applied legal principles and the facts of the case, and 
not on personal opinion or biases. Related to this, people expect processes to be 
transparent and for officials to be open about how decisions are being made. This 
facilitates the belief that decision-making procedures are neutral and made in 
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an objective way (p. 82). Third, people are sensitive to whether they are treated 
with dignity and politeness, and whether their rights as citizens are respected: 
‘people believe that they are entitled to treatment with respect and react very 
negatively to dismissive or demeaning interpersonal treatment’ (Tyler & Jackson 
2013, p. 82). Finally, people focus on cues that communicate the intentions and 
characters of the authorities with whom they are dealing:
authorities communicate this type of concern when they listen to people’s 
accounts and explain or justify their actions in ways that show an awareness 
of and sensitivity to people’s needs and concerns. 
(p. 82)
Tyler and Jackson conclude:
The key point about procedural justice is that being treated fairly communi-
cates value and respect within a group, which fosters compliance with group 
rules, promotes cooperation, and leads to identification and engagement 
with the group. Hence procedural justice promotes legitimacy and advances 
each of the three goals outlined: compliance, cooperation, and engagement. 
(p. 82)
While there is generally broad agreement about the importance of legal legiti-
macy in the social sciences literature, there is no accepted definition of legitimacy 
more generally (Jackson & Gau 2015, p. 49). Moreover, given the important role 
played by the concept in the empirical literature, a number of researchers have 
highlighted the need to re-examine and expand the ways in which legitimacy is 
conceived (Tyler & Jackson 2013, p. 87; Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, p. 119). 
Jackson and Tyler, for example, have argued that it is important to ask why legiti-
macy influences behaviour, in the sense that it achieves compliance with legal 
norms (Tyler & Jackson 2013, p. 87 supra note 39). They offer three reasons that 
potentially explain why legitimacy influences behaviour: psychological reasons 
associated with perceived duties to obey institutions, the trust and confidence 
people have in authorities, and the extent to which legal norms ‘morally align’ 
with peoples’ values.
According to Tyler and Jackson, legitimacy is a motivation to act based on 
positive and intentional beliefs about the right to power and influence (Tyler & 
Jackson 2013, p. 87). When one recognises the legitimacy of an institution, one 
believes that the institution has the right to proscribe and enforce appropriate 
behaviour, and that one has a corresponding duty to obey those proscriptions. 
Kelman and Hamilton call this ‘authorisation’ to reflect the idea that the person 
has authorised the authority to determine the appropriate behaviour in some 
contexts, and then feels obligated to follow those directives or norms (Kelman & 
Hamilton 1989, p. 16). This is referred to as ‘internalisation’ where the norms 
become part of an individual’s motive system, guiding behaviour in the appropri-
ate way, even when no authority exists (Hoffman 1977, pp. 55–57).
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The second reason legitimacy influences behaviour is the trust and confidence 
that people have in authorities and legal officers. Jackson and Gau define trust as 
the subjective judgement that a person (the trustor) makes about the likelihood 
of another person (the trustee) following through with an expected action. This 
requires the trustor to draw on a variety of sources, such as past experience with 
the trustee, personal relationships, and intuitive or ‘gut’ responses when decid-
ing on the level of trust to place in the person (Jackson & Gau 2015, p. 52). 
For example, with respect to law enforcement officials such as the police, this 
definition of trust refers to people’s expectations regarding future behaviour from 
police officers under conditions of uncertainty (Jackson & Gau 2015, p. 53). A 
person can never be sure that the police will respond promptly if called, that she 
will be treated with respect, and that she will be heard. However, the person may 
have formed a judgement about the intentions and the capacity of the police 
officers to respond appropriately with respect to their social role, based on prior 
contact with law enforcement officials, and these judgements will shape the indi-
vidual’s willingness to accept uncertainty and vulnerability, by perhaps coming to 
the police with information about a crime (Jackson & Gau 2015, p. 53).
The third reason why legitimacy influences behaviour is because of identifica-
tion and a sense of shared values or ‘moral alignment’. According to Tyler and 
Jackson:
Pride and status encourages identification with the group, and identity judg-
ments then shape attitudes, values and cooperative behaviour. Pride, respect, 
and group identification—activated by the use of fair procedures—may con-
sequently encourage not just a felt obligation to obey the rules of the group, 
but also a (connected) sense of shared moral values and purpose. 
(Tyler & Jackson 2013, p. 92, supra note 39)
Moral alignment is considered a constitutive element of legitimacy because it jus-
tifies the power and authority of legal officials in the eyes of the community (Tyler 
& Jackson 2013 p. 92, supra note 39). Finally, these features shape law-abiding 
behaviour because people tend to cooperate, comply, and accept the authority of 
the state and its use of force when they believe that the state has rightful author-
ity, when they trust the state and its officials, and when they identify with its goals 
and moral values. If these conditions of legitimacy are met, then it is likely that 
people will accept that they have a duty to obey the law.
While I do not contest the importance of identification, trust, and fair treat-
ment for the purposes of achieving compliance with legal norms, I suggest that 
this account of legitimacy fails to fully appreciate why participation might con-
tribute to legitimacy for reasons aside from trust and why it matters for the pur-
poses of identification. These reasons may have more to do with the nature of 
legitimacy in democratic societies, where participatory procedures confer objec-
tive legitimacy on governments. As such, the empirical research continues to 
adopt a ‘top down’ approach regarding the relationship between citizens and 
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the state, rather than a ‘bottom up’ or dialogical relationship. For example, Tyler 
and Jackson rely on a traditional model of social regulation, where legal author-
ity is centralised in elites, who issue legal norms and make legal decisions. They 
explain,
Legal elites expect the public to accept their authority and comply with the 
law; legitimacy as authorisation and perceived obligation means that people 
allow legal authorities to prescribe their behaviour when enforcing rules. 
People obey the law because they believe that legal authorities have the right 
to dictate appropriate behaviour. 
(Tyler & Jackson 2014, p. 78)
But why do legal elites expect this level of compliance and why and how do people 
authorise them to make legal norms? While it is the case that people obey the law 
because they accept the law’s authority, they do not blindly follow it or simply 
do what authorities command because the authority says so. The language of 
lawmakers having ‘authority’ over ‘subordinates’ assumes a disconnect between 
those who govern, issue directives, and make decisions, and those who are gov-
erned and obey those directives. It assumes that citizens come to identify with the 
law for reasons that have more to do with trust in legal authorities, than because 
of the existence of participatory procedures. The more benevolent and trustwor-
thy the officials are, the more their power is recognised, and their orders complied 
with. There is very little to suggest that citizens also have significant power and 
protections in legal processes (although this is implied by the evidence), and that 
they might accept the legitimacy of the law because they had some involvement 
in how that law or legal decision was made, by virtue of the existence of participa-
tory procedures. The nature and extent of this involvement will vary depending 
on the kind of issue under consideration and a person’s level of interest, ability, 
and engagement, to name a few. What matters, however, is that in various fora 
appropriate participatory procedures are in place, to enable appropriate levels of 
participation in legal decision-making.
In the following section, I draw on procedural models of law and democracy 
to offer a normative account of legitimacy. I suggest that legitimacy is conferred 
in the normative sense by virtue of an ongoing relationship and dialogue between 
citizens and the state, where citizens participate in various ways in issuing author-
ity or in devising the norms that will bind them. This participation occurs in a 
number of different contexts, including in elections, in law-making, and in the 
context of a trial or other kind of hearing (such as a tribunal or a commission 
inquiry). Of course, the level and kind of participation in these different fora will 
vary, but my claim is that the existence of participatory procedures, no matter 
their form, confers legitimacy in a normative sense, and brings about compliance 
with the law. This procedural model is better able to respond to the unique fea-
tures of legitimacy in democratic societies, a feature that is somewhat absent from 
the social sciences and traditional jurisprudential literature.
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6.3  Procedural theories of democracy and law
The ideal of democracy views government action as a collective action. It is 
the actions of the community, achieved through various procedures that deter-
mine the preferences or views of its members. Procedural theories of legitimacy 
focus on how the directives of an authority are arrived at and how an individual 
might contribute to the outcome. For example, a procedural theory might judge 
whether the process was deliberative, fair, or public (Hershovitz 2003, p. 212). 
Lon Fuller, perhaps one of the few legal theorists to take seriously this con-
nection between democracy and law, and between participation and legitimacy, 
argued that adjudication, contract, and elections are three ways of reaching deci-
sions, settling disputes, and regulating relations between people. The characteris-
tic feature of these different kinds of social ordering ‘lies in the manner in which 
the affected party participates in the decision reached’ (Fuller 1978, p. 363). 
Ideally, each of these arrangements requires that certain background conditions 
be met, or the existence of certain procedures. In the case of elections, it requires 
an intelligent and fully informed electorate, an active interest in the issues being 
discussed, candid discussion of the issues in public debate, and widespread par-
ticipation, conditions that Fuller thought were ‘scarcely ever realised in practice’ 
(p. 364).
Adjudication also depends on various procedures that provide the affected 
parties with an opportunity to participate in the decision, by way of present-
ing evidence and reasoned arguments. However, it differs from participation in 
democratic politics because it demands a higher standard of reasoning, both in 
terms of the arguments being presented by the parties, and the judgement that is 
reached by the impartial adjudicator:
adjudication is … a device which gives formal and institutional expression to 
the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs. As such it assumes a 
burden of rationality not borne by any other form of social ordering. 
(Fuller 1978, p. 367) 
The process of adjudication becomes a farce should the decision that is reached 
make no pretence to rationality.
Elections, by contrast, are often decided by the preferences of voters who are 
‘emotional, inarticulate, and not subject to rational defense … the will of the 
majority controls, not because it is right, but—well, because it is the will of the 
majority’ (Fuller 1978, p. 367). Despite his scepticism about the reasoning abil-
ity of the electorate, Fuller nevertheless offered an account of law as a coopera-
tive venture between rulers and ruled, requiring reciprocal obligations of mutual 
respect. Fuller’s account of law and legitimacy is capable of application to liberal 
democracies in general and is consistent with the moral and political assumptions 
underpinning them.
As Allan argues, Fuller’s ‘internal morality’ can be interpreted as a demanding 
ideal of due process of law that, when fully elaborated, imposes an obligation 
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on the government to defend every coercive act on the grounds that it is in the 
interests of all. The rule of law is essentially a procedural ideal, because the com-
mon good or the interests of all is left open for public debate, and any decision 
reached by the government needs to be rationally defended with reference to 
the needs and interests of the community as a whole (Allan 2001, p. 75). When 
the state’s demands are understood as making an appeal to the general good, 
‘the citizen’s moral judgment is inextricably engaged in the identification of law. 
He is enjoined by the constitution itself’ (p. 76). Closely connected with this 
relationship between the citizen and the state, and the rule of law, is a distinctive 
view of procedural fairness that reflects the sense in which the government, under 
the rule of law, is required to enter into a dialogue with citizens. The rule of law 
demands an opportunity for consultation with relevant officials.
Fuller’s theory does not, however, elaborate on this relationship or dialogue 
between the citizen and the state.6 More recent procedural theories of democracy 
and law give a richer, and less cynical account of public reason and of the specific 
procedures, which enable such a dialogue. For example, Habermas’ procedural 
model of legal legitimacy shifts the locus of legislative and decision-making power 
from the formal institutions of the state and locates it in the communications of 
an unsubverted public sphere. The public sphere is, in turn, tied to the ‘associa-
tional network of a liberal civil society and gains support from the core private 
spheres of the lifeworlds’ (Habermas 1998, p. 18). This model also shifts the 
normative expectations from the level of the actors’ qualities and competences 
to the forms or procedures of communication in which opinion-formation can 
develop and interact with the formal organs of the state (p. 18).
For Habermas, legal legitimacy is achieved by way of various participatory pro-
cedures or in the communicative networks of public spheres, which can include 
anything from a town-hall meeting, online discussion fora, media discussions, 
and so on. Participation is essentially a discursive activity, requiring people to 
present reasons and arguments for particular policies, ones that are based not 
only on their own self-interest, but also in the interests of their community more 
broadly. This participation takes place in a variety of different fora, including pub-
lic opinion-formation, institutionalised elections, and legislative decisions. These 
fora are categorised in terms of informal and formal processes of deliberation, 
and together form Habermas’ two-track model of deliberative democracy so that,
deliberative politics thus lives off the interplay between democratically 
institutionalised will-formation and informal opinion-formation. It can-
not rely solely on the channels of procedurally regulated deliberation and 
decision-making. 
(Habermas 1998, p. 308)
The two tracks of deliberation perform two different functions.
Informal communication in the public sphere is disorganised, anarchic, and 
uncoordinated. It provides an unregulated space for detecting new problems, 
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bringing them to public awareness without the use of specialised language, and 
suggesting ways to address them,
because the general public sphere is ‘unconstrained’ in the sense that its 
channels of communication are not regulated by procedures, it is better 
suited for the ‘struggle over needs’ and their interpretation. 
(Habermas 1998, p. 314) 
In this way, ‘the communicative structures of the public sphere constitute a far-
flung network of sensors that react to the pressure of society-wide problems and 
stimulate influential opinions’ (Habermas 1998, p. 300). The public space is 
founded on a network of associations that ‘specialise … in discovering issues 
relevant for all society, contributing possible solutions to problems, interpreting 
values, producing good reasons, and invalidating others (p. 485). Only after such 
a public struggle for recognition of issues as political can the responsible political 
authorities take up the proposals, put them on a parliamentary agenda and then 
legislate and make binding decisions in relation to them. This is referred to as the 
formal track of the legislative process.
The formal track of deliberative decision-making is how informal deliberation 
is made into positive law by conventional political institutions and the organs of 
the state. Formal political processes also include elections and legislatures, and 
the formal organs of the state include courts. The function of these institutions is 
to assess ideas, solutions, and make authoritative decisions that will be accepted 
by those affected. Habermas (1998) explains that these formal political processes 
rely on the informal public sphere when devising policies and laws:
The operative meaning of these regulations consists less in discovering and 
identifying problems than in dealing with them; it has less to do with becom-
ing sensitive to new ways of looking at problems than with justifying the 
selection of a problem and the choice among competing proposals for solv-
ing it. The publics of parliamentary bodies are structured predominantly as 
a context of justification. These bodies rely not only on the administration’s 
preparatory work and further processing but also on the context of discovery 
provided by a procedurally unregulated public sphere that is borne by the 
general public of citizens. 
(Habermas 1998, p. 307)
This two-track system displaces the principal locus of participation from formal 
political institutions to the informal public sphere and is intended to explain 
how legal legitimacy ought to be achieved, with respect to both the issues of 
authority and compliance. It describes the kinds of communication necessary 
between the citizen and the state, and the various procedures that mediate this 
dialogue.
Why do these participatory procedures produce legitimacy (or why can they 
give us a more adequate answer to the issues of authority and compliance?). First, 
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participatory procedures ensure that all those affected by an issue have some input 
into how that issue is addressed. They can ensure that all aspects of the issue have 
been identified and that all available evidence is presented. The resulting law 
issued by the legislature is thus considered legitimate because citizens have had 
the opportunity to participate in and formulate the law that will ultimately bind 
them. The law has the authority it does because it was achieved using a ‘bottom 
up’ process, rather than a ‘top down’ one.
Of course, it will not be the case that everyone who participated in the discus-
sion will agree with the decision that is eventually reached. Nevertheless, they 
are still bound to comply with the law because the procedures were democratic, 
transparent, and based on good reasons, even though the final decision is con-
tested. As Waldron puts it,
When something is enacted as law or as a source of law, I believe it makes on 
us a demand not to immediately disparage it, or think of ways of nullifying 
it or getting around it … it is a demand for a certain sort of recognition and 
… respect—that this, for the time being, is what the community has come 
up with and that it should not be ignored or disparaged because some of us 
propose, when we can, to repeal it. 
(Waldron 2001, p. 100)
Second, participatory procedures ensure that all citizens are treated with equal 
concern and respect. They presuppose that citizens are autonomous, self-
determining agents, capable of organising their own affairs, and pursuing their 
own interests and conceptions of the good. As such, participatory procedures 
assume that citizens not only have the ability to participate in political debate but 
that they would want some say in how decisions that affect them are made. As 
Hershovitz explains,
since governments play a pervasive role in organising our lives, denying peo-
ple the opportunity to participate in the process of government closes off 
opportunities to organise one’s life autonomously. Democratic procedures 
afford people opportunities to participate in life-defining decisions. 
(Hershovitz 2003, p. 214)
So, while features like identification and trust in legal officials are important for 
people’s perceptions of legitimacy, as the psychological literature describes, it is 
participatory procedures that confer legitimacy and bring about compliance with 
the law. Moreover, identification with one’s community and the establishment 
of shared values presupposes participation, insofar as it is the community itself 
that comes together to deliberate about what those shared values are and how 
they can be actualised in law. While elites might be responsible for shaping the 
actual law, this is not something that they impose from the ‘top’, onto ‘subordi-
nates’ who then obey. As I have suggested, in a democracy, it is the people who 
ought to decide what is best for themselves and their communities, who ought 
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to identify various issues that need to be addressed, and who ought to propose 
various ways of solving them. It is the citizens who should give reasons to one 
another to support one course of action over another, and it is the people who 
are affected by a particular issue who are best placed to make recommendations 
about how that issue should be addressed.
Again, the empirical evidence bears out these normative claims. Tyler and 
Jackson note that studies of long-term approaches to creating social order 
indicate the importance of creating viable communities, ones where people 
have a shared attitude, which in turn motivates engagement. If people are 
encouraged to engage in their communities socially and economically, they 
build social capital. They come to know others and how to work with them 
when problems arise in the community; they build trust in others and develop 
the belief that others can and will act collectively when issues arise (Tyler & 
Jackson 2014, p. 80).
Tyler and Jackson seek to explore whether such engagement can be enabled 
and facilitated by legal authorities: whether ‘the legal system can develop poli-
cies and practices that generate supportive attitudes and values that enhance 
communities’ (2014, p. 80). They find that the exercise of authority by way 
of fair processes and decision-making strengthens the social bonds between 
individuals and communities. People come to identify with the group that 
the authority represents and internalise the belief that they should follow 
the rules of the group and the laws that are issued by it. They find that legal 
institutions and authorities play a crucial role in fostering the identity needed 
to establish legitimacy, and in forging the social and collective bonds of a 
community (p. 80).
Using a proceduralist model of democracy and law, it is possible to inter-
pret these findings using a ‘bottom up’ approach to legitimacy: it is the peo-
ple themselves who come together to identify and help solve various social 
coordination problems, thereby fostering identification and solidarity with 
a group, a sense of shared values and respect for one another. Social elites 
and legal officers might then play a role in actualising a particular decision, 
perhaps by creating legislation and enforcing it. The relationship between 
legal authorities and communities in democratic societies is thus more com-
plicated and less linear than Tyler and Jackson suggest. People do not accept 
the legitimacy of law because of the benevolence of legal institutions and 
authorities, but they ought to by virtue of the existence of various participa-
tory procedures. This is a dialogical and discursive process, involving delib-
eration between citizens themselves, and between citizens and their elected 
representatives. Citizens thus should accept the law as legitimate and should 
consider themselves bound to obey it (even if they do not agree with it) 
because they played some part in shaping it. In the following section, I use 
this procedural account of legitimacy to explain the importance of procedural 
fairness in the context of a criminal trial, focusing on the opportunity to be 
heard in one’s own defence.
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6.4  The opportunity to be heard in one’s own defence 
and legitimacy
There are three significant relations between participation and legitimacy in the 
context of a criminal trial. First, giving the accused the opportunity to be heard in 
his or her defence may lead the accused to accept the decision, even if it does not 
go in his or her favour. Second, publicly presenting reasons for a decision means 
a political order is recognised as right and just, and thus as deserving of legitimacy. 
Third, participation extends to other actors in the criminal trial, such as members 
of a jury, and the participation of these various actors contributes to legitimacy 
in different ways.
Of course, there are vast differences between the kind of participation that 
occurs in the informal deliberative spheres and in a formal trial. In the public 
sphere, participation can take the form of deliberating over a public policy issue 
at a town-hall meeting, protesting, writing to elected representatives or to news-
papers, making submissions to parliamentary inquiries, and so on. These kinds of 
participation are, to greater or lesser degrees, unconstrained by various rules of 
order, and they are governed by various and differing procedures. For example, 
a town-hall meeting is likely to have more formal procedures that require partici-
pants to take turns speaking, and are regulated by a chairperson, whereas a protest 
march may have multiple deliberative sites and be largely unregulated, in terms of 
what people say and how they say it. These forms of participation are also open 
to all persons who are interested or who have a stake.
Participation in an adjudicative process differs in some fundamental ways. It is 
not open to anyone to participate in a trial (although the public nature of trials 
means that anyone can attend one). Only the parties affected are represented and 
allowed to present their cases; how they present evidence is subject to strict rules 
of procedure. Moreover, the kind of reason-giving in a trial is typically subject to 
higher standards than one would expect to find in the public sphere. A further 
distinctive feature of the procedural aspects of the rule of law is the requirement 
that individuals facing the imposition of some kind of penalty by the government 
must have a right to make legal arguments about the bearing of evidence and the 
legal norms relevant to the case. In doing so, participants are given an oppor-
tunity to affect a legal outcome, and this contributes to making a legal decision 
legitimate (Solum 2004, p. 274).
Despite these differences in the kinds of participation in different contexts, 
some key features of participation remain relevant across all deliberative contexts. 
First, the person whose interests are at issue is entitled to be heard, should be able 
to give evidence and make arguments for his or her position or case. Second, in 
each context, these arguments should be given due consideration and incorpo-
rated in the final decision. Third, all decisions reached need to be supported with 
good reasons that all participants can accept, even if the person does not get the 
outcome she was hoping for. And finally, this participation is crucial for legiti-
macy across these different deliberative spheres.7
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Another causal factor to achieving legitimacy in the context of a trial is reason-
giving by legal officials. Adjudication is thus not merely a process of reaching the 
correct result, consistent with appropriate legal standards, but more importantly, 
an attempt to justify that result to both parties (Allan 2001, p. 79). Lucas further 
argues that a principal purpose of the rules of natural justice, which define a ‘fair 
hearing’, is to enable a person to identify with the decision-making process and 
‘make it manifest to anyone disappointed at the outcome that we were solicitous 
of his interests and did not reach an adverse decision lightly or wantonly, but only 
for good reason and with evident reluctance’ (Lucas 1980, p. 97).
Participation in one’s own trial, in the form of being given an opportunity 
to be heard, may lead the accused to accept the decision and comply with the 
law. However, the public nature of a trial and the close scrutiny and argumen-
tation about the legal norms at issue can achieve legitimacy more generally 
through widespread recognition of the courts as just institutions. Decision-
making is, as Galligan puts it, an ‘unruly process’, one that requires judges and 
lawyers to try to make sense of the law as a whole, including not only the law 
and the evidence, but also in relation to the norms and standards, values, and 
beliefs operating in a complex social world (Galligan 1997, p. 65). It is, then, 
much more than the simple application of relevant laws to the facts of particu-
lar cases; because decision-making occurs in this space between legal norms, 
the facts of the case, and complex social circumstances, the procedures that are 
best suited for this purpose are ones that encourage inquiry, argument, and 
deliberation. They should reflect the fact that different ways of interpreting an 
issue are available, and that interpreting evidence and evaluating facts are open 
processes.
Subjecting legal norms to such intense and public scrutiny achieves widespread 
recognition of the authority of the courts. As Ho puts it, the trial is itself a process 
of public justification. Publicity is understood primarily in two ways: first, the 
grounds the executive has for a conviction must be presented in a forum in which 
the citizenry have right of access—justice must be seen to be done; and second, 
the reasons given for a guilty verdict must aim at public acceptability, meaning 
that reasonable citizens must be able to accept the reasons as sound and sufficient 
grounds for a conviction (Ho 2010, p. 53). The kind of debate that occurs in 
a courtroom and the accessibility of these arguments by the citizenry ought to 
achieve widespread legitimacy, insofar as people should come to recognise the 
authority of the courts and respect their decisions.
Participation in this context is not direct participation, because those who are 
not part of the proceedings do not have a right to make submissions or argu-
ments. However, they indirectly participate in having access to the court proceed-
ings (any person can, for example, attend court) or they can access the arguments 
that are made, and the courts’ reasoning for its decisions, and can participate in 
an ongoing public dialogue about those issues, where appropriate. In this respect, 
the courtroom forms part of a broader political and legal dialogue, in some cases, 
promoting public debate about various legal issues, which may lead to law reform 
in other spheres.
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Finally, participation in criminal trials also extends to the role of juries and 
promotes and achieves legitimacy in various ways. Notwithstanding some of the 
problems with juries, as an ideal, trial by jury has deep democratic roots—to 
be tried by a jury is to be tried by one’s own peers, and hence to be judged by 
the norms and standards of one’s community. Jury deliberation, the process of 
discussion, argumentation, and reasoning by a representative group of citizens 
in search of a collective judgement of a fellow citizen, has been described as 
the ‘crucible of democracy’ and it has been said that ‘the democratic theory of 
law would favour the retention of trial by jury as the means whereby the people 
play a direct, contributory part in the application of the law’ (Ho 2010, p. 253). 
The jury is one occasion where citizens participate in legal decision-making, and 
there have been occasions where a jury has refused to apply a norm that it deems 
oppressive, and hence, illegitimate.8
6.5  Objections and policy implications
There are at least two potential objections to this normative account that bear 
mentioning. First, actual participation in public deliberation falls significantly 
short of the ideal as represented here. A great deal of law is made by political 
elites without adequate participation by those affected, so in the absence of genu-
ine participation, it is necessary that people come to trust legal officials to achieve 
legal legitimacy. Second, participation in one’s own trial is also overstated. The 
increasing frequency of plea bargaining may mean the right to be heard in one’s 
own defence is forfeited in some criminal trials, and this does not appear to affect 
the legitimacy of decisions or affect whether people ought to comply with the law.
With respect to the first claim, while it is the case that actual law-making is 
made by legal elites, this is often in response to issues that have been identified in 
the public sphere as requiring legal responses, at least more often than not. For 
example, law reform in areas such as domestic violence, sexual assault and sexual 
harassment have occurred because women have identified these as serious social 
and political issues (first in the informal public sphere), and put these issues on 
the legislative agenda. Participation at the informal levels thus can and does influ-
ence the legislative agenda. Provided these participatory mechanisms are in place, 
it should lead to legitimacy and compliance with the law.
At a practical level, I concede that not every person affected by an issue will 
participate in law-making. It might be sufficient for the purposes of legitimacy 
that a wide range of views are represented in deliberation and are reflected in the 
final decision reached. This weakens the requirement that every person affected 
by an issue should participate in dialogue for the law or decision to be deemed 
legitimate (for this would be impractical, and time and resource intensive), but it 
does not affect that normative claim that so long as various participatory proce-
dures are in place, legitimacy and compliance with the law ought to be achieved.
There are also persistent issues of equality of access, especially for people who 
are socially marginalised or less well-educated, and so may not be able to genu-
inely participate in dialogue. This is a more intractable and complex problem, and 
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a full examination of these issues is outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it 
to say that large-scale inequalities in a society will distort deliberative exchanges, 
and may over time, undermine or weaken the legitimacy of authorities (such as 
governments or law enforcement officials) and compliance with the law.
The second concern is that participation in the context of legal trials is also 
overstated. Arlie Loughnan, for example, has argued that the rise of institutional 
practices such as plea bargaining or charge negotiation suggest that the criminal 
trial plays a ‘symbolic role that far outstrips its practical significance’ (Loughnan 
2010, p. 536). Dubber goes further, arguing that the prevalence of plea bargain-
ing, especially in the American criminal justice system is symptomatic of a crisis 
in the modern criminal process, where informal and non-public arrangements are 
increasingly replacing public trials in the imposition of punishment (1996–1997, 
p. 547).
At a descriptive level, there is an increased tendency to forfeit one’s right to be 
heard and forgo criminal trials in favour of plea bargaining. There are also good 
practical reasons for this, including increased efficiency, caseload management, 
and to spare victims the trauma of a trial. However, given the normative account 
I have defended, the increased use of practices such as plea bargaining should 
be of concern. If participation matters for legitimacy, perhaps over time, these 
institutional practices will erode the legitimacy of authorities, or undermine legal 
decisions.
Finally, this account of the relevance of participation has some important 
policy implications for both the criminal trial and for policing. It suggests that 
despite the costs and time resources associated with trials, the right to a fair hear-
ing and an opportunity to defend oneself during a trial are important, and ought 
not be eroded or replaced by plea bargaining and charge negotiation. The trial 
provides an important opportunity for participation, which is not only important 
for legitimacy of outcomes in particular cases, but also for legitimacy of law more 
broadly. The account of participation presented here also indicates the impor-
tance of involving and consulting with communities in the context of policing. 
It is likely that communities are best placed to understand their needs and will 
be more likely to accept police decisions and cooperate with police if they have 
the opportunity to participate in developing the policies that are to govern them.
I have argued that participatory procedures are relevant to answering the com-
plex questions posed by the issue of legitimacy—what gives institutions and legal 
officials the authority they have to make and issue legal norms and why should 
we comply with these norms? I have focussed on the relational and dialogical 
features of participation, in order to demonstrate that the relationship between 
the citizen and the state is more complex and less linear than conceived in tradi-
tional jurisprudential debates and in the empirical literature; that the dialogue is 
an ongoing one; and that it occurs across multiple deliberative spaces, including 
in courtrooms. If this account of the relevance of participatory procedures to 
achieving legitimacy is convincing, it might help explain the damage that can be 
done to our legal institutions when the principle of participation is undermined, 
through practices such as the increasing use of non-public plea bargaining. It can 
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also explain why some communities do not cooperate or trust police and other 
law enforcement bodies, and it can also provide ways of fostering this trust and 
identification through dialogical means.
Notes
1 See for example, Tyler (1990, 2006), Sunshine and Tyler (2003), Tyler and Fagan 
(2008), Tyler and Jackson (2014), Jackson et.al. (2012), and Murphy Bradford, 
and Jackson (2016).
2 See for example, Waldron (2011), Duff, Farmer, Marshall, and Tadros (2007).
3 In particular, I draw on the work of Lon Fuller (1978) and Habermas (1996).
4 See for example, Jeremy Waldron’s comments that the ‘dirty little secret’ of mod-
ern jurisprudence is that it is uncomfortable with democracy (Waldron 2001 pp. 
8–9), and his comments that when lay persons talk of the ‘rule of law’, they are 
not referring to the form of law, but to procedures. (Supra note 2, p. 5).
5 For example, I use this account to offer a different interpretation of Tyler and 
Jackson’s (2014) findings.
6 See for example, Allan’s comments that Fuller’s account of law is too spartan 
and ‘his commitment to the values of liberal democracy overly self-restrained.’ 
(Allan 2001, p. 73). See also Waldron’s criticisms in ‘The Rule of Law and the 
Importance of Procedure.’ (Waldron 2011, pp. 10–11).
7 See also Galligan (1997, pp. 130–132).
8 Consider, for example, some instances of ‘jury nullification’ where juries have 
ignored the law to acquit defendants who are otherwise guilty at law because they 
perceive the application of the law in the circumstances to be unjust. In the case 
of R v R 28 SASR 321 (1981), a woman was initially convicted of murder for 
killing her violent and abusive husband because the trial judge refused to direct 
the jury on the issue of provocation (traditionally a defence used by men who kill 
their partners for reasons of separation or suspected infidelity). On appeal, a sec-
ond jury acquitted the woman. Or consider the more recent US trial of William 
Lynch, charged with felony assault for attacking an elderly priest who had abused 
him as a child. He was also acquitted by a jury despite being guilty at law. See 
https ://ns wcour ts.co m.au/ artic les/j uries -dont -alwa ys-fo llow- the-l aw/
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The requirements of procedural justice may vary depending on a range of mat-
ters. These include the nature and importance of the substantive interests at 
stake; whether the decision concerns the treatment of particular individuals or 
is a general policy decision affecting many people; whether decision-makers are 
required to decide by applying rules or standards which have been laid down in 
advance or free to decide as they think best in the exercise of their discretion; and 
whether decision-makers are private individuals or are exercising public power as 
governmental officials.
This chapter will be concerned exclusively with governmental decision-making 
that concerns the treatment of particular individuals, using ‘government’ in the 
broad sense in which it includes the judicial branch. By way of further narrowing 
the issues, it will focus on the procedures that should be used when decisions of 
this kind are made by applying pre-existing legal rules and standards, since, as DJ 
Galligan says, decision by the application of rules and standards is ‘the character-
istically legal mode’ (1996, p. 24), involving, as it does, determining the content 
of the law, finding the facts, and applying the law to the facts.2 I will describe this 
activity as ‘adjudicative’, while noting that it is undertaken not only by judges, 
but also by administrative tribunals and administrative officials.3 This chapter asks 
how we should evaluate the justice of the procedures used for this task.
It is important to emphasise at the outset that when I talk about ‘procedural 
justice’, I am using the term ‘justice’ in a broad sense, rather than in the more 
traditional, narrow sense, according to which principles of justice are contrasted 
with consequentialist moral principles. Consequentialism holds that what makes 
an act right are its consequences, whereas principles of justice as traditionally 
conceived hold that individuals are entitled to be treated in certain ways even 
if the consequences are not overall beneficial. For instance, justice is frequently 
taken to require respect for rights as something to which individuals are morally 
entitled by virtue of their dignity and equality, even if this frustrates important 
social objectives. This is not necessarily to say that rights are absolute and should 
always prevail, no matter what the consequences, but rather to say that they enjoy 
great weight and cannot be straightforwardly balanced against consequentialist 
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considerations. It follows that in the traditional sense of the word ‘justice’, a 
consequentialist theory using cost-benefit analysis as the basis for recommending 
particular procedural rules and practices will not count as a theory of procedural 
‘justice’. However, since I want to provide a sufficiently rich description of the 
theories on offer, I prefer not to exclude consequentialist theories by definition. 
Instead, I will follow Michael Bayles in describing as a theory of ‘procedural jus-
tice’ any theory that offers an account of the procedures that morality requires 
(1990, p. 9). Thus, when I talk about theories of procedural justice, I mean any 
normative theory directed towards justifying procedural requirements.
In particular, I count theories that evaluate procedures from the economic 
point of view as theories of procedural justice. As will be explained later, eco-
nomic theories evaluate procedures by reference to the extent to which they 
allocate resources efficiently, which makes them consequentialist theories, rather 
than theories of justice in the narrow sense. Economic theories are neverthe-
less normative theories, since they maintain that it is morally desirable to design 
procedural rules so as to promote economic efficiency.4 Indeed, from their point 
of view, economic efficiency is synonymous with justice. Since it would impov-
erish the discussion to rule out economic theories on the ground that they are 
not strictly speaking theories of ‘justice’, and because it would be unfamiliar and 
inconvenient to describe economic theories as theories of ‘procedural morality’ 
(as opposed to theories of procedural justice), I have chosen to use the term 
‘theory of procedural justice’ as shorthand for any theory that aims to specify 
which procedures are required by morality.
It is also important to emphasise that the procedures required by morality 
may diverge from the procedural requirements imposed by the law. This point 
may be obscured by the fact that the law helps itself to the language of moral-
ity when it describes the procedural obligations it imposes as requirements of 
‘natural justice’, ‘procedural fairness’, and ‘procedural due process’. Still, there 
is no guarantee that legal notions of what procedures are just, fair, and due will 
be morally sound. Since the law’s understanding of procedural justice might not 
reflect a satisfactory understanding of the concept, the legal approach to these 
matters will not be dealt with here.
My main purpose in this chapter is to argue against the instrumentalist view 
that the only purpose of procedures in the adjudicative context is to lead to 
accurate outcomes.5 In Section 7.2, I explain that there are two kinds of instru-
mentalist account. What distinguishes them is their different attitude to conflicts 
between the achievement of accuracy and other social goals. The first account 
is willing to weigh the value of accuracy against its cost to society, while the 
second takes the view that accuracy-enhancing procedures are necessary to treat 
individuals fairly, even at some cost to society. Section 7.3 explores the difficul-
ties with the first idea, and Sections 7.4 and 7.5 explore the difficulties with 
the second. The arguments made in these sections suggest that procedures must 
matter intrinsically as well as instrumentally. As to how we should understand 
the intrinsic value of procedures, Section 7.6 concludes with some brief remarks 
suggesting that procedural justice requires the use of procedures that promote 
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relations of social equality between individuals and authority figures, especially 
governmental authorities.
7.2  Instrumentalism introduced
In the adjudicative context that is the subject of this chapter, there will frequently 
be a legally correct outcome to which the affected persons have a legal right (such 
as a right to social security benefits if they meet the relevant legal conditions or 
to acquittal if they are not guilty of a crime with which they have been charged). 
This makes procedures important because the procedures chosen to ascertain the 
facts and relate the law to the facts may be more or less suited to vindicate these 
substantive legal rights. To give an obvious example, judges are more likely to 
discover whether someone has committed a crime if they give defendants the 
opportunity to present evidence and arguments on their own behalf than if they 
toss a coin. In general, appropriate procedures can facilitate the discovery of rel-
evant facts and make it easier to test the accuracy of factual and legal propositions 
(Bone 2017, p. 143). Since everyone will agree that giving effect to substantive 
legal rights has some moral value, it follows that the instrumental capacity of 
procedures to enforce the substantive law is one obvious way in which they can 
be judged for their justice.
But is contributing to the accuracy of legal outcomes the sole benefit to be 
derived from procedures, in which case it would follow that the value of proce-
dures is entirely instrumental, being tied exclusively to the role they play in arriv-
ing at the right legal result? Empirical research into the psychology of procedural 
justice has shown that people do not see it this way. For instance, people value 
for its own sake the opportunity to present evidence and arguments on their own 
behalf, regarding this as fair in itself, and a requirement of justice, even when the 
correct outcome is obvious and there is no likelihood that the substantive rules 
will be incorrectly applied if they do not participate (Lind et al. 1983, p. 347; 
Tyler 1987, pp. 342–343; Tyler et al. 1985, pp. 79–80). In this chapter, I will 
give reasons for thinking that people’s procedural justice judgements, as revealed 
by the empirical studies, are philosophically supportable: procedures matter for 
reasons other than the outcomes to which they lead. To this end, I will argue 
against two kinds of instrumentalist theory: economic theories and outcome-
based theories. Both regard the avoidance of legal error as the only purpose of 
procedures. They differ, however, in their willingness to balance the benefits of 
accuracy-promoting procedures against their costs.
In order to understand this, it is necessary to note that procedures designed to 
avoid legal error are generally expensive. Economic theories take this into account 
by applying routine cost-benefit analysis, fixing on the optimal level of procedural 
accuracy by reference to considerations of cost-effectiveness. In Section 7.3, I 
criticise the economic approach. I argue that it fails to take our substantive legal 
entitlements seriously, since it makes no sense for the state to create legal rights 
with one hand but take them back with the other by allowing the procedures 
for enforcing these rights to be entirely dictated by economic considerations. If 
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there are no principled limits on the extent to which procedural protections can 
be withheld in the public interest, it is difficult to see the point of recognising 
substantive rights in the first place.
Outcome-based theories agree with economic theories that the justice of pro-
cedures is solely a matter of the correctness of the outcomes to which they lead. 
However, they differ from economic theories in taking the view that ‘[i]t is a mat-
ter of injustice when judges make mistakes about legal rights’ (Dworkin 1977, 
p. 130). Since they believe that adjudication engages issues of fairness to indi-
viduals, this leads outcome-based theorists to rule out routine trade-offs between 
the benefits of accuracy-promoting procedures and their costs. Unlike economic 
theories, outcome-based theories are therefore theories of procedural justice in 
the narrow sense of ‘justice’ explained in Section 7.1.
In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, I criticise outcome-based versions of instrumentalism. 
I begin by pointing out that there are practical limits on the instrumental value of 
procedures, since perfectly accurate procedures are unattainable and procedures 
that reduce error to the lowest possible level are too expensive. I argue that this 
fact creates a difficulty for outcome-based theories. Either they are forced to 
insist that procedural justice requires perfectly accurate procedures notwithstand-
ing the fact that society cannot afford to provide them, or they are obliged to 
concede that procedural justice is compatible with substantively unjust (that is, 
legally incorrect) results. I argue that the first response implies, implausibly, that 
no real-world legal system can be procedurally just, and that the second response, 
although correct, pulls the rug out from under instrumentalism. In particular, 
once it is acknowledged that there is a disconnect between just procedures and 
just outcomes, it becomes difficult to see why providing concededly imperfect 
instrumental protection should exhaust the content of procedural justice. On the 
contrary, it is more plausible to infer that procedures must serve intrinsic values 
in addition to their capacity to enforce the substantive law. In light of this, I 
conclude by briefly considering the intrinsic values that procedures might serve.
7.3  Economic theories of procedural justice
Economic theories of procedural justice, as defended by theorists such as Richard 
Posner (1973, 2011) and Louis Kaplow (1994), analyse legal procedures from 
the perspective of the ‘law and economics’ school. Like utilitarianism, the law and 
economics approach takes the consequentialist view that legal rules should aim 
to maximise or produce the largest amount of the good (Weinrib 1980, p. 310). 
The economic approach differs from utilitarianism, however, in its view of what 
is good, being concerned to maximise wealth, not utility.6
In discussing the optimal design of procedural rules, Posner distinguishes 
between two types of costs: error costs and direct costs. Posner defines error costs 
as the economic costs caused when legal officials make erroneous determina-
tions—for instance, when judges mistakenly impose legal liability or mistakenly 
fail to impose legal liability (1973, pp. 400–401). These errors are costly because 
they affect the extent to which people are deterred from violating the substantive 
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law. For example, if people who have caused accidents are mistakenly found not 
to be negligent, then this will detrimentally affect the extent to which people will 
be deterred from engaging in negligent activities, and the cost of accidents to 
society will increase. Accuracy-promoting procedures (such as providing hearings 
and subsidising the cost of lawyers for defendants) help to minimise error costs 
and therefore promote compliance with the law, which is socially beneficial (Bone 
2017, p. 145; Kaplow 1994, p. 310).
Direct costs (or decision costs) are the costs associated with running a decision-
making system—for instance, the time spent by legal officials and lawyers and the 
resources required to operate the system (Posner 1973, p. 400). Although pro-
cedural safeguards reduce error costs by producing information that increases the 
accuracy of the outcome, they are also expensive and therefore generate direct 
costs. Generally speaking, the more reliable a procedure is, in terms of the addi-
tional information it allows to be presented, the more it is likely to cost in time 
and money.
Posner argues that since the direct costs are just as real as the error costs, it 
would be irrational to provide procedural protections that reduce the error costs 
by 50 cents or even 99 cents but increase the direct costs by 1 dollar. In these 
kinds of cases, greater accuracy is, according to him, not worth the cost (Posner 
1973, p. 401; see also Kaplow 1994, p. 308). Posner concludes that the objective 
of a procedural system is to minimise the total social costs (the sum of the error 
costs and the direct costs) (2011, p. 757). Or, as Kaplow puts the point, proce-
dures should be ‘efficient producers of information’: the degree of accuracy they 
should afford is whatever degree is cost-effective (1994, p. 338, fn. 86). Since the 
only procedural entitlements recognised by the economic approach are to pro-
cedures that are economically efficient, it follows that we do not enjoy genuine 
procedural rights, viz. entitlements that should be respected even if this is not on 
balance beneficial for society.
The well-known United States case of Mathews v Eldridge (424 US 319 
(1976)) approaches procedural justice along these lines, as a matter of finding an 
optimal balance between the benefits of procedures and their costs, at any rate 
in the administrative law context. In justifying its finding that a procedure based 
on written submissions (as opposed to oral testimony) before terminating social 
security benefits provided sufficient due process, the United States Supreme 
Court stated:
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consid-
eration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
(pp. 334–335) 
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The primary objection to the economic approach to procedural justice is that 
it is difficult to square with the fact that when society creates legal rights it under-
takes to protect them, even if disregarding these rights would have better social 
and economic consequences. As Ronald Dworkin observes, ‘someone is entitled 
to win a lawsuit if the law is on his side, even if the society overall loses thereby’ 
(1985, p. 94). How can this entitlement be reconciled with the economic view 
that the only procedures that should be provided for the enforcement of sub-
stantive legal rights are those that are in the public interest? Although the deci-
sion to create a particular right may initially have been based on public interest 
considerations, the right thus created cannot be ignored just because it does not 
suit society to give effect to it. To quote Dworkin again, the ‘boast’ that society 
honours people’s rights under the law even at the expense of the public interest is 
no more than an ‘idle gesture’ if the procedures necessary to enforce these rights 
can be denied ‘for no better reason than that same public interest’ (1985, p. 77). 
Along the same lines, Robert G Bone observes:
[t]he existence of substantive rights implies procedural rights. Because 
effective enforcement is critical to respecting a substantive right, limiting 
procedure for reasons of utility would be tantamount to limiting the sub-
stantive right on utilitarian grounds. Put differently, without the constraint 
of procedural rights, courts could undermine substantive rights in order to 
serve utilitarian goals by denying the costly procedures necessary for their 
enforcement. 
(1999, pp. 993–994)
7.4  Outcome-based theories of procedural justice
Although both economic theories and outcome-based theories defend the instru-
mental view that the moral value of procedures depends solely on their ability to 
prevent legal error, there is a key difference between them. From the economic 
point of view, the value of accurate procedures lies in the contribution they make 
to maximising the good. By contrast, outcome-based theories are concerned with 
the just treatment of individuals. Outcome-based theories maintain that people 
suffer an injustice when they are deprived of their legal rights and they value accu-
rate procedures for their ability to guard against this form of substantive injustice. 
Outcome-based theories are therefore fairness-based or rights-based theories, not 
consequentialist theories (Bone 2003, pp. 487–488, 495–496).
Outcome-based theorists make a distinction between two kinds of error costs: 
those that impose costs on society and those that impose costs on individuals. 
Posner is concerned only with the former—the social costs that arise when legal 
error prevents the purpose of the law from being achieved. For outcome-based 
theorists, by contrast, error can have a ‘moral cost’ as well as a social cost. This 
will be the case when individuals are mistakenly denied their substantive legal 
rights. Although legal errors do not always consist in a denial of legal rights, since 
some errors may be in the interest of individuals (e.g. the acquittal of someone 
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who is guilty), outcome-based theorists maintain that when people are mistak-
enly denied their legal rights, this is unfair and a form of injustice (Bayles 1990, 
pp. 120–121).
Dworkin defends something like this view,7 arguing that we suffer a special 
kind of injury whenever our legal rights are not upheld. Using the example of 
a criminal trial, he says that someone who is mistakenly convicted and sent to 
prison does not experience only ‘bare harm’, such as the unpleasantness and frus-
tration of being deprived of one’s liberty (something that the guilty also suffer). 
In addition to this subjective form of harm, the innocent also suffer a further, 
objective injury, which consists simply in the fact that their punishment is unjust. 
Dworkin calls this kind of injury the ‘injustice factor’ in someone’s punishment, 
or their ‘moral harm’, and says that it is a distinct kind of harm against which 
people should be specially protected. This requires procedures that make it pos-
sible for them to test their substantive rights (1985, pp. 80–81). Galligan makes 
the similar claim that ‘where the individual person is treated unfairly by being 
deprived of a right to which he is entitled, injustice results and the integrity of the 
process is called into question’ (1996, p. 113). The injustice may be extreme, as 
in the case of wrongful convictions or ‘miscarriages of justice’ (Galligan 1996, p. 
112), as we call them, but outcome-based theorists do not confine their claim to 
factually inaccurate determinations of guilt. In their view, any failure to uphold 
a legal right is the source of injustice. For instance, administrative decisions that 
deny benefits to individuals when they are entitled to them are unjust (Dworkin 
1985, pp. 100–101; Galligan 1996, p. 112).8
In my view, outcome-based theories are correct to think that legal justice 
(upholding legal rights) is an aspect of substantive justice. Dworkin defends 
this position because he thinks that it is impossible to identify the law without 
recourse to moral reasoning. This means that there is, in his view, no clear dis-
tinction between legal rights and moral rights (1986, Chapter 7). It is not, how-
ever, necessary to endorse Dworkin’s controversial view to understand why it is 
prima facie desirable to give effect to people’s legal rights. As Galligan observes, 
legal standards give rise to normative expectations, including the expectation that 
one will be treated in accordance with the law. This expectation arises out of an 
implicit undertaking society gives to its members that their legal rights will be 
upheld. This does not mean that the commitment to treating people according 
to law can never be overridden—for instance, if a law is gravely unjust according 
to more fundamental standards of justice, this could be a reason to disregard it. It 
does, however, mean that treating people according to law is to treat them justly 
in one important sense of that term (Galligan 1996, pp. 58–62).
Since outcome-based theorists believe that the denial of legal rights is unfair 
and a form of injustice, and since avoiding injustice has some degree of priority 
over the public interest, it follows that outcome-based theorists reject the con-
sequentialist idea that the benefits of accurate procedures should be routinely or 
straightforwardly balanced against their costs. They maintain, in other words, 
that procedures that increase the risk of mistakenly denying someone their legal 
rights cannot be justified by simply appealing to the benefits to society of saving 
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money (Bone 1993, p. 598). A higher standard of justification must be met. 
Thus, in a discussion of the choice of criminal procedures, Dworkin expressly 
rejects a ‘cost-efficient’ approach, saying that questions of criminal procedure 
and evidence should not be decided ‘entirely on the basis of cost-benefit cal-
culations about the interests of society as a whole, balancing the interests of 
the accused against the interests of those who would gain from public savings’ 
(1985, p. 73). According to Dworkin, the use of a utilitarian calculus for fixing 
criminal procedures denies the importance of moral harm (1985, p. 81), and 
implies that people accused of a crime are ‘entitled to no particular level of accu-
racy at all’ (p. 73).
It will be clear from the discussion so far that although outcome-based theorists 
emphasise the ‘utility’ of procedures in leading to accurate outcomes, they do not 
take a utilitarian approach to procedure,9 since they are not willing straightfor-
wardly to balance the importance of achieving accurate outcomes against the cost 
of doing so. At first glance, then, it might seem that, unlike economic theories, 
outcome-based theories cannot be criticised for not taking our legal entitlements 
seriously. Matters are, however, more complex than this, as will shortly become 
apparent.
7.5  Tolerating outcome error: Galligan, Dworkin, 
and Rawls
If the purpose of procedures is to protect against the injustice that consists in 
denying legal rights, how robust must the protection be, according to outcome-
based theorists? Any answer to this question must begin by acknowledging that 
procedural perfection is unattainable. There are no procedures available to us 
that are guaranteed to produce correct results (Solum 2004, p. 185). All proce-
dures in the adjudicative context are attended by some risk of error, given what 
Bone describes as ‘the cognitive and other natural human constraints on accurate 
decision-making’ (2003, p. 514). It is not even feasible for the state to provide 
maximally accurate procedures, i.e. procedures that reduce unjust mistakes to 
the lowest possible level, since this would be so expensive as to severely limit 
the state’s ability to provide for other important needs. In a context of limited 
resources, no one would prioritise accuracy over all other competing interests 
(Dworkin 1985, p. 84).
Since inaccurate procedures and the substantive injustice to which they lead 
are inevitable, whether because of human fallibility or limited resources, this 
leaves outcome-based theorists with two possibilities. They can insist that proce-
dural justice requires perfectly accurate procedures, which carries the implication 
that procedural justice is unobtainable in the real world. Alternatively, they can 
narrow the concept of procedural justice, so as to adjust its demands to the con-
straints imposed by the real world.
Galligan takes the first approach. He argues that substantive rights justify a 
claim to whatever procedures are necessary to protect and uphold these rights 
(1996, p. 102). He writes:
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[o]nce it is recognized that to have a right is to have an undertaking from 
the community that a certain interest will be protected in a certain way, it 
is a short step to the conclusion that the undertaking ought to include the 
procedures and institutions necessary for the purpose. Procedures are part of 
what is necessary to take rights seriously and so to prevent unfair treatment. 
(1996, p. 101)
Galligan concedes that society cannot afford to provide fully adequate proce-
dures, and he also believes that if a society does its best to provide adequate pro-
cedures within the resources available, any inadequacy in the procedures provided 
is excusable. He insists, however, that to excuse is not to justify. In his view, there 
is no denying the fact that some of the resulting legal mistakes will violate rights 
and that these individuals will have been treated unjustly (1996, p. 116).
Dworkin takes the second approach. Although, as noted above, he appears to 
defend an outcome-based approach, he narrows the notion of procedural justice 
by reference to what is affordable, arguing that identifying procedural justice with 
maximum accuracy is too ‘severe’ a requirement (1985, p. 82), and that it is not 
unjust to provide less than maximally accurate procedures with a view to spend-
ing money on other worthwhile social programmes (1985, p. 72). It is not, how-
ever, clear that Dworkin’s position is stable. How can one recognise the ‘injustice 
factor’ in certain kinds of mistaken decisions while simultaneously affirming that 
it is not unjust to tailor procedural protections to what is affordable? If certain 
kinds of mistaken decisions are unjust, it would seem to follow that people are 
entitled to robust procedures that protect their underlying legal entitlements, 
even if the expense involved cannot be justified from the economic perspective. 
On the other hand, if providing less than maximally accurate procedures in order 
to save money is not unjust, this would seem to be the equivalent of the cost-
efficient approach defended by Posner.10
In an attempt to explain why affordability considerations can legitimately be 
taken into account within a rights-based framework, Dworkin argues that ‘we 
do not lead our lives to achieve the minimum of moral harm at any cost’ (1985, 
p. 86). Instead, we accept substantial risks of suffering injustice in order to achieve 
‘even quite marginal gains in the general course of our lives’ (1985, p. 86). This 
shows, according to Dworkin, that we reject a ‘grand right to supreme accuracy’ 
(1985, p. 90). Does this mean that the economic approach is correct and that we 
have no procedural rights at all? Dworkin thinks not. He argues that it is possible 
to carve out a middle ground between the idea that we have a right to maximally 
accurate procedures and the idea that the choice of procedures should depend 
entirely on what is economically efficient (1985, pp. 72–73). This supposed via 
media can be found in procedural rules that are appropriately sensitive to the fact 
that denying people their legal rights is a form of injustice, while not regarding 
this kind of injustice as something to be avoided at any cost. Dworkin argues, 
in particular, for two procedural rights that are weaker than the grand right to 
supreme accuracy, but still genuine rights, according to Dworkin, because they 
trump ordinary utilitarian calculations (1985, p. 89).
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Dworkin derives these two procedural rights from the principle that political 
decisions must treat everyone with equal concern and respect. He argues, first, 
that when the legislature enacts procedural rules, it must show concern for moral 
harm by making an assessment of the magnitude of the moral harm caused when 
people are unjustly convicted or otherwise denied their legal rights. Thus a legis-
lature would violate the first procedural right if, for instance, it refused to enact 
a procedural rule which would increase the accuracy of a trial at no additional 
cost to society, since that would indicate no concern at all with the risk of moral 
harm (1985, p. 89). At the same time, Dworkin rejects the idea that there is what 
Bone calls a ‘normatively acceptable level of error risk’ (2010, p. 1016). Provided 
that the legislature has attached importance to the risk of moral harm, it is free to 
decide how much to spend on procedures to guard against the risk, taking into 
account policy considerations and other competing social goals. This is because 
the first procedural right is
the right that a particular importance be attached to the risk of moral harm, 
not a right to a particular, independently describable, overall level of accuracy 
in adjudication … [I]f a rule would improve accuracy by a great deal but cost 
the community heavily, then a failure to adopt the rule would be consistent 
with valuing the risk of injustice very high indeed.
 (Dworkin 1985, pp. 95–96)
Dworkin thinks that it is fair to leave the decision as to how important moral 
harm is to the legislature because this is a moral issue about which people reason-
ably disagree. Furthermore, provided a legislative decision to sacrifice accuracy 
subjects everyone to the same risk, it will be fair to everyone (1985, p. 87). The 
procedural rules chosen by different legislatures may therefore justifiably differ in 
the degree of protection they afford, since there is no one set of rules of evidence 
and procedure which is uniquely permissible when a legislature considers whether 
the social gains achieved by choosing less expensive and therefore less accurate 
procedures outweigh the moral harm that these procedures risk (Plaxton 2008, 
p. 364). This approach should not, however, be confused with a cost-benefit 
approach, according to Dworkin, because the decision is not a ‘pure’ matter of 
policy. On the approach prescribed by Dworkin, a legislature would not bal-
ance the ‘bare’ harm caused by mistaken decisions against the savings made by 
providing reduced procedural protections. It would weigh the interests of those 
who stand to be deprived of their legal rights much higher than that, because it 
would see them as interests in avoiding moral harm. A legislature following this 
approach could therefore not be accused of utilitarianism, according to Dworkin, 
even though it might ultimately take the view that scarce resources should be 
spent on social goals other than accuracy (Dworkin 1985, pp. 77, 94, 97–98).
The second procedural right for which Dworkin argues is the right to consist-
ency in procedure. He maintains that once procedures have been established, 
they should be consistently applied (1985, pp. 89–90). If, for example, the num-
ber of jurors in a criminal case has historically been fixed at 12, it would be a 
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violation of the rights of accused persons if this number were to be substantially 
decreased. Even though there is no reason why a different number should not 
have been chosen initially, substantially winding back the protection would be 
unjustifiable, because it would diminish ‘the level of safety provided at the center 
of the criminal process for so long’ (1985, p. 91).
Dworkin (2002) expands on this idea in a more recent article considering 
United States anti-terrorism measures that dilute the rights of those accused of 
serious crimes. Dworkin concedes that the traditional rights of accused persons 
have evolved over time, that their details can be explained only historically, and 
that some of the procedural rights taken to be indispensable in the United States 
are not necessary features of all fair criminal justice systems. He maintains, how-
ever, that fairness requires, as a matter of equal concern for anyone who might 
be innocent, that the rights that have evolved historically are owed to anyone 
who is now accused of a serious crime and tried within the United States crimi-
nal justice system. It follows that it is unfair to persons suspected of terrorism 
to try them under special conditions that run an increased risk of convicting the 
innocent—for instance, before special military tribunals in which they have fewer 
rights than in ordinary criminal courts. Dworkin adds that if we believe that the 
danger from terrorism is so serious that we are justified in denying persons sus-
pected of terrorism the traditional rights extended to other accused persons, then 
at least we should have ‘the candor to admit that what we do to them is unjust’ 
(Dworkin 2002).
In effect, Dworkin turns his back on the idea of outcome accuracy. Since his 
two procedural rights are not rights to the enforcement of one’s substantive legal 
entitlements, but rather rights that guarantee that the risk of injustice created 
by inadequate procedures is fairly distributed across individuals, he turns pro-
cedural justice into a form of distributive justice (Bone 2010, pp. 1018, 1020; 
Galligan 1996, p. 119). This means that Dworkin does not carve out the desired 
via media between the purist view that we have a right to maximally accurate 
procedures and the economic view that we are entitled to no particular level of 
accuracy at all. Instead, he gives us an account of how to distribute scarce process 
resources fairly. As Bone observes, Dworkin tries to deal with the problem of 
limited resources by conceiving of procedural rights 
as rights to fair treatment, not to accurate outcomes … [E]rror does not 
violate procedural rights so long as the error is not due to skimpy procedures 
justified on utilitarian grounds and so long as the procedural system as a 
whole treats litigants fairly. 
(Bone 1999, p. 934, emphasis in original)
However, even procedures that carry a very high risk of injustice may distribute 
the risk fairly. It therefore seems that we can ask the same question of Dworkin as 
he asks of the economic approach. It is central to Dworkin’s rights-based theory 
of adjudication that society should honour people’s substantive rights under the 
law even if this comes at a social cost. How is this to be reconciled with the idea 
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that the only procedural rights we have are to a just distribution of the risk of 
error? Does the resulting mismatch between procedure and substance not entail 
that people’s rights under the law are not rights in the strict sense, contrary to 
everything else Dworkin tells us about legal rights?
Galligan’s approach is more coherent than Dworkin’s. Dworkin attempts to 
have it both ways: insisting that society should honour people’s legal rights while 
also maintaining that there is no specific or pre-defined level of accuracy which the 
procedures for enforcing these rights need to meet. Galligan, by contrast, connects 
substance and procedure as tightly as possible, since he holds that substantive rights 
justify a claim to whatever procedures are necessary to protect and uphold these 
rights. Procedural rights are therefore rights to procedures that always produce the 
right results (1996, pp. 113–114). In theory, this is an attractive position, because 
the idea that we are entitled to procedures that guarantee correct outcomes takes 
our legal rights with utmost seriousness. However, as previously noted, Galligan 
is forced to concede that inadequate procedures are unavoidable for practical rea-
sons, such as resource limitations, which turns his conception of procedural justice 
into a utopian ideal. Galligan’s purist approach implies that no procedural system 
in the real world can be just and that all legal systems violate people’s procedural 
rights on a daily basis—a conclusion that is counter-intuitive.11
If Dworkin’s procedural rights do not deliver on the promise of the outcome-
based approach —that the purpose of procedures is to protect against the injus-
tice that consists in the deprivation of substantive legal rights—and if Galligan’s 
approach puts procedural justice out of reach, is there any other way of retaining 
the idea that people are entitled to procedures that are designed to vindicate their 
legal rights, while simultaneously narrowing the scope of procedural justice in 
response to considerations of affordability and efficiency?
The remaining possibility is that procedural justice requires giving substantial, 
although not absolute, priority to the value of accuracy over the public interest. 
If accuracy were to be prioritised in this way, procedures would be chosen that 
generate the right conclusion in the majority of cases, even if the expense could 
not be justified on utilitarian grounds. The risk of erroneous decisions would 
then be low, even if efficiency would justify running a higher risk. Moral harm 
would be avoided to a significant extent, and trade-offs between accuracy and 
cost would be permissible only once a morally acceptable threshold level of accu-
racy has been guaranteed. An approach of this kind would occupy a true mid-way 
position between the purist view and the economic view, since it would fix a 
morally acceptable level of risk of moral harm and identify just procedures with 
procedures that do not impose more than that level of risk.
Arguably, this is what Rawls had in mind when he said that the pursuit of 
correct outcomes in criminal trials competes with ‘other ends of the law’ (i.e. 
considerations of cost), and that ‘imperfect’ procedural justice is therefore the 
most the legal system can offer us. Rawls wrote:
[t]he desired outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and 
only if he has committed the offense with which he is charged. The trial 
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procedure is framed to search for and to establish the truth in this regard. 
But it seems impossible to design the legal rules so that they always lead to 
the correct result. The theory of trials examines which procedures and rules 
of evidence, and the like, are best calculated to achieve this purpose consist-
ent with other ends of the law. Different arrangements for hearing cases may 
reasonably be expected in different circumstances to yield the right results, 
not always but at least most of the time. 
(1971, pp. 85–86)
Along similar lines, Rawls describes due process as ‘a process reasonably designed 
to ascertain the truth, in ways consistent with the other ends of the legal system’ 
(1971, p. 239). This version of an outcome-based approach is superior to both 
Galligan’s and Dworkin’s approaches. It does not turn procedural justice into 
an unattainable ideal, à la Galligan. On the other hand, it takes the underlying 
substantive rights more seriously than Dworkin’s approach, which rejects the idea 
of even a qualified right to accuracy and replaces it with a different kind of right 
altogether—one to the fair distribution of the risk of error. Yet imperfect pro-
cedural justice can still lead to substantive injustice, since procedures that satisfy 
Rawls’s test (of yielding the right results most of the time) can lead to unjust 
results some of the time.
7.6  Rejecting instrumentalism
My discussion has shown that the relationship between procedures and legally 
correct outcomes in the real world is imperfect. Infallible decision procedures 
do not exist and maximally accurate procedures are too costly. If an outcome-
based theorist responds by saying that people nevertheless have a right to per-
fectly accurate procedures, albeit one that cannot be met in practice, this means 
that procedural justice is not an ideal for the real world. On the other hand, 
if an outcome-based theorist concedes that considerations of cost reduce the 
scope of our procedural entitlements, and that procedures that are likely but not 
guaranteed to produce substantively just outcomes are sufficient to satisfy the 
demands of procedural justice (Rawls’s view), this implies that procedural justice 
is compatible with substantive injustice. The risk of injustice is even greater on 
Dworkin’s even weaker view that procedural justice merely requires a fair distri-
bution of the risk of error. Dworkin’s view approaches very close to economic 
theories of procedures.
Furthermore, once it is conceded that procedural justice is compatible with 
the violation of people’s substantive legal rights, it becomes difficult to sustain 
the instrumentalist view that the only way to evaluate the justice of procedures is 
by evaluating the accuracy of the results to which they lead. Instrumentalism is at 
home within the economic framework of a cost-benefit approach to procedures, 
since a cost-benefit approach is, by definition, concerned only with the conse-
quences of following different procedural rules. However, if one sees procedural 
justice as a matter of entitlements based in fairness to procedures that protect our 
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substantive rights, and if one also concedes that the ability of just procedures to 
play this role is limited, the insistence that the only point of just procedures is to 
avoid violations of substantive rights becomes puzzling. Outcome-based theo-
rists have not grappled with this question. Instead, they seem to regard the truth 
of instrumentalism as obvious.
Dworkin, for instance, quickly dismisses the view that there are ‘process val-
ues’, or that process can matter apart from outcomes. According to the process 
values view, certain procedures can be morally required even if they are not nec-
essary to reach accurate outcomes (Summers 1974). For instance, participation 
in legal decision-making processes is thought by some theorists to be valuable 
independently of its instrumental value. Thus, it is argued that it is intrinsically 
unjust not to allow affected parties to participate by telling their side of the story, 
even if their participation will have no effect on the outcome, the case being cut 
and dried and the outcome obvious (Mashaw 1981, pp. 902–903).12 Dworkin 
responds to this claim by saying that he finds it difficult to understand how there 
could be any moral harm other than the harm of a mistaken decision and there-
fore how there could be any basis for finding procedures unjust other than the 
fact that they create a risk of substantive injustice (1985, pp. 102–103). Bone also 
gives the process values view short shrift. He says that the reason why we have an 
adjudication system is to produce quality outcomes, and defenders of the process 
values view therefore need to explain why people should be given participation 
rights without regard to whether this is needed to ensure outcome quality (2008, 
pp. 338–339).
The problem lies, however, in attempting to combine the claim that proce-
dural justice is exclusively a matter of procedures that avoid injustice to individu-
als with the concession that just procedures are compatible with a substantial 
risk of outcome error. The effect is to turn procedural justice into an implausibly 
anaemic ideal—one that implies that there is very little that people are entitled to 
expect as a matter of fairness from the processes officials use to determine their 
legal situation. Procedures merely need to have some capacity to protect substan-
tive rights or should distribute the risk of error fairly.
In my view, the solution is to reject instrumentalism. I agree with the out-
come-based claim that procedural justice involves treating individuals fairly, not 
maximising benefits for society, and I also think that theorists like Dworkin and 
Rawls are correct to concede that even just procedures will not always be capable 
of protecting people’s substantive legal rights. However, I draw the conclusion 
that there must therefore be more to procedural justice than being the servant 
of substantive justice. In particular, procedures should be assessed not only for 
their capacity to reduce legal error, but also for their intrinsic justice. Following 
intrinsically just procedures could then assist in offsetting the substantive injustice 
of the mistaken decisions whose possibility has to be accommodated within any 
real-world conception of procedural justice.
This raises the question as to what might make procedures intrinsically just. 
I will end by briefly explaining what kind of account I would offer in answer to 
this question. Some defenders of the process values view appeal to the value of 
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dignity, understood as the capacity for rational agency. Thus, Jeremy Waldron 
argues that procedures should respect human dignity by treating people as active 
subjects, not passive objects—as people who can reason and explain themselves 
before decisions are made affecting them (2011, p. 19). Similarly, Laurence Tribe 
argues that it is unjust to deny persons the ‘right to be heard from’ and ‘the 
right to be told why’, because ‘to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be 
consulted about what is done with one’ (1988, p. 666, emphasis in original). For 
Tribe and Waldron, decision-makers are under an obligation to treat people in a 
way that respects them as rational agents, even if this is not necessary to achieve 
accurate results.13
Dignitarianism is not, however, the only way to understand the intrinsic value 
of procedures. The understanding of procedural justice in the empirical literature 
alerts us to another possibility—one that is not focussed on respect for rational 
agency. I mentioned in Section 7.2 that empirical research in psychology shows 
that people’s understanding of procedural justice is not entirely instrumental or 
outcome-based. I did not, however, explain the non-instrumental concerns that 
dominate people’s procedural justice judgements. The empirical studies show 
that these concerns are primarily focussed on the nature of people’s social rela-
tionships with authorities—whether authorities are trying to be fair towards them, 
are treating them even-handedly and with respect, and are considering their views 
properly (Tyler & Lind 2001, pp. 75–77). According to Tom Tyler and Allan 
Lind, it is ‘striking how much issues concerning relationships to authority color 
the perception of [procedural] justice. Relational concerns seem to overwhelm 
concerns about the specific problem or dispute involved’ (1992, p. 160). It seems 
that the reason why interpersonally satisfying interactions with group authorities 
are such a powerful influence on people’s perceptions of fair treatment is because 
positive interactions send the symbolic message that one has equal status in one’s 
group, which in turn promotes feelings of self-worth and self-respect (Tyler & 
Blader 2000, pp. 90–92).
In my view, there are sound normative arguments supporting this alternative 
understanding of procedural justice, with relational theory in ethics providing 
the requisite normative underpinnings. Very briefly, relational theory empha-
sises the role of egalitarian social relations in an equal society. It defends the 
attractive idea that equality is an ideal that consists in people relating to each 
other as equals and enjoying equal standing (Anderson 2010; Scheffler 2003). 
As Catriona Mackenzie emphasises in her contribution to this volume, rela-
tions of equality are particularly susceptible to being undermined by attitudes 
of expressive disrespect on the part of state institutions and state officials.14 
Relational theory therefore implies that officials are under a moral duty to inter-
act with citizens in ways that communicate a message of equal status. As to 
what this might involve, the psychology research shows that it requires officials 
to treat people with respect, listen attentively, behave impartially, and demon-
strate goodwill. In this way we arrive at a satisfying account of procedural justice 
that both dovetails with and justifies people’s expectations about how officials 
should treat them.
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7.7  Conclusion
Although the value of accurate procedures must form part of any adequate con-
ception of procedural justice, I have argued that instrumentalist theories of pro-
cedural justice are unsatisfactory. Economic theories do not take people’s legal 
rights seriously, since the procedures they provide for the enforcement of these 
rights are fixed by reference to a cost-benefit calculation, which could lead to 
large-scale under-enforcement of the rights. It makes no sense to grant legal enti-
tlements without recognising procedural rights that are to some extent insensitive 
to considerations of cost or social welfare more generally.
At the other end of the spectrum from economic theories, Galligan takes legal 
rights as seriously as it is possible to take them, since he insists that right-holders 
have a right to the perfectly accurate procedures needed to uphold their rights. I 
have argued, however, that his conception of procedural justice is unachievable, 
and that attempting even to approximate it would make it impossible to satisfy 
other important social needs.
Dworkin and Rawls recognise that maximal accuracy is too demanding a con-
ception of procedural justice in a world of limited resources. This leads them to 
regard procedures as unjust only when the risk of error is not distributed fairly 
(Dworkin) or when the risk is too high (Rawls). Although I agree with them 
that just procedures are not capable of fully protecting legal rights, and that 
procedural justice is compatible with some degree of substantive injustice, I have 
argued that the difficulty is in combining this relatively insipid form of protec-
tion for legal rights with the instrumental view that procedural justice is nothing 
more than the servant of substantive justice. How can protecting substantive 
legal entitlements be the only purpose of procedure if it is such a flawed means 
to this end? I have claimed that it is more plausible to infer that there must be 
more to procedural justice than ‘a process reasonably designed to ascertain the 
truth’, to use Rawls’s phrase. Procedures serve values other than reducing error 
and the moral assessment of legal procedures should not be limited to the out-
comes they generate. Finally, I have suggested that relational theory in ethics 
enables us to grasp the aspects of procedural justice overlooked by instrumental 
accounts.
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aspects of this chapter when earlier versions were presented at the Law and 
Society Association Meeting held in Toronto in 2018, a workshop on procedural 
justice held at Macquarie University in 2018, and a seminar in the Philosophy 
Department at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2019. Wendy Carlton 
provided excellent editorial and research assistance. Some of the discussion in 
this chapter draws on material in Meyerson and Mackenzie (2018). Research for 
this chapter was funded by the Australian Government through the Australian 
Research Council’s Discovery Project funding scheme (DP1701009600: ‘A 
Relational Theory of Procedural Justice’).
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2 For a discussion of procedural justice in the context of discretionary decisions, see 
Kristen Rundle’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 11).
3 Compare Galligan (1996, p. 241): ‘[i]n a broad sense, all standard-application deci-
sions are adjudicative, in that they require judgment in applying standards to facts’.
4 In Posner’s view, ‘morality is derived from the economic principle itself ’ (1979, 
p. 139).
5 In her contribution to this volume, Emanuela Ceva also provides reasons to 
reject what she calls the ‘epistemic interpretation of the value of due process’ 
(Chapter 8).
6 Posner defines wealth as ‘the value in dollars or dollar equivalents … of everything 
in society. It is measured by what people are willing to pay for something, or, if 
they already own it, what they demand in money to give it up’ (1979, p.119).
7 Bone describes Dworkin’s view as ‘an outcome-oriented theory based on a right 
to treatment as an equal’ (2003, p. 489, fn. 10).
8 Mistaken decisions in civil trials likewise cause injustice. For discussion, see 
Dworkin (1985, pp. 92–98).
9 Contra James Edelman, who maintains that tying the justice of procedures to 
their ‘utility’ in promoting accurate outcomes is equivalent to providing a ‘utili-
tarian rationale for procedural fairness’ (2016, p. 148).
10 See also Bone’s observation that procedural rights present a puzzle in that 
‘[b]ecause they are rights, they must resist arguments for limiting procedure 
based on the high social costs of litigation, but to fit prevailing intuitions of pro-
cedural fairness, they must also yield to social cost arguments at least to some 
significant degree’ (2010, p. 1013).
11 Compare Bone (2010, p. 1016): if people have a right to perfect accuracy, ‘every 
case would involve a rights violation, which hardly fits common intuitions of pro-
cedural fairness’.
12 For a defence of the non-negotiable value of participation in tribunal proceed-
ings, see Therese MacDermott’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 12).
13 In her contribution to this volume, Emanuela Ceva also defends a version of dig-
nitarianism, arguing that due process has a ’constitutive value’, which consists in 
the way in which it confers the normative status of being an agent or active subject 
on the parties to legal proceedings (see Chapter 8).
14 See Mackenzie’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 9).
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8.1  Introduction
After spending a night drinking in a bar, a young woman named Sarah is gang-
raped by three men. Although the rape occurs in front of a cheering crowd, no 
one besides the victim is willing to testify. Therefore, before the case goes to 
court, the prosecuting attorney and the defence lawyers bargain, and the three 
rapists plead guilty to the assault. The sentence imposed for an assault charge is 
similar to that standardly imposed for rape. However, given the guilty plea, the 
victim is prevented from presenting her own story before a jury. This course of 
action leaves Sarah distraught and enraged.1
What went wrong in the criminal proceedings that can account for Sarah’s 
reaction? To be sure, we can start from the conjecture that, by her reaction, Sarah 
claims that justice was denied to her. The formality of this initial conjecture calls 
for an analysis of what it means to do justice to the victim of a crime in legal 
proceedings. It requires, in other words, that we disentangle the many facets of 
procedural justice in this context. 
To move forward, consider due process as an epitomic instantiation of proce-
dural justice in legal proceedings. I devote this chapter to the presentation and 
discussion of three possible ways in which we can make a normative assessment of 
legal proceedings in the context of criminal trials. Two interpretations are quite 
customary in the philosophical debate and they both locate the value of due pro-
cess in some external good to which criminal proceedings relate. The first account 
is instrumental and offers an ‘epistemic interpretation’ of due process as valuable 
because (and to the extent that) it allows for the truth of the matter to be revealed 
through the criminal trial. The criminal proceeding is thus valuable because it is 
causally related to reaching a ‘just’ verdict, one that declares the defendants guilty 
of the crime they have actually committed. Because there is no guarantee that this 
outcome will be reached on all occasions, the criminal proceedings, informed by 
due process, are an instance of what John Rawls (1971) dubbed ‘imperfect proce-
dural justice’ (pp. 85–86). The second view comes from the ‘expressivist interpre-
tation’ of the value of due process. In this interpretation, due process is a means 
to convey to the parties a certain message. On this view, criminal proceedings that 
instantiate the principle of due process are valuable because they contribute to the 
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display of an appropriate consideration of the alleged victims and perpetrators. 
Under the ‘expressivist view’, justice thus resides in there being a vehicle for the 
public acknowledgement of persons’ status—an ideal function that the proceed-
ings may or may not be capable of achieving in practice.
Alongside these received interpretations, I want to suggest a third way of valu-
ing due process. Besides their role in securing some kind of external good (estab-
lishing the facts or conveying a certain institutional consideration of the parties), 
the procedures according to which the different parties interact in legal proceed-
ings can be considered inherently valuable and an object of normative assessment 
in their own right. In this ‘interactive interpretation’, due process has a specific 
‘constitutive value’, which is realised ipso facto by the establishment of proceed-
ings that instantiate it. This value consists in its capacity to change the parties’ 
normative status by establishing them as the holders of rights and the bearers of 
duties that they would not otherwise have.2 Because criminal proceedings thus 
create, by their very establishment, deontic relations, they can be more or less just 
in themselves depending on their structural features but independently of their 
results. My final claim will be that to bring this third way of valuing due process 
to the fore is essential to rendering a complete picture of how procedural justice 
can be realised through and in legal proceedings (thus offering a full account of 
what goes wrong when a party is denied a procedural right, as was the case with 
Sarah’s right to be heard in court).
8.2  The instrumental value of due process
8.2.1  The epistemic interpretation
According to a well-established instrumental approach to the normative assess-
ment of legal proceedings, the importance attributed to the principle of due 
process derives from an epistemic interpretation of its value:3 When we look at 
criminal trials from this point of view, the proceedings are just to the extent that 
they are structured in a way that facilitates the revelation of the truth. Criminal 
proceedings are just, in this epistemic sense, only because and when they work as 
effective instruments in making sure the defendant is declared guilty only if he has 
actually committed the crime of which he is accused.
However, the eventuality that legal proceedings may fail to deliver an epistemi-
cally accurate result makes them an instance of what Rawls (1971, pp. 85–86) has 
famously characterised as ‘imperfect procedural justice’.4 For Rawls, procedural 
justice is perfect, when we have a process capable of leading to the just outcome 
with certainty. Crucially, what constitutes a just outcome is known even before 
we engage in the process, and the process is in fact devised in entirely instrumen-
tal terms towards said outcome.5 In the case of criminal proceedings, we have 
seen that a just outcome is one that meets the epistemic standard of declaring 
the defendants guilty only of the offence they have actually committed. But it is 
apparent that there is no guarantee that a specific procedure can be devised that 
constantly delivers such an outcome (Rawls 1971, p. 85).6
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The imperfect nature of the kind of procedural justice that the epistemic inter-
pretation of the value of due process instantiates can be usefully employed to 
make sense of one facet of the distressed and enraged reaction of the victim of 
rape in our example. From this epistemic point of view, it seems inevitable that 
Sarah was enraged and distraught by the negotiated outcome of the proceeding. 
While the prison sentence for assault is similar to that usually imposed for a rape, 
the fact that Sarah was raped was not at all established, and therefore the proceed-
ing by which the sentence was reached cannot be considered just on the grounds 
that it failed to deliver an epistemically accurate outcome. The victim was not 
offered reparation for the actual offence she had suffered.
This instrumental interpretation can thus make sense of one important dimen-
sion of the normative assessment of criminal proceedings. In the epistemic inter-
pretation, criminal proceedings are unjust if they fail to lead to a legal decision 
that is appropriately responsive to the facts in question, as was the case with 
Sarah’s rape. Notice that the normative source of the value of the criminal trial 
is external. This means assessing the proceedings in view of their being causally 
related to reaching a decision whose value (being respondent to the truth of the 
matter) pre-exists the proceedings and their development. We can thus see how 
the proceedings are valued to the extent that they are subservient to the achieve-
ment of that decision.
While this epistemic aspect is important in the normative assessment of legal 
proceedings, I want to show that it is not sufficient. It cannot give a full account 
of how those proceedings may be more or less just, nor can it offer a solid defence 
of the value of due process. This is because in the epistemic interpretation, due 
process is entirely fungible. Consider the critical discussion Richard Arneson has 
offered of the legal procedural rights enjoyed by defendants and implied by the 
principle of due process. These procedural rights include ‘the right to confront 
one’s accusers, the right to a speedy trial, the right against self-incrimination, the 
right to counsel, the right to a jury of one’s peers, and so on’. Arneson (1993) 
argues that,
this panoply of rights would dissolve if it were discovered that abrogating 
them wholesale would produce trial verdicts that are fairer (and generate 
no morally undesirable outcomes of such magnitude as to outweigh the 
increased fairness of trial verdicts).
(p. 21)
So, Arneson concludes, given the imperfect nature of criminal proceedings 
informed by the principle of due process in delivering justice, were we to find 
more effective instruments to establish the truth of the matter about a crime, we 
should abandon due process without any regrets. In response to Arneson’s chal-
lenge, we could easily point out an implausible implication of his argument. If 
we claimed that procedures are inherently irrelevant from a moral point of view 
(because they are mere fungible instruments to deliver justice), we should be 
prepared to accept that any procedure enhancing the accuracy of criminal trials 
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should be preferred to a criminal trial guided by the principle of due process, even 
if that implied torturing the defendant to establish the truth of the matter. But 
who can possibly be willing to bite this bullet? Arneson is not and, in fact, he has 
a response to such a rejoinder:
The idea that procedures should be chosen in order to attain morally best 
results does not mean that the immediate consequences of operating the 
procedures themselves should be excluded from calculation … My position 
is that there are no special procedural rights determinable by examining our 
intuitions about inherently fair procedures (supposed to be independent of 
our convictions about the substantively fair outcomes that procedures work 
to reach).7
(Arneson 1993, p. 121)
Arneson’s line of argument is successful in showing that when we engage in the 
normative assessment of a criminal proceeding (just like any other process) we 
must also consider the impact the operation of such proceeding has on those 
who participate in it. This point is, in fact, empirically corroborated by a vast 
body of literature on the social psychology of procedural justice (see Tyler 1988, 
pp. 103–135; Thibaut & Walker 1975; Napier & Tyler 2008, pp. 509–510). 
This literature shows that the participants in any given process are psychologi-
cally more inclined to recognise the outcomes of that process as fair when they 
feel they have been treated fairly in the process itself even if the outcomes are 
not in their favour. This inclination is likely due to the positive effects that the 
participation in a fair process has on the parties. For example, the feeling of being 
respected when participating in a process where one has the opportunity to speak 
up and be heard, may enhance self-respect and encourage participants towards 
a more positive assessment of the fairness of the outcome.8 I shall expound this 
thought in the next subsection.
It bears highlighting now that these psychological findings lend empirical sup-
port to the twofold limitations of the epistemic interpretation I have mentioned 
above. First, the epistemic value of due process—while weighty and important—
is not exhaustive of the considerations that matter for a complete normative 
assessment of legal proceedings. We should also, at least, consider the effects that 
the participation in a process has on the parties in it. Second, in order to offer a 
solid account of the value of due process, we should pinpoint the features of the 
process that make it inherently worthwhile, beyond its extrinsic appreciation as a 
fungible instrument of epistemic justice.
8.2.2  The expressivist interpretation
To address the limitations of the epistemic interpretation of the value of due pro-
cess in legal proceedings, I want to present a second received interpretation. This 
further interpretation also points to an external good as the source of the value 
of due process, but it also assesses legal proceedings in virtue of their capacity to 
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convey to the parties a certain message with respect to that good. Notably, in this 
interpretation, the good in question is the appropriate consideration of the status 
of the alleged victims and perpetrators, which must be publicly displayed. The 
justice of the criminal trial thus resides in its contributing to the acknowledge-
ment of persons’ status in a specific legal context. This acknowledgement is often 
deemed important because of the impact it is expected to have on the parties’ 
self-perception, particularly their self-esteem.
To see the rationale of this expressivist interpretation of the value of due 
process, I proceed by analogy with what Charles Beitz (1989) termed the idea 
of ‘fairness as equal respect’.9 Beitz’s idea is straightforward: The way citizens 
are treated by the procedures through which they interact in society reveals the 
consideration institutions have of them. Take the case of democratic egalitarian 
decision-making procedures. The democratic way of making collectively bind-
ing decisions bears an expressive value because it is the way in which institutions 
display their public recognition of the status of citizens as equal political agents.10 
On this basis, Beitz (1989, p. 23) argues that just democratic decision-making 
must be perfectly egalitarian. This feature is necessary to ensure that all citizens’ 
interests are taken into due consideration, which, in turn, is expected to have a 
positive impact on their self-esteem.
Taking the cue from this expressivist assessment of the democratic decision-
making process, we can translate the same line of reasoning into an expressivist 
interpretation of the value of due process in criminal proceedings. In this inter-
pretation, the value of due process is irreducible in full to its instrumental capacity 
to produce just outcomes, that is legal decisions that establish the facts. Legal 
proceedings informed by the principle of due process retain their value even when 
judicial errors taint their outcomes insofar as their operation conveys to people 
important institutional messages whose public expression might also have a posi-
tive impact on the parties’ self-perception. This expressivist interpretation seems 
to pinpoint an important normative dimension of criminal proceedings that was 
clamorously frustrated in the case of Sarah’s rape. By pleading guilty to assault, 
the rapists were not publicly recognised as such (that is, as the perpetrators of the 
brutal offence Sarah had actually suffered). Correspondingly, by that sentence, 
Sarah was not recognised in her status as a victim of rape, thus diminishing her 
status as the sufferer of a horrendous crime with a negative impact on her sense 
of self-worth. But most significantly, by not being offered the opportunity to tell 
the story in her own voice before a jury in court, we can see that she was denied 
the procedural status as the bearer of a reliable testimony of her own story. This 
denial is a source of injustice because it expresses a diminished consideration of 
Sarah’s standing in the legal proceeding, which is likely to have a negative impact 
on Sarah’s sense of self-worth and hence her reaction of distress and rage.
Including the expressivist value of due process in our normative assessment 
of legal proceedings is an important step towards offering a fuller account of the 
relevant considerations necessary to perform a well-rounded and nuanced evalu-
ative exercise. It is, therefore, a significant improvement over the use of only the 
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instrumental kinds of assessments that the epistemic view enabled us initially to 
do. However, I wish to suggest that the capacity to appreciate the complexity of 
the normative worth of legal proceedings can be further enhanced. This enhance-
ment, in line with the thread of the argument followed in the previous subsection, 
should be capable of offering a solid account of the value of due process—more 
solid than one consisting in its appreciation as a fungible instrument of justice.
When the expressivist interpretation refers to the positive impact that the par-
ticipation in a certain process may plausibly have on people’s self-perception, it is 
exposed to erratic empirical considerations. The expressivist interpretation estab-
lishes a relation between the operation of certain criminal proceedings and the 
realisation of some moral values such as self-respect and self-worth. It is impor-
tant to notice that this relation is mediated, extrinsic and contextual. The relation 
is mediated by the psychological effects that the participation in a certain process 
can be expected to have on the parties in that process. It is extrinsic because it 
draws substantially on certain mental states and attitudes that are external to the 
structural features of the process itself (although it is crucial to acknowledge that 
personal mental states and attitudes and the process’s structural features are caus-
ally related). Finally, the relation between due process and justice is contextual 
because it is clearly conditional on the empirical verification of the abovemen-
tioned psychological effects and the realisation of the related mental states and 
attitudes, which may or may not occur. Quite plainly, different people can plau-
sibly be expected to react differently to the same events, given their own inclina-
tions and states of minds.11 It is little more than a truism to notice that what is 
deeply humiliating for one sensitive human being, may be just a mild offence for 
another.
Further, people may develop complex sets of adaptive preferences that make 
it impossible to predict how they are going to react to contextual stimuli and 
institutional treatment.12 To complicate the picture further, these variations are 
personal as well as cultural, and they may be subject to influence by historical 
developments too. How can we say that Sarah is just not overreacting to a per-
fectly acceptable bargained solution? Had she not been incensed, out of timidity 
or indifference, would that be a reliable basis not to question the justice of the 
legal proceeding denying her a fair hearing at all?
I think these are important questions to address to advance the refinement of 
our normative assessment of legal proceedings and understanding of the value of 
due process within that context. My claim, which I elaborate in the remainder 
of the chapter, is that to run a complete normative appraisal of the properties of 
criminal proceedings and offer a solid account of the value of due process, we 
should pinpoint the procedural features that make processes inherently worth-
while. To appreciate the normative powers the mere participation in a process 
constitutively confers upon the parties, it is essential to engage in a structural 
analysis of the inherent properties of that process. This analysis, I will submit, is 
also crucial to see the normative statuses, which the parties acquire just by virtue 
of their participation in the process.
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8.3  The inherent value of due process: the ‘interactive 
interpretation’
8.3.1  The different sites of the justice of a process: outcomes and 
procedures
The idea I want to present in this second part of the chapter is that the procedures 
according to which the different parties interact make a third important contri-
bution to any normative assessment of a criminal trial. Besides their instrumental 
role in leading to an epistemically accurate final verdict, and besides their contri-
bution to expressing certain positive institutional attitudes, procedures informed 
by the principle of due process can be considered inherently valuable by virtue of 
their structural properties.13
To articulate this idea, a good place to start—ad absurdum—is Martha 
Nussbaum’s (2006) critical discussion of procedural justice. With some irony, 
Nussbaum, argues that the idea that substantive value may lie in the structural 
properties of a process (rather than entirely in its outcome) should be rejected 
because it sounds
as if a cook has a fancy, sophisticated pasta-maker, and assures her guests that 
the pasta made in this machine will be by definition good, since it is the best 
machine on the market. But surely … the guests want to taste the pasta and 
see for themselves. 
(Nussbaum 2006, p. 83) 
Surely enough, Nussbaum’s critique exposes a weak spot of a certain mainstream 
view of procedural justice that conceives it, in Rawls’s terms, as a pure exercise of 
formality, by virtue of which having a just process is both necessary and sufficient 
to securing a just outcome.14
Central to Rawls’s idea of pure procedural justice is the claim that procedures 
are capable of transferring the justice of their properties to their outcomes (Rawls 
1971, p. 86).15 So, it is sufficient to have a just procedure and apply it correctly 
for the justice of its outcome to be secured. This idea, which Rawls had formally 
illustrated with reference to a procedure of fair bets, has become very popular in 
the characterisation of the authority of the democratic decision-making process 
(see Christiano 2008; Waldron 1999). The idea is that because there is disagree-
ment over what a good or just collective decision is on many politically relevant 
issues, we must ensure that whatever decision is taken that decision is at least 
legitimate, that is, recognised as binding by all citizens (including, of course, 
those who disagree with its content). To this end, the resort to pure procedural-
ism is based on the conviction that if we get citizens to agree on the legitimacy 
of the decision-making process, they would ipso facto recognise the legitimacy of 
the outcomes of that process (even if they could question them as inherently bad 
or unjust).
As argued extensively in previous work (Ceva 2016, pp. 71–73), pure proce-
dural justice is in fact the formal property of the outcomes of a process. We need 
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just procedures not because having them (or making them operative) realises 
any distinctive dimension of value per se. We need just (or legitimate) procedures 
only to identify acceptable outcomes in circumstances of moral disagreement. 
Whatever outcome has the formal property of being produced by a just (or a 
legitimate) procedure is, in this view, itself just (or legitimate) or, at least, not 
unjust (or not illegitimate). Nussbaum’s example suggests the inconsistency of 
this interpretation of proceduralism by questioning the inference from the quali-
ties of procedures to those of their outcomes. Of course, to question this infer-
ence does not mean to undermine the practical possibility that people may decide 
to agree between themselves to abide by the outcome of a process, whatever 
this outcome will happen to be. Not only are we familiar with this commitment 
within democracies, but also anytime we toss a coin to make a decision or partici-
pate in a lottery we engage in an exercise of pure proceduralism. However, the 
familiarity with these practical occurrences does not justify, nor does it entail, the 
philosophical claim that the normative properties of an outcome may be inferred 
from the normative properties of the procedure that produced it. As Nussbaum’s 
example suggests, the claim that we can identify the justice of an outcome with its 
formal correctness is fallacious. Processes and outcomes are distinct social objects, 
and recognising the justice of one tells us nothing about the justice of the other 
(see Ceva 2016, p. 74).
But there is an important ‘but’. In my previous work in the domain of jus-
tice (Ceva 2016, Chapters 3 and 4), I introduced a claim about the normative 
assessment of the structural properties inherent to processes, which lies beyond 
Nussbaum’s critical target. This is the claim that procedures and outcomes are 
distinct sites of justice; therefore, they can and should be assessed in the light of 
distinct normative standards. The way in which I see this claim is actually quite 
crude: in assessing the normative force of processes of human interaction (in the 
domain of justice), what matters is not only what people get, but also how they 
get it. While the former kind of assessment concerns the normatively relevant 
properties of the outcomes of a process, the latter concerns the structural proper-
ties inherent to the process itself. When we assess a process from this latter per-
spective, we focus on its inherent structural properties and the form of interaction 
they establish among the participants in the process. In this sense, processes (and 
the normative principles that inform them) may also have an ‘interactive value’.
To see what the interactive value of a process is, start from the simple notion 
of a process as a rule-based embodied practice.16 From this point of view, to offer 
a full characterisation of a process and a complete assessment of its properties, we 
must consider the formal rules that articulate the process but also what happens 
when people enter the process and have their dealings regulated by the rules of 
that process. Differently put, to characterise and assess a process, we must look at 
what changes occur to the status of the participants in the process and their recip-
rocal relations by virtue of the process’s rules. Notably, the rules on which a pro-
cess is based establish the participants in the process in a new normative capacity 
that does not exist prior to or outside the process. The participation in a process 
confers—ipso facto—special normative powers to the participants in the process. 
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That is to say, the rules of the process establish what people who participate in 
the process can claim against and owe to each other when they interact within the 
boundaries of those rules. In this sense, processes can be usefully understood as 
practices based on ‘constitutive rules’.
John Searle (1969, 1995)17 has offered the best-known account of the idea 
of a constitutive rule. Constitutive rules establish new practices and make them 
possible. These practices instantiate forms of action and relations that could not 
occur, nor could they be conceived, prior to or outside those rules. Rawls out-
lines the same view in the parlance of a ‘practice conception’ of rules (1955). 
According to this conception, rules define practices. To make people engage in 
a practice, the rules that define the practice (and on which the process in which 
the practice consists is based) must be taught to them. This understanding of a 
practice makes rules logically prior to particular activities because an activity may 
be described in a certain way only if it takes place against a certain practice, in 
accordance with a process articulated through the rules that define that practice. 
A typical illustration of this practice-based understanding of a process and its con-
stitutive rules comes from games (Searle 1969, p. 33). A group of people can kick 
a ball around a field and aim at throwing it in a net; but they cannot score a goal 
or commit a fault unless they engage in the practice of playing soccer. However, 
they cannot engage in the practice of playing soccer unless a process that articu-
lates the rules of soccer is established. When someone plays a game, they must 
abide by its defining rules; otherwise, they are just not playing that game but 
engage in an altogether different kind of practice.
Interestingly for the purposes of my discussion, those who engage in a pro-
cess, thus understood as a practice, start acting and interacting with others in a 
special capacity with which special normative powers are associated. To continue 
with the game-based illustration, someone’s participation in a game of soccer as 
a player establishes and gives a special normative sense to what the partipants in 
the game do. By entering into the practice of playing soccer, players acquire spe-
cial normative powers that derive from their status in the process. For example, 
any random person blowing in a whistle does not normally have the power to 
stop anyone else from running unless the relevant interaction happens within the 
process of playing soccer and the protagonists are the referee of the game and a 
player.
We can thus see how the constitutive rules of a process have two main norma-
tive functions. First, they establish people in certain statuses, and second they 
confer on them the powers linked to those statuses (see Hindriks 2009, pp. 254, 
262). These normative powers establish deontic relations between their holders, 
as they constitute a form of interaction between right-holders and duty-bearers, 
which has an inherent value—what I have called an interactive value. To see this 
value, consider the way Joel Feinberg (1970, pp. 243–257) has brought this 
feature to light with admirable clarity. Feinberg invites us to imagine the society 
of Nowhereville, where rights do not exist. We can assume that even in such a 
society people might act according to justice and give each other their due, either 
by benevolence, because they all adopt some teleological principle of desert, or 
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because some law or authority makes them do so. However, if rights were not in 
place, something important would be different from the rights-populated world 
we are used to: People would receive justice, but could not make claims as the 
final authorities to which justice is due.
The status of a claim-maker that the conferral of rights implies is importantly 
different, Feinberg (1970, pp. 244–245, 249–250) explains, from that of the 
beneficiary of some good because it entails the attribution and recognition of 
agency. Right-holders can claim against others that certain actions be performed 
(or omitted), and they are those to whom the others need to account for their 
behaviour toward them. The conferral of rights is thus importantly related to 
persons’ moral standing or, to put it in Feinberg’s words, ‘having rights enables 
us to stand up like men … to look others in the eye’ (Feinberg 1970, p. 252). 
The establishment of rights is thus constitutive of an inherently worthwhile form 
of human interaction that could not occur outside the procedures in which those 
rights are exercised. We can thus start to see how the value of this form of inter-
action is inherent to the structural properties of the process through which this 
interaction occurs, and may not be reduced either to the value of its final results or 
the effects it may cause as it develops. To gain a better view, let us finally bring this 
general discussion to bear on the normative assessment of criminal proceedings.
8.3.2  The inherent interactive justice of criminal proceedings
The claim that the inherent structural properties of a process may have a value 
of their own—what I have called an ‘interactive value’—does not hold true for 
any organised set of procedures. There are of course some procedures that are 
designed and made operative only as instruments to produce certain indepen-
dently valuable outcomes. Think of the procedures of traffic regulation or, in 
fact, the instructions to operate a pasta-maker, to revisit Nussbaum’s burlesque 
example. This apparent qualification granted, it is equally apparent that any one 
set of procedures in society can have more than an instrumental value (e.g. of the 
kind we have seen with reference to the epistemic view of due process in the first 
part of the chapter).
A conspicuous instance of a process that can have inherent interactive (as well 
as, as seen, instrumental) value, I want to suggest, emerges in consideration of 
the principle of due process in criminal proceedings. To engage in a normative 
assessment of criminal proceedings by bringing out the interactive value of due 
process means and requires concentrating on the inherent structural properties of 
the process and the moral values these structural properties realise in themselves. 
This kind of assessment is worthwhile, I believe, because it enhances our capacity 
for appraising the many facets of justice in criminal proceedings and presenting a 
theoretically solid account of the value of due process. This enhanced assessment 
may help us to ponder the extent to which we have reasons to value due process 
irrespective of whether the criminal trial informed by it leads to epistemically 
inaccurate verdicts or fails to express a message capable of eliciting the right kind 
of attitudes in those who participate in it.
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To see where the interactive value of due process lies, reconsider the case of the 
legal proceeding by which Sarah’s rapists plead guilty to a charge of assault before 
the case could go to court. We have seen that Sarah was distraught and enraged at 
the end of this story, and we have already pointed out why that could be the case 
from an instrumental perspective. I want to suggest that besides the disappoint-
ment over an epistemically inaccurate verdict, and the sense of frustration derived 
from the lesser consideration of the offence she had suffered, Sarah’s reaction can 
be seen as a manifestation of an interactive injustice she has suffered by not being 
heard telling her story in her own voice before a jury in court. Sarah’s negative 
reaction speaks to the inherent moral importance of the structural properties of 
legal proceedings informed by the principle of due process, access to which was 
denied to Sarah by virtue of the agreement that was bargained before the case 
could be brought to court.
The right to a fair hearing that due process confers upon the participants in 
criminal proceedings changes the normative status of the victim and, thereby, 
the nature of what goes on between her and the perpetrators of the offence she 
had suffered. This change is important because it opens up new possibilities of 
action and interaction that would be impossible outside the process in virtue of 
the constitutive rules that define it. By being prevented from giving her own 
account of the facts, Sarah was denied the normative status of an agent speak-
ing out in her own voice, as the holder of rights and as the potential maker of a 
valid claim. She was relegated to the role of a mere patient who passively receives 
both the offence and the sentence negotiated by others. This denial is not only 
problematic because it was an impediment to establishing the truth of the mat-
ter in court; nor was it wrong only because it is likely to have resulted in a loss 
of self-appraisal on the part of the accuser (thus misrecognised in her status as a 
victim). The frustration of due process was wrong in itself because it constituted 
a mistreatment of Sarah, a failure to do justice to her moral status as an agent 
capable of engaging in peer-interaction with her offenders. This enabling capac-
ity is a typical feature of rights and the normative status their conferral bestows 
on their holders—the status of a claim-maker (or, an agent). As seen above, fol-
lowing Feinberg’s characterisation, the conferral of rights by virtue of someone’s 
participation in a rule-based process is importantly related to a person’s standing. 
More precisely, the conferral of rights is constitutive of an inherently worthwhile 
form of human interaction that could not occur outside the procedures in which 
those rights are exercised.
The time has come to emphasise how this general feature of rights is realised 
in due process and how it gives inherent value to fair hearing as a structural fea-
ture of criminal proceedings modelled on that principle. I think that this idea can 
make sense of those views of due process that insist on its relation to the confer-
ral of a certain kind of ‘dignity’ on the parties in criminal proceedings. So, for 
example, Jeremy Waldron (2013) seems to point at this feature when he argues 
that ‘deciding what to do about a suspected offender is not like deciding what 
to do about a rabid dog or a dilapidated house’ (p. 12). The parties’ status must 
be reckoned with and adequate procedural provisions must be designed, whether 
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these also contribute to truth-finding and boosting the parties’ self-perception 
or not.
Within this context, Waldron (2013, p. 201) presents dignity as a status-con-
cept, as it has to do with ‘the standing (perhaps the formal legal standing or 
perhaps, more informally, the moral presence) that a person has in society and in 
her dealings with others’.18 So conceived, a person’s dignity supervenes on her 
agential capacities to be the author of her own actions on the basis of her own 
account of herself and of ‘the norms and reasons that apply to her’ (Waldron 
2012a, p. 202). In line with the Kantian tradition, possession of such capacities 
is the mark of moral personality; it is what makes people agents rather than mere 
patients, and what makes them act as subjects rather than merely undergo others’ 
actions as an object. In this sense, this status as agents is a precondition for people 
to be considered as the bearers of rights, that is, of valid claims that each of them 
may stake against each other. When rights are established in certain processes, 
people can interact by participating in those processes in a way that gives them 
due consideration in their capacity as potential makers of valid claims.
Criminal proceedings informed by the principle of due process may rightfully 
be considered an instantiation of this form of interaction and have, therefore, 
also an inherent interactive value. The very idea that a person has a right to have 
her say on her own behalf before a public tribunal is a constitutive component 
of the treatment of a person in accordance with her status of claim-maker. But 
due process is not the only instantiation of this kind of value in legal proceedings. 
Waldron, for example, discusses in a similar vein Lon Fuller’s account of ‘self-
application’ in law. This is the idea that people comply with official legal provi-
sions prior to the coercive intervention of law (see Fuller 1969).
An example is unsuccessful defendants in civil litigation, who are expected to 
pay by themselves what is ordered by the court or, in criminal justice, convicted 
offenders who are expected to report to prison on a given date. Clearly, should 
defendants fail to do what they are expected to do, the authorities would inter-
vene (to seize the former’s property or to escort the latter to jail); but—Waldron 
(2012a, p. 206) argues that the presence of provisions of self-application is to be 
viewed as an instantiation of a person’s capacity for agency. This is the case, I add, 
irrespective of the possibly suboptimal implications such provisions may have for 
the effective and time-efficient application of the judicial decision.
The attribution of this moral status of an agent to the parties in legal proceed-
ings, in general, and in a criminal trial, in particular, is not a mere side constraint 
on what can be done in courts while justice is pursued, while juries try to establish 
the truth and reach the right verdicts. This attribution and the forms of interac-
tion thereby inaugurated between the parties are a structural feature of criminal 
proceedings that make them an object of normative assessment in their own right 
and in accordance with standards internal to their own functioning. Note also 
that the presence of procedural provisions treating persons in ways that protect 
them from humiliation and degradation is not only a symbolic matter, express-
ing the consideration in which institutions hold those who take part in them. 
The recognition of the moral status of an agent is not just expressed through 
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procedural provisions;19 it is participation in the proceedings regulated by such 
provisions, which bestows this status upon the parties and enables them to enter-
tain dignifying forms of interaction.
Finally, it is important to notice that the normative assessment that the adop-
tion of this interactive perspective makes possible is not an alternative to, but an 
integration of the instrumental kinds of assessment I have reviewed earlier in this 
chapter. As my current discussion of legal proceedings shows, the normative eval-
uation of processes is a complex and composite exercise that requires the coop-
eration of many different evaluative criteria. All of these criteria should work in 
tandem to render an all things considered normative evaluation of a process that 
makes discrete assessments valid only pro tanto. The realisation of interactive jus-
tice in procedures is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the realisation of 
justice in politics, in society, and in legal courts (see Resnick 1977, p. 213). This 
normative approach to processes of human interaction introduces nuances that 
may complicate their assessment, but such complications are worthwhile because 
they make the evaluation of those processes more philosophically accurate.
8.4  Conclusion
In conclusion, one important result of the discussion in this chapter has been 
that, when we engage in the normative assessment of criminal trials (like any 
other process), no loss in one dimension of justice may be fully compensated by 
a gain in the other. The demand for interactive justice would remain valid even 
if we had omniscient and infallible juries capable of getting to the just outcome 
in all possible cases. The demand for interactive justice is a demand for being 
reckoned with as active subjects and not merely treated as the objects of oth-
ers’ actions. The attribution of this status bears an inherent value whose frustra-
tion makes a process inherently unjust, no matter how it could serve any other 
function.
Notes
1 Sarah is the leading role played by Jodie Foster in the 1988 film The Accused. 
(https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094608/). I borrow the example from Miller 
(1999, pp. 97–98).
2 I have tentatively presented this idea in Ceva (2016), Chapter 3. This chapter 
revisits and expounds the thoughts therein introduced.
3 For a seminal account of the epistemic approach in political theory, see Estlund 
(2008); I have discussed this approach at length in Ceva (2012, pp. 192–194).
4 For a discussion of the plausibility of Rawls’s typology of procedural justice see 
Nelson (1980, pp. 502–511).
5 To illustrate this kind of procedural justice, Rawls (1971, p. 85) provides this 
example: ‘A number of men are to divide a cake: assuming that the fair division is 
an equal one, which procedure, if any, will give this outcome? Technicalities aside, 
the obvious solution is to have one man divide the cake and get the last piece, 
the others being allowed their pick before him. He will divide the cake equally, 
since in this way he assures himself the largest share possible’. For a critique of 
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the tenability of the distinction between perfect and imperfect proceduralism, see 
Gustafsson (2004, pp. 300–305); the claim that Rawls’s im/perfect account of 
procedural justice is indeed a form of ‘proceduralism’ is disputed by Rosenfeld 
(1998).
6 These versions of proceduralism are distinguished from what Rawls (1971, p. 86) 
calls ‘pure procedural justice’. In this last idea, the qualities of a just outcome can-
not be known before a just procedure is actually operated, and in fact the justice 
of outcomes depends entirely on the justice of the procedures leading to them. 
Once we operate a just procedure correctly, its outcome will be just whatever its 
inherent features. I will not engage with this interpretation here (but will revisit 
it below) because it is not relevant to the assessment of legal proceedings, which 
cannot of course be open-ended in the way Rawls thinks pure procedural justice 
should be. For an extensive discussion, see Ceva (2016, pp. 67–69).
7 For an in-depth discussion of Arneson’s argument see Ceva (2012, pp. 196–197).
8 The centrality of the value of self-respect for procedural justice is at the core of the 
argument in Meyerson (2015).
9 Of course, this is one interpretation of the expressivist value of due process. A 
different way of framing the view would insist that the process is not just a mere 
means to convey a certain message but embodies or enacts the message. Two 
possible readings are available of this version of the expressivist view. One, as sug-
gested above, would look at due process as enacting a message whose content is, 
nevertheless, valuable independently of the process. In this reading, for example, 
we could think that just criminal trials are those positively responsive to the moral 
dignity the parties have outside the proceedings (as persons) and that must be 
preserved in the process too. In this sense, the parties’ status acknowledged in 
the process would be a reflection of a more general moral status that people have 
(as the external source of the value of due process). I view this version as exposed 
to the same limitations that I attribute to the view I discuss in what follows. On 
an alternative interpretation, the process would embody a message, which would 
confer (not just acknowledge) a certain normative status on the parties in the pro-
cess. This further reading would be a game changer, as it were, akin to the posi-
tion that I am going to defend in the second part of the chapter to which I refer 
for any further comment. I am grateful to the editors of this volume for pressing 
me on this point.
10 Recent statements of this position may be found in Christiano (2008) and Griffin 
(2003). For a general discussion of the position, see Elster (1999).
11 For a classic set of critiques of utilitarianism along these lines, see Sen and Williams 
(1982).
12 Jon Elster (1982, p. 237) has seminally characterised these preferences and pref-
erences of the ‘sour grapes’ kind.
13 I have introduced this idea in the debate concerning just conflict management 
under the label of ‘intrinsic proceduralism’ (see Ceva 2016, pp. 74–79; 84–86; 
99–107).
14 Formal accounts of procedural justice are presented, for example, in Hart 1961, 
pp. 155–157; Kramer 1997; May & Morrow 2012. For a discussion, see Lyons 
(1973).
15 The steps towards the formulation of this idea of procedural justice can be traced 
back to Hobbes (1985, p. 14), and they have been developed after Rawls in, e.g. 
Hampshire (1999).
16 I take this conception to be well received in the philosophical debate on institu-
tional theory—see, e.g., Emmet (1966); Rawls (1955). For a practice-dependent 
approach to justice, see Sangiovanni (2008).
17 For a discussion, see Hindriks (2009, pp. 253–275).
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18 For a more extensive discussion, see Waldron (2012b).
19 This reading is suggested by Michael Rosen (2012, pp. 94–97) in his commen-
tary Waldron’s discussion of dignity.
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9.1  Introduction1
The literature on procedural justice (hereafter PJ) in social psychology has 
amassed a significant body of empirical evidence showing the importance of rela-
tional considerations, both to citizens’ views about what makes the use of power 
and authority in legal and organisational contexts legitimate and to citizens’ will-
ingness to comply with the law and to cooperate with police, administrative, and 
legal authorities.2 This literature has shown that people care as much, if not more, 
about how authorities exercise power and make decisions as they do about the 
actual decisions that are made.3 Specifically, people care about whether admin-
istrative and legal processes are fair, and they care about the attitudes expressed 
by police, administrative and legal authorities in their interactions with the pub-
lic. What emerges from the empirical findings is that four factors really matter 
to people in their dealings with authorities: that authorities ‘treat citizens in a 
fair and respectful way, make neutral and unbiased decisions, display trustworthy 
motives, and allow the citizen a voice in their interactions’ (Jackson 2018, p. 4). 
These four factors influence the extent to which people view police, legal and 
administrative authorities as legitimate, the extent to which people are likely to 
obey the law, and the extent to which they are motivated to cooperate with these 
authorities.
Insofar as the social psychology literature is concerned with people’s percep-
tions of legitimacy it operates with a descriptive or sociological conception of 
legitimacy, according to which a set of institutions ‘is legitimate … if those sub-
ject to its directives widely believe it to enjoy the moral right to rule’ (Levitov 2016, 
p. 1, emphasis in original). This sociological conception of legitimacy should be 
distinguished from a prescriptive or normative conception of legitimacy, accord-
ing to which a set of institutions is legitimate ‘if it in fact enjoys the moral right to 
rule over those it claims the authority to govern’ (Levitov 2016, p. 1, emphasis in 
original). Social psychologists do not explicitly address the question of whether 
the four elements of PJ (respect, neutrality, trustworthiness, and voice) provide 
criteria for assessing the normative legitimacy of police, legal, or administrative 
authorities, although this claim does seem to be implicit in some of the literature 
on PJ. At the very least, however, an implication of the empirical research is that 
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citizens are more likely to confer legitimacy on police and legal authorities (and 
hence to consent to their use of power) if they judge that those authorities are 
behaving in line with citizens’ normative expectations. Hence, if authorities want 
to be perceived as legitimate (i.e. to be legitimate in the descriptive sense), they 
should take steps to ensure that the four elements of PJ are embedded in legal 
and administrative processes and that they guide officials in their interactions with 
citizens.
Several different kinds of justification for the view that authorities should try 
to satisfy citizens’ procedural expectations by attending to the four elements of 
PJ are suggested, but not clearly distinguished, in the empirical literature. One 
kind of justification appeals to people’s psychological motivations for voluntarily 
complying and cooperating with authorities, explicitly linking these motivations 
to the four elements of PJ. Tyler and Lind (1992), for example, claim:
The belief that the authority views one as a full member of society, trust in 
the authority’s ethicality and benevolence, and belief in the authority’s neu-
trality—these appear to be the crucial factors that lead to voluntary compli-
ance with the directives of authority. 
(p. 163)
Tyler and Lind explain the link between PJ and psychological motivations to 
cooperate and comply via group-value theory. Group-value theory contends that 
relational concerns are central to people’s judgements about procedural justice. 
According to the theory, people’s sense of self-identity is based on their member-
ship in valued groups, and they are very attuned to their perceived standing or 
status in such groups. For this reason, people are highly sensitive to the messages 
about their status conveyed by group processes and by how they are treated by 
persons in positions of authority:
To the extent that a procedure is seen as indicating a positive, full status rela-
tionship, it is judged to be fair, and to the extent that a procedure appears 
to imply that one’s relationship with the authority or institution is negative 
or that one occupies a low-status position, the procedure is viewed as unfair. 
(p. 141) 
The empirical research provides strong evidence that procedures embodying the 
four elements of PJ are more likely to be perceived as fair. Hence, if authorities 
want to be perceived as legitimate and if they want to secure cooperation and 
compliance, they should ensure their processes are responsive to people’s rela-
tional concerns.
This justification for why authorities should be concerned about PJ admits of 
both an instrumental and a normative interpretation. The instrumental interpre-
tation is that authorities, such as police, should be responsive to people’s rela-
tional concerns and hence should embed PJ in their interactions with citizens 
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because approaches based on PJ are more effective than other methods of law 
enforcement, such as deterrence based strategies that rely on coercion or reward 
mechanisms. While deterrence based strategies rely on motivations such as fear 
of punishment or self-interest, PJ is more effective, it is claimed, because it is 
more likely to encourage belief in the legitimacy of authorities, and to promote 
the internalisation of legal norms and voluntary compliance with the law (see, 
e.g., Tyler 2009).4 The normative interpretation is that authorities should be 
responsive to people’s relational concerns and hence should embed PJ in their 
interactions with citizens because it is morally right that citizens are treated in a 
procedurally just manner. Both the instrumental and the normative interpreta-
tion are invoked by social psychologists. However, to the extent that they do 
invoke the normative interpretation, social psychologists tend to assume, rather 
than argue for the normative correctness of PJ.
My aim in this chapter is to develop an argument in support of the normative 
interpretation. I argue that there are good normative reasons why people care 
about their standing in social groups and why citizens are more likely to perceive 
authorities as legitimate and to cooperate with them if these authorities treat 
them fairly and respectfully, are neutral and trustworthy, and allow them a voice 
in their interactions. I also argue that authorities should be responsive to people’s 
relational concerns and hence should embed PJ in their interactions with citizens 
because it is morally right that citizens are treated in a procedurally just manner 
by social institutions and their representatives. The moral correctness of PJ, I 
claim, is connected with its role in expressing attitudes of respect and supporting 
ideals of social equality among citizens. If this argument is persuasive, it also sug-
gests that legitimacy in the descriptive or sociological sense provides the basis for 
legitimacy in the normative sense.
In developing this argument in the following sections, I draw on the resources 
of recent work in normative political philosophy. In Section 9.2, I discuss recent 
philosophical theories of relational equality and outline their relevance for articu-
lating a normative argument for a relational approach to PJ, as it is understood in 
the empirical literature. In Section 9.3, I discuss Emanuela Ceva’s (2016) recent 
‘interactive theory’ of PJ, which articulates a normative conception of procedural 
equality and presents an argument for why states have obligations to ensure that 
interactions between authorities and citizens, and among citizens, are procedur-
ally just. In Section 9.4, I briefly outline two influential views in moral philosophy 
that link the normative requirement of respect for others to the normative and 
psychological importance of self-respect. I conclude by explaining why the view 
defended in this chapter lends support to the idea that legitimacy in the descrip-
tive sense may provide the basis for legitimacy in the normative sense.
9.2  Relational equality and procedural justice
Reviewing the empirical literature on procedural justice in tandem with recent 
debates in normative political philosophy reveals an interesting parallel shift in 
both literatures towards more relational conceptions of justice. To start with a 
 PJ, relational equality, and self-respect 197
very broad outline, philosophical theories of relational ethics and justice uphold 
the normative importance of individual rights, welfare, dignity, and autonomy 
(Anderson 2009, p. 132). However, these theories reject social atomism. They 
hold that we are social beings whose individual identities are constituted through 
interpersonal relationships and in the context of the broader social and political 
environments in which we live. Our self-identities and sense of self-respect are 
therefore necessarily shaped by and vulnerable to the quality of our interpersonal 
relationships and our interactions with social institutions. Relational theories 
of ethics and justice draw specific attention to the moral significance of social 
oppression, marginalisation, and inequalities of social power and standing, and 
their effects on individuals’ self-identities, autonomy, and sense of self-respect.
Theories of relational equality are relational in this broad sense. More specifi-
cally, relational egalitarian theorists, such as Elizabeth Anderson (1999, 2008), 
Jonathon Wolff (1998, 2015), and Samuel Scheffler (2003, 2015), among oth-
ers, have argued that the preoccupation among post-Rawlsian liberal political 
philosophers with distributive justice fails to appreciate the real point of liberal-
ism’s concern with equality. For these philosophers, concerns about equality are 
not only, or not primarily about minimising gross inequalities in the distribution 
of social goods and resources, but more importantly about relational or social 
equality. Liberal political philosophers take one of the foundational principles 
of liberalism to be that people should be treated as moral equals. Theories of 
distributive justice assume that the best interpretation of this principle of moral 
equality is that people should be equally entitled to fair shares of the currency of 
justice. Debates in the post-Rawlsian literature have focused almost exclusively 
on the question of how best to conceptualise this currency or metric—e.g. wel-
fare, resources, opportunity, or capabilities. These debates have done much to 
clarify the differences between equality of welfare, equality of resources, equal-
ity of opportunity, and equality of capabilities. Yet, the exclusive focus in these 
debates on questions concerning what distributive shares people are entitled to 
has overlooked other important dimensions of justice.
Relational egalitarian theories do not dismiss distributive considerations as 
unimportant for justice. However, they claim that justice is about more than pat-
terns of distribution. It is more fundamentally about social equality. Relational 
egalitarianism can be expressed both as a positive ideal of social equality and as 
a critique of social inequality. In articulating a positive ideal of social equality, 
Samuel Scheffler, for example, characterises social equality as a broad and com-
plex ideal, bound up with other values such as respect and reciprocity. At its core 
is the ideal of a society of equals: ‘justice requires the establishment of a society 
of equals, a society whose members relate to one another on a footing of equal-
ity’ (2015, p. 21). The ideal of a society of equals directs the focus of concerns 
about justice from purely distributive concerns to concerns about the structure 
and character of social relationships. In a just society, Scheffler argues, the idea of 
social equality should shape the attitudes and dispositions of both institutions and 
individuals in their interpersonal relationships, so that commitment to equality 
becomes a social practice. Central to this practice is a reciprocal commitment to 
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respect others, a commitment to a common social framework, and commitment 
to participatory decision-making procedures where no person’s interests (values, 
needs, preferences) are discounted without due consideration.
Similarly, Elizabeth Anderson articulates a positive ideal of social equality that 
she refers to as ‘democratic equality’. Anderson claims that the fundamental obli-
gation of citizens in a democratic state towards one another is to secure the social 
conditions for everyone’s freedom. This requires, in her view, ‘a social order in 
which persons stand in relations of equality’ and respect (1999, p. 313), because 
‘the counterpart to an individual’s inalienable right to the social conditions of her 
freedom is the unconditional obligation of others to respect her dignity or moral 
equality’ (p. 319). A social order based on this kind of reciprocal respect is one 
in which all citizens have equal access to the capabilities required to participate 
in a democratic state, not only in the political sphere, but also in civil society. It 
is a social order that expresses respect for citizens, and in which state institutions 
and citizens feel an obligation ‘to justify their actions by principles acceptable to 
the other’ and in which ‘mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition’ are 
taken for granted (p. 314). In other words, such a social order is a democratic 
community of collective self-determination and cooperation.5
Perhaps of more fundamental concern to relational egalitarians than the artic-
ulation of a positive ideal of social equality is the importance of exposing and crit-
icising social inequality and the harms it causes. Jonathan Wolff (2015) argues, 
for example, that the primary theoretical and epistemological task of political 
philosophy should not be to formulate ideals of justice but to identify and criticise 
manifest injustices. He suggests that the main contribution of relational egalitar-
ian theory is not the articulation of an ideal of social equality but rather the way 
it draws attention to social inequality as one of the primary causes of injustice. 
For relational egalitarians, social inequality is characterised by social hierarchies of 
rank and esteem, and by social institutions, norms and relationships that entrench 
social relations of oppression, exploitation, domination and subordination. These 
kinds of inequalities of status and standing are inherently unjust, according to 
relational egalitarians, because, as Anderson (2008) puts it, they are ‘degrading, 
humiliating and assaultive of individuals’ status as beings entitled to moral stand-
ing before others’ (p. 142).
Further, status inequalities undermine the mutual respect and recognition that 
should characterise social relationships in democratic communities. Entrenched 
social inequalities cause a range of harms to those who are on the receiving end 
of attitudes of social disrespect and disregard. These harms include being sub-
ject to social stigma and exclusion, being distrusted, being silenced, ignored, or 
regarded as not credible in discursive and testimonial contexts, being required to 
act towards one’s social superiors in ways that one finds demeaning, servile and 
shameful, and being vulnerable to violence.
Two key concerns of relational egalitarianism are particularly important to 
note at this point. First, relational egalitarians hold that a central commitment of 
liberalism should be to ensure equality of access to the social bases of self-respect. 
Entrenched social inequality, they maintain, undermines this commitment 
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because social disrespect and the harms that it causes also damage self-respect 
(Garrau & Laborde, 2015 pp. 49, 57). I will return to this issue in Section 9.4. 
Second, relational egalitarians are particularly concerned with the expressive role 
of state institutions. They hold that state institutions have special responsibilities 
to ensure that their processes express respect for citizens, and that, in their inter-
actions with citizens, office holders treat individuals in ways that convey attitudes 
of equal respect. Christian Schemmel (2011) notes that the expressive demand 
is not just a matter of what the institution or its agents meant to express by their 
actions, but also a matter of ‘how those subject to the action may reasonably 
understand it’ (p. 138). Wolff is especially critical, for example, of the way the 
social welfare system in the UK routinely subjects welfare recipients to demean-
ing and intrusive forms of expressive disrespect.6 However, expressive respect is 
not just a matter of the attitudes conveyed by legal or bureaucratic processes and 
office holders; it is also a matter of what structural protections institutions put in 
place to mitigate social inequality and the vulnerabilities and harms it causes. As 
Schemmel puts the point,
institutions treat individuals with the proper attitude when they offer them 
adequate and equal structural protection against unjust treatment by other 
individuals, against ending up on the wrong side of inegalitarian relationships. 
(p. 142) 
Relational egalitarians maintain that to be just, social institutions must ensure 
that ‘individuals are not dominated by others, that others cannot interfere with 
their choices in an arbitrary manner’ (p. 142).
Given this critique of social inequality, one of the questions that relational 
egalitarian theory needs to address is what it has to say about the inescapable hier-
archies of authority and command in complex modern societies. For it is these 
kinds of social hierarchies that, in democratic societies, often threaten people’s 
status as social equals, and expose them to relations of domination, social stigma 
and disrespect. In addressing this question, Anderson (2008) makes a useful dis-
tinction between three kinds of unequal social hierarchies (pp. 144–145): i) hier-
archies of standing, which deny rights and privileges, or grant inferior rights and 
privileges, to those at the bottom of the social hierarchy; ii) hierarchies of esteem, 
where those at the top ‘command honour and admiration, while those below are 
stigmatized and held in contempt, as objects of ridicule, loathing, or disgust’; and 
hierarchies of command, ‘of domination and subordination, whereby those at the 
top issue orders to those below, who must defer and obey’ (p. 145). ‘Egalitarians 
aim’, she says, ‘to the extent possible, to abolish such hierarchies and replace 
them with relations of equality’.
While state-sanctioned hierarchies of standing, such as those based on class, 
caste, gender, race or ethnicity can be abolished through constitutional and leg-
islative measures, it is more challenging to abolish the hierarchies of esteem that 
are typically associated with unofficial hierarchies of standing in civil society. 
Nevertheless, these must be the focus of sustained egalitarian critique. The same 
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applies to hierarchies of command when these are not required for coordinating 
social functions. But what should relational egalitarians say about the hierarchies 
of command that are required for coordinating complex social functions, such 
as command hierarchies in bureaucracies, courts and legal systems, the police, 
the military, corporations, and other large workplaces? These kinds of hierarchies 
may be rationally required to ensure social order and cooperation, but are they 
normatively justifiable? Relational egalitarians hold that such hierarchies can be 
normatively justified if they meet the requirements of legitimacy. To count as 
legitimate, institutions and command hierarchies must first abide by principles 
of non-domination. What this entails is that state institutions have obligations to 
ensure that the differential power, authority and status attached to office hold-
ers in these kinds of command hierarchies do not enable them to wield arbitrary 
power and dominate those who are subject to their commands. As Schemmel 
puts the point:
in successful social cooperation, power must, most of the time, not be 
exercised in the form of naked coercion but in the form of commands and 
directives on the part of holders of offices and occupants of privileged social 
positions whose legitimacy is generally recognized by those subject to their 
power. 
(2015, p. 160)
A further requirement of legitimacy, as this quote from Schemmel suggests, is 
that differences in the exercise of power and authority arising from command 
hierarchies can only be normatively justified if institutions and the authorities 
who represent them are recognised as legitimate by those who are subject to 
them; that is, if they are legitimate in the descriptive or sociological sense. This 
requires that institutions put in place mechanisms or processes by which those 
who exercise power can be held publicly accountable for their actions and deci-
sions, and those who are subject to that power are able to voice and defend their 
interests.
This brief summary of relational egalitarian theory provides a starting point 
for explaining how relational egalitarian theories of justice might be used to 
provide normative support for relational approaches to PJ. Relational egalitari-
anism, as outlined above, shifts the focus of claims about justice to the structure 
and character of social institutions and relationships. It claims that justice is 
normatively grounded in an ideal of social equality and that social inequality 
and domination are major sources of injustice. Social institutions therefore have 
normative obligations to ensure that their processes and office holders express 
respect for the moral and social equality of all persons; that the exercise of power 
and authority by office holders in command hierarchies is regarded as legitimate 
by the persons who are subject to it; and that mechanisms are in place both for 
holding institutions and office holders publicly accountable and for enabling 
persons who are subject to power and authority to voice their concerns and 
interests.
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These claims, I suggest, give normative substance to the concerns about social 
standing and fair treatment by authorities that emerge as strong themes in the 
empirical research on procedural justice. Tyler and Lind (1992) say:
Information about standing—i.e. status recognition—is often communi-
cated to people by the interpersonal quality of their treatment by those in 
a position of authority. In particular, when one is treated politely and with 
dignity and when respect is shown for one’s rights and opinions, feelings of 
positive social standing are enhanced … On the other hand, undignified, dis-
respectful or impolite treatment by the authority carries the implication that 
one is not a full member of the group, and this is very threatening indeed. 
(p. 141)
Tyler and Lind explain people’s concerns about standing in terms of group-value 
theory, which focuses on people’s psychological motivations. Relational egalitari-
anism suggests, however, that people’s concerns about how they are treated by 
authorities, about the attitudes expressed towards them, and the messages these 
interactions convey about a person’s social standing are not just matters of psy-
chological motivation. These concerns are grounded in an expectation of norma-
tive entitlement to be treated as a moral and social equal, an entitlement that is 
violated by interactions with authorities that express disrespect.7
The four elements of PJ identified in the empirical research, I suggest, embody 
citizens’ expectations of normative entitlement to be treated as social and moral 
equals. Institutions and authorities that treat people fairly and with respect, 
ensure that people have opportunities to participate in processes that affect them, 
make decisions neutrally, and act from trustworthy motives, are responsive to 
those expectations. The empirical research shows that institutions and authorities 
that are responsive in these ways are more likely to be regarded as legitimate in 
the descriptive sense. Relational egalitarianism helps to explain why this kind of 
responsiveness is normatively required, and hence why institutions and authori-
ties that act in procedurally just ways, are normatively legitimate; namely, because 
procedurally just processes and interactions express respect for citizens as moral 
and social equals.
Given the potentially fruitful conceptual connections between relational egali-
tarian theories of justice and the empirical research on procedural justice, it is sur-
prising that relational egalitarians have paid little attention to procedural justice. 
Nor have they said much about how institutional processes should be designed so 
that they both act as constraints on the arbitrary exercise of power in command 
hierarchies, and more positively help to foster genuine cooperation between 
authorities and the individuals and communities with whom they interact. In 
order to flesh out these conceptual connections more fully, in the following sec-
tion I discuss Emanuela Ceva’s recent ‘interactive theory’ of justice (2016).8 Like 
relational egalitarianism, Ceva identifies social relationships and interactions as a 
locus of claims of justice. However, her specific focus on procedural justice makes 
a distinctive contribution to the literature on justice in contemporary normative 
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political philosophy, and one that is highly relevant to the argument of this chap-
ter. I begin by providing a brief outline of Ceva’s conception of procedural jus-
tice and then assess its merits and relevance, relative to relational egalitarianism, 
with respect to providing normative support for the findings of the empirical 
research on PJ.
9.3  Ceva’s ‘interactive’ theory of procedural justice
Like relational egalitarian theories, Ceva (2016) argues that debates about jus-
tice in normative political philosophy have been overly focused on ‘end-state 
justice’, that is questions concerning justice in distributive shares and outcomes. 
However, little attention has been paid to questions of ‘interactive’ or procedural 
justice. Interactive justice is concerned with the justice or injustice of processes 
and procedures of social and political interaction. Ceva’s specific concern in the 
book is with debates about intractable, antagonistic value conflicts in politics—for 
example, debates over abortion, or gay marriage. The problem with these kinds 
of conflict, she argues, is that they often expose people, especially vulnerable 
minorities, to inherently morally unacceptable forms of treatment, such as silenc-
ing, marginalisation, and public stigmatisation, or ‘interactive injustice’ (p. 15). 
The question that Ceva seeks to answer is how these kinds of value conflict can 
be shifted from antagonistic and disrespectful exchanges towards what Rawls calls 
‘reasonable disagreement’ (Rawls 1993)—that is, forms of disagreement in which 
the parties do not feel disrespected or marginalised but engage with each other 
in a mutually respectful and trusting manner, and are open and willing to try 
to understand the other party’s viewpoint (Ceva 2016, pp. 13–31). I will not 
engage in any detail with this aspect of Ceva’s argument. The main focus of my 
discussion will be on her more general normative arguments for the importance 
of procedural justice. I want to highlight four main claims that are of particular 
relevance to my concerns in this chapter.
First, Ceva argues that outcomes and procedures are distinct social objects 
and raise distinct questions of justice. What matters is not only what people get 
but also how they get it. End-state or outcome-focused justice and interactive or 
procedural justice, although complementary, are therefore conceptually and nor-
matively distinct (pp. 78–79). She says, ‘procedures … may be a locus of justice 
for quite distinct reasons and in accordance with quite distinct standards from 
those employed to evaluate the qualities of outcomes’ (p. 74). While outcome-
based theories might accept that procedures are instrumentally important, insofar 
as procedures are a means of achieving just outcomes, outcome-based theories 
do not regard procedures as inherently or intrinsically important for justice.9 In 
contrast, Ceva (2016) argues for intrinsic proceduralism. Intrinsic proceduralism 
claims that,
certain procedures are inherently valuable insofar as they are constitutive 
of inherently valuable forms of human interaction in politics and society; 
these are interactions in which people are treated in an inherently morally 
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acceptable manner because they are given appropriate consideration—they 
are reckoned with in terms that are fittingly responsive to their status as 
potential makers of valid claims. 
(p. 80)
Second, Ceva (2016) grounds moral acceptability in the principles of pro-
cedural equality and human dignity. The principle of procedural equality is the 
principle that all parties to a conflict are equal in a fundamental but minimal 
sense—that is, they are ‘entitled to an equal chance to have their say’ (p. 115). 
The test for whether a procedure or form of social and political interaction is 
morally acceptable and hence meets the requirements of procedural equality 
is whether the parties are treated in a manner consistent with the demands of 
human dignity. Ceva understands dignity, following Jeremy Waldron (and Kant), 
as a status concept that is grounded in recognition of our human capacities for 
rational agency, and hence recognition of our rights as rational agents to make 
claims against others (pp. 76–77). The demands of human dignity require that no 
individual is regarded or treated by public institutions and office holders as mor-
ally inferior to others, that each person is regarded as having the status of a poten-
tial maker of valid claims, and that each person is entitled to a chance to voice 
their claims that is not inferior to the chance granted to others (p. 125). Having 
an equal chance does not mean ‘that the outcome is equally influenced or shaped 
by all views in an equal manner’; rather, it means that all claims are voiced on an 
equal footing (p. 132). She cites the principle of due process in legal contexts as 
an instantiation of this form of dignity and procedural equality:
The very idea that a person has a right to have her say on her own behalf 
before a public tribunal is a constitutive component of the treatment of a 
person in accordance with her dignity as it implies that she is recognized as 
the source of a potentially valid claim that should be aired. From this per-
spective due process is not only—and perhaps not primarily—valuable as an 
instrument to reach an accurate verdict (a just outcome) but as it realizes in 
itself the fundamental normative commitment to treating persons with dig-
nity (with just procedures being constitutive of such a treatment).10 
(p. 77)
Third, Ceva (2016, pp. 115–117) argues that states have a moral duty to 
design institutions and processes that meet the requirements of procedural equal-
ity and interactive justice. Exactly how to meet these requirements will vary 
depending on the context, because factors that may hinder the realisation of 
procedural equality need to be taken into account and mitigated. These factors 
include the effects of material and relational inequalities on individuals’ abilities 
to voice their claims, including the effects of lack of education, being a member 
of an unpopular minority, being disenfranchised, socially marginalised, and so on.
Finally, Ceva argues that intrinsic proceduralism provides a stronger argu-
ment for the value of procedures than expressive forms of proceduralism.11 Many 
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relational egalitarian theories, as discussed above, are expressivist in maintaining 
that state institutions have special responsibilities to ensure that their processes 
express respect for citizens, and that, in their interactions with citizens, office 
holders treat individuals in ways that convey attitudes of equal respect. On the 
expressivist view, respect (or disrespect) are not only conveyed but also embodied 
in the processes and procedures by which citizens interact with social institutions 
and authorities. In other words, procedures matter because of the messages they 
embody about a person’s social standing in the eyes of authorities. Procedures 
that express respect publicly acknowledge a person’s standing as a moral and 
social equal. Ceva argues, however, that procedural equality does not simply 
express or promote normative commitments to human dignity, it actually realises 
those commitments and bestows dignity. This is because just procedures, such 
as due process, confer a normative status on participants in those procedures, a 
normative status they would not otherwise have and that is constituted by the 
procedures themselves. I think Ceva is correct that procedurally just processes 
can confer or bestow, as well as express, dignitary standing. However, I think that 
one way in which they confer this standing is by virtue of embodying a message 
about citizens’ social and moral equality. For this reason, I am not sure that as 
much hangs on the distinction between expressive and intrinsic proceduralism as 
Ceva claims.
Ceva’s understanding of dignity as grounded in rational agency is, however, 
quite Kantian, and so I think the notion of respect for dignity that is cen-
tral to her account of procedural justice differs in important ways from the 
understanding of respect that is at stake in both relational egalitarianism and 
relational models of procedural justice in the empirical literature. Although rela-
tional egalitarianism is grounded in the idea of moral equality, it claims that 
social equality is a central requirement of justice, while inequalities of social 
standing that undermine the social conditions required for individual freedom, 
autonomy and self-respect are inherently unjust. So for relational egalitar-
ians, respect for others’ dignity is not just a matter of respecting their status as 
rational agents. Respecting others’ dignity is also a matter of respecting their 
rights to be included as equal participants in a social community, conceived of as 
‘a system of cooperation and affiliation among equals’ (Anderson 2008, p. 143). 
Further, inclusion in a social community, as an equal participant is a condition 
for self-respect.
For this reason, I think the relational egalitarian view may be closer than 
Ceva’s view to Tyler’s relational notions of respect and dignity, which are based 
on group-value models of identity. However, as outlined above, Tyler’s group-
value account is psychological—he says, ‘people are concerned about their status 
in groups because high status within a group validates their own self-identity’ 
(Tyler & Lind 1992, p. 141) and their sense of self-worth. Relational egalitari-
anism, I have argued, is both psychological and normative. Certainly, there are 
psychological reasons why, as social beings, we value others’ recognition of our 
status as equal participants in a social community. But relational egalitarians also 
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claim that we are normatively entitled to the conditions for that recognition and 
hence to the social bases of self-respect. That is why social processes that deny 
those conditions to individuals or social groups are unjust.
To sum up the argument presented in this section, I have suggested that Ceva 
presents an important argument for procedural justice as a distinct locus of jus-
tice. She also develops a normative argument for why state institutions have an 
obligation to design and enact procedurally just processes—that is, processes that 
express and bestow dignity and respect on those who are subject to these pro-
cesses. However, I have suggested that her account of respect is more dignitar-
ian than relational. In the next section, I will briefly outline two philosophical 
analyses that will help to further clarify the differences between dignitarian and 
relational conceptions of respect and self-respect.12
9.4  Respect, self-respect, and procedural justice
The conception of respect for dignity that underpins Ceva’s account of pro-
cedural justice resonates with Stephen Darwall’s (1977) influential analysis of 
recognition respect. Darwall distinguishes two kinds of respect: appraisal and 
recognition respect. Appraisal respect for someone as a person is respect or 
esteem for that person’s character as a moral agent. Appraisal respect for a per-
son is therefore responsive to merit or excellences of character (1977, p. 39). 
Because it is responsive to persons’ moral qualities, there is no moral obliga-
tion to regard all persons with appraisal respect; such respect is only due when 
it is warranted. Recognition respect for persons, by contrast, is categorical 
and is the kind of respect that is owed to all persons in virtue of their status 
and dignity as persons. It involves giving due weight to the recognition that 
someone is a person, that is, a free and rational agent, in the way one treats 
and acts towards her. In later work (2004, 2006), Darwall adds to this the 
idea that recognition respect involves recognition and acknowledgement of 
another person’s second-personal authority to demand that she be respected 
as a person. It thus involves ‘addressing the other in a way that presupposes 
and reciprocally recognizes the equal dignity, hence mutual accountability, of 
addresser and addressee’ (2004, p. 55). Relational egalitarians would argue 
that the expectation that one is due this kind of recognition respect is nor-
matively grounded in the requirement to respect others as moral and social 
equals. The expectation that one is due recognition respect, I suggest, also 
underpins the expectation of respect that emerges as a strong theme in the 
empirical research on PJ.
However, while Darwall’s analysis of respect is relational to the extent that it 
places second-personal interactions at its heart, it overlooks the social and politi-
cal context of these interactions and the way they are shaped by dynamics of social 
power and inequality.13 Hence, it overlooks the ways in which these dynamics can 
shape both individuals’ second-personal authority to demand respect and their 
sense of self-respect—that is, their sense of themselves as respect-worthy persons 
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whose lives have value. Robin Dillon’s (1997) analysis of self-respect is more 
attuned to these relational dynamics. She argues that,
the nature and meaning of self-respect and how it is constituted and 
expressed, both at the level of individual experience and at the level of con-
cept, is a function of social relationships and the structure and functioning of 
the social institutions among which we live. 
(p. 244)
Dillon draws on Darwall to distinguish two kinds of self-respect: appraisal 
and recognition self-respect. Appraisal self-respect is ‘confidence in one’s merit 
as a person’ (p. 231), or the evaluative appraisal of oneself as living up to the 
standards of one’s normative self-conception. Recognition self-respect involves 
respecting oneself as a moral agent, and regarding oneself as having equal moral 
worth and standing, or to use Darwall’s later terminology, as having the second-
personal authority to demand that others respect one as a person. Dillon argues, 
however, that the ground for both appraisal and recognition self-respect is a more 
fundamental kind of self-respect, basal self-respect, which is a basic emotional 
and experiential attitude toward oneself and one’s life as having intrinsic value 
or worth. This basic value orientation to oneself ‘is relational, interactional and 
institutionally structured and enacted’ (1997, p. 245) and can be damaged by 
dysfunctional interpersonal relationships, and by experiences of social marginali-
sation and exclusion.
Dillon’s claim about basal self-respect being relational, interactional, and insti-
tutionally structured and enacted resonates with group-value theory. It provides a 
complementary explanation of why people are so sensitive to the messages about 
their status conveyed by group processes and by how they are treated by persons 
in positions of authority. Dillon’s emphasis on the impact of social dynamics of 
power and inequality on people’s sense of self-respect is also borne out in the 
empirical research literature on PJ. Tyler and Blader (2003, p. 358), for example, 
argue that for members of minority social groups who are subject to stereotyping 
and stigmatisation, the quality of both the decision-making and interpersonal 
treatment they receive at the hands of authorities has direct impacts on their sense 
of identity, especially their sense of self-worth and self-esteem. Fair and neutral 
decision-making by authorities communicates to members of minority groups 
that they will not be subject to prejudice and stereotyping. Being treated politely 
and with respect communicates the message that they are valued members of 
society. By contrast, practices such as racial profiling can ‘communicate marginal-
ity and exclusion from important protections’ that are extended to members of 
other social groups, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention (2003, 
p. 359), thereby undermining what Dillon refers to as basal self-respect, as well as 
prompting reactions of anger and alienation.14
Critics of expressivist views, such as Ceva argue that the expressivist appeal 
to the negative effects of unfair and disrespectful treatment on citizens’ sense of 
self-respect and self-worth is vulnerable to empirical contingencies.15 Different 
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people may react in different ways to such treatment, and these different reactions 
may also be connected to contextual, cultural or historical factors. Tyler’s work 
suggests, however, that people’s reactions may be less variable than Ceva thinks. 
Furthermore, to the extent that such differences exist, Dillon’s relational analyses 
of recognition self-respect (as respect for one’s equal moral worth and standing), 
and of basal self-respect (as a basic emotional and experiential attitude toward 
oneself and one’s life as having intrinsic value or worth) show that the existence 
of any such differences does not undermine the normative force of the obligation 
to treat others in ways that promote self-respect.
The relational analysis of self-respect thus provides further support for the 
normative claim that authorities should embed PJ in their interactions with citi-
zens because it is morally right that citizens are treated in a procedurally just 
manner. Governmental officials, such as police, members of the judiciary, and 
administrative officers in areas such as social welfare, are representatives of institu-
tions that exercise considerable coercive power over people’s lives. Many citizens 
who are subject to the determinations of such officials may be socially disadvan-
taged or marginalised and predisposed to be mistrustful of government institu-
tions. Moreover, they may not regard themselves as having the second-personal 
authority to demand respectful treatment from officials. Even citizens who are 
not disadvantaged in terms of their social standing may feel similarly powerless 
in the context of judicial or administrative decision-making processes that affect 
their rights and welfare. The empirical research on PJ shows that this sense of 
powerlessness can damage not only people’s sense of self-respect but also their 
confidence in the neutrality and trustworthiness of governmental officials and 
institutions. A commitment to procedural justice entails a commitment to pro-
cesses that support and promote self-respect by expressing respect for individual 
citizens as moral and social equals. Enacting this commitment requires taking 
seriously the institutional power wielded by officials, and developing processes 
that keep this power in check, and that aim to convey the sense that officials and 
the citizens who are subject to their determinations are mutually accountable. 
This requires processes that demonstrate officials’ neutrality, trustworthiness, 
willingness to listen, commitment to justice, and concern for the welfare of those 
who appear before them.
9.5  Conclusion
The empirical research on procedural justice provides strong evidence that the 
four factors of respect, neutrality, trustworthiness and voice are central to citizens’ 
judgements about whether institutions and authorities are legitimate in the descrip-
tive or sociological sense. Social psychologists do not presume that their findings 
provide criteria for legitimacy in the normative philosophical sense. Nevertheless, 
in this chapter I have argued that recent work in normative political philosophy 
lends support to the idea that legitimacy in the descriptive sense may converge 
with legitimacy in the normative sense. Relational egalitarian theory provides nor-
mative support for citizens’ expectations that they should be treated fairly and 
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with respect. It grounds these expectations in the idea that a central requirement 
of justice is that citizens should be treated as moral and social equals. Ceva’s work 
provides support for the view that procedural justice is a distinct domain of jus-
tice, as well as for the claim that procedures are inherently normatively important. 
Darwall’s analysis of recognition respect explicates what respect for a person as a 
moral equal entails, while Dillon’s relational analysis of self-respect underscores 
the normative connection between social equality and self-respect. If the argument 
developed in this chapter is persuasive it shows that, to the extent that the four fac-
tors of PJ satisfy citizens’ expectations for fair and respectful treatment, institutions 
and authorities that embed PJ in their processes and interpersonal interactions 
with citizens will count as both descriptively and normatively legitimate.
Notes
1 Thanks to Denise Meyerson and Therese MacDermott for their very helpful com-
ments on earlier versions of this chapter. Thanks also to participants at a workshop 
on procedural justice held at Macquarie University in 2018. Research for this 
chapter was funded by the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Project fund-
ing scheme (DP1701009600: ‘A Relational Theory of Procedural Justice’).
2 While the empirical research on procedural justice is voluminous, my discussion in 
this chapter has been most influenced by the work of Tom Tyler and Alan Lind. 
See especially Tyler and Lind (1992).
3 However, see Bottoms and Tankebe’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 4) for 
a more qualified endorsement of this claim.
4 In referring to an ‘instrumental’ justification here I mean to contrast it with a 
normative justification in the philosophical sense, as explained in the text that fol-
lows. However, it is important to clarify that the term ‘instrumental’ is often used 
in the social psychology literature to refer to approaches to authority and legiti-
macy which assume that people are motivated to obey the law primarily from self-
interested concerns. In this context, ‘instrumental’ approaches to authority and 
legitimacy are typically contrasted with ‘relational’ and ‘normative’ approaches 
to procedural justice, which claim that relying on people’s instrumental (i.e. 
self-interested) motives to obey the law is not an effective way to govern, and 
that encouraging belief in the legitimacy of the law via PJ is more effective. Tina 
Murphy’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 1) understands the term ‘instru-
mental’ in this way. For a more detailed analysis, see, e.g., Tyler and Lind (1992, 
119–121), who refer to ‘social exchange’ theories of legitimacy as instrumental in 
this sense. According to Tyler and Lind, social exchange theories hold that peo-
ple are primarily motivated by self-interested concerns and hence people evaluate 
social relationships and interactions in terms of their costs and benefits. Thus, 
people’s perceptions of the legitimacy or otherwise of procedures and authorities 
are tied ‘to the extent to which the authority’s decisions and the procedures used 
to generate those decisions are personally favourable’, as well as the transaction 
costs and benefits of those procedures (1992, p. 120). In their chapter in this 
volume (Chapter 4), Bottoms and Tankebe provide a useful and related analysis of 
the way social psychologists understand the terms ‘instrumental’ and ‘normative’.
5 There are parallels between Anderson’s argument and Habermas’ analysis of the 
importance of democratic participatory procedures for political and legal legiti-
macy. For discussion of the relevance of democratic or ‘bottom up’ participatory 
procedures for procedural justice, see Sarah Sorial’s contribution to this volume 
(Chapter 6).
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6 In her contribution to this volume (Chapter 10), Natalie Stoljar argues that the 
feeling by members of racially profiled groups that the justice system is unfair and 
disrespectful is justified, because racial profiling both expresses and constitutes 
disrespectful treatment. This is another powerful example of how the processes 
and procedures by which authorities interact with citizens can embody messages 
of disrespect.
7 This expectation of normative entitlement to be treated as a moral and social 
equal might be a form of what Bottoms and Tankebe, in their contribution to this 
volume, refer to as a ‘basic legitimation expectation’. (See Chapter 4).
8 My discussion focuses primarily on the account of interactive justice developed in 
Ceva (2016). However, see also Ceva’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 8).
9 In her contribution to this volume (Chapter 7), Denise Meyerson also provides a 
detailed argument against instrumentalist, outcome-based accounts of the value 
of procedures.
10 In her contribution to this volume (Chapter 8), Ceva provides a more detailed 
analysis of due process in legal contexts as an instantiation of interactive justice.
11 For Ceva’s critique of expressivism, see Ceva (2016, pp. 82–84). Her argument 
for intrinsic proceduralism is developed in detail in Ceva (2016, esp. pp. 92–107). 
See also her contribution to this volume (Chapter 8).
12 Some of the discussion in the following section draws on material in Meyerson 
and Mackenzie (2018).
13 Drawing on Darwall’s work, in her contribution to this volume (Chapter 10), 
Natalie Stoljar argues that racial profiling constitutes a form of both recognition 
and appraisal disrespect. Racial profiling provides a salient example of why rela-
tional theories of justice should attend not just to second-personal interactions 
but the way these interactions are shaped by dynamics of social power.
14 See also the findings of empirical studies reported in Tyler (2001 and 2009), 
which indicate that perceived quality of treatment is directly linked to the extent 
to which members of minority groups are supportive of law and legal authorities.
15 See Ceva’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 8).
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Part IV
Implications and applications





It seems intuitive to many people that racial profiling is morally repugnant. A 
2017 report of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Under Suspicion, calls 
racial profiling an ‘insidious and particularly damaging type of racial discrimina-
tion that relates to notions of safety and security’ (p. 9). The report details the 
daily reality of racial profiling for members of Indigenous communities, Muslims, 
Arabs, West Asians, and Canadians of African descent. It includes a wide range 
of phenomena under ‘racial profiling’, such as surveillance in retail or airport 
security that disproportionately affects members of minority groups, suspicion 
and prejudice directed towards Indigenous people by child protection services, 
and the criminalisation of racialised youth in policing. The focus of the philo-
sophical literature is often narrower and limited to racial profiling in law enforce-
ment. Following this literature, I adopt the definition that ‘racial profiling’ is ‘any 
police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin, and not 
merely on the behaviour of an individual’ (Risse & Zeckhauser 2004, p. 136).2
David Harris (2017) describes three waves of racial and ethnic profiling in 
criminal contexts (in the United States in particular). The first refers to poli-
cies developed in the 1980s and 1990s targeting drug crimes that concentrated 
on highway traffic stops of Black and Hispanic men; the second is the profiling 
of Arabs and people of Middle Eastern appearance after the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001; and the third is the more recent targeting in the United 
States of people of Hispanic descent who appear to be undocumented or ‘illegal’ 
immigrants (Harris 2017, pp. 120–124). It is important to note that profiling 
need not be de jure, namely sanctioned by an explicit law or policy. It can also 
occur de facto without authorisation of the state, due to racist implementation of 
policies, implicit racial biases or even unintentional microaggressions (cf. Hosein 
2018, p. e3).3
Philosophers classify racial profiling as discrimination because it constitutes 
disadvantageous differential treatment of people who are profiled relative to peo-
ple who are not profiled (Lippert-Rasmussen 2013, Chapter 12; Eidelson 2015, 
Chapter 7). It also counts as group discrimination because it is disadvantageous 
differential treatment on the basis of perceived group identity (Lippert-Rasmussen 
2013, p. 273). Discrimination can be direct or indirect; it can be the result of an 
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explicitly discriminatory policy, or of a facially neutral policy that has a differential 
impact on minority groups (Khaitan 2018). Stop-and-frisk, or the ‘Terry stop’, 
is an ostensibly neutral policy allowing police to stop and search people whom 
they reasonably suspect have committed, are committing, or will commit a crime 
(Torres 2015, p. 932). However, empirical evidence about racial disparities in the 
implementation of the Terry stop shows that it is indirectly discriminatory. From 
2004 to 2012 in New York, 83% of those stopped under stop-and-frisk were 
Black and Hispanic (Torres 2015, pp. 933–934).
On most philosophical analyses, neither racial discrimination nor racial profiling 
is immoral by definition. There is also no consensus in the philosophical literature 
that racial profiling is morally wrong. On the contrary, profiling has seemed to be 
warranted on the basis of statistical correlations between criminality and people of 
certain racial or ethnic backgrounds. As Mathias Risse and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
put it, ‘racial profiling assumes certain crimes are committed disproportionately by 
certain racial groups. Hence special efforts at crime reduction directed at mem-
bers of such groups are justified, if not required’ (2004, p. 144). Racial profiling 
is ‘rational’ if it increases the number of criminals caught by the police, reduces 
overall criminal activity, and therefore promotes the important public good of 
security.4 However, this does not settle the question of whether profiling is mor-
ally permissible. Despite being beneficial for crime reduction, there may be sig-
nificant costs that outweigh the benefits. In addition, or alternatively, profiling 
may be impermissible for non-consequentialist reasons: it may violate rights or be 
inconsistent with the obligation of the state to treat all citizens with equal respect.
The first goal of this chapter is to employ procedural justice theory to exam-
ine consequentialist arguments for and against the morality of racial profiling. 
Procedural justice focuses on the interpersonal or process-related aspects of laws 
and policies that obtain independently of and in addition to the outcome-related 
aspects (Tyler 1990, p. 7). Tom R. Tyler calls this:
the normative perspective on procedural justice, [which] views people as 
being concerned with aspects of their experience not linked only to out-
comes. Normative aspects of experience include neutrality, lack of bias, hon-
esty, efforts to be fair, politeness, and respect for citizens’ rights. 
(Tyler 1990, p. 7)
For instance, groups that are targeted by profiling experience both the policy 
itself, and the specific police–citizen interactions that occur when it is imple-
mented, as biased, unfair, and disrespectful. Tyler and his colleagues argue that 
such experiences lead to loss of trust in the police and a perception that the crimi-
nal justice system is illegitimate, which in turn reduces compliance (e.g. Tyler 
2006, p. 379). Reducing compliance with law will inhibit overall security and 
hence undermine the very goals that profiling aims to achieve. Therefore, con-
siderations from procedural justice call arguments for racial profiling (that puta-
tively establish its rationality) into question. They also reinforce consequentialist 
arguments against profiling. Consequentialist arguments focus on weighing 
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outcomes: the benefits of reducing crime are weighed against the costs of con-
tributing to racism. One prominent argument claims that, in an already-racist 
society, the small additional contribution of racial profiling to racism will be out-
weighed by the benefit of promoting security (Risse & Zeckhauser 2004, p. 147). 
But once we recognise the magnitude of the process-related harms experienced 
by members of profiled groups, this argument is no longer plausible.5
The second goal is to develop a new, non-consequentialist objection to racial 
profiling. I argue that profiling constitutes disrespectful treatment and therefore 
violates the state’s obligation to treat citizens with equal respect. The procedural 
justice literature is important for this argument as well. There is evidence that 
when people think that the procedures used to enforce laws or policies are unfair, 
this negatively affects their sense of self-worth and self-respect (e.g. Meyerson 
2015, pp. 258–259). This raises the question of whether profiling constitutes dis-
respectful discriminatory treatment. Does the experience of profiled groups that 
they are being treated unfairly and disrespectfully track actual disrespectful treat-
ment by police or by the state? If so, this would provide a non-consequentialist 
or deontological objection to racial profiling. Many philosophers nonetheless dis-
miss the deontological argument.6 In particular, despite arguing that the moral 
wrongness of core racial discrimination can be traced to disrespectful treatment, 
Benjamin Eidelson (2015) claims that racial profiling itself is not disrespectful in 
the relevant sense. My goal is to counter this argument and show that profiling 
constitutes disrespectful treatment.
Section 10.2 addresses the consequentialist arguments for and against racial 
profiling. I argue that the procedural justice notion of legitimacy undermines the 
rationality argument for profiling. I also identify the costs of racial profiling and 
suggest that process-related harms are an important component of these costs. I 
conclude that there is no convincing justification for profiling on consequential-
ist grounds. In Section 10.3, I explain Eidelson’s argument that racial profiling 
does not constitute disrespectful treatment. The argument turns on a distinction 
between ‘basic disrespect’ and ‘conventional disrespect’. The former corresponds 
to Stephen Darwall’s notion of recognition disrespect, namely, failure to appropri-
ately take account of a person’s normative standing in moral deliberation (Darwall 
1977). Eidelson claims that profiling perpetuates racist social meanings (generali-
sations that associate racialised groups with criminality), which are conventionally 
disrespectful to racialised groups. However, by hypothesis, racial profiling is based 
on true statistical correlations between these racialised groups and criminality, 
and hence does not convey an attitude of basic disrespect (Eidelson 2015, p. 86). 
Section 10.4 challenges this argument. I agree that racial profiling is convention-
ally disrespectful; it contributes to conventional meanings that are racist and hence 
is morally problematic on consequentialist grounds. However, this does not pre-
clude the possibility that it also corresponds to basic disrespect. I propose that 
profiling functions as a particular form of generalisation called a ‘striking-property 
generic’ (Leslie 2007, 2008, 2017). On Sarah-Jane Leslie’s analysis, striking prop-
erty generics make claims about the natures of the members of the groups they 
describe. I argue that attributing criminality by nature to members of profiled 
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groups is both a violation of recognition respect—it makes a moral mistake about 
the normative status of members of profiled groups—and an unjustified violation 
of a second form of respect, appraisal respect (Darwall 1977).
10.2  Consequentialist arguments and procedural justice
Some philosophers maintain that the adverse consequences of profiling are not 
significant enough to establish that it is unethical. Risse and Zeckhauser (2004) 
assume that profiling is rational and offer a ‘qualified defence’ of its moral permis-
sibility; they claim that the costs to targeted groups are likely to be minimal and 
hence do not outweigh the beneficial consequences of reducing crime. David 
Boonin’s (2011) ‘reluctant defence’ is more circumspect, arguing that profiling 
is sometimes rational and sometimes not (p. 326). However, for Boonin, the 
costs of profiling are all reducible to subjective responses on the part of members 
of profiled groups. These types of costs are neither weighty enough nor well-
justified enough to override the presumed benefits. In this section, I revisit the 
rationality and morality arguments in the light of procedural justice theory.
10.2.1  The rationality argument
The claim that profiling is rational constitutes the first step in a broadly con-
sequentialist defence of racial profiling. For the sake of argument, I accept the 
assumption that there are non-spurious, statistical correlations between certain 
racialised groups and rates of criminality.7 Does profiling these groups in fact 
reduce criminal activity and promote the public good of security? According to 
one prominent argument, the answer is no. Harris points to empirical evidence 
about ‘hit rates’, the ‘rate at which officers’ activity results in the recovery of 
contraband or guns, the detection of other offenses, the making of arrests, or the 
writing of summonses’ (Harris 2017, pp. 138–139, Harris 2002, pp. 79–80). The 
evidence suggests that whereas people in minority groups are stopped by police 
at a higher rate than whites, the hit rate for these groups (e.g. for possession of 
contraband or weapons) is lower than it is for whites (Harris 2017, p. 138). This 
seems to establish that racial profiling is less successful at apprehending criminals 
than random searches.
It has been suggested, however, that the hit rates argument is inconclusive.8 
I therefore propose an alternative reason to question the rationality of profiling. 
Consider the idea of legitimacy in procedural justice theory. Legitimacy corre-
sponds to citizens’ beliefs that an authority’s power is legitimate and exercised 
in ways that are appropriate (Tyler 2006, p. 377). It includes the sense that one 
ought to obey the directives of the authority. According to scholars of procedural 
justice, when law and other authorities are perceived as legitimate, compliance 
will be achieved without coercion or incentives that are in citizens’ self-interest. 
The contrary is also true: when authorities are perceived as unfair and illegitimate, 
compliance will be undermined. Since racial profiling is perceived by targeted 
groups as unfairly singling them out, compliance is therefore likely to be eroded. 
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Indeed, this is recognised by the police themselves. In describing attempts of 
advocates of tighter immigration controls to involve local police in their efforts, 
Harris (2017) says,
Local police … understood that becoming adjunct forces to federal deporta-
tion efforts would cause their own immigrant communities—both undocu-
mented and documented people—to fear involvement with them. That fear 
would cause people to avoid calling police with reports of crime for fear 
of bringing immigration policing into any given situation. This would give 
predators in the community—robbers, killers, domestic-violence perpetra-
tors, even child molesters—free rein. 
(Harris 2017, p. 124)
Rick Trinkner, Jonathan Jackson, and Tom R. Tyler (2018) identify an additional 
concern: citizens’ sense of the legitimacy of an authority is not limited to the 
‘how’ of the exercise of the authority’s power, but also extends to the ‘when’ 
and ‘where’ of its exercise—that is, to the citizen’s perception of the appropriate 
boundaries of the power being exercised (2018, p. 282). For instance, in discuss-
ing the Terry stop, these authors note that:
some citizens are not only concerned about the manner in which the police 
conduct such stops, but also question whether the police have the right to 
enter individuals’ personal space. 
(2018, p. 282)
Thus, racial profiling is likely to undermine legitimacy due to the perception 
that it unfairly singles out profiled groups and its implementation exceeds the 
boundaries of the legitimate authority of the police.
Advocates of the rationality of profiling assume a simple proposition, namely, 
that profiling groups who disproportionately engage in criminal activity will 
reduce crime and promote security, including for the targeted groups themselves. 
Evidence about how profiling affects legitimacy within targeted communities calls 
this conclusion into question. If profiling generates fear, distrust, and the sense 
that law enforcement is illegitimate, this is likely to reduce compliance and hence 
make policing such communities much more difficult. Even if we assume for the 
sake of argument that profiling leads to the apprehension of more criminals, this 
is not the only dimension to be considered when assessing its rationality. Any 
small reduction in criminal activity is likely to be offset by a substantial increase 
in non-compliance within profiled communities. Thus, overall, it is unlikely that 
profiling will achieve its stated aims of promoting security.
10.2.2  The morality argument
Even if profiling turns out to be rational, this does not settle the question of 
whether it is morally permissible. I now turn to the arguments offered by Risse 
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and Zeckhauser (2004) and Boonin (2011) claiming that the costs of profiling 
do not outweigh the benefit of promoting security. Risse and Zeckhauser classify 
racial profiling as an ‘expressive’ harm, which corresponds to either a ‘reminder 
of other painful events or practice ... or a focal point for events or practices, a 
symbol of structural disadvantage or mistreatment’ (2004, p. 147). A focal point 
becomes ‘associated with harm [that] plausibly accounts for the lion’s share of 
the harm associated with that practice’ (2004, p. 147). Risse and Zeckhauser ask 
how much better off ‘African Americans would be if we just got rid of profiling, 
keeping everything else fixed. We think that the answer is “only slightly so”’ 
(2004, p. 149).9 Thus, underlying racism is responsible for the harm suffered by 
minority groups and racial profiling is a mere focal point. Any additional harm 
due to profiling in an already-racist society is negligible and insufficient to out-
weigh the benefits to security.
Boonin argues that the costs of profiling are all reducible to the negative reac-
tions of members of profiled groups. He claims that this type of cost, although 
not negligible, is insufficient to outweigh the benefits.10 The costs identified by 
Boonin include direct costs, such as feeling ‘distressed, upset, degraded, angry, 
and outraged at being targeted by race for investigation, at least in part, because 
of the color of [one’s] skin’, and indirect costs, such as reluctance to move around 
freely in certain neighbourhoods and distrust of the police and criminal justice 
system (2011, p. 337). Boonin claims that all the costs arise from the negative 
reactions of members of profiled groups and that the negative reactions of people 
subject to a policy do not generate a moral reason against it: ‘[a] moral objection 
to racial profiling should give us a reason to be outraged by the policy, not a rea-
son to think that people will be outraged by it’ (Boonin 2011, p. 340).
These arguments misrepresent, respectively, the extent and the type of harm 
suffered by profiled groups. As others have pointed out (Lever 2005; Eidelson 
2015; Hosein 2018), the harms of profiling are not always psychological. Even 
when they are, they are significant and not reducible to mere negative reactions. 
The profiling of minority groups leads to a wide variety of harms: it exacerbates 
the subordination and unequal status of minority groups, inflicts stigma and rep-
utational harm, and contributes to psychological harms such as diminished self-
worth and an insecure sense of social identity. For example, the Ontario Report 
points out that profiling leads to inequality, such as the overrepresentation of 
minority groups in prisons.11 The report explains that,
Racial profiling by law enforcement can have far-reaching impacts that go 
beyond the specific incident. For example, racial profiling may contribute to 
the overrepresentation of racialized and Indigenous peoples in the criminal 
justice system, beginning with racial differences in stop and search practices. 
Involvement with the criminal justice system can lead to loss of connections 
with families and communities, and loss of opportunities for employment, 
education and social mobility. This exacerbates existing systemic racial barri-
ers for racialized and Indigenous peoples in society. 
(OHRC 2017, p. 85)
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Profiling also contributes to racial inequalities by perpetuating conventional 
meanings that associate minority groups with criminality. As Annabelle Lever 
puts it, racial profiling reinforces ‘odious claims about immorality and criminal-
ity’ and ‘white tendencies to draw invidious and complacent racial distinctions’ 
(2005, p. 97). This will perpetuate the racism that affects all members of profiled 
groups even if they are never profiled themselves (Eidelson 2015, p. 207).
Further, racial profiling causes significant psychological harms, such as extreme 
anxiety, humiliation, and alienation. One member of a profiled group describes 
her reaction as follows:
I live in fear for my black son, I experience sickening levels of anxiety if I text 
him or call him and [he] does [not] respond within 30 minutes or so. I feel 
bad that I have put my black children under surveillance in order to protect 
them from the system that is supposed to protect them (Black female, age 
35–44). 
(OHRC 2017, p. 86)
Profiling is perceived to place a disproportionate burden on minority groups and 
hence to be unfair, which—as procedural justice theory has extensively docu-
mented will compound the psychological harm. The perception of fair treatment 
by authorities promotes positive attitudes of self-worth and self-respect, and a 
secure sense of one’s own social identity (Meyerson 2015, pp. 258–259). As 
Denise Meyerson explains,
the empirical findings … show that a key factor in developing and maintain-
ing a favourable social identity is the perception that one has status within 
one’s group and, furthermore, that when authorities treat people in ways 
that are interpersonally satisfactory, this sends the message that they have 
status within their group.12 
(Meyerson 2015, p. 258)
Interpersonal treatment that is perceived to be biased, unfair, and disrespectful 
will have the opposite effect. Racial profiling is therefore likely to have extensive 
negative consequences including undermining self-worth and self-respect, desta-
bilising social identity, and producing a sense of inferior social status.13
It is implausible therefore to construe the harms of profiling as either ‘expres-
sive’ of underlying racism and thus minimal, or of a type that is insufficiently 
weighty to be included in moral argument. Boonin (2011) is correct that subjec-
tive outrage or offence in response to some policy is insufficient on its own to 
provide a moral argument against it (p. 340). But his position conflates an offence 
argument with a harm argument. The negative psychological effects inflicted on 
the targets of profiling should not be equated with a subjective sense of offence or 
even outrage that is felt in response to a policy with which one does not agree. In 
short, the combined costs of profiling are likely to outweigh any benefits.14 The 
remaining question is whether there is a plausible non-consequentialist objection 
220 Natalie Stoljar 
to racial profiling in addition to the consequentialist ones. Does racial profiling, 
independently of its consequences, constitute disrespectful treatment of racialised 
minorities by the state?
10.3  Eidelson’s argument: profiling and disrespect
Eidelson claims that profiling is not disrespectful in a ‘basic’ sense. Although the 
wrong-making feature of core cases of racial discrimination is disrespectful treat-
ment, racial profiling is an exception because it is not a violation of what Darwall 
calls ‘recognition respect’ (Darwall 1977). Racial profiling is based on statistical 
correlations, not on a mistake about the personhood of the recipient. Eidelson 
(2015) observes that it ‘seems foolish to deny that there are often genuine cor-
relations between certain perceptual features, such as race or sex, and other rel-
evant traits, including some forms of criminality’ (p. 175). Hence, on Eidelson’s 
account, racial profiling based on genuine statistical correlations does not display 
the attitude necessary for disrespectful treatment. This section outlines Eidelson’s 
argument in detail. The argument turns on a distinction between profiling as an 
attitude of basic disrespect and profiling as contributing to conventionally disrespectful 
social meanings. Eidelson rejects the former and therefore the possibility of a non-
consequentialist argument based on recognition respect. He nevertheless adopts 
the latter to argue that profiling is impermissible for consequentialist reasons.
Eidelson considers racial profiling as a case study of racial discrimination. The 
conceptual analysis of discrimination should be distinguished from its wrong-
making features. He says, ‘discrimination is best seen as a very general kind of 
act—one that is only sometimes wrong. Acts fitting within that type may be 
wrong in different cases for different reasons’ (Eidelson 2015, p. 73). Eidelson 
claims, however, that ‘core’ cases of discrimination are wrong for non-conse-
quentialist reasons. Suppose a person is denied a job purely on the basis of their 
race (or other arbitrary personal characteristic), but finds a better one immedi-
ately afterwards. Eidelson argues that the wrong is not just a ‘contingent’ mat-
ter, as it would be on a consequentialist analysis. Rather, our moral intuitions 
imply that such cases are ‘intrinsically’ wrong—that there is an objective basis of 
the wrongness independently of contingent effects. The objective basis in core 
cases of racial discrimination is a violation of recognition respect. Eidelson (2015) 
explains that,
the relevant sort of respect—recognition respect for someone’s standing as a 
person—imposes an affirmative obligation that one take to heart the various 
normative upshots of … being a person and regulate one’s action accord-
ingly. On this view, what matters is how an agent deliberates, rather than the 
social meaning of her act. But her deliberation is rendered morally defective 
not merely by the presence by some positive factor of animus or a discrimi-
natory belief, but by the absence of appropriate recognition of someone’s 
personhood whether that absence comes about willfully or by neglect. 
(pp. 74–75)
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Thus, Eidelson (following Darwall) offers a ‘deliberative’ conception of respect. This 
should be distinguished from two other possible conceptions: (i) a ‘mental state’ 
conception on which a necessary condition of disrespectful treatment is contempt 
or animus for the targeted group; and (ii) an expressivist conception on which a 
sufficient condition for an agent to express disrespectful treatment is for that agent 
to express a disrespectful conventional meaning through actions or words.15 The 
expressivist conception takes exemplars of racial discrimination, for instance, the 
1890 Louisiana law that prohibited people of different races from travelling together 
on trains,16 to be wrongful, not because they are the result of hostile racist intent, but 
because the meaning they express is morally unacceptable.17 Different expressivist 
views explain the wrong-making feature in different ways. For instance, such treat-
ment may constitute an insult, ‘an expression of the view that certain people are infe-
rior or socially unacceptable’ (Scanlon 1998, p. 72); or it may convey a demeaning 
message which is disrespectful ‘in an especially strong way [because it is] an expres-
sion of a lack of respect for the equal humanity of the other’ (Hellman 2008, p. 36).
Eidelson unpacks the relations between the different conceptions of respect as 
follows. Disrespect on the mental state conception is an example of basic disre-
spect on the deliberative conception because deliberation can be morally defec-
tive as a result of racist animus or a racist belief. On the other hand, expressive 
disrespect is not equivalent to basic disrespect on the deliberative conception. 
Engaging in action that corresponds to a demeaning conventional meaning is 
not sufficient on its own for the attitude of basic disrespect. This is because, on 
expressive views, the presence of certain social conventions is sufficient for dis-
respect to be displayed and hence expressivist views effectively render the moral 
wrongness of discrimination a contingent matter. For example, failing to shake 
someone’s hand in a culture when this is required by norms of courtesy is taken to 
be disrespectful just because it expresses an insulting or disrespectful social mean-
ing (Anderson & Pildes 2000, pp. 1512–1513, quoted in Eidelson 2015, p. 86). 
Eidelson argues that although this might be conventionally disrespectful, it does 
not correspond to an attitude of basic disrespect. He explains that,
one can act disrespectfully by unwittingly failing to integrate someone’s 
standing as a person in one’s practical deliberation … But one does not fail 
to satisfy the relevant criteria simply by acting in ways that are conventionally 
disrespectful, such as failing to shake someone’s hand in a culture with which 
one may be unfamiliar. To disrespect someone is to fail to take account of 
the normative significance of some facet of her moral standing; and it is just 
not up to a culture to decide what constitutes such a failure. 
(Eidelson 2015, p. 86)
The implication of Eidelson’s analysis is that racial profiling is not disrespectful in 
an ‘intrinsic’ sense on any of the three conceptions of respect. Racial profiling is 
not disrespectful on the mental state conception because it need not and typically 
does not rely on racist animus or contempt. It is not disrespectful on the delib-
erative conception because the associations on which racial profiling is based, 
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such as ‘Blacks are more likely to be drug couriers’, are non-spurious statistical 
correlations. There are ‘genuine correlations between certain perceptual features, 
such as race or sex, and other relevant traits, including some forms of criminality’ 
(Eidelson 2015, p. 175). Hence, racial profiling cannot be traced to a mistake in 
practical reasoning about the moral status of the profiled groups. Finally, racial 
profiling is not disrespectful in the basic sense on the expressive conception. Even 
if profiling were to convey an insulting or demeaning social meaning, this would 
be due to contingent circumstances only and would constitute at most ‘conven-
tional disrespect’. It would not correspond to the basic or intrinsic disrespect that 
is the wrong-making feature of core cases of racial discrimination.
Although Eidelson rejects the conclusion that racial profiling constitutes an 
attitude of basic disrespect, he argues that profiling is impermissible on conse-
quentialist grounds. In particular, profiling contributes to racist social meanings 
that inflict ‘broad’ social harm on members of profiled groups even absent actual 
encounters with police (2015, p. 197). This ‘Broad Harm Argument’18 first dis-
tinguishes profiling from ‘suspect descriptions’, individualised descriptions based 
on evidence about the actual perpetrator of a crime (2015, pp. 178 ff.). Unlike 
profiling, the use of suspect descriptions is often taken to be morally acceptable 
(2015, p. 178). For example, Harris says that,
The state—through its agents, the police—has the power to step in to inves-
tigate and prevent crime, but … must meet legal standards that require some 
amount of evidence stemming from the personal conduct of the suspect, or 
because they match the appearance of a perpetrator (in a somewhat detailed, 
not general, way) witnessed by others. 
(Harris 2017, p. 137)
For Eidelson the morally relevant distinction between uses of profiling and sus-
pect descriptions is that the former ‘derive all their force’ (2015, p. 182) from 
generalisations about the whole group, whereas the latter do not.
Consider Eidelson’s examples. Suppose a redheaded person is observed flee-
ing the scene of a crime and the police stop all redheaded people in the vicinity. 
The justification for stopping redheaded people is that having red hair (matching 
the suspect description) increases the probability that the stopped person is the 
perpetrator. The suspect description (‘being redheaded’) does not rely on any 
generalisation that connects being redheaded to criminality. Indeed, redheads 
as a group may in fact commit fewer crimes than other groups (2015, p. 183). 
Now suppose the police stop people of Middle Eastern appearance because of the 
(putative) statistical correlation between being Middle Eastern and being a ter-
rorist. Unlike the evidence on which suspect descriptions are based, the evidence 
for racial profiling is non-individualised because,
if nothing further is known about the [unidentified] terrorist, the criteria 
used to identify him in particular may derive all of their force from generali-
zations about the whole class of people who commit terrorist acts. 
(2015, p. 182)
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Suspect descriptions and profiling are morally distinct because,
when we scrutinize someone because of a suspect description rather than a 
profile, we effectively dilute the inference from possessing a particular trait to 
criminality by introducing a mediating factor of personal identity.19
(2015, p. 187)
Eidelson therefore claims that the moral harm of profiling is its perpetuation of 
social meanings that are generalisations associating whole racialised groups with 
criminality. This is, however, a contingent effect of profiling not an example of 
‘intrinsic’ or basic disrespectful treatment.
On Eidelson’s argument, the problematic generalisations conveyed by profil-
ing are at most conventionally disrespectful. There is no ‘intrinsic’ or objective 
basis for the wrongness of these generalisations that is independent of the con-
tingent (and historically racist) association between racialised groups and crimi-
nality. In the next section, I develop an argument based on striking property 
generics to challenge this claim. For now, let me briefly mention two prima facie 
reasons to question Eidelson’s conclusion. First, as noted by procedural justice 
theory, people have ‘normative experiences’ in response to the procedures used 
by the state to achieve its ends; they can be perceived as biased and disrespectful 
of citizens’ rights (Tyler 1990, p. 7). Even if people endorse the goal of racial 
profiling (that is, to promote security), being stopped by police for no reason 
except skin colour (which often occurs for instance to Black drivers of expensive 
cars)20 is experienced as disrespectful because,
it undermines and calls into question everything you’ve accomplished in 
your life, everything you’ve worked for. No matter how hard you’ve worked, 
no matter what you do … you’re treated like a common criminal. 
(quoted in Eidelson 2015, p. 205)
The experience of citizens provides some evidence, albeit defeasible evidence, 
that the encounters with police that occur in profiling constitute actual disre-
spectful treatment. In addition, one may wonder whether Eidelson’s insistence 
that there is an intrinsic wrong-making feature of core cases of racial discrimi-
nation could be applied to racial profiling itself. Subjecting innocent people to 
stop-and-frisk on the basis of arbitrary personal characteristics seems wrong even 
absent historically racist associations between the characteristic and criminality. 
For instance, suppose there are statistical correlations between certain types of 
criminality and being redheaded, being white, or being male.21 Since there are no 
problematic social meanings that associate these characteristics with criminality, 
would profiling on the basis of these characteristics be permissible?
10.4  Profiling and generics
Drawing on the lessons of procedural justice research, I return in this section to 
the attitudes inherent in the police–citizen encounter. Eidelson’s argument that 
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profiling contributes to conventionally disrespectful racist generalisations does 
not preclude the possibility that the encounter is also disrespectful in a basic 
sense. I propose three arguments for the claim that racial profiling constitutes 
an attitude of disrespect. First, in addition to the conventional generalisations 
identified by Eidelson and the statistical generalisations on which profiling is 
based, there is a third form of generalisation, a ‘striking property generic’, that 
is relevant to the morality of profiling. I argue that racial profiling conveys strik-
ing property generics that implicitly attribute a negative property by nature to 
members of profiled groups (Leslie 2017).22 Since this is a moral mistake about 
their personhood, it is inconsistent with recognition respect and therefore consti-
tutes a kind of basic disrespect. Second, in permitting racial profiling policies, the 
police and the state disregard the perpetuation of the racist conventional mean-
ings identified by Eidelson. The attitude of indifference towards the perpetuation 
of racist meanings that attribute criminality to minority groups also constitutes 
basic disrespect. Third, there is a second form of disrespect, ‘appraisal disrespect’, 
that often occurs as a result of racial profiling. Appraisal respect is an attitude of 
‘positive appraisal of a person or his qualities’ (Darwall 1977, p. 39). Whereas 
recognition respect is a moral requirement and hence recognition disrespect 
is always morally wrong, negative appraisal may in some instances be justified, 
namely when a person’s merits do not warrant an attitude of positive appraisal. 
However, since racial profiling mostly targets innocent people just on the basis of 
their group identity, racial profiling corresponds to unjustified negative appraisal, 
or disrespect.
Sarah-Jane Leslie’s work provides an illuminating account of the psychology 
and the semantics of generalisations or ‘generics’ (Leslie 2007, 2008, 2017). 
Generics attribute a trait to a category in general without employing the quanti-
fiers ‘all’, ‘some’, or ‘many’, such as ‘Scots drink Iron Brew’ or ‘Sharks attack 
surfers’.23 Leslie claims that the cognitive mechanism that forms generics is ‘prim-
itive’ and is ‘our most basic and immediate means of obtaining information about 
categories’ (2007, pp. 383–384). The mechanism forms generalisations in three 
ways that correspond to different types of generics. First, the mechanism makes 
‘neutral’ generalisations that rely on statistical information about the possession 
of the trait by members of the kind: ‘Scots drink Iron Brew’ or ‘Cars have radios’ 
are true only because a majority of members of the kind possess the trait. Second, 
generics can be formed in the absence of evidence that the majority of members 
of the kind have the property if the property is considered to be characteristic of 
the kind. For example, reproduction is a characteristic of animal kinds in general 
and egg-laying is a characteristic of the particular animal kind ‘duck’. Speakers 
assent to ‘ducks lay eggs’ despite the fact that only female ducks lay eggs (Leslie 
2008, pp. 32–33).24
For purposes of the argument here, I focus on the third category, ‘striking 
property generics’, such as ‘Sharks attack surfers’ or ‘Blacks are violent’. These 
attribute ‘harmful, dangerous, or appalling properties to the kind … the sort 
of property of which one would be well served to be forewarned’ (Leslie 2008, 
p. 15). Like characteristic generics, their truth does not require a majority of 
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members of the kind to exemplify the property. Indeed, we often assent to strik-
ing property generics even when there are only a small number of instances of a 
kind that possess the property. Less than 1% of mosquitoes carry the West Nile 
virus yet we take the generic ‘Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus’ to be true; 
only a small number of sharks have attacked surfers, yet we take ‘Sharks attack 
surfers’ to be true, and so forth. Leslie argues that the formation of these gener-
ics is due to an ‘unreflective’ and ‘pervasive’ cognitive tendency to make gen-
eralisations about both the natural and the social world (2017, pp. 398–403). 
She proposes that when we encounter harmful or appalling properties, ‘we seek 
to generalize the property to a kind whose members are disposed to manifest 
it’ and that this requires essentialising the kind—that is, tacitly positing ‘that 
there is some hidden, nonobvious, and persistent property or underlying nature 
shared by members of that kind that causally grounds their common properties 
and dispositions’ (2017, p. 405). Leslie’s proposal about the truth conditions of 
striking property generics is that they are true if and only if there is at least one 
instance of the kind that has the property and the kind is an essentialised kind, 
i.e. members of the kind are disposed by nature to have the property (2017, 
p. 404). Therefore, the generic ‘Sharks attack surfers’ is true because some sharks 
have attacked surfers and all sharks have a tendency to attack surfers due to their 
underlying nature.
It is especially important to note that Leslie’s psychological picture applies 
to the social world. There are numerous historical examples of the formation of 
striking property generics in social contexts (Leslie 2017, pp. 398–403). As Leslie 
notes, ‘the “introduction” conditions ... are very undemanding when it comes to 
how prevalent the property has to be in the general population’ (2017, p. 397). 
People regularly assent to striking property generics about social kinds—‘Blacks 
are criminals’ or ‘Muslims are terrorists’—because of a primitive cognitive ten-
dency to form striking property generics when confronted by harmful, danger-
ous properties. The undemanding introduction conditions are easily satisfied in 
racist background conditions, which already include implicit biases and historical 
tropes that connect minorities with criminality.25 Even the presence of exceptions 
will not block the formation of these generics. Leslie argues that the cognitive 
mechanism of generalisation is unaffected by the simple fact of ‘negative coun-
terinstances’ (there are many Muslims who are not terrorists) and will be under-
mined only when the members of the kind who are exceptions display a ‘positive 
alternative property’ (2007, p. 385). It is plausible that in societies that are both 
racist and highly segregated (in which for instance members of the majority rarely 
encounter Muslims), there will be little evidence available to the majority that 
members of the minority have positive alternative properties.26 Hence, the lack of 
sufficient available evidence about the positive traits of minority groups will be an 
important additional factor in the formation of (false) striking property generics.
I now draw on both aspects of Leslie’s account—the psychology and the 
semantics—to argue that racial profiling is inconsistent with recognition respect. 
Consider first the psychological picture. When a racial profiling policy is intro-
duced, there will be little cognitive resistance to seeing it as anything other than 
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tacitly conveying a striking property generic. Although it purports to be a neutral 
crime-reduction strategy based on statistics, both the police who implement pro-
filing and the targeted person or group will be hard-pressed to differentiate the 
statistical rationale from a generic that attributes criminality. An especially impor-
tant aspect of Leslie’s psychological picture is her observation that the introduc-
tion conditions of striking property generics are undemanding. In racist social 
conditions, a racial profiling policy will itself contribute to the introduction con-
ditions because it will reinforce the already-present association between the pro-
filed group and the to-be-avoided property. As Adam Omar Hosein points out, 
a claim by the criminal justice system, that profiling is a neutral crime-reduction 
policy because it relies on statistical evidence about crime rates, could reason-
ably be treated as a sham (2018, p. e11)—especially because the state could have 
selected an alternative crime-reduction strategy, such as randomised screening, 
that genuinely is morally neutral.27
Suppose I am right that racial profiling tacitly conveys striking property gener-
ics due to the cognitive disposition to form these generics in precisely the circum-
stances in which racial profiling operates. Leslie’s conception of the semantics of 
these generics helps to shows that they, and hence racial profiling, violate recog-
nition respect. The crucial feature of striking-property generics is that they pick 
out essentialised kinds and attribute a disposition to have the negative property 
(i.e. criminality, being a terrorist) to the nature of each member of the kind. 
This is inconsistent with recognition respect because it is a moral mistake about 
the personhood of each profiled person (as well as about members of the whole 
group). Notice that, although social conditions might be required to trigger the 
formation of striking-property generics, once they are formed, they provide the 
objective basis of the wrongness of racial profiling. That is, the wrongness of 
profiling does not depend on the contingent effects of such generics. Notice, 
too, that the disrespect argument does not have to rely on Leslie’s (perhaps con-
troversial) analysis of the truth conditions of generics. Sally Haslanger develops a 
parallel account that relies on pragmatics rather than semantics. She claims that 
generics like ‘Blacks are criminals’ implicate, rather than assert, false claims about 
natures:
There is a set of problematic generics that introduce implicitly into the com-
mon ground a proposition about how ... blacks are by nature or intrinsically. 
These cases are problematic because the proposition introduced is false. 
(Haslanger 2011, p. 193)
The advantage of employing Haslanger’s approach is that it is compatible with 
saying that problematic striking-property generics are sometimes true. Suppose 
the criminal justice system insists that it is relying on true statistical generalisa-
tions about Muslims being more likely to engage in terrorism or Blacks being 
more likely to be drug dealers. The pragmatic implicature identified by Haslanger 
is compatible with the truth of these claims. Nevertheless, because the implica-
ture that is introduced by a racial profiling policy makes false claims about the 
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nature and personhood of Muslims or Black people, the policy is inconsistent 
with recognition respect.28
Let’s now turn to a second argument that racial profiling is inconsistent with 
recognition respect. Recall Eidelson’s conclusion that the wrongness of racial 
profiling is due to its contingent effects, namely its contribution to racist social 
meanings. He claims that therefore racial profiling is only conventionally disre-
spectful; it is not a mistake of practical deliberation but rather expresses a social 
meaning that is disrespectful in a racist cultural context. (In the same way, failing 
to shake someone’s hand might express disrespect in a culture, yet not corre-
spond to a failure of appropriate practical deliberation about a person’s normative 
status.) Eidelson does acknowledge, however, that indifference to and disregard 
for people’s normative standing will constitute recognition disrespect: ‘one can 
act disrespectfully by unwittingly failing to integrate someone’s standing as a 
person appropriately in one’s practical deliberation’ (2015, p. 86). I suggest that 
introducing de jure profiling or permitting de facto profiling corresponds precisely 
to this kind of disregard. Indifference on the part of the state towards the effect of 
policies in contributing to racist social meanings is itself equivalent to disregard-
ing the moral standing of such minority groups. This is especially true when these 
racist social meanings are, as I have just argued, indistinguishable from problem-
atic striking-property generics that attribute criminality by nature to members of 
the profiled group. This disregard on the part of the state in specific police–citizen 
encounters, or more generally, turns a violation of conventional disrespect into a 
violation of basic recognition disrespect. As Darwall puts it, ‘One is not free, from 
a moral point of view, to act as one pleases in matters which concern something 
which is an appropriate object of moral recognition respect’ (1977, p. 40).
Finally, there is another potential disrespect argument based on the second 
form of respect identified by Darwall, appraisal respect, which is an attitude of 
‘positive appraisal of a person or his qualities’ (1977, p. 39). Unlike recognition 
disrespect, appraisal disrespect is morally wrong only when it is unjustified. If 
someone actually has an evil character, it will be justified to negatively appraise 
his character. However, most people who are profiled are innocent; they are 
subjected to policies such as stop-and-frisk purely on the basis of their group 
membership or social identity. This relies neither on evidence from their own 
behaviour that they have engaged in criminal activity, nor even on individualised 
evidence about the perpetrator of the crime being investigated (that is, on a sus-
pect description).
Moreover, if I am right about the operation of striking-property generics in 
racial profiling, profiling conveys the generalisation that members of profiled 
groups are disposed to criminality by nature. It is obvious that this is a false and 
unjustified appraisal of their characters. In addition, a study by Leslie and her col-
leagues suggests that, once people assent to striking-property generics, they think 
that arbitrarily selected members of the kind are not only disposed by nature 
to have the relevant property but actually have it (Leslie 2017, pp. 397–398; 
Khemlani, Leslie, & Glucksberg 2012). This finding is a plausible explanation of 
why innocent people who are profiled experience it as disrespectful. They rightly 
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suspect that racial profiling conveys the unjustified assessment that they are actu-
ally a criminal. For these reasons, it is plausible to conclude that racial profiling 
conveys an attitude of unjustified appraisal disrespect in addition to constituting 
recognition disrespect.
10.5  Conclusion
This chapter has made a case for the moral impermissibility of racial profiling. 
I employed considerations about legitimacy from procedural justice theory to 
undermine arguments for the rationality of profiling. I also noted that process-
related harms, such as diminished self-respect, reinforce the consequentialist 
arguments against profiling. The main argument of the paper developed a non-
consequentialist objection to profiling. Being subjected to profiling, or being a 
member of a profiled group, generates the feeling that the criminal justice system 
is unfair and disrespectful. I argued that the feeling that it is disrespectful is justi-
fied; profiling actually does constitute disrespectful treatment. The argument does 
not imply, however, that racial profiling in all contexts is disrespectful, or that 
racial profiling that is disrespectful is always impermissible. For instance, racial 
profiling with the aim of promoting diversity in jury selection (Lever 2011), will 
not be based on false striking-property generics or negative appraisals of people’s 
characters and hence may well be morally unobjectionable.
Further, although I have not spelled out the implications of my argument for 
the obligations of the state, this chapter has shown only that de jure and de facto 
racial profiling violates a prima facie state obligation to treat people with respect. 
I have not shown that this obligation is absolute or always overriding, so it is 
possible that in some rare and unusual situations, the obligation will not obtain 
all things considered. In all standard situations, however, racial profiling will be 
morally impermissible.
Notes
1 This chapter has benefited from very helpful comments from Catriona Mackenzie, 
Denise Meyerson, and Therese MacDermott, as well as from members of audiences 
at Macquarie University, the University of Glasgow, and Western University, espe-
cially Sarah Armstrong, Andrew Botterell, Carolyn McLeod, and Rob Stainton.
2 A note on the term ‘race’: although there is philosophical debate about the term 
‘race’, I assume here what I take to be the consensus view that there no such thing 
as race as an intrinsic biological property of individuals. The term ‘race’ as I use it 
here is shorthand for perceived race or assumed race.
3 For a definition and discussion of microaggressions, see McTernan (2018).
4 Boonin clarifies the distinction between the rationality and morality arguments. 
Profiling can be ‘an effective public policy, and so in that sense a rational one’ 
(2011, p. 308). However, even if it is rational or ‘instrumentally useful’, [it] ‘could 
be unethical nonetheless and would merit rejection for that reason’ (2011, p. 308).
5 Eidelson makes a similar point under what he calls the ‘Narrow Harm Argument’. 
For example, he says that opponents of racial profiling ‘might do better to empha-
size simply how badly it hurts innocent people relative to the benefits it yields’ 
(2015, p. 206).
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6 Risse and Zeckhauser (2004) and Boonin (2011) both argue that profiling does 
not constitute a rights-violation, so there is no non-consequentialist objection 
to profiling. Lever (2005), Lippert-Rasmussen (2013) and Eidelson (2015) all 
argue against profiling on consequentialist grounds. As far as I know, Hosein’s 
(2018) defence of the position that racial profiling is an injustice is the only exam-
ple in the literature of a non-consequentialist critique.
7 Hosein points out that these statistical correlations can be challenged (Hosein 
2018, p. e4).
8 I cannot do justice here to Boonin’s extensive discussion of Harris’s hit rates argu-
ment (2011, pp. 314–323).
9 Risse and Zeckhauser’s expressive argument is extensively critiqued by Eidelson 
(2015, pp. 203–206). I have benefited immensely from his careful discussion of 
their view.
10 Boonin offers a second objection based on knowledge, which I do not address 
here (2011, p. 338).
11 Some authors argue that these kinds of negative consequences are due to police 
abuses in executing racial profiling rather than racial profiling itself (e.g. Risse and 
Zeckhauser 2004 discuss the potential abuses that occur in the context of profil-
ing). It is true that we should not conflate the negative consequences of police 
abuse with the negative consequences of profiling. However, it seems undeniable 
that profiling will lead to there being a greater number of encounters between 
police and minority groups than between police and whites. This in itself could 
lead to the consequences mentioned here, even if there is no police abuse in these 
encounters.
12 Meyerson is referring in particular to work by Tyler & Blader (2000).
13 See also Hosein’s recent argument that profiled minority groups have a ‘reason-
able sense of inferior political status’ (Hosein 2018).
14 My discussion does not cover all the consequentialist arguments against profiling 
in the literature, e.g. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2013, Chapter 7) proposes a 
critique of racial profiling drawing on G.A. Cohen’s ‘interpersonal test’.
15 For a more detailed discussion of the three approaches to characterising disre-
spectful treatment, see Beeghly (2018).
16 This law was challenged in the notorious United States Supreme Court case of 
Plessy v Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Homer Plessy, who was seven-eighths 
white (only his great grandmother was Black), had sat in a white car on a train.
17 Note that this understanding of ‘expressive’ is different from that of Risse and 
Zeckhauser (2004), discussed above.
18 Eidelson also develops a ‘Narrow Harm Argument’ against racial profiling; see 
footnote 5.
19 Although I cannot pursue this line of thought here, I do not wish to imply that 
the use of suspect descriptions is never morally problematic, even if it is less obvi-
ously problematic than racial profiling.
20 The Ontario Report points out that, in general, people risk being profiled when 
they are deemed to be doing something ‘out of place’ (OHRC 2017, p. 23).
21 Annabelle Lever considers this question using a hypothetical statistical correlation 
between being white and being a drunk driver (2017, p. 430).
22 There are alternative accounts of generics in the literature. See, e.g., the discussion 
in Haslanger (2011).
23 Most of the examples come from Leslie’s work or are variations on her examples. 
I thank Fiona Macpherson for the ‘Scots drink Iron Brew’ example.
24 See Haslanger (2011, pp. 184–185) for further discussion. Haslanger sug-
gests that there are some generics that do not fit neatly into Leslie’s taxonomy. 
Stereotypes such as ‘Women are submissive’ seem at first to be social generics 
that are taken to be true because they attribute a characteristic or typical trait to 
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the kind (i.e. they are analogous to ‘Ducks lay eggs’). However, Leslie’s analysis 
implies that speakers should not assent to ‘Women are submissive’ (as a character-
istic generic) because there are numerous women who have alternative positive 
traits (see Leslie 2007, p. 385, for an explanation). Perhaps then these generics 
are making normative not descriptive claims, such as that good examples of the 
kind ‘women’ are submissive (Haslanger 2011, p. 200). As Haslanger points out 
‘Women are submissive’ could also be a majority generic: if so, it would be true 
only if most women are in fact submissive.
25 I am grateful to members of the audience at Western University, especially Carolyn 
McLeod, for insisting on the role of implicit biases and other aspects of structural 
oppression in this argument.
26 Jennifer Saul points out that the generic ‘Muslims are terrorists’ is unlikely to be 
taken to be true in a majority Muslim society (Saul 2017).
27 Eidelson himself points to the difficulty of keeping the statistical rationale for 
profiling separate from an attribution of criminality by nature: ‘[T]he distinction 
between a trait’s making one (epistemically) more likely to be a drug courier, and 
its actually making one more likely to be a drug courier, is predictably lost on 
many people … adopting a profiling policy may encourage the familiar and hurt-
ful biases that attribute differences in rates of crime to deep-seated differences 
internal to the people involved, rather than to their social context’ (Eidelson 
2015, p. 210).
28 In a recent paper, Saul critiques the arguments due to Leslie and Haslanger that 
generics are ‘especially pernicious’ (Saul 2017). She argues that the focus on 
generics is misguided, and that the real problem is statements (whether generic 
or not) that have implicatures of irrelevant associations, e.g. between Blackness 
and criminality. Unfortunately, I cannot do justice to Saul’s argument in the space 
available here. I note, however, that it would be difficult to claim that the associa-
tions implicit in racial profiling policies between rates of criminality and certain 
social groups are irrelevant. It is precisely because these associations are (puta-
tively) based on genuine statistical correlations and deemed relevant that profiling 
is thought to be a worthwhile crime-reduction policy.
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11.1  Introduction1
When ‘procedural fairness’, ‘procedural justice’, or ‘procedural due process’ 
have been singled out as sites of theoretical inquiry, efforts have primarily been 
directed to identifying the value of observing this cardinal demand of fair treat-
ment within decision-making processes.2 Among administrative law scholars, 
responses to this question have especially emphasised the intrinsic value of rules 
of procedural fairness to honouring human dignity, as well as the consequential 
value of such observance to the efficiency of government decision-making.3 These 
responses have largely tracked the more general effort of philosophers to illumi-
nate the contribution of procedural fairness to ‘dignitarian’, ‘utilitarian’, or other 
‘outcome-based’ values across different legal contexts, with particular emphasis 
on the instrumental value of fair procedures to the realisation of substantive legal 
rights.4
The recent turn towards ‘relational’ approaches to procedural justice signals 
a new philosophical perspective among these established accounts of the value 
of procedurally fair treatment within decision-making processes. Drawing upon 
research in social psychology, relational theories seek to explain and justify the 
intrinsic value of procedures in terms of how they enhance the quality of inter-
personal interactions with individuals, groups and institutions (Meyerson & 
Mackenzie 2018, p. 6). Yet while the perspective might be new, relational theories 
share with established accounts a common background assumption: namely, that 
the legal form within which procedural justice carries its relevant value is an order 
of rules. This default to rules and the adjudicative processes that enliven them is 
hardly misguided. Adjudication based on the application of rules is ‘the charac-
teristically legal mode’ across criminal, civil and administrative decision-making 
processes (Galligan 1996, p. 24). Still, the virtually exclusive focus on rule-based 
orders within inquiry into the value of procedural fairness represents a significant 
limitation on the scope of analysis, and joins a wider tendency to assume the pres-
ence of rule-based orders as the focus of legal theoretical inquiry generally.
My aim in this chapter is to turn attention to a different legal form—
administrative discretion—with a view to addressing its relative neglect by scholars 
of procedural justice. Though my approach is distinctly relational in orientation, 
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Administrative discretion
my goal is not to offer a relational theory of procedural fairness with justifica-
tory or explanatory aims. Rather, my aim is to illuminate the significance of the 
relational dynamics carried by procedural fairness to the possibility of situating 
administrative discretion within a condition of the rule of law. Building on other 
work in which I have illuminated the centrality of procedure to an understanding 
of the rule of law as a practice of framing governing relationships by the authority 
of law, the argument I develop can be summarised as follows.
An administrative discretion is a distinctive legal form in which its repository 
is ‘free to make a choice between possible courses of action or inaction’ (Davis 
1969, p. 4). This core feature of administrative discretion carries important 
implications for the relationship between repository and subject that is convened 
and sustained through it. Above all, it causes the relational dynamics between 
repository and subject to be highly unpredictable. This unpredictability is in turn 
likely to be amplified in relation to those aspects of administrative discretion that 
address larger political or policy goals—such as considerations of the ‘public 
interest’—as contrasted with those aspects which attend solely to the subject’s 
individual circumstances.
Acknowledging these features of administrative discretion invites considera-
tion of the special contribution that observance of procedural fairness might 
make to correcting this relational unpredictability, and by extension, to situating 
administrative discretion within the relational conditions necessary for the rule 
of law. Examined from this wider perspective, the relational dynamics sustained 
by procedural fairness carry a significance beyond their contribution to treating 
that person fairly or with dignity within a decision-making process, important 
though that might be. On the account I develop here, these relational dynamics 
bear directly upon the fundamental question of whether what is constituted by 
an exercise of administrative discretion is recognisable as a governing relationship 
framed by the authority of law.
I begin in Section 11.2 by setting out the resources of legal theory from which 
I have developed my account of the importance of procedure within an under-
standing of the rule of law as a practice of framing governing relationships by the 
authority of law. These are drawn from insights of Lon Fuller’s jurisprudence of 
the ‘internal morality of law’ (Fuller 1969), and in particular from my interpreta-
tion of that jurisprudence as yielding a conception of the rule of law in which the 
quality of governing relationships between those who possess authority and those 
who are subject to it is central. Relevantly for present purposes, I argue that the 
demands Fuller places on these governing relationships hold irrespective of the 
characteristics of the legal form through which they are carried. It is this feature 
of my account that opens up consideration of governing relationships that are 
not framed by the model of an order of rules to which thinking about the rule 
of law typically attaches, and which therefore makes it ripe for application to the 
phenomenon of administrative discretion.
My task in Sections 11.3 and 11.4 is to lay the groundwork for extending these 
relational demands and the procedural conditions necessary to support them to 
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administrative discretion. This requires consideration of how procedural fairness 
(Section 11.3) and administrative discretion (Section 11.4) need to be theorised 
if the relational significance of their interplay is to be brought to the fore. As I 
emphasise in Section 11.4, of special importance to my analysis is that aspect of 
administrative discretion in which the governing relationship between repository 
and subject is shaped by political or policy considerations beyond the individual 
circumstances of the subject, and which invites its exercise to orient towards more 
unilateral than relational dynamics.
In Section 11.5 I make the case for why the interplay between procedural 
fairness and administrative discretion is so significant: namely, because of the rela-
tional correction that procedural fairness supplies to the stark asymmetry between 
repository and subject that is a defining feature of administrative discretion. In 
materially altering the experience of the subject within the particular governing 
relationship that is convened through the possession and exercise of adminis-
trative discretion, I argue that this correction goes some way towards locating 
that relationship within the relational conditions necessary for the rule of law. I 
then turn in Section 11.6 to situate my analysis within other efforts to illuminate 
the promise of relational approaches to administrative law, before offering some 
thoughts on its significance to practice by way of conclusion in Section 11.7.
11.2  The demands of governing relationships framed 
by the authority of law: situating the importance 
of procedure
Elsewhere (Rundle 2019a), I have developed an account of the demands of the 
rule of law in terms of prescriptions to be imposed on governing relationships 
framed by the authority of law. The place of procedure within this account is 
central. As the primary vehicle for relational contact between legal officials and 
legal subjects, procedures, processes, and institutional forms provide the chan-
nels through which the authority of law directly touches upon those subject to 
it. Accordingly, how a repository of legally constituted authority engages with 
the subject of his or her authority within those procedures, processes, and insti-
tutional forms is of foundational significance to what is required to convene and 
sustain a condition of lawful authority rather than one of mere power.
I have developed this argument from elements of Lon Fuller’s jurisprudence 
of the ‘internal morality of law’ (1969, pp. 33–38). Fuller’s point in introducing 
the idea that a condition of law implicates an ‘internal morality’ was to direct 
attention to how governing through law requires practices, conditions, and 
commitments conducive to that end. Fuller conveyed these lessons through his 
famous tale of a king, Rex, who failed in eight ways to make law. By exemplify-
ing how not to create and administer a legal system, Fuller’s account of Rex’s 
eight failures was designed to invite reflection on the constitutive demands of the 
enterprise that he had undertaken but failed to achieve. The eight principles of 
Fuller’s ‘internal morality of law’ are thus understood in terms of the need for law 
to be (1) general, (2) publicly promulgated, (3) non-retroactive, (4) sufficiently 
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clear, (5) non-contradictory, (6) possible to comply with, (7) relatively constant 
through time, and (8) that there be congruence between official action and 
declared rule.
In my reading of Fuller I have emphasised the irretrievably relational commit-
ments that he sought to convey through these eight principles. This is clear from 
his analysis of the ‘reciprocity’ between ‘government and citizen’ that is built into 
the structure of governing through enacted rules, and how this causes his princi-
ples of the ‘internal morality of law’ to entail ‘a relationship with persons gener-
ally’ (Fuller 1969, pp. 39–40). But I have equally emphasised the importance 
of grasping the context of these relational demands in Fuller’s jurisprudence: 
namely, his concern to articulate the conditions necessary for the authority of law. 
Fuller speaks of these conditions in terms of the mutual ‘fidelity to law’ in the 
part of both legal officials and legal subjects that must be sustained if legal order 
is to be achieved. The subject’s acceptance of the authority of the lawgiver or 
other legal official has a special place within this picture, for the reason that legal 
officials ultimately take their authority to govern from that acceptance. Thus, 
the lawgiver must enter into a relationship of ‘reciprocity’ with the subject to 
secure her fidelity to law, otherwise ‘nothing will be left on which to ground the 
citizen’s duty to observe the lawgiver’s rules’ (1969, p. 40). Fidelity to law on 
the part of (putative) legal subjects is to be earned through, and only through, 
relational conditions between legal officials and legal subjects that are capable of 
generating and sustaining that fidelity.
The burden that Fuller’s jurisprudence places on legal officials if they are to 
be regarded as participating in a condition of lawful authority as opposed to 
one of mere power is clearly a demanding one. He described these burdens as 
belonging to the ‘role morality’ that attaches to being a legal official.5 Central to 
the fulfilment of this role morality is appropriate regard for and respect towards 
those with whom the legal official seeks to be in a relationship of authority.6 This 
is why Fuller also provided an account of what it means to be a subject of law as 
opposed to mere power in his reflections on ‘the view of man implicit in the inter-
nal morality of law’ (1969, p. 162). To embark on the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules, Fuller argued, involves of necessity ‘a 
commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable 
of following rules and answerable for his defaults’ (1969, p. 162).
On their face, these reflections on ‘responsible agency’ are directed to the 
capacities required of the legal subject in order to participate in an order of rules. 
The emphasis is on the kind of agency that is presupposed by legal rules. But 
Fuller also went on to explain the important difference between engaging with 
the subject through the medium of rules and merely acting upon him. To do 
the latter, he argued, was not just to convey indifference to the subject’s ‘powers 
of self-determination’, but to negate the reciprocal dynamics upon which the 
achievement of legal order itself depends (see Rundle 2019a, pp. 24–25; 2014, 
pp. 220–225). The point of interest for present purposes is what this suggests 
about the kind of agency that is constituted by participation in a condition of 
law as opposed to one in which the putative subject is merely acted upon. I have 
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called this species of agency ‘legal agency’:7 that which materialises and is made 
visible when a subject participates within a condition of law.
The significance of procedure to Fuller’s jurisprudence enters here, and, I 
have argued, is much deeper and more profound than what has typically been 
indicated in the description (initially articulated, if cautiously, by Fuller himself) 
of the eight principles of the ‘internal morality of law’ as a kind of ‘procedural 
natural law’ (Fuller 1969, pp. 96–97).8 When Fuller’s reflections on the concep-
tion of the person to which the demands of the internal morality of law attach 
are situated within his overarching concern for what is required to sustain a con-
dition of lawful authority as opposed to one in which subjects are merely acted 
upon, the significance of procedures and institutional channels capable of sup-
porting the possibility of legal agency becomes apparent. The dynamics between 
legal official and legal subject through which a relationship of lawful authority is 
given concrete expression must be not just respectful, but productive, of the kind 
of agency that supports participation in a governing relationship framed by the 
authority of law (see also Rundle 2012, p. 42). In Fuller’s jurisprudence it cannot 
be otherwise. What it takes to bring a condition of lawful authority into existence 
is equally what it must take to keep that condition in existence.
This last point is critical to the analysis of the significance of procedural fair-
ness in circumstances of administrative discretion that I develop in the pages to 
follow. Most crucially, the requirement that the relational conditions that attach 
to an instance of authority in its concrete expression must be continuous with the 
relational conditions that generate the authority of legal order in the first place 
is a general demand. As such, it need not and should not be limited to the rule-
based orders with which Fuller’s jurisprudence has been explicitly if not exclu-
sively associated so far (see Rundle 2019a, pp. 32–36), and which occupy the 
primary focus of legal theory generally. Rather, on my reading the demands of 
Fuller’s ‘internal morality of law’ attach to all governing relationships framed by 
the authority of law. Indeed, observance of these relational demands might ulti-
mately be more critical in the context of modalities of contemporary government 
that are not modelled on an order of rules, as is the case for administrative discre-
tion.9 I therefore turn now to consider how we might need to think about proce-
dural fairness and administrative discretion, respectively, to develop this analysis.
11.3  Procedural fairness: mapping the territory
At their essence, the terms ‘procedural fairness’, ‘procedural justice’, and ‘proce-
dural due process’ each speak to the idea that a person subject to the decision of 
another should be provided with a fair opportunity to advance their case before 
that decision-maker. While particular emphasis might historically have been given 
to the significance of this demand of fair treatment in the face of adverse allega-
tions, in contemporary administrative law the obligation to afford procedural 
fairness is thought to apply to any exercise of power apt to affect an individu-
al’s interests, broadly understood. To establish a denial of procedural fairness 
as a matter of law, therefore, the issue for determination will be whether the 
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aggrieved person has suffered some material encroachment on a fair opportunity 
to advance his or her case before the decision-maker.10
I explained in Section 11.1 that until the recent emergence of ‘relational’ 
approaches to procedural fairness, philosophers have gravitated towards two 
broad sites of analysis when seeking to identify the ‘value’ of the provision of 
procedural fairness in decision-making contexts: ‘dignitarian’ and ‘utilitarian’ 
or other ‘instrumental’ or outcome-based accounts. A wide range of arguments 
falls within these broad categories.11 The efforts of administrative law scholars 
to explain the value of procedural fairness have borrowed directly from these 
philosophical debates, giving primary emphasis to ‘dignitarian’ and ‘utilitarian’ 
justifications.
Those who favour the dignitarian view emphasise the enduring appeal of its 
evident concern for persons.12 For example, Jerry Mashaw, the leading American 
administrative law scholar and proponent of the dignitarian view, has argued that 
procedural ‘due process’ is important precisely because it respects ‘values inherent 
in or intrinsic to our common humanity-values such as autonomy, self-respect, 
or equality’ (1985, p. 171).13 By contrast, those who promote ‘utilitarian’ per-
spectives see the observance of the rules of procedural fairness as consequentially 
valuable for their contribution to more efficient decision-making processes and 
better decisional outcomes. The appeal of such perspectives thus lies in their 
apparently more concrete and measurable orientation to results.14 Though often 
pitted against each other, these two standard justifications for procedural fairness 
in administrative law need not always be in opposition. For instance, if the oppor-
tunity to advance one’s case is led by utilitarian considerations, that opportunity 
might still secure the ‘side-effect’ of respecting the dignity of the subject, with 
all the benefits that proponents of the dignitarian view have emphasised so far. 
Be that as it may, in my own work I have insisted that something important is 
overlooked in these analyses.
This missing element is attention to the particular setting in which the demands 
of procedural fairness arise in administrative law: namely, in the context of one 
person possessing authority to exercise administrative power over another. When 
this context is brought into view, we can see that at stake in different ways of 
explaining the value, rationale, or justification for the rules of procedural fairness; 
are different ways of prioritising the perspective and experience of the repository 
and subject of that exercise of authority respectively and, crucially, the relation-
ship between them (see Rundle 2016, pp. 164–167). Although there might be 
nothing intrinsic to the utilitarian view that necessarily excludes orientation to the 
perspective or experience of the subject within this relationship, there is equally 
nothing intrinsic to the utilitarian view that orients towards that perspective or 
experience. Fundamentally, utilitarian perspectives are directed to the position of 
the repository of authority and the wider institutional frame within which that 
repository operates. They are not, or not primarily, directed to the position and 
experience of the subject who ultimately has no power to direct the outcome of 
the repository’s exercise of authority beyond the influence afforded to her in the 
processes leading to it. Only dignitarian accounts can support an understanding 
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of the exercise of administrative authority as a relationship between those who 
possess government power and those who are subject to it. Dignitarian justifica-
tions for the demands of procedural fairness must therefore take priority over 
utilitarian justifications not merely for their own sake, but for how they lend sup-
port to the empowerment of the subject necessary for the relational conditions 
of authority itself.15
11.4  Administrative discretion: mapping the territory
Echoes of the wider legal theory commitments outlined in Section 11.2 will be 
discernible in the argument just outlined. In the work in which it was devel-
oped, my interest lay with the place of procedural fairness within circumstances 
of administrative power generally. I did not single out administrative discretion as 
potentially demanding separate treatment, as I propose to do here.
The reason why administrative discretion may demand such separate or addi-
tional treatment is because the form of legal relation constituted by its possession 
and exercise is materially different from that which is constituted under the model 
of an order of rules that ordinarily lies in the background of discussions of proce-
dural fairness. Under an order of rules, the role of the lawgiver is to articulate the 
relevant rule(s), the role of the law-applier is to apply those rules to the circum-
stances of the legal subject, and the role of the legal subject is to ‘obey’ or other-
wise to cooperate with their normative demands. Contestation around processes 
of rule-application typically concerns conflicting interpretations of the rules, or 
complaints about the fairness of their application in the individual case. But the 
important point for present purposes is that the legal relation itself is framed by 
an order of rules to which rule-applier and rule-subject alike are mutually subor-
dinate. Asymmetries will undoubtedly still be present within this rule-governed 
relationship. These will moreover stand to be amplified by the fact that some dis-
cretion will typically be vested in the rule-applier to determine precisely how the 
rules will be applied. Still, even accounting for such asymmetries, it remains the 
case that the legal relationship itself will be framed by the rules, that these rules 
will be known in advance, and that any discretion as to their application will be 
subject to some degree of contestation.
The form of legal relation constituted by the possession and exercise of admin-
istrative discretion is different. As earlier noted, when a discretion is reposed in 
an administrative official, it leaves that official ‘free to make a choice between 
possible courses of action or inaction’ (Davis 1969, p. 4). This defining feature 
of freedom of choice on the part of the repository, whatever its degree, produces 
a different form of legal relation to that which arises when an exercise of power 
is framed by rules. This legal relation still has boundaries, in the sense that it 
is framed and therefore confined by the boundaries of the statutory provision 
through which a discretion is reposed. The discretion might also be structured 
through the statutory imposition of certain requirements for its exercise, such as 
mandating consideration of particular facts about the individual, or reference to 
specified public policy priorities or simply the ‘public interest’.
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These ways in which administrative discretions are confined and structured are 
undoubtedly important to the character and quality of the governing relation-
ships between repository and subject that come to be convened through them. 
Nonetheless, the point to highlight for the purpose of the present analysis is that 
neither of these ultimately contingent features of an administrative discretion 
alters the relational implications that necessarily follow from the feature of choice 
between possible courses of action that belongs to the repository of the discre-
tion and the repository alone. In short, the element of mutual subordination 
characteristic of an order of rules is starkly absent in the case of administrative 
discretion.
This key difference in the form of legal relation constituted by rule-based 
and discretionary administrative orders, respectively, has received an—at most—
implicit treatment in the literature on procedural justice so far. Two key studies, 
however, have yielded arguments and insights that provide important support for 
those that I wish to develop and defend here. The first is the seminal effort of the 
mid-twentieth century American administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis 
to situate administrative discretion at the centre of administrative law inquiry. 
The second is the socio-legal study of due process in the context of administrative 
procedures undertaken by Dennis Galligan (1996).
In Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969) Davis sought to 
address the problem of individual injustice that can result from either too much 
or insufficiently limited discretionary power. In pursuing this inquiry Davis high-
lighted some key theoretical commitments that had led to the marginalisation 
of administrative discretion as a site of legal inquiry to that point. In particular, 
Davis emphasised the extent to which this marginalisation had been encouraged 
by what he described as ‘extravagant’ versions of the rule of law according to 
which enacted rules are presented as the only legal form, and the courts the 
only supervisory institutions, through which a condition of the rule of law can 
be maintained (pp. 28–41).16 On this understanding administrative discretion 
essentially embodies and gives legal form to arbitrary power: the very antithesis 
of the rule of law. To Davis’s eyes, this ‘extravagant’ version of the rule of law 
not only presented a descriptively inaccurate account of modern government and 
the centrality of the administrative state within it, but also operated to limit wider 
theoretical inquiry into conditions necessary for the rule of law (pp. 29–30).
It is important to emphasise that Davis was not a defender of discretion per se. 
Indeed, he thought that ‘a good deal of discretion is illegal or of questionable 
legality’ (p. 4). His point was simply that not all administrative discretion is nec-
essarily at odds with a condition of the rule of law. Thus, while arbitrary power 
‘should be eliminated to whatever extent it can be eliminated without undue 
sacrifice of other values that may be deemed more important’ (p. 30), so long as 
administrative discretions are appropriately confined and structured ‘discretion-
ary justice’ in the individual case and compliance with the rule of law could both 
be achieved. For Davis, then, the key question is how administrators can ‘regu-
larise’, ‘organise’, and ‘produce order’ in their exercise of discretionary power in 
order to avoid unjust arbitrariness (p. 98) or other miscarriages of justice in the 
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individual case (p. 119).17 Among the ‘instruments’ he identified as potentially 
contributing to that aim was the provision of ‘fair informal procedure’, which 
he described in terms of the ‘opportunity for the affected party to know what is 
considered and to respond to it before a decision is made’ (p. 98).
A more extended treatment of the demands of procedure in the context of 
administrative discretion can be found in Galligan’s study of due process in the 
context of administrative processes (1996). The taxonomical aim of Galligan’s 
project was to differentiate common families of processes on the basis of their 
legal purpose (the particular mode of resolution each offers within the legal sys-
tem itself) so as to consider the implications for procedural fairness reflected in 
each. Within this taxonomy he identified discretion as belonging to a family of 
processes characterised by the capacity of the official in whom it is reposed to 
decide as he or she ‘thinks best’, which was to be distinguished from the char-
acteristic legal mode of the application of authoritative standards (pp. 26–27). 
Galligan recognised that a discretion will still generally be situated within a system 
of standards, even if only those to be implicitly taken from the wider purposes of 
the statute within which the discretion is reposed. But he argued that it would 
be a ‘distortion’ to overstate the role of authoritative standards within discretion 
given the substantial degree to which the exercise of discretion depends on the 
judgement of the official as to what standards should apply (p. 26).
Galligan’s observations on ‘policy-based discretion’ are of particular interest to 
present concerns (pp. 264–267). ‘Policy-based discretion’ arises in circumstances 
where, in deciding how a person is to be treated, the authority is obligated to act 
as appears best in the public interest (p. 264). Examples include the discretion to 
decide whether to release a prisoner on parole, deport an alien, or grant a plan-
ning permission. What distinguishes this kind of administrative discretion is how it 
involves ‘an uneasy combination of an individualised process on the one hand and a 
policy-based process on the other hand’ (p. 264), inviting attention to the individ-
ual’s circumstances at the same time as leaving space for considerations of politics.
Relevantly for present purposes, the tension between these two elements car-
ries important implications for the demands of procedural fairness in relation 
to such discretions (p. 266). As Galligan explains it, the individualised aspect 
of a ‘policy-based’ discretion points towards the standard ‘adjudicative’ model 
of procedural fairness and its prescriptions for how facts are to be determined 
and issues of merit considered. Yet the absence of authoritative standards of the 
kind typical in rule-based orders complicates even these individualised aspects of 
‘policy-based’ discretions, with the consequence
that the relationship between the official and the party … is better character-
ised as one in which the official may decide as seems best while at the same 
time being responsive to the claims of the party. 
(p. 265, emphasis added)
As for the policy-based component, here Galligan suggests that the notion of 
‘consultation’ might better capture the procedural demands of the relationship 
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between the official and the subject that is in play. This is because even if the 
subject might use her procedural rights to attempt to influence the application 
of the policy-based aspects of the discretion, the official ultimately ‘may decide 
for reasons which go beyond those submissions’ (p. 265). The dual features of 
a ‘policy-based’ discretion thus make it impossible to prescribe precisely what 
is needed to meet the demands of procedural fairness in such contexts, beyond 
well-settled general standards of fair treatment (p. 375).18 But in Galligan’s view 
these demands of fair treatment should include an opportunity for the affected 
party to make a case specifically directed at influencing the policy aspects of the 
discretion, at least in relation to their application to the individual case. Galligan 
acknowledges that this controversial suggestion might be thought to invite into 
the administrative space a kind of participation in assessing the merits of policy 
that belongs foremost to the legislative domain (p. 378).19 But, as he puts it, ‘in 
this shadowland between adjudication and policy, the very understandings gov-
erning the citizen-state relationship are unsettled’ (p. 266).
The present analysis benefits from Davis’s and Galligan’s in several respects. 
The affinity with Davis lies above all in the latter’s effort to bring administrative 
discretion to the fore, and to illuminate the rules-based assumptions and commit-
ments of legal theory that have operated to marginalise its study as a distinctive 
form of legal relation or to associate it with arbitrariness for its non-alignment to 
that archetypal legal mode. Davis was also entirely alive to the asymmetries gener-
ated by discretion and the dangers this produces for those subject to its exercise. 
The affinity between Galligan’s project and the present lies on another plane. 
Galligan’s careful differentiation of the ‘individualised’ versus ‘policy-based’ com-
ponents typical of many administrative discretions helps us to see that the very 
same person whose particular circumstances might be brought into focus within 
the ‘individualised’ aspect of this kind of discretion might in turn be at best tenu-
ously situated within its ‘policy-based’ aspects. Thus, even if implicitly, he points 
to the relational problems that accompany the phenomenon of administrative 
discretion.
I turn now to make the case for why the interplay between procedural fairness 
and administrative discretion is so significant to managing and potentially cor-
recting these tensions, and how this might in turn contribute to the possibility of 
situating administrative discretion within conditions necessary for the rule of law 
as Fuller understood them.
11.5  The interplay of procedural fairness and 
administrative discretion: promoting 
the relational conditions for authority
The feature of choice as to possible courses of action that is the hallmark of the 
possession and exercise of administrative discretion complicates its character as 
a form of legal relation into which practices of procedural fairness might enter. 
What we can take from Galligan is that this complexity is amplified in the face 
of the dual character of ‘policy-based’ discretions. Saliently, it is precisely this 
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kind of administrative discretion that tends to be in view when the location of 
discretion within a condition of the rule of law is disputed. What, then, is the 
significance of procedural fairness when a governing relationship is framed by 
administrative discretion?
Following Galligan’s division, this question must be considered separately for 
the individualised versus policy-based aspects of administrative discretion. With 
respect to the former, it is not difficult to discern how procedural fairness in the 
context of the individualised aspect of an administrative discretion facilitates a 
recognisable relationship between its repository and subject. The obligation to 
observe procedural fairness is clearly most at home in the individualised aspect of 
administrative discretion, where the concern has been to ensure that the person 
subject to the discretion is given a fair opportunity to put a case for its exercise 
in her favour. This demand has been strenuously protected by courts in their 
supervisory jurisdiction over administrative action, in no small measure because 
courts have long recognised the alignment between their own procedural fairness 
obligations within judicial processes and what the law ought to demand within 
this aspect of administrative decision-making.
But what of the relational significance of procedural fairness in the context 
of those policy or political aspects of a ‘policy-based’ administrative discretion 
where, as just noted, the very same person whose particular circumstances might 
be brought into focus within the ‘individualised’ aspect of this kind of discretion 
might be at best tenuously within the repository’s gaze? This tendency, inherent 
in the very form of administrative discretion, gains further traction from the trap-
pings of unilateral power inherent in the idea of being ‘authorised’ to exercise 
such discretion. This invitation to unilateralism is even more extreme when the 
exercise of an administrative discretion is conditioned on the ‘public interest’, for 
the reason that such considerations necessarily operate to divert the perspective of 
the repository away from the subject. It is therefore precisely here, I want to sug-
gest, that affording procedural fairness contributes a crucial relational correction 
to what could otherwise operate as mere power over the individual affected by it.
It is important to understand why the relational correction needed in this con-
text can only be supplied by affording procedural fairness to the subject posi-
tioned within it. Other structural features of administrative discretions, such as 
their answerability to certain stated mandatory, relevant, or irrelevant considera-
tions may well operate to direct attention to some or other aspect of the circum-
stances of the subject. But beyond the fact of how the presence of these features is 
contingent on how the boundaries of the discretion are formulated, these struc-
tural features ultimately go to the conditions of authorisation imposed by the 
vesting authority on the official in whom the discretion is reposed. Though they 
might provide important standards against which that repository can be called 
to account, it does not follow that these structural features of an administrative 
discretion are concerned with the agency of the person subject to that discretion, 
or the obligation of the repository to engage with it.
Procedural fairness, by contrast, makes precisely this agency-investing con-
tribution. In doing so, it operates to render concrete a governing relationship 
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between repository and subject that otherwise stands to be absent or radically 
attenuated as a consequence of the relational vulnerability that characterises 
administrative discretion generally. The statutory boundaries of an administra-
tive discretion might provide the frame for a governing relationship, but it is the 
agency-investing character of procedural fairness that secures the relational qual-
ity of that relationship. It is therefore essential to grasp the relational contingency 
that characterises administrative discretion, and which is most acute in the case 
of ‘policy-based’ discretion, if we are to achieve a more sophisticated account 
of its place within overarching commitments to the rule of law. The extent to 
which observance of procedural fairness operates to provide a relational correc-
tion to that contingency will determine whether administrative discretion can be 
so situated.
In developing this view, it is important to consider what this relational cor-
rection serves in terms of situating administrative discretion within conditions 
of the rule of law. Here we meet a number of complications that attend the 
effort to theorise administrative law generally.20 In the context of the exercise of 
administrative power it might be difficult to argue that the relational dynamics 
at play in the provision of procedural fairness serve the acceptance of authority in 
the manner signalled in Fuller’s arguments about the relational conditions that 
constitute the authority of legal order in the first instance. Administrative law 
belongs to a domain of practice concerned with the application or administration 
of legally authorised power, rather than the conditions for the constitution of that 
power. The descriptive or normative theoretical commitments we might associate 
with those constitutive conditions might therefore strain to be extended, with-
out modification, into the administrative space: specifically, the notion that pro-
cedural fairness serves the subject’s acceptance of the repository’s power might 
be misplaced as either a description or a normative demand. Further, though 
procedural fairness might play an important role in supporting acceptance of the 
repository’s decisions, it is unlikely that such acceptance will be carried by proce-
dural fairness alone. The justificatory practice of reason-giving is arguably more 
likely to contribute to the acceptance of administrative decisions in this sense.
The claim I want to advance about what the relational correction supplied by 
procedural fairness serves, in terms of situating administrative discretion within 
conditions of the rule of law, addresses something beyond the conditions nec-
essary for accepting the authority of administrative decisions. My argument is 
instead that the relationality supplied by procedural fairness is fundamental to 
the intelligibility and recognisability of the experience of authority itself within 
an order of law. To be experienced as an instance of lawful authority rather than 
mere power, the relational conditions that structure administrative action must 
be continuous with those which support conditions for the acceptance of author-
ity in its constitutive aspect. This position can accept that the structure of authori-
sation underscoring administrative action will hardly collapse if a subject does not 
actively ‘accept’ an administrative decision: the person authorised to make that 
decision will still be authorised to make it regardless. But, and crucially, the legal 
status of being ‘authorised’ still comes with relational demands.
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These demands necessarily follow from the theoretical commitments outlined 
earlier, in which the central idea was that what it takes to bring a condition of 
lawful authority into existence is equally what it must take to keep that condition 
in existence. Once we defend a normative conception of the rule of law in these 
terms, we must reject the idea that the concrete expression of authority, in its 
administrative aspect, can be characterised by unilateralism or other conditions 
in which relational dynamics are radically attenuated. This is precisely why proce-
dural fairness is so important. The particular species of agency there generated—
what I earlier termed legal agency—stands to effectively convert an instance of 
authorisation into a condition continuous with the foundational conditions of 
authority from which that authorisation is derived.
11.6  Promoting relational approaches to 
administrative law
In addition to marking out a new contribution to relational approaches to 
procedural justice, the arguments just offered might be situated among other 
recent works that have sought to promote ‘relational’ approaches to questions of 
administrative law, including with respect to procedural fairness and administra-
tive discretion specifically. Jennifer Nedelsky’s treatment of ideas of bureaucratic 
autonomy within American approaches to procedural ‘due process’ is a leading 
contribution to the former (Nedelsky 2011), while Genevieve Cartier’s concep-
tion of ‘discretion as dialogue’ within Canadian administrative law offers an inno-
vative account of the latter (Cartier 2005).
As part of her study in Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, 
and Law, Nedelsky considers what kinds of practices and values might be needed ‘to 
make autonomy viable in a bureaucratic state’ (2011, p. 139). Questions of auton-
omy in this context are of special interest to Nedelsky, as a theorist of ‘relational 
autonomy’ more generally (1989), as those who are ‘in the most dependent rela-
tion to the government’ will invariably find themselves in bureaucratic relationships 
(2011, p. 140). In such settings, Nedelsky argues, affording procedural fairness 
is potentially status-transforming in regard to the components of autonomy with 
which she is concerned: dignity, competence, comprehension, and defence against 
arbitrariness. As she expresses the point, ‘a hearing designates recipients as part of 
the process of collective decision-making rather than as passive, external objects of 
judgment’, and may accordingly prevent the subjects of administrative decisions 
‘from becoming passive objects’ of bureaucratic intervention (2011, p. 140).
Nedelsky takes her cue for the autonomy-promoting promise of procedural 
fairness from an (albeit limited) era of 1970s American ‘due process’ jurispru-
dence that indicated how autonomy can be fostered through bureaucratic rela-
tions between the individual and the state (2011, p. 140). Although Nedelsky 
describes this ‘due process explosion’ as growing out of ‘the best of the American 
liberal tradition’ in its emphasis on the protection of individuals from the power 
of the state (2011, p. 143), she observes many problems associated with it. Some 
are specific to the American constitutional context: for example, Nedelsky notes 
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that the conceptual framework underlying the ‘due process explosion’—conceiv-
ing of welfare payments as a form of ‘new property’ that required constitutional 
‘due process’ protections before being taken away—does not of itself provide 
an adequate basis for articulating affirmative responsibilities of the state (2011, 
p. 143). Other problems are more general: for instance, she identifies how the 
objective of fostering autonomy will be rendered vulnerable if procedural fair-
ness protections are tied to the specificities of a particular agency’s powers or 
particular substantive rights (2011, pp. 140, 144). The objective must instead 
be ‘to protect the autonomy of all in their interactions with government’, in all 
circumstances (2011, p. 144).
Resonating with Nedelsky, the normative aim of Cartier’s project (2005) is to 
promote a relational view of what is demanded in the exercise of administrative 
discretion specifically. Cartier’s conception of ‘discretion as dialogue’ as opposed 
to ‘discretion as power’21 accordingly seeks to foster ‘a reciprocal relationship 
between the decision-maker and the individual affected by the decision’ (p. 644). 
According to this conception, the process of communication triggered within the 
idea of ‘discretion as dialogue’ prevents a repository from imposing its decision 
‘unilaterally’ on the subject, and supplies an opportunity for the subject to par-
ticipate in the creation of the norms that will govern the exercise of the discretion 
(p. 644). At an interpretive level, Cartier claims that her conception best accounts 
for the progressive trend reflected in a line of key Canadian cases commencing in 
the late 1970s that saw the courts impose procedural obligations on repositories 
of discretionary powers, and which departed from a previous reluctance to super-
vise the exercise of discretionary powers so as to avoid overstepping into ques-
tions of policy (pp. 640, 642).22 But most relevantly for present purposes, Cartier 
insists that her conception of ‘discretion as dialogue’ brings discretion ‘down to 
the individual, instead of maintaining it in the high spheres of the government 
machinery’ (pp. 630–631), and gives concrete expression to the principle ‘that 
the administrative state is there first and foremost to serve the individuals submit-
ted to the authority of the state’ (p. 648).
Situating my account alongside Nedelsky and Cartier’s reveals some key points 
of common emphasis. First, and foundationally, we are each preoccupied with 
questions of agency in the face of administrative power, and specifically with 
ameliorating or removing the possibility that the repository of such power will 
unilaterally ‘act upon’ the person subject to it. We are each equally concerned to 
highlight the importance of procedural fairness in providing a channel not just for 
participation in administrative decision-making, including in processes of norm-
creation, but for situating the relational contact between repository and subject 
within the larger project of government. The agentic and relational demands of 
the bureaucratic space are thus, in each analysis, viewed as continuous with the 
agentic and relational demands of democratic constitutionalism and the institu-
tions through which it is given concrete expression. Moreover, in each analysis 
the normative prescriptions advanced in association with these shared preoccu-
pations are inseparable from a relational conception of administrative authority 
itself, whether implicitly or explicitly.
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In the present instance, however, the foundation for insisting on a rela-
tional conception of administrative authority, and for drawing out the unique 
relationship between administrative discretion and procedural fairness that it 
yields, is an extension of a particular set of theoretical commitments: namely, 
my concern to develop and defend an understanding of the rule of law itself 
as a practice of framing all governing relationships by the authority of law. 
In ‘Fuller’s Relationships’ I suggested that such a conception offered a more 
fitting contemporary tribute to Fuller’s contribution to theorising conditions 
necessary for the rule of law than the kind of ‘checklist-style’ applications of 
his eight principles of the ‘internal morality of law’ that are so often associated 
with that endeavour (Rundle 2019a). In support of the foregoing analysis, I 
want equally to suggest that this explicitly relational reading of Fuller offers the 
most generative ‘application’ of the insights of his jurisprudence to questions of 
administrative law.
In so urging, I am distinguishing my approach from the efforts of other schol-
ars who have sought to bring Fuller’s thought to such questions. An important 
recent contribution to that end is the effort of the leading American public law 
scholars, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule (2018), to articulate ‘the morality 
of administrative law’ (p. 1927). Though Sunstein and Vermeule do not attempt 
to apply each of Fuller’s eight principles to specific issues in American adminis-
trative law in developing this idea, they do seek to ‘examine Fuller-compatible 
approaches’ to a number of pressing issues, including vagueness and retroactivity 
in the practice of administrative agencies (p. 1929). There is not space here to 
recount the details of this contribution that has done much to direct the attention 
of administrative law scholars to the promise of Fuller’s thought. What requires 
emphasis in the present context is how, even if there is some acknowledgement 
of present concerns,23 Sunstein and Vermeule’s project reflects a qualitatively dif-
ferent engagement with the idea of the ‘internal morality of law’ than that which 
I have pursued here.
The key point of difference is that Sunstein and Vermeule accept, and adopt, 
the ‘checklist’ reading of Fuller’s principles that my own work has been at pains 
to resist. As I read them, Fuller’s principles speak to an idea that is broader, and 
more fundamental, than the sum of eight parts. They speak to the distinctive 
quality of relationship that is brought into being, regulated and served, but not 
exhausted by, those principles (Rundle 2012, pp. 10, 92). Treating the eight 
principles as a ‘checklist’, I have therefore argued, distracts from Fuller’s cen-
tral concern to illuminate the relational conditions constitutive of a condition 
of the rule of law (Rundle 2019a, pp. 35–36). The importance of this point 
bears repeating in the present context. In my view, emphasising Fuller’s endur-
ing concern to illuminate the quality of governing relationships required by an 
order of law offers the most generative connections between his avowedly nor-
mative, authority-centred, form-sensitive, role-emphasising and subject-oriented 
jurisprudential commitments and the kinds of questions raised by the design and 
exercise of contemporary administrative power.
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11.7  Conclusion: the promise for practice
My aim in the foregoing has been to expand the theoretical treatment given 
to ‘procedural fairness’, ‘procedural justice’, or ‘procedural due process’ in two 
new directions. First, I have directed inquiry towards a different form of legal 
relation—administrative discretion—to that to which inquiry into the value or 
other significance of procedural fair treatment in decision-making settings most 
commonly refers. Second, I have aimed to situate this move within a jurispru-
dence of the rule of law understood as a practice in which governing relationships 
are framed by the authority of law, and in which the distinctive kind of agency 
supported by procedures occupies a central place.
Among the motivations for developing this analysis has been an awareness 
of the vulnerability of these procedural supports in practice. As Nedelsky and 
Cartier emphasise with respect to the American and Canadian contexts, trends 
in the articulation of the legal demands of procedural fairness show, starkly, 
the contingency of the relational promise of its conceptualisation and realisa-
tion (Nedelsky 2011, pp. 144–145, 147). The scope and content of procedural 
fairness in Australian administrative law have followed a similar trajectory. As 
with the American and Canadian experience, there have been some important 
moments, indeed eras, of relational promise in the conceptualisation of what 
procedural fairness demands as a matter of law. For example, for a period the 
Australian common law held that if a subject of administrative power had a ‘legiti-
mate expectation’ that a particular course of action would be taken in association 
with its exercise, then a duty to afford procedural fairness would arise in the event 
that the repository proposed to depart from that course of action. Though the era 
of ‘legitimate expectations’ has now all but passed, what was striking about this 
idea being included among the possible triggers for a duty to afford procedural 
fairness was the concern it indicated for the quality of administrative relation-
ships. That is, to insist that procedural fairness might be owed to a person whose 
legitimate expectation of a particular course of administrative action has been 
defeated, is to acknowledge that being a subject of administrative power involves 
a relationship with the repository of that power, and that this relationship carries 
demands that will be enforced by the law.24 The same might be said about the 
recent emphasis in the Australian case law on why the provision of an oral hearing 
may be necessary in certain contexts (such as when questions of credibility are at 
stake) if the demands of procedural fairness are to be met.25
These and other features of the Australian common law of procedural fair-
ness—past and present—might be thought to suggest that observing this cardinal 
legal demand ensures ‘that those governing are answerable to and should be 
responsive to those affected by that exercise of power’ (Robertson 2016, p. 162; 
see also Rundle 2016, p. 168). But this, too, might be historically and institu-
tionally contingent. In the present era, responsibility for determining the ambit of 
procedural fairness to be afforded to subjects of administrative power is increas-
ingly appropriated by parliaments for their exclusive determination through the 
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statute that establishes the authorising scheme. Moreover, contemporary practice 
demonstrates that administrative discretions that push furthest into the policy or 
political space are precisely those to which few or no procedural fairness obliga-
tions will attach. The widespread statutory exclusion of procedural fairness in the 
context of parole hearings, and in connection with administrative powers associ-
ated with national security measures, provide just two examples.
The framing of administrative discretion itself has also begun to take new 
and innovative forms. A leading Australian example is the device of the ‘non-
compellable’ administrative discretion that can be exercised at the option of its 
repository. Conditioned by unspecified considerations of the ‘public interest’, 
and departing from the longstanding assumption of administrative law that a 
discretion reposed must be exercised upon an application to do so, procedural 
fairness protections will only be available in association with such powers in the 
event that the repository chooses to consider exercising them.26 This squarely 
reflects the ‘authorisation’ mindset analysed above, in which the very design of 
the scheme of power orients toward the repository and away from the subject. 
One can only question where these developments leave conditions for the gov-
erning relationship itself.
In administrative law these governing relationships are inherently and invaria-
bly unequal. This fact that attends the work of government in its practical expres-
sion is a perennial one. Still, there are ways of thinking about the administrative 
state, and about administrative law, which can promote the idea that the project 
of both is to mediate the governing relationships that arise between a state and its 
subjects. In this enterprise, ideas matter. A relational theoretical perspective on 
what is at stake when power is exercised by the administrative state, irrespective of 
the legal form through which that power might ultimately manifest, is a necessary 
foundation for a relational practice.
Notes
1 I am grateful to the editors, and participants in the Julius Stone Institute of 
Jurisprudence seminar in September 2019 at which an earlier version of this 
chapter was presented, especially Denise Meyerson and Jeffrey Gordon, for their 
helpful comments. Sincere thanks also to Emily Peck for her superb research assis-
tance.
2 Following Denise Meyerson and Catriona Mackenzie (2018), I will treat these 
three terms as essentially interchangeable. For the purpose of my analysis, how-
ever, I will primarily adopt ‘procedural fairness’ given the prevalence of this term 
in the administrative law context with which my analysis is concerned.
3 I return to the administrative law treatment in Part III.
4 For an excellent review of the philosophical literature, see Meyerson and 
Mackenzie (2018).
5 Fuller’s private correspondence explicitly affirms that ‘role morality’ is the primary 
meaning he intended for the ‘morality’ element of his idea of the ‘internal moral-
ity of law’. For one example, see Letter from Fuller to Rolf Sartorius, 29 January 
1974 in The Papers of Lon L Fuller, Harvard Law School Library, Box 7, Folder 
15 (Correspondence).
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6 This was also fundamental to Fuller’s objections to the concept of law presented 
by legal positivism. To Fuller’s eyes, the picture of a unidirectional ‘manifested 
fact of authority or social power’ reflected in legal positivism might better be 
described in terms of ‘managerial direction’ than ‘law (1969, p. 147). For a full 
treatment of Fuller’s objections to legal positivism, especially those of HLA Hart, 
see Rundle (2012, pp. 86–140).
7 For a use of this term with compatible aims by scholars interested in questions 
of legal capacity in the context of disability law, for example, see Anna Arstein-
Kerslake and Eilionóir Flynn (2017).
8 It follows that I depart from Jeremy Waldron’s assessment (2011) that ‘Fuller’s 
“procedural” theory was concerned almost entirely with the formal properties of 
legal rules, such as their clarity and consistency’, and that the features of Fuller’s 
internal morality of law ‘all relate to the form that legal norms take, not to either 
the procedure of their enactment or (more important) the procedural mode of 
their administration’ (pp. 7–8).
9 Though administrative discretion did not take a central place in the development 
of Fuller’s claims about the principles of the ‘internal morality of law’ per se, those 
familiar with the discussion of Nazi law in the famous debate between Fuller and 
HLA Hart in the 1958 Harvard Law Review will recall that Fuller paid special 
attention to the ostensibly unbounded administrative discretions characteristic 
of certain Nazi statutes. Relevantly for present purposes, it was in the context of 
discussing Nazi law that Fuller distinguished between a ‘tinsel of legal form’ and 
the kind of conditions actually capable of supporting the relational demands of 
legal order, as he understood them (1958, p. 660).
10 For my own treatment of the rules of procedural fairness in the context of 
Australian administrative law, see Rundle (2016, p. 164).
11 See Meyerson and Mackenzie’s (2018) review of the key philosophical argu-
ments.
12 Philosophers have extended upon the connections between procedure and dig-
nity in different ways. For example, Jeremy Waldron (2011) has argued that pro-
cedures embody ‘a crucial dignitarian idea—respecting the dignity of those to 
whom the norms are applied as being capable of explaining themselves’ (p. 16). 
Lawrence Solum (2004) has developed a position that recognises both the intrin-
sic dignitarian value of procedure alongside the ‘irreducible’ instrumental value of 
procedural participation to conferring legitimate authority on adjudicative deci-
sions, irrespective of their substantive correctness (pp. 275, 278).
13 For a helpful explanation of the constitutional lineage and preoccupations of 
American ‘procedural due process’ thinking, see Jennifer Nedelsky (2011, 
pp. 139–141).
14 For an overview, see the helpful discussion of different justifications for the rules 
of procedural fairness in terms of ‘instrumental’ versus ‘intrinsic’ or ‘non-instru-
mental’ accounts offered by Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald (2012, p. 118).
15 My position here resonates strongly with Jennifer Nedelsky’s observation, 
also addressing questions concerning state-subject relations in the adminis-
trative state, that ‘[d]ignity is not necessarily about perception, competence, 
judgment and capacity to act’, and that ‘[n]ot all the relations that express 
dignity will foster these abilities’ (2011, p. 141). Though with different theo-
retical questions in view—in my case, theorising conditions for authority, in 
Nedelsky’s, theorising conditions of autonomy—the common point is that 
more than dignitarian arguments are needed to illuminate the value of pro-
cedural fairness in administrative settings. See my discussion of Nedelksy’s 
‘relational’ approach to questions of autonomy in the administrative state in 
section 11.6.
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16 Ed Rubin’s important analysis of law and legislation in the administrative state 
echoes and develops Davis’s polemic in key ways. Also rejecting abstract theories 
of ‘law’ and seeking to promote the theorisation of legislation in a manner that 
more closely reflects its modern attributes, Rubin pointed out that the legislative 
form implicated in administrative authorisation rarely produces the classic rule-
governed relationship between lawgiver and citizen but is instead directed primar-
ily to empowering officials to apply rules to or exercise discretion over subjects 
(see Rubin 1989).
17 Davis ultimately suggested seven ‘instruments’ through which this exercise of 
structuring discretionary power might be achieved, with different applications in 
different contexts: ‘open plans, open policy statements, open rules, open findings, 
open reasons, open precedents, and fair informal procedures’ (1969, p. 98).
18 For example, established procedural demands such as that the facts of the case be 
enquired into and properly assessed, and that the official properly consider the 
circumstances of the case and its consequences for the subject (Galligan 1996, 
pp. 375–378).
19 Galligan highlights how this prescription runs against the position articulated by 
the majority of the High Court of Australia in South Australia v O’Shea (1987) 
73 ALR 1, that the merits of a minister’s policy on parole are matters for deter-
mination by government and should not be subject to attack in an individualised 
case (1996, p. 379).
20 As the French administrative law scholar Denis Baranger has astutely put the 
point, engaging with Martin Loughlin’s Foundations of Public Law (OUP 2010), 
administrative law is readily assumed by public law theorists to be ‘not founda-
tional’ in character (2016, p. 112).
21 It is notable for present purposes that in setting up this distinction Cartier analo-
gises her point to Fuller’s complaints about the conception of law advanced by 
legal positivist philosophy as ‘one-way projection of authority’ or a ‘unidirectional 
assertion of control over human behaviour’ (see Cartier 2005, p. 636).
22 Engaging with Cartier’s account, Nedelsky suggests less optimistically that ‘dis-
cretion as dialogue’ might be better understood as accounting for the best of 
Canadian administrative law (2011 p. 147).
23 For example, in their suggestion that claims about law’s internal morality ‘help to 
underscore the serious problems … that arise, for example, if public officials have 
the discretion to do whatever they want’ (p. 1966)
24 For my treatment of legitimate expectations, and the corresponding loss repre-
sented in its demise, see Rundle (2016, p. 170), and (2019b, pp. 10–11).
25 See Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 
CLR 326.
See also my discussion of developments in the English case law in Rundle 
(2016, p. 172). 
26 For my analysis of non-compellable powers, see Rundle (2019b).
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The Australian legislative framework governing tribunals often specifies the ‘just, 
quick, and cheap resolution’ of the issues in dispute—a phrase that is increasingly 
finding its way into statutory schemes as an overriding purpose or guiding princi-
ple for both courts and tribunals across the spectrum. The quick and cheap aspect 
of this mantra has been the subject of attention directed to what procedures 
legal institutions should adopt to make them more accessible and affordable to 
litigants. Statutory phrases of this kind have been interpreted as necessitating the 
elimination of unnecessary delays and avoiding unduly technical and costly dis-
putes (Black 2009). But how should we understand the meaning of ‘just’ in the 
context of tribunal procedures, and can we give effect to it in a way that can be 
reconciled with the quick and cheap aspects?
A common way of answering this question is to suppose that tribunals should 
balance the competing considerations of cost, efficiency, and justice (Mason 
2017). It has been described as a ‘search for that elusive point of equilibrium’ 
(Productivity Commission, Access to justice arrangements, 2014, p. 14). In a simi-
lar vein, Rees (2006) identifies it as a tension to be resolved as a consequence of 
the fact that ‘fairness and detachment are sometimes in conflict with efficiency 
and accessibility’ (p. 54). This chapter explores whether the standard approach 
of seeking to balance these three competing dimensions provides an adequate 
account of the way in which the procedures of tribunals should be assessed. It 
argues instead for a relational justice approach that is centred on the notion that 
participation has an intrinsic value quite separate from questions of cost and effi-
ciency. Giving effect to the just dimension thus requires that an opportunity 
for participation must be afforded to the parties before cost savings and other 
claimed efficiencies come into consideration. There may be circumstances where 
affording that opportunity is considered inefficient or costly. Nevertheless, the 
opportunity for participation is a fundamental requirement that must be met and 
cannot simply be ‘balanced’ away in the service of timeliness or efficiency.
In this chapter I use the concept of participation to encompass practices that 
afford an opportunity to have an input into how a dispute to which an individual 
is a party is resolved, acknowledging that an individual may not in fact take up 
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that opportunity (Solum 2004, pp. 272–273). I argue that although participation 
may take different forms in various contexts in order to bring about efficiencies 
and timeliness, these factors do not overcome the need for regard in the first place 
to whether a party was afforded the opportunity for some form of participation 
appropriate to the nature of the dispute.
There are several arguments supporting this approach. First, is the way in 
which tribunals are set up to function. Most operate on the premise that par-
ties will represent themselves and be their own advocate in resolving a dispute. 
To varying degrees, tribunals limit the opportunities for legal representation or 
make this conditional on the tribunal’s assent. Therefore, a party’s own involve-
ment is set up as pivotal to the resolution of the dispute. Second, the idea that 
participation is a core consideration finds support in the fact that tribunals them-
selves are regularly subject to some form of statutory obligation to take certain 
measures to help parties understand the proceedings in which they are involved. 
Third, the importance of participation is consistent with findings in social psy-
chology that highlight the connections between relational concerns and people’s 
perceptions of procedural justice. These findings confirm that the opportunity 
to present information to a decision-maker prior to a decision being made has a 
positive effect on the perception of the fairness of the decision-making process 
(Thibaut & Walker 1975). Tyler and Lind (1992) identified that participation in 
the form of the opportunity to voice one’s concerns and to present evidence on 
one’s own behalf conveys that a person is worthy of being heard (pp. 140–141), 
thereby supporting a sense of self-respect (Tyler & Blader 2000, p. 171). These 
positive perceptions can in turn enhance the perceived legitimacy of legal institu-
tions and foster compliance.
My focus in this chapter is on the procedures commonly utilised by Australian 
tribunals with a broad remit, rather than institutions that are principally involved 
in administrative reviews or bespoke tribunals limited to one area of specialisa-
tion, such as mental health or industrial relations. The jurisdiction of the tribunals 
I consider in this chapter may include reviewing administrative decision-making, 
and extend to areas such as consumer, commercial, and tenancy disputes; occu-
pational regulation and professional discipline; and matters pertaining to guardi-
anship, discrimination, or the care of children. Tribunals of this nature largely 
operate at the state and territory level in Australia, as this extended jurisdiction 
is not available to federal tribunals. My focus on tribunals is quite deliberate and 
is informed by several factors. First, it is very common for academic commen-
tary to focus on criminal proceedings when exploring aspects of fair procedures, 
where the threat of a deprivation of liberty dictates certain types of procedural 
safeguards. Instead, I use the context of civil proceedings, where the subject 
matter of disputes is quite different, and therefore factors that do not pertain to 
the serious nature of criminal convictions may influence the types of procedure 
that are considered appropriate. Second, tribunals tend to use a greater variety of 
non-determinative dispute resolution processes, such as conciliation and media-
tion, than do other more formal legal institutions such as courts. Tribunal pro-
ceedings therefore have the potential for a more inclusive dialogue and greater 
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participation of individuals. Third, it is more likely that individuals will participate 
in tribunal proceedings without legal representation than in court settings. This 
has the advantage that an assessment of the opportunity for meaningful partici-
pation is less likely to be masked by the involvement of legal representatives. 
Fourth, unlike courts, tribunals are often subject to a statutory obligation to assist 
parties to understand the available procedures.
In Section 12.2, I examine the common features of the operational set up of 
Australian tribunals. In Section 12.3, I explore the aspect of the statutory frame-
works governing Australian tribunals that involve the obligation to help parties 
understand the procedures and examine the role of appropriately resourced tri-
bunals in facilitating such participation. In Section 12.4, I examine the tension 
within the quick, cheap and just mantra, and the competing values that influence 
decisions about how to reconcile these factors. Section 12.5 offers some tentative 
conclusions.
12.2  Common features of Australian tribunal procedures
The environment in which Australian tribunals operate is one that seeks to offer 
what is often referred to as ‘affordable’ justice. Common descriptors of what 
tribunal processes aspire to achieve are that they are accessible, fair, just, eco-
nomical, informal, quick, and proportionate to the importance and complexity 
of the matter. The legislative intent is that they are not designed to operate with 
perfect procedures. In the context of tribunal proceedings, it has been observed 
that ‘the content of procedural fairness should take its colour from the structure 
of the statute and circumstances of the case’ (Smyth 2010, p. 262). Procedural 
flexibility and the capacity of tribunals to inform themselves in any way they 
consider appropriate is what often sets tribunals apart from courts (Allars 1991, 
p. 377). The mantra of ‘just, quick, and cheap’ is often written into the statutory 
framework of a tribunal as a guiding principle or overall objective with respect to 
the exercise of the tribunal’s functions and in relation to its approach to practices 
and procedures. Tribunals also aspire to accessibility, both in a geographic sense, 
and in the sense of less formal processes (Crekye 2012, p. 19).
Tribunals are commonly given considerable latitude by statute to determine 
their own procedures, to inquire into and inform themselves on any matter in such 
manner as they think fit, and to act with as little formality as the circumstances 
of the case, equity, and good conscience permit.2 As a consequence, tribunals 
have considerable discretion as to how proceedings are conducted in practice. 
For example, they are able to invoke procedures that impose time limits on the 
presentation of cases if appropriate, limit the number of witnesses, direct that 
witness evidence be given in writing or only orally, require that parties provide 
further information, or determine a claim based on the papers only. In addition, 
tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence, but are guided by the relevance 
of the evidence in question.
The fact that tribunals are empowered to make their own inquiries is regarded 
as a basis for tribunals not to restrict their deliberations to the material put forward 
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by the parties, enabling tribunal members to ask questions or raise issues that they 
regard as insufficiently dealt with by the parties themselves. Such features are 
generally interpreted as giving tribunals the capacity to operate in a manner more 
akin to an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial approach. Some commentators 
contest whether this is in fact inquisitorial in the European sense,3 and prefer to 
see the reliance on less formal and more user-friendly processes as an evolution in 
the common practices of courts and tribunals through the greater use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution (ADR) and case management, and the adoption of a less 
passive role (De Villiers 2014, p. 182). The operations of Australian tribunals do 
not reflect a strict binary divide between inquisitorial and adversarial procedures 
(Bedford & Creyke 2006, p. 66). While tribunals have the discretion to make 
their own inquiries, courts have not interpreted this as requiring that tribunals 
take on such a role, nor do they impose this on tribunals as a strict duty, except in 
limited circumstances.4 Moreover, due to the limitations on resources available it 
is not common for tribunals to undertake extensive enquiries beyond the material 
presented by the parties themselves (Groves 2011, p. 177; Smyth 2010, p. 238). 
Hence the material on which a decision is made will, in the majority of disputes, 
be dependent on what the parties bring to the tribunal’s attention through their 
individual input into the processes.
The statutory framework governing tribunals will often expressly encourage 
the use of ADR to resolve or at least narrow the issues in dispute,5 and the refer-
ral of a matter to a form of ADR, such as mediation, can be made with or with-
out the parties’ consent.6 Wright (2015) described alternative dispute resolution 
processes in tribunals as ‘not merely an alternative to an adjudicative hearing but 
rather at the heart of what the Tribunal is doing’ ([103]). He also characterises 
tribunals as offering litigants the opportunity to present their own cases ‘without 
disadvantage’, particularly where the proceedings involve smaller value claims, 
where it has been stated that ‘resolution is not assisted by an adversarial approach’ 
([50]–[51]).
The legislative framework governing tribunals may impose a positive obli-
gation on the parties and their representatives to cooperate with or assist the 
tribunal to give effect to the guiding principle or overall objective. Few statu-
tory schemes governing tribunal procedures provide for a specific obligation in 
this respect. However, the legislation governing the operations of the Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal in New South Wales (NCAT) does articulate the duty 
to cooperate and imposes a requirement on parties to participate in the processes 
of the tribunal.7 Case law and commentary both make clear that the duty to 
cooperate with NCAT is not considered in a vacuum, but rather in the context of 
giving effect to the mandate of the tribunal and as inherently tied to facilitating 
the overall guiding principle of ‘just, quick and cheap’.8 The duty to cooperate 
may also be relevant to the determination of orders for costs (Maiolo v Chiarelli 
(No 2) [2016] NSWCATAP 219 [30]).9
However, the procedural flexibility and freedom from the rules of evidence 
vested in tribunals by statute is usually explicitly subject to adherence to the 
principles of procedural fairness. As outlined in an NCAT decision, the guiding 
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principle ‘does not gainsay in any way the right to be accorded procedural fairness’ 
(Su v Public Guardian [2014] NSWCATAP 32 [25]). The tribunal expressed 
a similar sentiment in Amad El Ahmad v Imelda Reyes ([2015] NSWCATAP 
50 [32]), stating,
The Tribunal is required to comply with natural justice and to ensure that 
parties have a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal has not been 
established to operate in the same way as a court. However, while it must 
facilitate quick and inexpensive resolution of the real issues, it must do this 
in a just manner, which requires adherence to the principles of procedural 
fairness, which, in the circumstances of this case, meant allowing cross-exam-
ination of the applicant.
Ultimately, the restatement of the three dimensions of just, quick and cheap in 
conducting tribunal proceedings does not resolve how to accommodate these 
aspects. Despite the latitude tribunals have to determine their own procedures 
to enable a speedy and cost-effective resolution, the fairness of the procedures 
adopted still needs to be established.
12.3  The role of tribunals in supporting participation
A range of legislative provisions impose on tribunals a requirement to take certain 
measures to assist parties to understand the proceedings in which they are involved. 
Different statutory schemes frame the obligation in different ways. In some jurisdic-
tions it may not be explicit in the governing legislation,10 but could form part of a 
tribunal’s practices. The taking of reasonable measures might be directed to ensur-
ing that the parties understand the nature of the proceedings11or the nature of the 
matter under consideration.12 In some legislative schemes it includes helping the 
parties to understand the nature and legal implications of any assertions made by 
parties before the tribunal,13 or providing an explanation where requested to do so.14
The threshold question is, what is the scope of the legislative obligation? If the 
legislation is worded as relating to an understanding of the nature of the proceed-
ings, the scope of the obligation will depend on how ‘proceedings’ is defined. If 
the legislation defines ‘proceedings’ in a way that restricts it to the conduct of 
hearings, then the obligation may not arise unless there is an actual hearing, as 
opposed to some less formal process that disposes of the matter, such as a case 
conference or mediation. Some provisions have a broader reach, as they extend 
the obligation not only to proceedings, but also to an understanding of the 
‘practices and procedures of the tribunal’ (Queensland Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s29). In addition to the question of the contexts in 
which the duty might arise, there is the secondary question of the nature of 
the obligation itself. Most of the statutory provisions refer to measures that are 
reasonably practicable, or to the taking of reasonable steps. Others frame the 
obligation more broadly by using the terminology of ‘all reasonable steps’ and 
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the concept of ‘ensuring proper understanding and regard’ (Queensland Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s29). Thirdly, the obligation to 
explain to the parties any aspect of the tribunal’s procedures arises in a number of 
jurisdictions only where requested to do so.
In reviewing the various statutory frameworks, the Queensland legislative 
scheme appears the most comprehensive regarding a tribunal’s mandate to sup-
port parties to understand its practices and procedures, as well as the nature of the 
matter to which they are a party. Wilson (2013) described the Queensland Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) as planning to be ‘actively fair’ from its 
inception (p. 131). The obligation is expressed in Section 29 of the Queensland 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) in mandatory 
language whereby the tribunal must take all reasonable steps to:
 (a) ensure each party to a proceeding understands—
 (i) the practices and procedures of the tribunal; and
 (ii) the nature of assertions made in the proceeding and the legal implica-
tions of the assertions; and
 (iii) any decision of the tribunal relating to the proceeding; and
 (b) understands the actions, expressed views and assertions of a party to or wit-
ness in the proceeding, having regard to the party’s or witness’s age, any 
disability, and cultural, religious and socioeconomic background.
Framing the statutory obligation in this manner establishes an explicit responsi-
bility to ensure that parties understand all the procedural aspects as well as the 
implications of what happens in any proceedings. But, as Matthew Groves (2011) 
argues, this does not ‘oblige tribunals to assume control of, or responsibility for, 
the conduct of a party’s application’ (p. 184). The QCAT Act further requires the 
QCAT principal registrar to,
give parties and potential parties reasonable help to ensure their understand-
ing of the tribunal’s practices and procedures, including, for example, reason-
able help to complete forms required under this Act or the rules (Section 30).
While the scope of statutory provisions such as Section 29 of the QCAT Act can 
be viewed through the lens of what would assist a self-represented party to under-
stand the legal implications of tribunal proceedings, it is also open to a broader 
view. For example, in Lida Build Pty Ltd v Miller ([2010] QCAT 17 [6]), the 
tribunal described the obligation inherent in Section 29 as follows:
While this provision largely reflects and embodies what the courts have said 
in recent years is the nature of the duty owed by the judicial system to, at 
least, self-represented litigants, it also suggests that parties to proceedings before 
this Tribunal will receive, and have an entitlement to expect, assistance with the 
legal implications of the issues in the case [my emphasis].15
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The notion that parties are entitled to expect assistance clearly places an obliga-
tion on the tribunal to actively assist the parties. Without such assistance the like-
lihood of a party having an opportunity to participate in a meaningful way may 
be diminished. But tribunals have not regarded all failures in terms of information 
provision as automatically leading to a breach of this obligation.16
The comparable obligations in Section 38(5) of the Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (‘CAT Act’) are framed around taking such measures 
as are reasonably practicable:
 (a) to ensure that the parties to the proceedings before it understand the nature 
of the proceedings, and
 (b) if requested to do so—to explain to the parties any aspect of the procedure 
of the Tribunal, or any decision or ruling made by the Tribunal, that relates 
to the proceedings, and
 (c) to ensure that the parties have a reasonable opportunity to be heard or oth-
erwise have their submissions considered in the proceedings.
The CAT Act also provides in relation to matters dealt with in the consumer or 
commercial division, that the tribunal will have regard to ‘the extent to which the 
party is familiar with the procedures of the Tribunal’ and ‘the party’s capacity to 
understand, and act on, a direction of the Tribunal’ in determining whether the 
conduct of a party ‘unreasonably disadvantages another party in the proceedings’ 
(Schedule 4, Part 5, Section 10(3)(a)–(b)).
The obligation to take reasonable measures to ensure that the parties have an 
opportunity to be heard, or otherwise have their submissions considered in the 
proceedings, encapsulates what is generally considered to be covered by the fair 
hearing rule. However, that is only one of the dimensions specified in the CAT 
Act. It imposes additional requirements, by extending the mandatory obliga-
tion to include taking all reasonable steps to ensure that parties understand the 
nature of the proceedings and to provide an explanation of the procedures where 
requested to do so. A good example that illustrates how these additional aspects 
operate is the decision of ZDU v ZDV ([2017] NSWCATAP 197). The appellant 
(ZDU) successfully appealed a decision of the NCAT Guardianship Division on 
the basis that the tribunal in the first instance failed to comply with its obliga-
tions as set out above. The Panel’s reasons for allowing the appeal are extracted 
at length below:
As directed by s 38(5)(a) of the CAT Act, the Tribunal must take such meas-
ures that are reasonably practicable to ensure that parties understand ‘the 
nature of the proceedings’. Self-evidently, without such understanding, a 
party will be unable to make submissions about the key issues that arise for 
determination in the proceedings. It follows, that unless the Tribunal has com-
plied with its obligations under s 38(5)(a) of the CAT Act, there is a risk it 
might also fail to comply with its obligation under s 38(5)(c) of the CAT Act to 
ensure that the parties have a reasonable opportunity to be heard … However, 
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we believe the primary cause for concern was the limited nature of the measures 
taken by the Tribunal to ensure that ZDU and ZEF, both unrepresented par-
ties, understood the nature of the proceedings in which they were involved … 
The particular circumstances of this matter were that: ZDU and ZEF were 
unrepresented; they were in a spousal relationship; and both were opposed 
to the making of a financial management order. Given these circumstances, the 
Tribunal was obliged to take reasonably practical measures to ensure that ZDU 
and ZEF understood the nature of the proceedings. They were obliged to take steps 
to ensure that ZDU and ZEF were aware that the issue of who could be appointed 
as ZDU’s financial manager if an order was to be made was a live issue in the 
proceedings so that each had an opportunity to be heard on this critical matter. 
([44], [47], [49], [51], [53]–[54], emphasis added)
An interesting aspect of the ZDU v ZDV decision is the reference to the inter-
relationship between ensuring the parties have an understanding of the proceed-
ings and ensuring a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The decision indicates 
that a failure to provide for the former also potentially puts at risk the latter 
requirement. At the same time, it acknowledges that both are distinct statutory 
obligations. Hence, the duty to ensure a level of understanding can be seen as a 
stand-alone obligation, and not simply as part of the fair hearing rule. It is some-
thing more than a requirement that a decision-maker must ‘hear’ a person before 
making a decision affecting their interests (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 
585). It is also an obligation to ensure a level of understanding that will facilitate 
their opportunity to be heard.
It is possible to view this decision as confined to the situation where persons 
are self-represented, as a result of which their circumstances warrant special atten-
tion to their understanding of what the proceedings involve and what orders 
are at risk of being made. However, the legislative framing of the obligations is 
not confined to the circumstances of self-represented persons. Moreover, even 
though the situation of self-represented individuals may necessitate a higher duty, 
this does not detract from the imposition of the obligation more generally with 
respect to all parties. Unless the statutory framing of the duty restricts its opera-
tion in some way, the requirement that a tribunal help parties understand the 
proceedings is an obligation that applies to all parties.
What this analysis confirms is that the obligation on tribunals to support the 
participation of parties is not a passive one, especially where the enabling statutes 
of tribunals are relatively comprehensive in terms of the nature and extent of the 
obligation to help parties understand the proceedings. Parties need to be actively 
supported not only in comprehending the steps involved in reaching a resolution, 
but also in developing an understanding of what is actually involved in pursuing 
or defending a claim, how to go about identifying the real issues in the dispute, 
and how to determine the most appropriate dispute resolution pathway for their 
situation. It necessitates a type and level of interaction between a party and the 
tribunal that facilitates a party’s understanding of the conduct of the proceedings 
and the legal implications that arise.
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While the statutory provisions and case law referred to above acknowledge 
the importance of facilitating this participation, in practice few tribunals are set 
up or resourced to service these needs. Some institutions attempt to fill the gap 
through the provision of guidance materials in on-line and other forms. While 
this might be cost-effective, it is doubtful that such materials would assist indi-
viduals with little prior exposure to tribunals to develop a full understanding of 
the nature of the proceedings or an understanding of how to frame their claim in 
such a manner that a legal authority is likely to be receptive. The Law Council of 
Australia’s Report on the Justice Project (2018) stated,
the capacity of courts and tribunals to resolve matters both swiftly and fairly 
is hampered by insufficient resources in the face of increasing demand for ser-
vices … [and that] … sufficient resources and sustainable funding, coupled 
with active case management and triage, are necessary for courts and tribu-
nals to efficiently process disputes and provide a fair outcome to participants. 
(p. 4)
The Report makes mention of the critical under-resourcing of courts and tri-
bunals as a ‘false economy’ and as contributing to ‘expensive societal problems 
over the long term’ (p. 10). The Report also recorded the Council’s observa-
tion that ‘involvement of legal practitioners in certain tribunal proceedings can 
significantly enhance the efficiency and fairness of proceedings and improve 
the participant’s experience’ (p. 4). Hence, the continual emphasis on the 
ability of individuals to self-navigate the system and on limiting legal repre-
sentation in tribunal proceedings may in fact be counterproductive in some 
circumstances. While one State Attorney-General has proudly described the 
tribunal operating in that state as a ‘lean, mean, justice machine’ (Queensland, 
Parliamentary Debates 2013, p. 1314) such ‘leanness’ runs the risk of impact-
ing adversely on the opportunity parties have for input into how their dispute 
is resolved.
12.4  Competing values and approaches
The standard approach to reconciling the three dimensions of quick, cheap and 
just is the adoption of a balancing approach. Courts and tribunals have recog-
nised that the objectives of speed, efficiency and fairness may give rise to tension, 
because a mechanism that is ‘economical, informal and quick’ may well not be 
fair or just.17 A common response to seeking to resolve this tension is the bal-
ancing approach. The Hon Michael Black AC QC, former Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court of Australia, articulates this approach using a mixture of references 
to perfection, fairness and justice in the following terms:
We should maintain the search for that elusive point of equilibrium at which 
the competing pulls of cost, speed, perfection and fairness are balanced in 
a way that produces substantial and accessible justice—not perfection, but 
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nevertheless processes and outcomes readily recognisable as substantial jus-
tice according to law. 
(Michael Black quoted in Productivity Commission 
Inquiry Report No.72 2014 p. 14, my emphasis)
This attempt at balancing competing considerations is regularly adopted in the 
decision-making of tribunals and by appellate courts evaluating the procedural 
practices of other legal institutions. For example, a decision by QCAT stated that 
there needs to be a balance between ‘the obligation to provide procedural fair-
ness with the tribunal’s obligation to deal with matters economically and quickly’ 
(Jennifer D Keen Pty Ltd t/as Brides of Brisbane v Barkhuizen [2013] QCATA 
224, [7]). The tribunal justified the approach on the basis that
resources for the resolution of disputes are in high demand and serve, as the 
High Court has recently observed in relation to court resources … the public 
as a whole, not merely the parties to the proceedings. 
(at [7])
Similarly, in considering whether a refusal to adjourn a hearing could constitute 
a failure to give a party an opportunity to present their case, NCAT has acknowl-
edged that
essential to a just resolution to proceedings it is also necessary to minimize 
delay and expense [and that] the achievement of a just but timely and cost-
effective resolution of a dispute has effects not only upon the parties to the 
dispute but upon the court and other litigants. 
(El-Saeidy v NSW Land and Housing Corporation 
[2016] NSWCATAP 155[40])
In other proceedings, NCAT concluded that its duty to ensure that a party has 
a reasonable opportunity to present its case did not extend to acceding to every 
application for evidence to be admitted out of time, where the effect of granting 
the request would necessitate setting aside a further hearing date. It stated:
The Tribunal’s broad inquisitorial powers do not impose upon it an obliga-
tion to inquire into every matter a party asserts might be relevant to the facts 
in issue. The duty of the Tribunal is to ensure that a party is given a reason-
able opportunity to present its case. That duty does not extend to acceding 
to every application for evidence to be admitted out of time, which a party 
believes might assist the Tribunal’s knowledge of its case. One of the direc-
tives in s 73 is that the Tribunal act as quickly as possible. The practical effect 
of granting this application would have been to require a further hearing day 
to be set aside. 
(Battenberg v The Union Club [2004] NSW ADT 
285 [23]–[24])
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A landmark case in this area is the High Court of Australia’s decision in AON 
Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University ([2009] HCA 
27) (‘Aon’) where the court took a strong stand with respect to a late applica-
tion to amend pleadings in a litigated matter. It adopted an approach that had 
regard to the public interest and the interests of litigants in other cases waiting 
for their matters to be heard that might be affected by a further adjournment of 
the matter, and to the community interest in the efficient use of court resources. 
The court followed its earlier approach in Sali v SPC Ltd ((1993) 116 ALR 625) 
where Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ stated:
What might be perceived as an injustice to a party when considered only in 
the context of an action between parties may not be so when considered in a 
context which includes the claims of other litigants and the public interest in 
achieving the most efficient use of court resources. 
(p. 629)
In declining to allow the late application to amend the pleadings, the High Court 
observed:
Where a party has had a sufficient opportunity to plead his or her case, it may 
be necessary for the court to make a decision which may produce a sense of 
injustice in that party, for the sake of doing justice to the opponent and to 
other litigants. 
([94])
The inaugural President of QCAT attributes this broader notion of whose inter-
ests are relevant as being propelled by
the growth in individual rights, and increasing pressure from the Executive 
and Parliament upon courts and tribunals to be ‘productive’ in the sense 
that more services are to be provided to more citizens, but at lesser cost to 
society. 
(Wilson 2013, p. 132)
In framing this approach, the President referenced the work of Les Arthur (2011), 
who states:
While justice on the merits fits well with formal access to justice, which 
regards justice as a commodity to enforce an essentially individualistic phi-
losophy of rights, it is unable to give practical effect to the widespread vindi-
cation of legal rights … Recognition of the limited resources available for the 
delivery of civil justice means that in order to achieve overriding objectives, 
community interests in the administration of justice must transcend partisan 
interests. 
(p. 241)
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Arthur does acknowledge that the contemporary formulation of the statutory 
mandate of courts and tribunals ‘requires balancing justice with efficiency, not 
the wholesale replacement of justice by efficiency’ (p. 246). Along similar lines, 
the case of Amad El Ahmad t/as Cars for Everyone v Imelda Reyes ([2015] 
NSWCATAP 50), an NCAT decision on whether a refusal to allow an applicant 
the opportunity to cross-examine the respondent amounted to a denial of proce-
dural fairness, included the following observation by an Appeal Panel that
speed must be tempered by the requirements of fairness. Focussing on time-
liness or the potential problems posed by unpreparedness to the exclusion of 
fairness is not mandated by section 36. 
([27])
The prevailing approach to balancing appears to be that the broader interest in 
the administration of the civil justice system should be taken into account, in 
a way that extends the balancing approach beyond the interests of the parties 
themselves. Balance of this kind could be determined by factors that pertain to 
broader economic considerations and bear little relation to the circumstances of 
the parties themselves or their substantive claim.18 A party may feel a justifiable 
sense of injustice when it is not the balance between the parties that is determina-
tive, but instead involves considering other factors extraneous to their dispute, for 
example, the efficient use of court resources and the cost to the community as a 
whole of certain procedural safeguards.
The balancing approach is also open to criticism on the basis that the weigh-
ing of the various considerations and their reconciling can be highly subjec-
tive. Academic commentary has pointed to the fact that speed and efficiency on 
the one hand, and fairness and justice on the other, have been given different 
weight by judges in superior courts’ reviews of tribunal processes (Creyke 2006, 
pp. 17–18). Creyke gives the example of the High Court’s approach in SAAP 
v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ((2005) 
215 ALR 162), where the decision at a hearing to give oral rather than written 
notice of material adverse to the claim, was criticised by the majority as under-
mining a just approach. However, the dissenting judges found that written notice 
would have been pointless in the circumstances, and that the objective of the 
hearing was ‘to hear evidence and receive arguments in the most useful and effi-
cient manner’ (Crekye 2006, p. 21). In addition, Courts have accepted that in 
some contexts the fairness dimension can be diminished to ‘nothingness’ by the 
circumstances in which a statutory power is exercised.19 However, a reduction of 
this type will not occur unless there is a clear statutory direction to this effect. 
Finally, some of the case law lends itself to an interpretation that there is a blur-
ring of the distinction between procedural and substantive fairness in some cases, 
evidenced by judicial observations to the effect that adopting a particular process 
would not have made any difference to the actual outcome.
If one looks at the way in which the High Court in Aon referred to doing jus-
tice in the broader sense of what serves the public interest in the administration of 
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justice, it was qualified by the notion that ‘a party has had a sufficient opportunity 
to plead his or her case’. It is important to give this qualification due weight. This 
could be construed as suggesting that where a party has had a genuine oppor-
tunity to have an input into the process, then it is possible to take into account 
other factors, such as the effect on the tribunal operations and on other litigants 
waiting to have their disputes dealt with in deciding whether to allow a late appli-
cation to amend the pleadings. Using this approach, the opportunity that the par-
ties were afforded to engage in a meaningful way in the processes is a precursor 
to considering those broader factors. It would then follow that without the initial 
provision of the opportunity for the parties to have input into the process, factors 
such as speed or efficiency do not have a role to play. This is because affording the 
opportunity for participation is a fundamental requirement that cannot simply be 
‘balanced’ away to meet the need for speed and efficiency.
A participation-centred approach is justified by relational approaches to justice 
according to which an individual’s self-identity and sense of self-respect are shaped 
by the nature of the interpersonal interactions they have with institutions such 
as legal authorities (Meyerson & Mackenzie 2018, p. 8). Studies in psychology 
have established that relational factors such as voice, neutrality, dignified treat-
ment, and trustworthiness play an important role in conveying messages of social 
inclusion and that individuals value interpersonal treatment from legal authorities 
that sends a message of equal status or value within a social group (Tyler & Lind 
1992, pp. 140–141; Tyler & Blader 2000, p. 171). Being afforded the oppor-
tunity to have an input into how one’s dispute is resolved has the potential to 
convey that a person is worthy of being heard. It is not simply a matter of how an 
individual subjectively feels about a tribunal’s processes. Processes that convey to 
individuals that they are valued as full participants in society are more likely to be 
regarded as legitimate, which in turn promotes compliance with legal outcomes. 
The argument of this chapter is that it is not possible for messages of equal status 
and value to be conveyed to an individual unless they are afforded the opportu-
nity to have an input into the processes used by tribunals to resolve matters.20
This approach is compatible with the established legal rules used to determine 
whether procedural fairness has been denied in the context of a hearing. The 
classic judicial pronouncements on procedural fairness21 are formulated in terms 
of the key concepts of the hearing rule and the rule against bias. An individual 
does not have the opportunity to participate if there is no opportunity to be heard 
or if the decision-maker is not open to hearing what the person has to say, due, 
for example, to some form of bias or partiality. An approach based on participa-
tion is also capable of dealing with the variety of ways in which tribunals actually 
resolve matters. As outlined earlier, much of the work of tribunals is directed 
to deploying alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution to assist the parties 
to reach a settlement, without the need for a formal hearing of the matter. A 
participation-focused approach can accommodate the different forms of ADR 
that are part of the broad dispute resolution framework of Australian tribunals, 
and allow the fairness of processes to be judged beyond simply the application 
of rules that are constructed around the typical adjudicative process of a formal 
hearing (MacDermott & Meyerson 2018).
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If we accept that participation has a central role to play in assessing tribunal 
procedures, there is then the question of what type or extent of participation 
may be appropriate in a particular factual scenario. Is there some ‘irreducible 
minimum’ that determines the fairness or otherwise of that opportunity? The 
notion of proportionality serves a useful function in this context. Some legislative 
schemes governing tribunals specifically dictate a proportionality approach. By 
way of example, section 36 (4) of the CAT Act states that
the practice and procedure of the Tribunal should be implemented so as to 
facilitate the resolution of the issues between the parties in such a way that 
the cost to the parties and the Tribunal is proportionate to the importance 
and complexity of the subject-matter of the proceedings.
Hence processes could be seen as being on a spectrum that ranges from elabo-
rate procedural safeguards to a form of participation that may, for example, be 
time-limited, judged solely ‘on the papers’, or take place in a truncated form. 
However, utilising the concept of proportionality does not involve balancing 
away the opportunity for participation. It acknowledges participation as a foun-
dational requirement but allows measures to be adopted that take account of, and 
are appropriate for, the nature of the dispute.
Compare a claim for a refund on goods purchased to a guardianship dispute 
where a person’s autonomy to manage their own affairs is in question. In these 
situations, there is scope for crafting different procedural responses and safe-
guards to reflect what is at stake for the parties and what investment of time and 
resources is therefore warranted. However, in both cases initial regard should 
still be paid to the opportunity to participate that is made available to the par-
ties, albeit proportionate to the circumstances. The fact that a claim might be 
regarded as involving a small monetary claim, or an item of low value, does not 
mean it will be simple to resolve (Genn 1993, pp. 393–400). There is a risk of 
over-extending the category of disputes that are regarded as largely transactional 
in nature, simply on the basis of a monetary figure. Moreover, for the individu-
als who are parties to the dispute, the issues at stake for them personally are not 
necessarily defined only in terms of the amount of money claimed. From the per-
spective of the parties, the value of the processes used to resolve a dispute includes 
being afforded the opportunity to have their say and to have their concerns taken 
seriously by a legal institution.
12.5  Conclusion
Civil tribunals exercising jurisdiction over a broad range of subject areas offer a 
context in which to focus on procedural justice that is not subject to the same 
considerations that arise with criminal proceedings. These tribunals are also 
vested with considerable procedural flexibility and the discretion to inform them-
selves in any way they consider appropriate. How they meet the requirement that 
their procedures operate fairly, while subject to the pressures of efficiency and 
affordability, poses an interesting dilemma. A standard response in the tribunal 
266 Therese MacDermott 
context is to see it as a matter of balancing competing considerations, including 
broader considerations beyond the interests of the parties themselves, such as 
those pertaining to the administration of the civil justice system and the needs 
of other litigants. This chapter has argued for an approach that is less concerned 
with seeking to balance competing factors and instead looks first to the opportu-
nity a party was afforded to participate in the process, before factors of cost and 
timeliness come into play.
Thus, this chapter has argued that from the perspective of relational justice, 
participation is the pivotal factor in understanding how legal institutions that are 
designed to offer affordable and timely justice can operate fairly. The informal-
ity with which tribunals are meant to operate is premised on the notion that 
parties are able to navigate the processes without requiring legal representation 
and that individuals can successfully advocate on their own behalf. This makes 
the participation of parties of primary importance. This is reinforced by the fact 
that many tribunals are required by statute to be actively engaged in helping par-
ties to understand the nature of the proceedings, and thereby to facilitate that 
participation. However, to fulfil this important function, tribunals need to be 
appropriately resourced. Finally, enabling individuals to have an input into how 
legal institutions such as tribunals resolve disputes, can have a positive influence 
on how individuals view the interactions they have with such authorities. This in 
turn can build legitimacy in the operation of such institutions and the trust and 
confidence vested in them.
Notes
1 Research for this chapter was funded by the Australian Research Council’s 
Discovery Project funding scheme (DP1701009600: ‘A Relational Theory of 
Procedural Justice’).
2 See Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Section 38, Queensland 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) Section 28; Victorian Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) Section 98; Northern Territory 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) Section 53; South Australian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) Sections 39 and 43; ACT Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) Section 23; State Administrative 
Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) Sections 9 and 32.
3 Robin Creyke describes the inquisitorial process of European based civil proceed-
ings as ‘where the adjudicator takes an active role in identifying witnesses and 
seeking out the evidence before reaching a conclusion’ (Creyke 2006, p. 17).
4 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 
611; KO v Commissioner of Police [2004] NSWADT 3; Chand v Rail Corporation 
of New South Wales (EOD) [2007] NSWADTAP 54. See also Smyth (2010) p. 241.
5 See for example Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 3 Section 37.
6 See Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 75. Victorian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 88; Northern Territory Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 118; South Australian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act Section 51; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
Act Sections 31 and 35; State Administrative Tribunal Act Section 54.
7 See New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 36(3). This 
is also present in the legislation applicable to civil proceedings more generally. See 
for example, Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) Section 56(3)–(4).
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8 See Edmondson Rural Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon [2017] NSWCATAP 155 [3]; 
Shirley Ford v Conrad Meder t/as Brian's Autoscreens & Glass [2014] NSWCATCD 
156 [18]; Woodhouse v Thalis [2017] NSWCATAD 260 [43].
9 See also John Maiolo t/as M & N Peninsular Kitchens & Joinery v Chiarelli [2017] 
NSWSC 982 [51].
10 See for example, the operations of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
and the Federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
11 See Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 38(5)(a)–(b); South Australian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunals Act Section 43(1)(c); State Administrative 
Tribunal Act Section 32(6)(b); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal Act Section 54(c); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 
Sections 29–30.
12 See South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunals Act Section 43(1)(a); 
Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 54(a).
13 See South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunals Act Section 43(1)(b); 
State Administrative Tribunal Act Section 32(6)(a); Northern Territory Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act Section 54(b); Queensland Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal Act Section 29(1)(a)(ii).
14 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 38(5)(b). Northern Territory Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 54; State Administrative Tribunal Act 
Section 32; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act Section 43.
15 See also Thorne v Toowoomba Regional Council & Tytherleigh [2017] QCATA 
128 [15]–[22].
16 See for example, Cox Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Burns [2015] QCATA 
9 where the QCAT Appeal Panel noted that where a party failed to appear in a 
matter on the basis of advice allegedly provided by the QCAT 1300 telephone 
information service, that issue did not constitute a failure of the tribunal’ 
Section 29 obligations.
17 See for example, Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
(1997) 81 FCR 71; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu 
(1999) 197 CLR 611, 643.
18 The problem of a balancing approach not giving due weigh to a party’s substan-
tive rights is considered by Denise Meyerson (Chapter 7) in this volume.
19 See also Johnson (1985), p. 71.
20 The claim that there is a normative requirement on institutions to establish pro-
cesses that express respect for citizens is explored in more detail in the contribu-
tions to this volume by Ceva (Chapter 8), Mackenzie (Chapter 9), and Stoljar 
(Chapter 10).
21 See Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 
596; Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564; Minister for 
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273.
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